





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HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. III.



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CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE FALL OF ANTWERP TO THE BATTLE OF THE YSER.

THE SITUATION OCTOBER 9—THE RETREAT OF THE BELGIANS FROM ANTWERP—THE ADVANCE OF THE ENGLISH—THE BELGIAN RETREAT TO OSTEND AND THE FRENCH FRONTIER—GERMAN OCCUPATION OF GHENT, BRUGES, OSTEND—THE FLIGHT TO ENGLAND AND FRANCE—GERMAN MISTAKES—THEIR POSSIBLE EXPLANATION—WANT OF ACCURATE INFORMATION—FAILURE OF THE GERMAN CAVALRY—THEIR AEROPLANE SERVICE—THE GERMAN GAINS.

BY October 9, the date of the fall of Antwerp and the day before the bombardment of Lille, the army of General de Castelnau, with General Brugère's Territorial Divisions, stretched across the Plain of the Somme from the region of Compiègne to the heights north of that river. Castelnau's left wing rested on the Ancre west of Bapaume. Upon the hills northward between the Ancre and the Plain of the Scheldt, as far as the region of Béthune, were disposed the troops forming the army of General de Maud'huy, a detachment of which in the centre held Arras at the edge of the plain. Since October 6 that city had been bombarded by the enemy. Facing Maud'huy's Army (the 10th) extended a line of Germans forming a continuous crescent from the region of Bapaume to La Bassée. The left wing of this body held high ground between the Plains of the Somme and the Scheldt. The centre was in the Plain of the Scheldt west of Douai; the right wing passed east of Lens through Loison to La Bassée on the Canal St. Omer-Aire-La Bassée-Lille. This canal enters the canalised river Aa a little to the south of St. Omer. At Watten, five miles

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to the north of St. Omer, it meets a canal which runs eastward—through Furnes—to Nieuport and thence into the Canal de Ghent between Ostend and Bruges.

From Watten the Aa flows past Gravelines to the North Sea. It meets the Canal de Calais going west, and next, from the east, another canal, which enters the sea at Dunkirk.

The Canal de Calais, the canalised Aa, and the portion of the Canal St. Omer-Aire-Béthune-La Bassée-Lille which lies between St. Omer and Béthune skirt the hilly district extending from the south of Calais to the south of Arras. Together these waterways formed a deep ditch in front of the low rampart of hills which from Calais to Péronne barred the advance of the Germans to the English Channel. The army of General d'Urbal, to whose support the Cavalry Corps, the III. and the II. Corps of the British Expeditionary Force* were being rapidly transported, held both banks of the ditch and also the line of the canal which from Watten runs south of Dunkirk through Furnes and

* To facilitate reference the British Army Corps are numbered thus: I., II., III., IV., &c.; the divisions and brigades 1st, 2nd, 3rd, &c.



MAJ.-GEN. THE HON. JULIAN BYNG.

Nieuport to the Canal de Ghent. But d'Urbal's Army, on October 9, was only in process of formation.

Further to the east was Lieut.-General Sir Henry Rawlinson with the 7th Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division. They had disembarked between October 6 and 8 at Ostend and Zeebrugge. On the 10th the 3rd Cavalry Division under Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng was south of Bruges, round Thourout and Ruddervoorde. The task of Sir Henry Rawlinson was to prevent the Germans, who had crossed the Lys west of Ghent, seizing Bruges and Ostend and cutting the retreat of the Belgian Army and its British auxiliaries retiring from Antwerp on Bruges, Ostend and Nieuport.

One by one the national defences of Belgium against an invasion from the east had fallen into the possession of the Germans. First had been lost the Meuse and the Ardennes, then the Dyle and the Senne, next the Dendre and the Scheldt, and now the Lys. In the oblong plain, roughly 60 miles by 30 miles, which is bounded by the Lys from Aire to Ghent, by the canal from Ghent to Zeebrugge, by the sea from Zeebrugge to Calais, and by the canal and the canalised Aa from Calais to Aire, the Germans had occupied Ypres, the long, narrow ridge of hills to the south-west of it, and Bailleul. Their

outposts were close to Hazebrouck and Cassel, and they were advancing up both banks of the Lys from Armentières towards Aire; they held the bridges and fords of the river between Courtrai and Merville and even further west.

South of the Lys and between it and the Scheldt the Germans were surrounding and about to bombard Lille, sternly defended by French Territorials.


This and the next chapter deal chiefly with the important movements between October 9 and 20. During this period the Germans pursued the Belgian Army through Ghent, Bruges and Ostend to the line of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude, and they succeeded in capturing Lille. But, at the same time, General d'Urbal's Army (the 8th), which was daily growing in numbers, and the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps, with the assistance of the IV. Corps—*i.e.*, the forces under Sir Henry Rawlinson—drove the Germans east of Ypres.

The oblong Aire-Ghent-Zeebrugge-Calais is divided into two more or less equal sections by the canal from Comines on the Lys to Ypres, by the canal from Ypres to the Yser, and by the canalised Yser through Dixmude to its mouth at Nieuport Bains. The Germans were expelled from the western section of this oblong and from a part of the eastern section. South of the oblong, in the "Black Country" of France, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, with the II. Corps, and General Conneau's Cavalry Corps pushed the Germans some distance back towards Lille between the Lys and the Aire-Béthune-La Bassée-Lille Canal, and the armies of Maud'huy and Castelnau continued their struggle with the Germans from Béthune to Compiègne.

Meanwhile Hindenburg in the Eastern Theatre of War, after his defeat on the Niemen at the battle of Augustovo (September 25 to October 3), had advanced on Warsaw, and in South Africa, on October 13, Maritz raised the standard of revolt.

Of the above events in the Western Theatre of War, the first to be described will be the retirement of the Belgian Army from Antwerp to Nieuport and the line of the Yser.

Antwerp, "the pistol aimed at the heart of England," as Napoleon had called it, was in the grasp of the mailed fist, but so long as the Kaiser respected the neutrality of Holland he could not load and fire the weapon he had filched.



GENERAL MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS FROM OCTOBER 9 TO OCTOBER 20.



LILLE.

Nevertheless, the capture of Antwerp—held by the ignorant to be impregnable—was not without influence, especially in Germany, where even the bombardment of an open seaside town in England is regarded as a notable military operation. Antwerp had long been coveted by German captains of industry, like Herr Ballin: German capital had been largely invested there and, before the Great War, it was fast assuming the appearance of a German port. Whether it was the fall of Antwerp that decided Beyers and De Wet to start their abortive rebellion in South Africa may be a moot point; but it is certain that this success put fresh life into the German forces in Europe.

It was an excellent augury for the impending marches on Warsaw and Calais. Also, it again enabled the German commanders on the Oise and Aisne to look forward to the resumption of the march on Paris.

So long as Antwerp was in Belgian hands, the German communications back through Liège were perpetually menaced. For the two towns were only sixty miles apart—*i.e.*, roughly four days' march—so that if the Allied force at the former place was materially strengthened it would need no great effort to thrust Beseler back on Liège or beyond. Then not only would the whole of the German communications through Liège have been cut, but those south

of Liège through the Ardennes would have been rendered precarious.

While Ostend and Zeebrugge were Belgian ports, and the line of the canal from Ostend through Bruges to Ghent and the line of the Scheldt from Ghent to Antwerp were held by the Allies, the Belgian Army in Antwerp might be rapidly reinforced either from Great Britain or from France by the railways and roads along the French coast to Dunkirk. From Dunkirk a single-line railroad ran through Furnes and Dixmude to Thourout; through Thourout passed the double-line railroad* from Courtrai to Ostend and the single-line railway from Ypres to Bruges. Steam tramways joined Furnes and Dixmude to Ostend, and, until the Germans occupied Hazebrouck and Ypres, troops could be transported from St. Omer, without going north to Dunkirk, through Ypres and Thourout to Bruges. There were also, of course, plenty of highways on which men and material could be carried by auto-omnibus, that new and useful military vehicle, from France to Ostend or Bruges.

The German Staff had, therefore, to face the possibility, or rather probability, of the areas between the Dutch frontier and the Canal de Ghent and the Scheldt, between

* The line between Courtrai and Thourout was single

the Lys and the North Sea, being suddenly filled with armies from England or France. From Antwerp those armies could be directed on Liège, Brussels, Namur. Lastly, as a springing-off point for air-raids on Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen and the cities of Westphalia the country round Antwerp would be invaluable to the Allies.

By the capture of Antwerp and by holding Brussels and Liège the Germans opposed a strong barrier across the road to the Rhine.

But, though the Germans had taken Antwerp, crossed the Scheldt between Ghent and Antwerp, and forced a portion of the Belgian and British troops on to Dutch soil, the remainder of the Allied forces had reached the line Ghent-Selzaete in good order. There was a chance that the German forces which had occupied Ypres on October 3 and had spread out towards Hazebrouck might move from Ypres to Bruges and Ostend and cut off the retreating Belgians and British at those points. To provide for this contingency, Lord Kitchener, as mentioned, had dispatched Sir Henry Rawlinson with the 7th Infantry Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division to Ostend and Bruges. Between Ypres and the canal connecting Ostend with Bruges was no serious natural obstacle to delay the German movements, and

oops alone could stop a German advance in force. On the 9th—the day after Sir John French's interview with General Foch at Doullens—the Cavalry Division, under Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng, concentrated at Bruges, where it was joined by a detachment of armoured motor-cars. The next day, the 10th, it moved towards Ypres, the 6th Cavalry Brigade to Thourout, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade to Ruddervoorde. The day after the armoured motor-cars "drew first blood," capturing two officers and five men in the direction of Ypres. On the 12th the Division held a line stretching through Roulers from Oostnieuwkerke on the west to Iseghem on the east. From Roulers a canal runs to the Lys. During the next day the Cavalry reconnoitred towards Ypres and Menin, while the 7th Infantry Division reached Roulers. At 9 a.m. on the 14th Byng's Cavalry entered Ypres, which had already been occupied by Franco-British troops on the 13th; Byng was followed by the Infantry of the 7th Division.


Three days before (October 11), as will be related elsewhere, the II. Corps (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's) had commenced its march south

of the Lys from the Aire-Béthune Canal to turn the position of the Germans at La Bassée. The French Cavalry Corps of General Conneau was to his left; on Conneau's left—round Hazebrouck—was the III. Corps (General Pulteney's), and beyond them, to the north, the Cavalry Corps (General Allenby's). The Cavalry Corps had captured the western end of the ridge to the south-west of Ypres. On Ypres itself the 87th and 89th French Territorial Divisions, commanded by General Bidon, had been directed by General d'Urbal.*

Thus any German intention of marching from Ypres on Bruges had been frustrated by the advance of Rawlinson from Bruges on Ypres, combined as it was with the movement eastward of d'Urbal's and Sir John French's Armies from the line Dunkirk-Béthune. In the next chapter that movement will be narrated in detail.

In the meantime the Belgian and British troops who evacuated Antwerp had halted round Ghent. They were threatened by the German forces at Lokeren, north of the Scheldt, and at

* "When I arrived in the Nord I found in all two divisions of Territorials and some Cavalry."—GENERAL D'URBAL.



THE BELGIAN WAR OFFICE.
Villa Louis XIV. at St. Adresse, near Havre.

Alost, on the Dendre, which flows into the Scheldt east of Ghent from the south. A Taube had flown over Ghent and dropped—for a wonder—not a bomb but a proclamation. On the morning of the 9th Uhlans were repulsed by some Belgian cyclists at Quatrecht, but, later in the day, German field artillery opened on what remained of the village of Melle, which three weeks before had been visited by the Kaiser's professional incendiaries. Quatrecht and Melle were south of the Scheldt and east of the Lys.

By 5 p.m. the Belgian artillery was overpowered and withdrawn, and a column of German infantry pushed forward. Passing under a long railway bridge they were mown down by some Belgians in ambush.

Nor was that the end of the Belgian successes. Batteries of quick-firing guns had been quietly brought up into positions from which they could enfilade the German guns. Suddenly they opened fire and the hostile batteries were put out of action. More guns were moved forward by the enemy, and at midnight the Germans renewed the battle. Finally, in the early hours of the morning of October 10 the Belgians marched through Melle, fired on the Landsturm troops entrenched in the fields to the east of the village, and charged them with the bayonet. The Germans fled, losing heavily in dead, wounded and prisoners.

The next day (Sunday) the people of Ghent spent in peace and at liberty. The streets were filled with refugees. As Ghent and Bruges were to Belgium what Verona and Venice were to Italy, it had been decided to give the demolishers of Louvain and Malines and the bombardiers of Antwerp, Reims, Arras, Lille no excuse for the exercise of their peculiar talents for destruction. Ghent and Bruges were to be left open cities; the town in which Maeterlinck had been born was to be surrendered on the morrow to the followers of the Kaiser.

On Monday, October 12, three German officers in a motor-car drove up to the Hôtel de Ville, and arranged with the Burgomaster for the "peaceful occupation." After the motor-car came some cyclist soldiers, next troops of cavalry. An hour later the German flag was hoisted over the Hôtel de Ville.

From Ghent one body of Germans proceeded to Bruges. Half way between the two cities—at Ursel, to the north of the Canal de Ghent—there was a brief engagement. Another force marched by Thielt towards Thourout and Roulers.

At 2 p.m. on October 14, forty cyclist soldiers rode into Bruges, and some of them tore down the British and French flags from the Hôtel de Ville. Out of derision they left the Belgian flag flying. The "All-highest" had



A BELGIAN FIRING LINE.



FRENCH CITIZENS TAKEN PRISONERS BY THE BAVARIANS.

not proclaimed himself King of Belgium! The day before, at 8.30 a.m., the Belgian Government, the personnel and families of the Ministers, had sailed for Havre; the King and the Minister of War remained behind. To receive the exiled Government the French Minister of Marine had left Bordeaux for Havre. The official announcement was made in the following terms:

The Belgian Government, finding no longer in Belgium the necessary freedom for the full exercise of its authority, asked for the hospitality of France, and indicated a wish to transfer its residence to Havre. The Government of the Republic replied at once that, even as it made no distinction in its solicitude for the Belgian and French Armies, so it would heartily receive the Belgian Government and would assure it full sovereign rights and the complete exercise of its authority and governmental duties.

It had been arranged that the Belgian Government should have the same rights at Havre as were accorded by Italy to the Pope under the Law of Guarantees. The King of the Belgians thanked M. Poincaré:

"We await," he telegraphed, "the hour of mutual victory with unshakable confidence. Fighting side by side for a just goal, our courage will never fail."

The Belgian Prime Minister, M. de Broqueville, at the same time assured M. Viviani that Belgium, who sacrificed everything for

the defence of honesty, honour, and liberty, regretted nothing.

Bruges seized, the Germans rushed on the seaside resorts of Belgium from Ostend, the Monte Carlo of the North Sea, to the picturesque little village of Knocke, with its golf greens. Ostend and Zeebrugge (connected with Bruges by a ship canal) were the termini of the Belgians escaping to England; those flying to France were pouring either along the coast from Ostend through Nieuport and Furnes to Dunkirk, or by the more inland roads.

Never before this war had such sights been seen. Ever since 1870-1 the French, who had then learnt the real nature of those Prussians idolised by Carlyle and his school, had been expecting the Prussians to commit atrocities. But living Belgians as yet had had no experience of Prussian *Kultur* in war-time.

Remembering this fact, picture the scene at Ostend. Of those unable to bear arms, some with stoical resignation were awaiting an invader who at any moment might behave as he had behaved at Louvain, Malines, or Termonde. The remainder, abandoning businesses which they had built up, leaving the posts which assured their livelihoods, snatched up a few clothes and portable objects of value, escaped with their womenfolk and children



A SUSPECTED SPY STOPPED BY GERMANS OUTSIDE BRUSSELS.

from the houses which had sheltered them, leaving their furniture, objects of art, trinkets, books, letters, pictures, portraits, photographs, which meant so much to them, to be stolen, destroyed, or defiled by the German house-breakers. The rich, who had no money invested out of reach of the Germans and their Allies were, unless they had had the prescience to convert their wealth into gold and silver or jewels, reduced to the level of the poor.

On the quays at Ostend, and in the Square fronting the Gare Maritime, were collected old men, women, children, infants in arms, town-folk, farmers, peasants, waiting under the drizzling rain to be shipped in the chilly month of October to an island of whose inhabitants but few spoke French, and hardly any Flemish.

They embarked on trawlers, fishing smacks, even row boats, as well as on steamers. Between dawn and 9 a.m. of October 13 a vast crowd awaited the mail boats. The arrival of the ships was the signal for a frantic rush to board them. Hundreds jumped from the landing stages on to the decks. Children were separated from their mothers; wives from their husbands; the old were trampled on. It was like the

stampede which takes place in a theatre on the cry of "fire."

Overhead flew a German biplane, whose occupants coolly inspected the horrible scene below. After gratifying their curiosity they departed to observe what was happening at Zeebrugge.

When the last boat put off (October 14), the scene was indescribable. Nearly 4,000 persons, mostly women and children, were gathered in and round the boat station. Many of them had tasted neither food nor drink for twenty-four hours. As the boat pushed off there was a wild rush, and several persons were flung forward into the water between the pier and the ship's side and were drowned.

A *Times* correspondent witnessed the heart-breaking spectacle on October 14:

Ostend had a great alarm this morning, and the panic at the time I write is much worse than yesterday.

This morning two mail boats had cleared loaded to the gunwales with a varied human freight, when certain persons among the crowds on the quays forced their way through the struggling mass shouting out that all the remaining vessels in the port had been requisitioned to carry off the wounded soldiers, hundreds of whom had been hurried in from Knocke, Blankenberghe, Coq, and other coast villages between Ostend and the Dutch border, and so save them from falling into the clutches

of the Germans. The alarmists—they were both men and women—added that the enemy had already occupied Bruges, and was marching on Ostend in force. Women fainted, children shrieked, and men ran hither and thither as if possessed. Only when three more steamers drew alongside and the people were permitted to board them without any such formalities as ticket examination and production of passports did the terror abate.

To make matters worse, the familiar Taube made its morning call, and dropped a bomb. This fell in the Rue Peter Bénéit, close to a group of refugees, who scattered in all directions. Luckily no one was injured. To-day practically nobody remains in the hotels, and the shopkeepers are putting up their shutters. Hundreds of wounded—those on the way to recovery—have crossed to England to-day, but a large number remain with few Red Cross people to care for them, and to add to their misery and that of the town in general food has become very scarce.

One of the War Correspondents left for England in a paddle-wheel steam-tug. Normally it took 50; that night it had to accommodate 200 or 300 persons. At 9 p.m. the passengers went on board. There was neither light nor food nor shelter; rain swept in from the sea; a heavy mist penetrated everywhere. Not till 7 a.m. was a start made. Then the pilot remembered that he had left behind him his wife and children. The tug returned and was made fast to a large mud barge. At last, with the pilot's wife and her belongings, which included a pet dog and a canary, they put out again, and it was then discovered that the compass was out of order. Fortunately the sea was calm, and by following another vessel the tug reached Folkestone in safety.

But all could not obtain passages for England. When day broke (October 15) men and women sat shivering on the *Digue*, some reading the following proclamation:

Fellow citizens, countrymen! For two months and a half, at an heroic price, the Belgian soldiers have defended inch by inch their homeland. The enemy counted on the annihilation of our Army, but a retreat carried out in admirable order has, at the same time, wrecked his hopes and assured to us the conservation of our military forces, who will continue to fight to the bitter end for the highest and most just of causes. From now onwards our Army in conjunction with the Allies will operate on the southern frontier. Thanks to this valorous cooperation the triumph of right is certain.

To the sacrifices already made and accepted by the Belgian nation is added another. So as better to bring to naught the designs of the invader the Belgian Government has provisionally established itself in a place where on the one hand it may rest in contact with the Army, and on the other, with the help of France and England, it may better exercise and continue the national sovereignty. That is why it has left Ostend, carrying with it the memory of the warm reception that town extended to it. The Belgian Government goes to Havre, where the noble friendship of the French Republic will permit it at the same time the fullness of its sovereign rights and the complete exercise of its authority and its duty.

This momentary tribulation to which our patriotism ought to yield will have, we are convinced, a prompt revenge. The public services in Belgium will continue

in such measure as the local circumstances may permit. The King and the Government count on the wisdom of your patriotism. On your side count on the ardent devotion, on the valour of our Army, and the help of the Allies to hasten the hour of the common deliverance. Our dear country, so odiously treated by one of the Powers which had sworn to guarantee our neutrality, has excited an astonished admiration throughout the entire world. Thanks to the unanimity, the courage, and the clear-sightedness of all our children, she will remain worthy of that admiration which comforts her to-day. To-morrow she will emerge from her tribulation greater and more beautiful, having suffered for the justice and for the honour of civilization itself.

Long live Belgium. Free and Independent.

A Belgian galloped up shouting: "The Germans are coming. The Germans are coming." A lieutenant and six Uhlans trotted into the central square; behind them was a detachment of twenty cyclists. Half-an-hour later General von der Goltz, the ex-trainer of the Turkish Army, author of "The Nation in Arms," and Governor of Belgium, motored in, and soon after left with the Burgomaster for Bruges. The day afterwards Ostend was filled with German officers and soldiers. The 3rd German Reserve Corps was quartered in or around it, and forty officers of the Staff were feasting at the Hôtel Royal du Phare. Magnums of looted champagne and quarts of stolen Burgundy "lined the centre of the two long tables."



GENERAL MAUD'HUY (right)
Talking to a French officer.



BRITISH TROOPS AT OSTEND.

Simultaneously with the exodus to England by boat, there had been an exodus on foot or on wheels to France. Vehicles of all sorts, crowded with human beings or piled high with their belongings, had been rolling along the muddy, cobbled roads to the French frontier. An endless stream of men, women, and children, soaked to the skin by the incessant rain, some with their clothes reduced to rags, sleeping for the most part in the fields, unfed, unwashed, their feet lacerated by their unwonted exertions, straggled slowly across the border. How many died, how many were crippled for life, how many lost their reason will probably never be known.

Behind, or among the fugitives, marched or rode what remained of the heroic Belgian Army. As early as October 12 the vanguard passed through Furnes. A *Times* correspondent on that day saw it defiling through the streets of the little town.

I have just returned from Furnes, the first town across the Belgian frontier on the road to Ostend. There I met the head of the army. They began to arrive yesterday between 5 and 6 in trains, in trams, and by road, and completely upset the Sunday evening calm of the little town. The people were just trickling out of church, and the priest and his surpliced choir boys were slowly walking in procession across the square when the first transport motor-cars arrived. Then came a Red Cross detachment, a mixed body of soldiers, civilians, and priests, who had come by tram from Ostend; they were followed by the troops themselves, and an hour later the little square with its high crow-stepped gables was crammed with parked automobiles, and a steady stream of infantry, wagons, and guns was moving by in the lamplight.

Most of the troops had marched out of Antwerp three days ago. The town was becoming untenable and a field army could do nothing. "We have done our best," the soldiers kept saying. There was little sign of demoralization among them. The infantry in particular seemed glad to be out of Antwerp, where they were at the mercy of the Germans' big guns, and to have a chance of meeting them again in the open. Fighting is all very well, but sitting in a trench without firing a shot, while 100 lb. shells come shrieking over six or seven miles of country to kill and bury you at the same time, is a depressing occupation. Such, at least, was what the infantry felt, and they were glad to have done with it.

All the coast district from here to Ostend is crowded with refugees who have fled from Antwerp to Ghent, from Ghent to Ostend, and are now making their way into France. The French Consulate at Furnes was besieged by hundreds of people waiting to get their passports *visé*. As the railway is now entirely reserved for military purposes, the roads are black with travellers in every sort of vehicle. Many of them have no fixed idea of where they are going, and move on from place to place wherever they can find beds. Several thousand are stranded at Panne, a little village on the dunes near Furnes, for the sole reason that it is the terminus of a

local tramway, and once there they can get no further without going back the way they came.

Others are going to Calais in order to take the boat to England. Again and again I have been anxiously questioned by poor people about the price of living in England, and as to where it would be best to go. I have assured them that everything would be done to help them in England, and that those who had not friends there already to go to would speedily find them.

A portion of the Belgian Army halted on the Yser and faced the hated foe; the rest retired into France. "You can imagine," wrote a Belgian officer to a friend, "with what grief I crossed the frontier, followed by my squadrons, and left our native soil. I do not even hide from you the fact that I rode ahead of my Staff so that they might not witness my emotion. But let us hope," he added, "that God may give us the happiness to recross it, driving before us these slave-merchants of the twentieth century." Though the uniforms of the Belgian soldiers were caked with mud or soddened with rain, and their boots and gaiters were adhering to their swollen feet, though the plight of Belgian civilians was a miserable one, all alike, from their King downwards to the boy of eleven who was observed riding on a tall horse and smiling to the passers-by, were resolved to assist the French and British now hurrying up to avenge the outrages committed by the "slave-merchants" from beyond the Rhine. But for

a time nine-tenths of Belgium was left to the mercy of her enemies.

Here one criticism may be safely ventured on the German strategy. Before Sir Henry Rawlinson's force landed at Ostend and Zeebrugge there appears to have been nothing but the two French Territorial Divisions and some cavalry round Dunkirk to prevent a German Army crossing the Lys between Ghent and Courtrai and advancing through Roulers and Thourout on Bruges and Ostend. Even after the British IV. Corps (minus the 8th Division which was not yet mobilised) had issued from Bruges, the German leaders, considering the railway and road facilities and the motor traction at their disposal, ought to have been able to concentrate between the Lys and the Belgian coast overwhelming forces. Had they done so and the movement been properly timed, they might have occupied Ostend and Bruges before, or immediately after, the fall of Antwerp. In that case it is difficult to see how the Belgian Army and its British auxiliaries could have escaped destruction or capture.

To have permitted the mass of the Army defending Antwerp to retire to the line Ghent-Selzaete may have been pardonable. Until Antwerp was actually taken the garrison could not be pursued through the city, and to cut



A BELGIAN ARMoured TRAIN.

their retreat by crossing the Scheldt between Antwerp and Ghent in face of desperate troops well supplied with artillery was no light undertaking. But it was a different matter to traverse the undefended Lys and move over the easy country from that river to the environs of Bruges and Ostend.

Two explanations for the strange behaviour of the German General or Generals may be hazarded. They undoubtedly overestimated the numbers of the French troops spread out from Dunkirk to Lens; they may have imagined that Lord Kitchener would pour a much larger force than he actually did into Ostend and Zeebrugge. The overestimate of the French forces resulted from a variety of causes.

One of the chief advantages with which the Germans had started the war had been that the countries invaded by them were swarming with the Kaiser's spies—often in the possession of wireless installations. By October, however, the number of spies and traitors within the Allied lines could have been but small. The Belgian and French officers and officials had not played with espionage; among German spies the mortality had been very high; and shot or hanged spies could not quickly be replaced.

From Belgians and Frenchmen no reliable information could be obtained by the Germans. The latter's ferocity, greed, and insolence had united their neighbours against them to an extent which would never have been credited before the war. Cosmopolitan Socialists and Republicans had become the bitterest opponents of the Germans. A rigid censorship of letters, postcards, and telegrams had, too, minimized the chances of useful information with regard to the Allied Forces reaching Berlin through Great Britain or neutral countries.

The German leaders had now to rely for their knowledge of the Allied movements mainly on the reports of their cavalry, automobilists, cyclists, and airmen. Unfortunately for them the German cavalry would seldom in equal numbers face the British or French, and the Allies, although badly provided with armoured motor-cars at the outset of the war, had in October a sufficiency of land cruisers to render the expeditions of German automobilists in advance of the main bodies very dangerous.* We have seen that the British IV. Corps was

accompanied by several armoured cars, which rendered an excellent account of themselves.

As for aeroplane reconnaissance: the French and British aviators were more than a match for the Germans, and the scouts on "Taubes," when reconnoitring, found it more and more difficult to survey at their leisure the country beneath them. Even when undisturbed by enemy air-craft or fire from below the aerial observer, however skilled, was liable to make bad mistakes. In August, when the days were long, the weather fine, and the air clear, watching from the skies had been comparatively easy. But the nights were lengthening, rain coming down, and mists and fogs covered the surface of the ground. The leaves had not yet fallen, and were turning the colour of khaki, and so the woods afforded considerable cover.

For all these reasons the German Staff could not see clearly the forces opposed to them on the huge chessboard. Taken prisoner in the fighting round Dixmude, which will be described in a subsequent chapter, a Prussian Major asked his captors the number of the forces opposed to the Germans at that point.

"Forty thousand, I suppose?" he queried.

"Yes, yes," answered a French officer, indicating by his manner that he was not answering the question.

"But tell me how many," pleaded the German.

"Six thousand," was the suave reply.

The other burst into tears.

"Ah! if we had known!" he cried.*

The strategy of Joffre and his lieutenants also mystified the Germans.

"I have attacked the Germans to make them believe that I was in force," said General d'Urbal, referring to the fighting in the first fortnight of October. "I have multiplied the actions, I have harassed them day and night without giving them a moment's rest. Meanwhile, my army was being formed; each day reinforcements were reaching me."

The other explanation why the Germans proceeded with so much caution and by the wrong route to Ostend and Bruges is that they could not read into Lord Kitchener's mind and know what forces he was sending to Ostend and Zeebrugge. Mr. Winston Churchill's presence at Antwerp must have suggested to them that the British set immense importance on the retention by the Allies of that city and *a fortiori* on the

* See an interesting article, "La Guerre en Automobiles," in the *Lectures pour Tous* of January 15, 1915.

* *Lectures pour Tous*, January 15, 1915, p. 426.



A BRITISH HEAVY GUN.

The markings are daubs of paint which help to render the gun invisible.

holding of Ostend and Zeebrugge, from which submarines and aircraft could operate in the Straits of Dover and the estuaries of the Thames and Medway. That the First Lord of the Admiralty should have rushed away from the most responsible duties to lead Marines in Antwerp must, it may be surmised, have made the Staff officers round the Kaiser pause.

Since 1807 the military policy of Prussia had been always to run no excessive, no avoidable risks. The Prussian Army did not desert Napoleon I. until they were aware that nearly the whole of the Grande Armée had perished in Russia. Even then they waited for the advancing legions of the Czar to arrive. The Prussians had attacked Denmark in 1864, but they had the Austrian Army supporting them; they attacked Austria in 1866, after Bismarck had induced Italy to help them and Napoleon III. to remain neutral. In 1870 Bismarck had Moltke's and Roon's assurance that the German Armies were immeasurably superior to the French, and the Czar's promise that Russia would not permit Francis Joseph to assist Napoleon III. In the light of subsequent events it may seem strange, but there can be no doubt that the Kaiser and his officers had

entered on the Great War in the firm belief that they would break up the French in the first three weeks of the struggle.

To calculating schemers of the Prussian type unexpected moves were most disturbing. The regret felt by the Germans that a civilian was not British Minister of War must at this moment have been intense. Unable to surmise their astute and experienced adversary's hand, unable to look over his or Joffre's shoulder, they hesitated, played for safety, and the opportunity of capturing or annihilating the Belgian army and the British IV. Corps was lost for ever. They had to content themselves with having obtained an unfortified post, Ostend, 70 miles distant from Dover, which formed the first milestone on the road to London.

But though the enemy's army had escaped, the conquest of the Belgian coast line between Ostend and the Dutch frontier, the acquisition of Ostend, of Zeebrugge, and the ship canal from Zeebrugge to Bruges, of the Canal de Ghent, of the Scheldt from Ghent to Antwerp, and of the railways from Antwerp to the coast, were from the Pan-German point of view no mean achievements. The Kaiser had performed part of his contract. The Germans had been



ON THE GERMAN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

content to leave their liberties in his hands on the understanding that he would deprive the British of the command of the sea. From Emden, Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven, Heligoland, Cuxhaven, and the mouths of the Elbe and Kiel Canal to strike at the British Fleet, to raid the British naval bases, to invade the British coast, had hitherto been proved to be impracticable.

Ostend and Zeebrugge once gained, all attempts of this kind might be feasible. The

German "High Seas Fleet" being intact submarines could be transported to Zeebrugge, or built there; boats and barges for the transport of troops to Kent or Essex might be accumulated in the waterways between Antwerp and the coast, as Napoleon had done a hundred and ten years before.

Above all, a convenient base for aeroplanes, Zeppelins, and Parsevals, which might bombard Portsmouth, Dover, Chatham, Harwich and London, had been annexed.



CHAPTER XLVIII.

THE ADVANCE ON YPRES

THE PLAN OF THE ALLIED ADVANCE—THE FRENCH CAVALRY CROSS THE LYS—THE ATTACK ON THE GERMAN LINE BETWEEN ESTAIRES AND LA BASSÉE—THE FIELD OF BATTLE—THE BATTLE OF LA BASSÉE—THE FALL OF LILLE—THE MOVEMENT ON YPRES—ACTIONS OF METEREN AND MONT-DES-CATS—OCCUPATION OF YPRES, BAILLEUL AND ARMENTIÈRES—ATTEMPT TO CROSS THE LYS NEAR MENIN—END OF THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE.

WHILE the Belgian Army was withdrawing to the banks of the Yser and the British IV. Corps (Sir Henry Rawlinson's) was protecting the flank of the retiring divisions by occupying the country between Bruges and Ypres, the third attempt of General Joffre to turn the right wing of the main German army was in progress. Lille, the importance of which to the French was explained in Chapter XLVI., p. 479, had been bombarded on October 10. As detachments of Germans had passed westward between this town and the Lys and were to the north of the St. Omer-Aire-Béthune-La Bassée-Lille Canal in the vicinity of Merville, and as the right wing of the army opposing Maud'huy extended to La Bassée, Lille ran the risk of being completely isolated and its garrison of French Territorials captured. To obviate this disaster the offensive had promptly to be resumed. It had been brought to a standstill after Maud'huy's unsuccessful advance through Arras.

For a renewed offensive there were available on the 9th the skeleton army of General d'Urbal based on Dunkirk and the British 7th Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division round Bruges. Ypres was in the hands of the Germans and the latter were operating on both

banks of the Upper Lys. The comparatively small Allied forces north of the Lys were, therefore, fully employed, and the only hope for Lille lay in the now rapidly-approaching II., III. and Cavalry Corps of the British Expeditionary Force coming from the Aisne.

It will be remembered that on the 8th General Foch had arranged at Doullens with Sir John French that Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien with the II. Corps should arrive on the line Aire-Béthune by the 11th. This corps was to prolong Maud'huy's Army to the north and, pivoting on the French position to the west of La Bassée, attack in flank the German troops stationed there. The Cavalry Corps under General Allenby, of which the 2nd Division (General Gough's) had marched from Compiègne on October 3, was, with General Conneau's Cavalry Corps, to protect Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's left flank from the attack of the Germans north and south of the Lys. When the III. Corps (General Pulteney's) had detrained at St. Omer, north of the Lys, which would not be till the 12th, Allenby—but not Conneau—was to move to Pulteney's left wing, General d'Urbal's 87th and 89th Territorial Divisions under General Bidon, to be supported later by four French Cavalry Divisions

under General de Mitry, the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps were to sweep the Germans east of the line Dixmude-Ypres-Comines and effect a junction with the British IV. Corps (Sir Henry Rawlinson's) and the Belgian Army. Into Dixmude were to be thrown a body of French Marines under Rear-Admiral Rornarc'h; into Nieuport, at the mouth of the Yser, a division of French troops commanded by General Grossetti.

Obviously, this plan for the employment of the British Expeditionary Force—*minus* the I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's), which it was calculated would not reach St. Omer till about October 19—contemplated, besides the saving of Lille, the probability that the Germans north of the Lys might make a rush for Calais and Dunkirk or endeavour to envelop and destroy the British IV. Corps and the Belgian Army retiring behind it. Otherwise the Corps of Allenby and Pulteney would have remained south of the Lys, and supported Smith-Dorrien in his advance on Lille.

Foch's decision to leave Smith-Dorrien with Maud'huy to save, if they could, Lille, was a wise one. The misty weather had hampered aerial reconnaissance, and the numbers of the Germans north of the Lys could only be guessed. Weighed against the preservation of the Belgian Army, of Rawlinson's Corps, the forces of d'Urbal, of Calais and Dunkirk, the safety of Lille and its garrison had to be subordinated to the major interests of France and the Allies.

The stakes were too tremendous for sentimental reasons connected with Lille to affect Joffre and Foch. Nearly the whole of Belgium had been overrun by the Germans and, according to M. Clemenceau, Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, had declared that the only conditions of peace which the Kaiser would grant to France were :

1. The cession to Germany of all the territory north and east of a straight line drawn from the mouth of the Somme to Lyons—in other words, the reduction of millions of French men and women to a worse position than that of the Alsatians before the war; the loss of some of the most venerated places and monuments in France—*e.g.*, the battlefields of Valmy and Montmirail, the Cathedral of Reims and the cottage of Joan of Arc; the acquisition by the Germans of the rich coal country round Lille, of the vineyards of Champagne and Burgundy, and the extension of the German frontier to the outskirts of Paris and Lyons.

2. The surrender to Germany of Algiers, Tunis, and all other French Colonies, and also the French Protectorate of Morocco.

3. The payment to Germany of a War Indemnity of £400,000,000.

4. The transfer to Germany of 3,000,000 rifles, 3,000 guns, and 40,000 horses; the dismantling of all French

fortresses, and the suppression of recruiting in France for twenty-five years.

5. An alliance with Germany against Great Britain and Russia, and a commercial treaty with Germany for twenty-five years. Under the commercial treaty, German merchandise was to enter France free of duty, and French patent fees were not to be payable by Germans.

Whether M. Clemenceau were ill-informed or not as to Count Bernstorff's statements, there could be little doubt that if the Allies were defeated and France conquered, a treaty on some such lines as the above would be imposed on the French. "France," had written General Bernhardt, "must be so completely crushed that she can never again cross our path."

On October 9, 2,000 French Dragoons from Aire were ordered by General Conneau to dislodge the German cavalry lining the south bank of the Lys from Merville to Estaires. The crossings at those places were covered by machine guns, and after sunset they were illuminated by searchlights. The French commander assembled his men on the north bank at a point west of Merville where the current was very swift and the water deep. The Germans had regarded the river as unfordable at this point, but a trooper who was a good swimmer stripped and, pulling after him a light line, swam to the right bank. The line at the other end was tied to a heavy rope and when the dripping soldier stepped out of the water he hauled the rope across and fastened it securely to the trunk of a tree. The other end was similarly secured and, assisted by the rope, the men on horseback filed one by one across the river during the night. At daybreak (October 10) the whole force had passed safely and the hostile horsemen retired in the direction of Estaires.*

The character of the fighting in which Conneau's Cavalry was engaged was well

* It was east of Estaires, at Saily, that Lieutenant Wallon, the well-known rider, fell a victim to German perfidy. He was advancing with some Dragoons to seize the crossing of the Lys at that point. Some distance from the village which was held by the Germans the party entrenched itself. They beat off an attack and shot several German scouts. Soon eleven "peasants" with picks and spades over their shoulders were seen moving towards the French. When these "peasants" were within 40 yards or so of the trenches, they suddenly dropped their stolen implements and drawing concealed revolvers emptied them into the French, while their comrades in front of the village opened a general fusillade. A ball struck Lieutenant Wallon in the chest. He dropped to the ground. Sergeant Rossa, in spite of the wounded man's protests, dragged him to the rear and placed him on a cart. Shortly after he expired. The eleven "peasants" were shot and the village taken.



FRENCH INFANTRY GUARDING THE RAILWAY LINES SOUTH OF LA BASSÉE.

described in the *Standard* on the authority of a wounded French officer. "There are no longer," he said, "massed charges in which thousands of men collide in formidable shock, but engagements of detail, in which ruse and decision play the greatest part. The side which succeeds in surprising the other, in filtering

through its lines, in gaining ground without arousing the attention of the enemy, obtains an indisputable advantage." He illustrated the point by two examples.

A regiment of French Cavalry was deputed to cross from the south to the north bank of the Lys. The Germans had here broken down the



GERMAN PRISONERS IN CHARGE OF SPAHIS.

bridges and their guns commanded all the fords. In the middle of the night a reservist, and four troopers, like the Dragoon who swam across the Lys between Aire and Merville, plunged into the river at a spot where it was unfordable. They reached the left bank and installed cables which permitted a bridge to be rapidly constructed. An hour later the whole regiment was north of the Lys.

The other incident occurred between La Bassée and Estaires. At dawn some 600 Uhlans, taking advantage of a thick fog, occupied one among the numerous villages that stretch like a chain from the La Bassée-Lille Canal to the Lys. A captain, with the officer who told the story, was sent with 80 Cuirassiers to reconnoitre. In half an hour they were three hundred yards from the village, and halted. Dismounting, a sergeant and four men crept forward through the dense fog. They found the Uhlans camped in the streets or resting in the houses. On hearing this the Cuirassiers resumed their march. Suddenly a German patrol appeared through the fog. It was immediately captured, and the French rode on. Close up to the village church the French captain gave the order to charge. The Germans offered little resistance; many were killed and wounded; 250 were made prisoners; the rest fled.

This example shows the repeatedly-proved inferiority of the German Cavalry to that of the

Allies, which was, indeed, one of the most marked features of the war.

The French and British Cavalry habitually routed the vaunted German horsemen. Remembering the past history of the Prussian Cavalry, an explanation is not difficult. Cavalry is an arm particularly liable to impressions. On the results of the first collisions largely depend the future conduct of the arm. Thus it was that Frederick's cavalry won for him the battles of the Soor, Hohenfriedberg and Rosbach. For the above reason forty years later it went down before the French horse at Auerstadt and Jena like corn before the sickle, and made no further effort during the war. It cut but a sorry figure in 1866, but in 1870 did good service. In this war the encounters of the German with the British Cavalry were a revelation to the former. Their previous training led them to think themselves invincible. The belief was as erroneous as it was in 1806, and, after the first few shocks, they seldom tried to meet the British cavalry, and nearly always fled before them. The same was true when they were opposed to the French. The moral of their opponents was superior to theirs, and this was because the individual men were more rationally trained, better led and better manœuvred.

Conneau's Dragoons were south of the Lys on the 10th. The next day (October 11)

General Gough with the 2nd Cavalry Division cleared the German cavalry from some woods north of the Béthune-Aire Canal. The Division placed itself astride the Lys, its right wing in touch with the left of the II. Corps, which had crossed the canal and was moving in a north-easterly direction. Gough's left joined hands with the Divisional Cavalry of the 6th Infantry Division (III. Corps) near Hazebrouck.

The right of the German front rested on Mont-des-Cats, a hill some 500 feet high "from which radiate spurs like fingers from the palm of the hand" * at the western end of the long ride south-west of Ypres. Mont-des-Cats is opposite the little hill on which stands Cassel, and is eight miles or so north-east of Hazebrouck and a little to the south of a straight line drawn from Cassel to Ypres. From Mont-des-Cats the German line ran south through Meteren to Estaires on the Lys and from Estaires due south for three miles through very intricate country. It then turned slightly to the south-east, "passing about three miles east of Béthune" through La Bassée to Vermelles. West of the German front were detached bodies of cavalry and infantry. It was

with some of these that the French dragoons who had crossed the Lys above Merville and General Gough's cavalry had come in contact.

The task allotted to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien with the II. Corps was to pierce through the German line between Estaires on the Lys and La Bassée; he would be aided by Conneau's Cavalry Corps on his left. The Allied troops were then to wheel to the right against the right flank of the Germans entrenched round La Bassée, which would thus be exposed, while, to hold the latter fast, Maud'huy was to attack them in front.


The locality in which Sir Horace was to operate was the "Black Country" of France, "similar," as Sir John French observes, "to that usually found in manufacturing districts and covered with mining works, factories, buildings, &c." The desperate and bloody Battle of Charleroi (August 21-2) had been fought under analogous circumstances.


Like the rest of the plain of the Scheldt, the country was very flat. The word "plain," however, which is associated with long and uninterrupted views, does not convey an adequate idea of the district between the Lys and the Béthune-La Bassée-Lille Canal. The military Eye-witness at the British Headquarters sketched the landscape in graphic language.

* The Eye-witness, October 17.



MACHINE GUN SECTION GUARDING A ROAD.





Miles 0 5 10

Railways — Chief Roads

Land over 100 metres above sea level

Kilometres 0 5 10

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ALLIED FORCES FROM OCTOBER 11 TO OCTOBER 21.



BRITISH INFANTRY: EXAMINING ARMS.

“It is mainly,” he says, “an industrial region, and, with its combination of mining and agriculture, might be compared to our Black Country, with Fen lands interspersed between the coal mines and factories. In some directions the villages are so close together that this district has been described as one immense town, of which the various parts are in some places separated by cultivation, and in others by groups of factories bristling with chimneys. The cultivated portions are very much enclosed, and are cut up by high, unkempt hedges and ditches.”

Such was the new field of battle as it appeared to Sir John French and the officer on his Staff who supplied the descriptive accounts of the movements of the British Expeditionary Force. The enemy had barriaded themselves in many of the villages. Nearly all these villages were defended by a series of narrow, inconspicuous trenches. Driven from these trenches the Germans retired into the village itself, the

streets of which were commanded by machine guns. To hide them from observation these were often placed in the centre of rooms. When the village was in danger of being taken incendiaries set fire to the houses on the outskirts and, under cover of the flames, the defenders retired to the trenches behind the village. If the British or French put the fires out and themselves occupied the village it was heavily shelled.

Another difficulty encountered was this. Some of the villages on the line of march were held, others were left undefended. It was not until the cavalry, cyclists and advance guards had thoroughly reconnoitered a village and, if it was held, drawn the enemy's fire, that the troops behind could be brought through it. The danger of ambushes in this network of buildings and mounds was very great, and the ambushes of the past were by no means as dangerous or as difficult to detect as those of modern warfare. In 1914 two or three men

hidden with a machine gun might destroy a column of soldiers.

The soldier of 1914 had, in fact, to be as meticulously vigilant as the modern surgeon. Behind every embankment, spoil heap, hedge, in thickets, in houses, cottages, factories, as well as in villages, might be lurking Germans with rifles and mitrailleuses. Broad and deep dykes traversed the fields and meadows between the villages, and, if the troops had to deploy on either side of a village, farm, or factory, they were likely to be met by these obstacles, for the crossing of which planks or ladders had to be carried.

Sir John French and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien were not Hindenburgs and Klucks. They regarded the soldiers entrusted to them as their comrades, and not as "cannon-fodder"; to attempt to surprise the villages by clothing their men in the dress of German soldiers or French peasants or workmen was in the eyes of British officers dishonourable; to place prisoners, much less civilians, in front of a column of attack was to the Allied leaders as an abominable crime. The appropriate tactics from the British and French standpoints was to deluge the villages and buildings occupied by the enemy with common shell and shrapnel, and when the enemy's nerves were shaken and their machine guns destroyed or buried in the ruins, to order an attack with the bayonet, which the Germans seldom faced. Unfortunately, as mentioned, the weather was misty, and the flatness of the country and its enclosed nature rendered it very difficult even for howitzers to find and get the range of a village unless, indeed, its presence was indicated by a church or a factory chimney rising above the trees surrounding it.

Met with such difficulties it might have been expected that the III. Corps would have halted on the edge of the "Black Country" or joined the II. Corps and the Cavalry Corps to the north of the Lys; and, as Lille fell on October 13, it may be plausibly argued that either course would have been preferable to that which was actually adopted. Had, however, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien not attacked, the Germans might have poured most of the troops contained by him across the Lys, employed them against Sir Henry Rawlinson's and General d'Urbal's forces, and turned the line of the Yser.

Indeed, if the British II. Corps had followed the III., the Germans between the Lys and the La Bassée-Lille Canal would have certainly

been sent to strengthen the front between Mont-des-Cats and Estaires. Had then, d'Urbal's Divisions, with the II. and III. Corps and the Cavalry Corps, been unable to pierce or turn the German line the IV. Corps (Sir Henry Rawlinson's) might have been caught between the Germans advancing through Ghent to Ostend and the army facing d'Urbal and Sir John French. By thrusting the II. Corps against the flank of the army engaged in a desperate struggle with Maud'huy's force Sir John French destroyed the last chance the Germans had of overwhelming Sir Henry Rawlinson's Corps and the Belgian Army. The vanguard of the Belgians reached Furnes on October 12, the day Sir Horace commenced his attack. Other points had their weight. If Sir Horace and General Maud'huy had cleared the enemy from La Bassée, Lille would have still surrendered, but the effect of a victory at La Bassée might have been decisive on the long-drawn Battle of Arras. The tenacity with which the Germans continued to hold on to La Bassée shows the importance they attached to it in their scheme for crushing Maud'huy.

On the other hand, if Maud'huy had been driven to the Somme, the main communications



Gale & Todd

MAJOR-GENERAL H. de la P. GOUGH.



NEWS FROM THE FRONT.
Germans in the trenches writing hurried letters home.

of d'Urbal's, Sir John French's and now King Albert's Army would have been cut, and the whole of the Allied Forces north of Béthune would have had to be based on Étaples, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Needless to say, their position would have been most precarious: most, if not all, of the gigantic army hurled a week or so later by the Kaiser into the battle which goes by the name of Ypres would have been directed against them, and, in the event of defeat, they would have had to embark at three small ports, an undertaking which, in the days of guns and howitzers with a range of from five to ten miles and of submarines and bomb-dropping airships and aeroplanes, might have led to a frightful catastrophe. To add Smith-Dorrien's Corps to Maud'huy's Army and to help Maud'huy to achieve a victory or to avoid a defeat was, therefore, the wisest course open to Joffre, Foch and French. But it led to a terrible strain being put on the heroic body of troops who at the Battle of Le Cateau had saved the British Expeditionary Force from annihilation.

Happily the II. Corps was no longer opposed by troops of the same quality as those they had met in August, nor were the conditions under which they opposed them so unfavourable. Judged by the following Order of October 7 to the German 14th Reserve Corps, the directors of that vast organisation, the German Army, were already experiencing difficulties in feeding and munitioning the soldiers:

It is notified that the troops must no longer count on the regular arrival of supplies. They must, therefore, utilize the resources of the country as much and as carefully as possible.

The regulation for the use of the iron rations must be strictly observed.

In spite of all precautions complaints are continually being received that supply and ammunition columns constantly fail to arrive because they are stopped and unloaded by unauthorised persons. It is again notified that only the authorities to whom the supplies, &c., are consigned have the right to take delivery of them.

To terrorise the Belgians and the French the disciples of Bernhardt had relaxed the bonds of discipline: they had encouraged the men to murder, rape, burn, get drunk and loot. It was not to be expected that, after their debaucheries and crimes, the soldiers would rigidly obey the call of duty and behave with the carefulness of ordinary men.

The II. Corps had reached the Aire-Béthune Canal on October 11. As related, it crossed the Canal the same day, its left wing moving in a north-easterly direction. Sir John French decided that on the 12th this wing was to be brought up in the direction of Merville, from which the Uhlans had been driven by the French Dragoons of Conneau's Cavalry Corps, who had crossed the Lys east of Aire. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then to move to the line Laventie-Lorgies. The former place is a little to the south-east of Estaires, the latter a few miles to the north of La Bassée. He would then be threatening the flank of the army struggling with Maud'huy's. On

October 12 the 5th Division (Sir Charles Ferguson's) "connected up" with Maud'huy's left, north of Annequin, which is south of the canal and to the west of La Bassée.

To counter this manœuvre the Germans extended their right. The 3rd Division (Sir Hubert Hamilton's) now deployed on the left of the 5th Division and the whole of the II. Corps advanced to the attack, but, owing to the obstacles already described, they could make little headway. Several counter-attacks, however, were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, who abandoned a number of machine guns. Conneau's Cavalry Corps joined in the battle, following the roads between Estaires and Fleurbaix, Laventie, Vieille Chapelle, Lacouture and Richebourg. The Germans were defeated in almost every encounter. At Vieille Chapelle the church was bombarded and left in ruins, and in the kitchen of a house a French Chasseur engaged in an Homeric contest with a Uhlan. Thrusting and cutting at the German, the Frenchman drove him into the backyard, where both fell mortally wounded. They were buried in a neighbouring field. Richebourg was set on fire by the Germans as they retreated. The first building burned was a factory which gave employment to the village.

On October 13 Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, pivoting on Givenchy—a village two miles due west of La Bassée—wheeled to the south and endeavoured to get astride the La Bassée-Lille road in the neighbourhood of Fournes. Thence he would menace the enemy's position on the high ground south of La Bassée. In the course of the advance, near Pont Fixe, the Dorsets and other regiments of the 7th Brigade especially distinguished themselves. They, like the enemy, were entrenched. During the night the Germans sapped towards them, and they towards the Germans. At daybreak a British shell dropped into and burst in one of the advance trenches of the enemy. Five Germans were taken prisoners. "I saw the fellows," wrote a war correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle*, some days later, "and they undoubtedly belonged to the last line of the German Reserve. One felt sorry for them, they looked starved, dirty and weary to death." The British guns shelled, and the infantry fired at the Germans till 5 p.m., when the latter abandoned all but the last trench.


By this time only a ploughed field and a couple of ditches divided the two infantries, and the soldiers on either side could be heard

cursing each other. At last the order was given to the British to fix bayonets and charge. With a yell they rushed forward and, in the expressive language of a corporal, "dug 'em out same as you'd dig bully beef out of a can." Then they rushed for the villages behind the trenches, clearing the enemy out and capturing a mitrailleuse. For two miles the chase continued.

In the morning of October 14 the battle was continued, the advance being in the same direction.

It was on this day that the 3rd Division and the nation suffered a heavy loss. While riding along the lines the Commander of that Division, Sir Hubert Hamilton, was struck by a shrapnel bullet. He fell from his horse and died immediately afterwards. At night he was buried in the churchyard of the little village of Lacouture, three French Chasseurs being interred near him. An eye-witness described the scene to a *Times* Correspondent:

The darkness of the night was profound and the mourners had a difficulty in distinguishing the features of their neighbours. The group which gathered round the grave at the entrance of the little village of Lacouture included the General Staff of the 3rd British Division, delegates of the Headquarters Staff, the officers of the II. Army Corps, led by General Smith-Dorrien in person, and some French officers attached to the British General Staff.



GRAVE OF GEN. HUBERT HAMILTON
At Lacouture.



INDIANS NEAR LA BASSÉE.

Owing to the proximity of the enemy absolute silence was observed, except for the low voice of the priest, advantage being taken of a lull in the attack. Just at the moment when the priest was saying the last prayers the guns began to roar again, and projectiles whistled over the heads of the mourners. The German attack was directed from a distance of a few hundred yards. The moment was well chosen, for the volleys fired by the troops of the Allies in honour of the dead, gloriously fallen for the common cause, were at the same time volleys of vengeance. Crackling reports of rifles continued round the ruined church, but the voice of the priest, reciting the last words of the Requiem, lost nothing of its calm and clearness.

Soldiers in single file acted as an escort to the cemetery beside the little church, which is now a mass of ruins in consequence of the bombardment.

Afterwards Sir Hubert Hamilton's body was removed and reburied in his native land. Among the wreaths on his tomb was one from Lord Kitchener. Hamilton had been among the ablest of Kitchener's pupils; he had been his Military Secretary in India, and had shown marked ability in the retreat from Mons and at the battles of the Marne and Aisne.

The death of their leader was avenged by the 3rd Division on the 15th when, as Sir John French wrote, "they fought splendidly." The dykes in their way were crossed with planks, and they "drove the enemy from one entrenched position to another in loop-holed villages." By nightfall they had thrust the Germans off the Estaires-La Bassée Road, and they were established on the line Pont de Ham-Croix Barbée. On the 16th the left of the II. Corps was in front of Aubers, which was

strongly held. The next day this village was captured by the 9th Infantry Brigade, and at dark the village of Herlies, south-east of Aubers, was carried at the point of the bayonet after a fine charge. "The Brigade," remarks Sir John French, "was handled with great dash by Brigadier-General Shaw." At this time the belief was that the II. Corps was being opposed by a portion of the 14th German Corps, by several battalions of Jaegers, and by the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 9th German Cavalry Divisions.

With the capture of Herlies the offensive of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien came to an end.

The Kaiser was about to begin the counter-offensive, which is known to the public under the name of the Battle of Ypres. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had not been able to drive the Germans out of their position at La Bassée nor to save Lille.

Before describing the bombardment and surrender of Lille let us look at some details of the fighting between the Lys and the canal, which have some value in completing the picture of the war. The British "Eyewitness" states:

Parts of the region where fighting has been in progress now present a melancholy aspect. Many of the once prosperous homesteads and hamlets are literally torn to pieces, the walls still standing pitted by shrapnel balls, and in some of the villages the churches are smouldering ruins. Dead horses, cows, and pigs which have been caught in the hail of shrapnel litter the village streets.

and among the carcasses and *débris* wander the wretched inhabitants, who have returned to see what they can save from the wreckage. Here, blocking up a narrow side street is a dead horse still harnessed to a trap, and beside it is stretched the corpse of a Jäger; close by, in an enclosure where a shell has found them, lie some thirty cavalry horses; a little farther on is laid out a row of German dead, for whom graves are being dug by the peasants.

The work of burial falls to a great extent on the inhabitants, who, with our soldiers, take no little care in marking the last resting-places of their countrymen and their Allies, either by little wooden crosses or else by flowers. Amidst the graves scattered all over the countryside are the rifle pits, trenches and gun emplacements, which those now resting below the sod helped to defend or to attack. From these the progress of the fighting can be traced, and even its nature, for they vary from carefully constructed and cunningly placed works to the hastily shaped lair of a German sniper, or the roadside ditch, with its sides scooped out by the entrenching implements of our infantry.

The unfortunate inhabitants, too, had to suffer from friends and foe alike. For the British had had to destroy the farms and cottages which had sheltered a large number of industrious families.

Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, we have seen, began his advance towards Lille on October 11. But on the 10th the Germans, unable to break their way into the city, had resorted to their favourite procedure. They bombarded Lille with their heavy artillery. The city had been seized by them in August and a war indemnity levied on it. It was a flourishing town of over 200,000 inhabitants; the fine public buildings and the splendid Art Museum bore witness to its prosperity, and to the innate culture of the

French which distinguishes them from most industrial races. The Germans affected to treat the French as decadent. A walk through Lille should have dispelled that illusion.

In 1792, when the Prussians and Austrians endeavoured to reimpose the yoke of the Bourbon despotism on France, Lille had been vainly bombarded by the Austrians. A bombardment in 1914 was not so likely to be ineffectual, for the weapons employed had fifty times



AN INTERRUPTED GAME OF CARDS.



LILLE DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.

the power of those brought to bear on the town a hundred and twenty-two years before.

On October 10 a small body of German cavalry rode up to the Town Hall and inquired for the Mayor. While they were demanding hostages, French horsemen arrived, and the Germans, after a brief encounter, fled. At 5 p.m. the bombardment began, a shell bursting above the Town Hall. It was the first of several. A panic started and the streets were soon a seething mass of excited men and women flying for refuge to their cellars. A Taube hovered and dropped a bomb, which killed a boy and a horse, and injured a woman. At 7 p.m. the bombardment increased in violence and several houses in the Rue Nationale were destroyed.

The night was comparatively calm. On October 11, from 8 a.m. to nightfall shells fell incessantly. Numerous public buildings, houses and factories were on fire, and the people were flying in all directions. The next day, at 6 a.m., the Germans resumed their work of destruction. Far off could be heard the French artillery replying to the German heavy guns. On the 13th, as there was no hope of succour, to save the city from total destruction it was surrendered. Five or six thousand shells had been fired into it, the Art

Museum was damaged, some quarters of the city were in flames. The Germans, who afterwards systematically pillaged the town—packing up and dispatching to Germany furniture, linen, and even clothing—sent for the fire engines of the neighbouring places and the flames were finally subdued. According to the official report 882 buildings, amongst them some of the finest, had been destroyed and 1,500 damaged, but the loss of life had been small. The Mayor, Bishop and Prefect and several councillors were taken as hostages.

A gentleman who was in Lille during the bombardment and for a week after the German occupation writes as follows :

The two most prominent buildings in Lille were untouched by the shells, but the splendid art gallery had suffered. There were holes through the roof, but I do not know what damage was done to the pictures. In the Rue de la Gare two solid blocks of buildings were destroyed, and from the Place de la République to the Gare du Nord the buildings were terribly damaged. The Café Jean, known to every Englishman and American who has visited Lille, was in ruins.

The Germans on the entry behaved well. They were apparently under strong and admirable discipline. They set themselves at once to put out the fires. Buildings were dynamited to prevent the flames from spreading. The ordinary police were left in charge of the town, although there were German soldiers stationed in all the streets. The people were told to remain within their houses with the blinds down. Civilians with arms in their possession were told that they were liable to be

shot at once. Owners of motor-cars were bidden to report the fact to the authorities. The Germans commandeered all the horses, motor-cars, and bicycles—in fact, every means of transport.

During the bombardment few civilians suffered. I saw one civilian dead in the street. Among the defenders was a small party of Algerian troops. While they were defending the gates one man was left in charge of the horses, just off the Rue de la Gare. A shell burst just by him, and I saw the man and thirteen horses lying dead in a heap.

For a week after the German occupation I remained in the town. No attempt was made by the Germans to dig trenches. I saw twenty-five big guns brought into the city.

My papers were inspected by the German military authorities, who were satisfied of my neutrality, and I left Lille and came to England through Belgium. As we passed through we saw entrenchments and barbed wire defences being constructed around the towns.

The German soldiers entered Lille accompanied by bands playing their favourite music. They were singing and smoking, but many were in a state of complete exhaustion. A prominent resident who escaped from the city stated that several soldiers lay down on the pavements and slept for hours and that some of the cavalymen could scarcely sit their horses. Later, regiments of white-haired old men, and boys between the age of 16 and 18, in brand new uniforms arrived. They had been told that France was conquered and that they were to be reviewed by the Kaiser in Paris!

The feelings of some of the Germans may be surmised from the letter below found on the body of a dead soldier:

Perenehies, near Lille,
16th October, 1914.

Dear Brother,—Taking the opportunity of a five hours' pause, which is the first chance of writing I have

had, I hasten to inform you of my present position. On the 5th October came the order that the XIXth Corps should leave the Third Army and form part of the First Army under General Kluck. The march from St. Hillegras to Lille, 180 kilometres (108 miles) in five days was very exhausting. In Lille hostile infantry was reported, and we were engaged in street and house fighting on the 13th and 14th, and it was only by the 19th Heavy Artillery that the town was compelled to surrender. Lille has already been taken by us three times, and if troops or supply columns are attacked again the place will be razed to the ground. The shell fire, although it only lasted an hour, has cost the town at least a hundred buildings. Here, also, in Lille the 77th Field Artillery has many of our comrades on its conscience.

Of prisoners we have absolutely none at present, since the wretches put on civilian clothes, and then one can look in vain for soldiers. We lie five miles from Lille and are to hold up the English who have landed. This will be no light task, since we are not fully informed as to their strength. It gives one the impression that the war will last a long time. Well, I shall hold out even if it goes on for another year. In front of us we can hear heavy guns, so we may easily have more fighting to-day. We have had no pest for fourteen days, for the country here is very unsafe.

Thus Lille—like Liège, Namur, Charleroi, Louvain, Malines, Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, Tournai, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Cambrai, Douai, Rethel, Mézières, Sedan, Montmédy, St. Quentin, Laon—was in the possession of the Germans. The day before (October 12) they had seized Ghent; the day after they were to occupy Bruges, and, on October 15, Ostend. North of the Lys, however, the tide of invasion had turned. The British III. Corps and Cavalry Corps with d'Urbal's Territorial Divisions and Cavalry were driving the enemy from Ypres and its vicinity at the very moment when the Germans entered Lille.



FRENCH SEARCHLIGHT
Thrown on attacking Germans.

The turning movement prepared by Joffre and French, north and east of the Aire-Lille Canal, had on the centre and left been more successful than on the right. This was due to two causes. The obstacles had been fewer, and less serious than those encountered by Smith-Dorrien's and Conneau's Corps; the enemy had been less numerous.

From the Lys to the sea is a distance on an average of thirty miles. While the population of Lille was over 200,000, that of Ypres, one of the largest towns in the inland portion of the oblong Aire-Ghent-Zeebrugge-Calais was under 20,000—10,000 less than that of Armentières, on the south bank of the Lys to the north-west of Lille. Crossing the Lys one passed from an industrial to a rural neighbourhood, to villages instead of towns, to farmhouses instead of villages. Except for the hill, on which Cassel stands and for the Mont-des-Cats, and the long ridge which stretches from it eastward, the whole district was either flat or gently undulating. Next to the coast were reclaimed marshes drained by canals and dykes. On the

edge of the sea were dunes. Hedges and belts of trees restricted the view; the main roads, though straight, were badly paved; the by-roads were winding.

On October 11 the whole of the coast and reclaimed marshland was in the hands of the Allies, and the German line, as already mentioned, stretched from Mont-des-Cats (south of the road from Cassel through Poperinghe to Ypres) to Meteren (on the road from Cassel viâ Bailleul to Armentières) and thence to Estaires on the Lys. This position could be turned from the north by an advance of d'Urbal's troops from Dunkirk through Bergues and Poperinghe to Ypres or on the south by Conneau's cavalry crossing the Lys east of Estaires. To the rear it was threatened by the movement of Rawlinson's Corps from Bruges. By the 10th the head of Byng's Cavalry Division was at Thourout; and on the 12th the 6th Cavalry Brigade held the line Oostnieuwkerke-Roulers, the 7th that of Rumbeke-Iseghem.

The aim of the Germans was to remain on the defensive until the army released from



A BELGIAN LOOK-OUT IN FLANDERS.
Finding Ranges.



WOUNDED BRITISH IN THE STATION AT BOULOGNE.

Antwerp, and the reinforcements which had crossed the Scheldt and were now hurrying to the Lys, joined hands with them. They took every advantage of the ground, concealing themselves in ditches, woods, and villages, and behind hedges, and a network of telephone wires warned them of the Allied movements. The line, however, they had to defend was longer than that from Estaires to La Bassée, and, while the commander opposing Smith-Dorrien and Conneau had one wing resting on the Lys and the forces from Estaires to Mont-des-Cats, the other on the Canal La Bassée-Lille, the right wing of the Germans north of the Lys was in the air, while their left wing was threatened by the movements of Conneau and Smith-Dorrien south of the Lys.

The resistance of Lille was another important factor in the situation. Troops badly needed between Estaires and Mont-des-Cats had to be held back till Lille surrendered. The inhabitants of Lille and the French Territorials there have the gratification of knowing that, like the Belgians in Liège, they largely contributed to the coming success of the Allies. If Lille had surrendered on the 9th, and not on the 13th, it may be doubted whether d'Urbal and the British would have reached the canal from Comines to Ypres, and from Ypres to the Yser.

The misty and, occasionally, rainy weather and the hostility of the civilian population

were also to the disadvantage of the Germans. There can be no question that they believed they were being attacked by a much larger force than was actually the case. The reports of their air-scouts were defective, and the Allied Cavalry, assisted by armoured motor-cars, screened the advance of the infantry.

From now onward the armoured motor-car began to play an important part in the schemes of Joffre and French for defeating the invaders. One of the many examples of their use is given by the British Eye-witness :

On the 16th the crew of one of our armoured motor-cars obtained information that a party of hostile cavalry was in a farm. They enlisted help from ten men of the nearest battalion, who stationed themselves on one side of the farm while the motor-car waited on the other. Being unable to bolt their quarry, our men carried fire to the farm, which had the desired effect and resulted in two Uhlans being killed and eight captured, no casualties being sustained by the attacking party.

The Belgians showed special aptitude for this kind of warfare. They "appeared to regard Uhlans-hunting as a form of sport," and often ventured miles ahead of their own troops, and seldom failed to return with spoils in the shape of helmets, lances, and rifles. At the opening of the war the Germans had scored heavily with their miniature forts on wheels, but with every day their superiority in the mere machinery of war was diminishing.

It will be recollected that on October 11 General Gough with the 2nd Cavalry Division



GERMANS ON THE DUNES
Watching the Allied Fleets.

had driven the German Cavalry from woods to the north of the Béthune-Aire Canal, and linked up with the Divisional Cavalry of the 6th Division (part of the III. Corps) in the neighbourhood of Hazebrouck. On the 11th General Pulteney had practically completed the detrainment of that corps at St. Omer, and moved it east to Hazebrouck, in and around which town it remained during the 12th.

The same day a Taube ventured over St. Omer and dropped three bombs on the Rue Carnot, killing a laundress and a small child in her arms and wounding a man. It was immediately pursued by five French aeroplanes. The "passenger" was shot by the pursuers in the head. The Taube swerved, but the pilot managed to right it and flew away at full speed. Another shot struck the pilot and the machine "fell like a stone to the ground." At Pradelles, on the road from Hazebrouck to Bailleul, a German officer wished on the 12th to make some observations from the tower of the church. He applied to the Abbé Bogaert for the key. The Abbé could not find it. He was taken to Strazeele, where he was murdered. Extraordinary and horrible as such incidents as the above would have seemed in July, in October they attracted little attention.

On Tuesday, the 13th, the advanced guard

of the III. Corps, consisting of the 19th Infantry Brigade and a Brigade of Field Artillery, moved eastward to the line St. Sylvestre-Caestre-Strazeele Station. Three miles out of Hazebrouck the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment came under shell fire at 7.30 a.m. "Lost Private Ward," notes a non-commissioned officer, "about two yards in front of me—struck dead by a shell. He had just lighted a cigarette, and said it might be his last." Through Strazeele the Staffordshires advanced to Merris, south of Meteren, "where we remained in position under shell-fire for 7½ hours, holding up the Bosches." Merris a few days before had been the scene of an act of atrocious cruelty. Uhlans had pursued an old man to the "Bon Bourgeois" Inn. He had hidden in an oak chest. Discovered, he was at once shot with a revolver.

At St. Sylvestre and Caestre the British were on the main road between Cassel and Bailleul; at Caestre they were across the single line railway from Hazebrouck through Poperinghe to Ypres; at Strazeele Station they were on the double-line railway from Hazebrouck through Bailleul to Armentières and Lille. The Germans held the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats between Godewaersvelde (on the railway from Caestre to Poperinghe) and Bailleul. They

were in force at Meteren four miles or so to the east of Caestre and two miles west of Bailleul. The Fourth German Cavalry Corps and some Jaeger Battalions were known to be occupying the neighbourhood of Meteren and were believed to be supported by the advanced guard of another German Army Corps. The high ridge of the Mont-des-Cats extends eastward to the road from Armentières to Ypres. It ends round Wytschaete and, south of Wytschaete, round Messines.

Sir John French now ordered General Pulteney to push toward the road between Armentières and Wytschaete. The latter village is four miles south of Ypres, seven from Armentières. In heavy rain and fog and through very enclosed country the III. Corps marched forward. The artillery gave little assistance because objects could not be seen distinctly; the roads and fields were bad going. By nightfall, however, the British had routed the enemy in all directions and captured Meteren, and Oultersteene to the east of Merris. "We lost," says the non-commissioned officer, "another seventeen men in taking Oultersteene. . . . Were not the villagers pleased to see us! But what a toll! I do not take into account the battalion or brigade—only my company. We got two machine guns, a dead German officer, with the Iron Cross; cycles. Repaid our losses," he adds, "with interest."


On account of their deeds at Meteren the Medal for Distinguished Conduct was awarded to Sergeant E. Howard of the 1st Royal Lancaster Regiment, to Sergeant H. Duckers of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, to Sergeant G. A. Hodges of the 2nd Essex Regiment, and to Private C. Rowley of the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Howard, at very great risk to himself, had crawled to 12 men of his platoon who had ceased firing. He found they were all dead. Duckers had handled his platoon with remarkable skill, both at Meteren and on other occasions. Hodges, shot through the shoulder, continued in command of his platoon and led it forward to the firing line. Rowley had volunteered under a heavy rifle fire to go back from the firing line to the support trench, a distance of some 300 yards, for ammunition. He reached it and, later, recrossed the same piece of ground under similar conditions.

Meanwhile General Gough, to the left of the III. Corps, had not been inactive. As had been arranged, the Cavalry Corps, after the arrival of the III. Corps, had moved to the

north of it. On the 12th Gough's Division had ridden through Flêtre (between Caestre and Meteren) and on the 12th–13th engaged the right of the enemy at Mont-des-Cats. In this action Prince Max of Hesse was mortally wounded. He lies buried in the grounds of the monastery which crowns the hill, together with three British officers and some German soldiers. This day a cavalry patrol came suddenly upon a German machine gun detachment. The subaltern gave the order to charge; the Germans were killed and scattered and the gun captured. For his gallantry and determination at Mont-des-Cats Lieutenant C. J. Aris of the 16th Lancers obtained a D.S.O. He had charged and driven off a German patrol, and although twice wounded, persisted in sending in his report to his squadron leader.

It was on the 13th–14th that French and British troops marched into Ypres.

On the 14th the 1st Cavalry Division joined up with the 2nd, and the whole Cavalry Corps under General Allenby moved north, and in face of considerable opposition secured the



MORTAR CAPTURED IN A GERMAN TRENCH.

high ground above Berthen round Westoutre, whose Mayor, it will be remembered, had been lashed across the face by a German cavalryman. Further to the north the 87th and 89th French Territorial Divisions were marching from the direction of Dunkirk on Poperinghe, Vlamerhinghe and Ypres. The 3rd Cavalry Division (Byng's) on the 13th had reconnoitred towards Ypres and Menin.* Patrols had been sent forward towards Comines and Wervicq. At Comines—the birthplace of the historian Philip de Comines, who deserted Charles the Bold for Louis XI.—the canal from Ypres enters the Lys. Both places are on the Lys between Menin and Armentières. The 7th Infantry Division (Major-General Capper's) had occupied Roulers, menaced by the Germans from Thielt, and Sir Henry Rawlinson ordered Byng to hold the line Dadizeele-Iseghem.†

* The latter town is on the Lys a few miles west of Courtrai. It was at Menin that Scharnhorst, the Hanoverian who reformed the Prussian Army after the Jena catastrophe, had first distinguished himself in war.

† Roulers had a population of over 25,000; on June 13, 1794, the French under Pichegru and Macdonald here defeated the Austrians under Clerfait. The Battle of Roulers had been the prelude to that of Fleurus, the first battle in which a captive balloon was used—by the French—for military purposes.

The next day (October 14) considerable bodies of Germans, believed to belong to the 12th Corps, were reported to be moving from the vicinity of Balleul towards Wervicq and Menin. Consequently Byng, followed by Capper, was directed on Ypres with orders to reconnoitre to the south-west. At 9 a.m. Byng's Division was at Ypres and the 6th Cavalry Brigade proceeded to the line La Clytte-Lindenhoek. Near Ypres the Brigade with rifle and revolver fire brought down a Taube. The pilot and observer fled to the woods, but were captured. Accompanied by armoured motor-cars, the advance guard pushed on towards Neuve Eglise, killing and capturing numbers of the retreating enemy. No "formed bodies" were, however, met with. From the direction of Bailleul heavy firing was heard. At dusk the 7th Cavalry Brigade moved into billets at Kemmel, west of the Ypres-Armentières road; the 6th were at Wytschaete in touch with Gough's Cavalry Division, with which they had established contact during the day. On the 15th, the day of the German entry into Ostend, Byng's division rested.

As the Germans, issuing from Ostend, Bruges, and Ghent, might be expected to advance on



MOTOR FOR HEAVY TRANSPORT WORK.



GERMAN CAMP OUTSIDE OSTEND.

Ypres, Sir John French on the 16th placed the 3rd Cavalry Division round Langemark and Poeleapelle north-north-east of Ypres and south of the Forêt d'Houthulst. The Division, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade leading, moved via Ypres and Wieltje to the line Bixsehoote-Poeleapelle. It was reported that the enemy in large numbers were in the Forêt d'Houthulst and Oostnieuwkerke, and a patrol of the 2nd Life Guards was obliged to withdraw from Staden. There was intermittent fighting during the afternoon, and at dusk French troops relieved the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which was then billeted at Passchendaele, south-east of Poeleapelle. The 6th Cavalry Brigade was south of it at Nieuwemolen. The 7th Infantry Division extended east of Ypres in the wooded district from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke, south of Nieuwemolen. Supporting Sir Henry Rawlinson's Corps was General Bidon with the 87th French Territorial Division in Ypres and Vlamertinghe, and behind it, on the road to Dunkirk, the 89th French Territorial Division in Poperinghe. Sir Henry Rawlinson was to support the Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps on the Lys if he was not attacked by the Germans advancing from Ghent, Courtrai, Bruges, and Ostend.

The next day (October 17) four French Cavalry Divisions under General de Mitry deployed on Byng's left and drove the vanguard of the Germans from Ostend and Bruges out of the Forêt d'Houthulst.

The day before the German Army coming from Ostend had commenced its attack on the Allies defending the Yser.

A glance at the map will show that on October 14 the Germans, who were originally on the line Mont-des-Cats-Meteren-Estaires, were in imminent danger of being enveloped and their retreat cut. The operation orders of the 6th Bavarian Cavalry Division which were captured stated that, the right of the line having been forced to withdraw, the left was compelled to follow the movement.


While Rawlinson's Corps moved against the German rear, and while the French Territorial Divisions and the Cavalry Corps crumpled up the German right, the III. Corps moved on towards Bailleul, which was entered at 10 a.m. on October 14, and where many wounded Germans were captured. The town had been pillaged; a war-tax of £2,000—paid by the farmers of the neighbourhood—imposed, and several houses burned. Fourteen men of military age had been shot. There was a lunatic asylum in the town. With Teutonic humour, the Germans turned the hundred inmates out of doors. These poor creatures wandered about the country and many were afterwards found dead by the roadside or in the woods.* That night the III. Corps occupied the line St. Jans Cappel-Bailleul.

* See the account given by a native of Bailleul in the *Daily Chronicle* of October 26: "The Germans," he says, "are not soldiers so much as brigands and assassins."

The advance was resumed on the 15th in very foggy weather. The enemy offered a stubborn defence. As Ypres and Wytschaete were now in the hands of the Allies Sir John French had altered the direction of the III. Corps. He pushed it to the north bank of the Lys between Saily and Armentières. It will not be forgotten that Conneau's Cavalry Corps was on the south side of the river in the region of Estaires. By nightfall the 6th Infantry Division was at Saily-Bac St. Maur, the 4th at Nieppe on the road from Bailleul to Armentières. On the 15th the Cavalry Corps had been ordered to make for the Lys below Armentières. There had been an encounter near Messines on the 14th, and Sergeant C. Graham, of the 5th Lancers, for engaging with his revolver the enemy behind a barricade and, although badly wounded in the hand, giving a clear account of his reconnaissance whilst his hand was being dressed, subsequently

received the Medal for Distinguished Conduct. At sunset all the country on the north bank to some six or seven miles below Armentières (on the south bank) and all the bridges above it from Aire eastward were held by the Allied troops. Warneton, six miles or so east of Armentières, was taken in the following circumstances:

At the entrance to the town the Germans had constructed a high barricade loopholed at the bottom so that men could fire through it from a lying position. A squadron of British Cavalry rode up in the dark (October 16), but, nothing daunted, obtained help from the artillery, who man-handled a gun into position and blew the barricade to pieces. The cavalry then rode into the middle of the town. Hardly had they reached the further end of the large Place, when "one of the buildings appeared to leap skywards in a sheet of flame, a shower of star shells at the same time making the Place light as day." The enemy from the houses round the Place fired on the horsemen from rifles and machine-guns. The squadron retired with the loss of an officer wounded and nine men killed and wounded. Determined not to leave the wounded to the mercy of the dervishes of Central Europe, some troopers took off their boots, went back into the Place and succeeded in carrying away their bleeding comrades. Warneton was captured, but the bridge had been destroyed.



AN ADVANCED POST.

Armentières lies to the south of the Lys. A bridge connects it with Nieppe. After a few shells had been fired at the barricade on the bridge the Germans evacuated Armentières (October 16), leaving behind them fifty wounded, rifles, ammunition, and a motor-car. The river-line, almost as far east as Frelinghien, was in British or French hands. Armentières had been systematically plundered. The members of the Municipal Council and prominent factory owners had been arrested and held as hostages. The inhabitants, it need scarcely be said, welcomed with joy the British troops.

From the condition of the bridges over the Lys it is clear that the Germans had been completely surprised by the rapid offensive of the Allies. At Warneton the damaged bridge was being repaired; at Frelinghien the bridge had not been demolished and was defended; further west, at Houplines, the bridge was destroyed, but at Nieppe both the road bridge and railway bridge leading to Armentières were only barricaded, and the bridge at Erquinghem, west of Armentières, was neither defended nor broken. The Lys in this part of its course flows through a slight depression in the plain. It is from 45 ft. to 75 ft. wide, and only 6 ft. deep. At places it had been canalized. Many of the bridges were of the draw or swing type.

Accordingly, on the 17th, when Smith-Dorrien's Corps—the right wing of the Allied Forces engaged in the battle between La Bassée and Nieuport—had ended its offensive and the Germans from Ostend and Bruges had already* begun their attempt to break through the left wing on the Yser between the sea and Dixmude, the 3rd Corps (General Pulteney's) had crossed the Lys and occupied Armentières. "Took up outposts," writes a non-commissioned officer of the 1st North Staffords, "near Armentières at Wez Maequart and dug ourselves in." Both banks of the Lys up to Frelinghien were held by the Allies. To the north of the Lys the Cavalry Corps had taken Warneton and were reconnoitring towards Menin. "With a view to a further advance east," wrote Sir John French in his dispatch of November 20, 1914, "I ordered General Allenby, on the 15th, to reconnoitre the line of the River Lys, and endeavour to secure the passages on the opposite bank, pending the arrival of the III. and IV. Corps." From the 15th to the 19th this reconnaissance was



LOADING AN 18-pr. GUN.

most skilfully and energetically carried out, but, although valuable information was gained and strong forces of the enemy held in check, the Cavalry Corps was unable to secure passages or to establish a permanent footing on the southern bank of the river. On the 17th the III. Corps (Pulteney's) was on the line Bois Grenier-Le Gheir. The enemy were holding a line from Radinghem through Perenchies to Frelinghien and thence along the south bank of the Lys as far as the crossing at Wervicq.

On the 18th Sir John, trusting to the Belgians and French to maintain the line of the Yser, and to the Cavalry of de Mitry and the Territorials of Bidon to stop any German advance on Ypres through or past the Forêt d'Houthulst, ordered up Sir Henry Rawlinson's Corps—*i.e.*, Capper's Infantry and Byng's Cavalry Divisions—to the support of the Cavalry Corps. The 7th Infantry Division (Capper's) was to drive the Germans from Menin on the north bank of the Lys between Warneton and Courtrai. "I considered," says Sir John, "that the possession of Menin constituted a very important point of passage, and would much facilitate the advance of the rest of the Army." Sir John still hoped that the offensive of the Allies might be continued. The left of Capper's Division was to be supported by Byng's Cavalry and by the French Cavalry operating on the east of the Forêt d'Houthulst in the neighbourhood of Roulers. Sir Henry Rawlinson represented

* The Battle of the Yser began on October 16.



A GERMAN RANGE FINDER.

to Sir John French that large hostile forces were advancing upon him from the east and north-east and that his left flank was severely threatened, but Sir John, now that the I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's) was detraining at St. Omer, decided that Rawlinson's Corps should run the risk of an attack of the Germans on his flank.

The following account by a Flemish gentleman of the fighting round Roulers to the North-east of Ypres on October 18 and 19 will help to explain Sir H. Rawlinson's objections to Sir John French's plan:—

About the middle of this month thousands of German soldiers appeared in Roulers. On the doors of the houses they chalked the number of men to be billeted under each roof. The requisitions were numerous—carriages, barrows, horses, cycles, hay, oats, etc. Everything had to be supplied so quickly that the invaders had no time to give coupons. But as a reward they chalked here and there on a house the words "Good people."

On October 17 the German troops marched off in the direction of Dixmude, towards the coast, to strengthen the German forces between Ostend and Nieuport. A hundred men remained in occupation of Roulers. Early next morning, Sunday, the cry was heard along the road to Dixmude, "The French are here!" Seventeen Frenchmen appeared from the direction of Ypres and two hours later 200 French dragoons followed them. They concealed themselves in a little wood. The hundred Germans in the town got to know their whereabouts, perhaps through spies. A skirmish occurred in the little wood, and at 3 o'clock in the afternoon only 40 survivors of the German troops went back to the town.

The same evening many French troops marched into the town, and more arrived during the night. They built in the market-place and the streets barricades of mattresses, sacks, and barrels. Mitrailleuses were stationed behind pillar-boxes and in the porches of corner houses. Guns were placed in position at one of the approaches to the town.

The next morning, Monday, many German troops appeared from the direction of Bruges and Ghent. They placed their guns in three villages, Hoogledede, Ardoye, and Iseghem. At Hoogledede they had a specially good position, on the ridge of a hill, which runs straight through West Flanders. The Flemish people say that the threshold of the church of Hoogledede lies as high as the top of the tower of Roulers, which is about 245 feet high.

The Germans placed their guns in front of the church of Hoogledede, whence they saw Roulers lying below them. The French artillery began the action, but the Germans for a time did not answer. The clock of Roulers had struck 12 before they opened fire, and it rained shells on the town. Its population escaped into the cellars, anxiously awaiting the fate of their beloved town. The bombardment went on. Roofs fell in, walls reeled. The tower of the church of Notre Dame leaned over. A shell fell through the roof of St. Michael's Church and did much damage. Flames went up on several sides.

In the meantime German infantry tried to approach the town. Their advanced troops fortified themselves in railway carriages at the shunting station on the line Beveren-Roulers, but the French artillery on the Dixmude road shelled and destroyed the carriages. More troops were brought up and, towards evening, the Germans succeeded in forcing their way into the town. The fight was continued in the streets, but the French were obliged to retire. They fell back in good order, with all their guns, and took up new positions at East Nieuwerkerke, about three miles to the south-west.

Night came, and from afar one could see the fierce glow of burning Roulers. That night, however, the British advanced from Ypres and camped near Moorslede, with the French lying near the old battlefield of Roozobekke.

At the same time as Rawlinson's movement on Menin the III. Corps was to move down the south bank of the Lys from Armentières to assist the Cavalry Corps to cross to the right bank. To do this, the enemy between the III. Corps and Lille had first to be vigorously pushed back. On the night of the 17th the III. Corps and Cavalry Corps were being opposed by the 19th Saxon Corps, released from Lille after its capture, by at least one division of the 7th Corps, and by three or four divisions of cavalry. Reinforcements for the enemy were known to be coming up from the direction of Lille.

Despite the odds against him, Pulteney attacked on the 18th, but he made little progress. At nightfall his 6th Division had taken Radinghem and was holding Radinghem, La Vallée, Ennetières, Capinghem, and a point 300 yards east of Halte. A wounded soldier described the attack of Ennetières to a *Times* correspondent:

The advance began early yesterday morning. The enemy was driven out by shell fire. They retired towards Lille and shelled the village in their turn. Not a habitable house was left standing. The Allied troops advanced round the village under a terrible fire, taking cover under the walls of factory buildings. The enemy had taken the range of the buildings. Their fire was accurate. An officer with two companions mounted to the roof of a factory to make observations. A shrapnel shell burst on them at once, and all three were killed. In the village 500 German dead were found. The cart-

ridges found upon them were of the old Snider type with large lead bullets, some flattened at the top. I have seen two of them. Infantry succeeded in entrenching themselves on the farther side of the village. But their trenches were not more than two feet deep, and they had to lie full length in them. It was here in the trenches that my informant was wounded. A shrapnel struck the pile of earth in front of him, and a bullet from the bursting shell hit him on the head. It was a glancing shot, which inflicted a severe scalp wound. Just previously he had seen a shrapnel shell burst immediately over the heads of six men. "They are gone," he thought. But when the smoke had cleared away all six rose from the ground, unscathed.

It is clear that in the operations of the past week our troops have gained much ground. They are now, however, coming into touch with the main German position at Lille. Our men are now "digging themselves in" to hold their ground until the necessary reinforcements can reach them.

The 1st North Staffords were engaged round Wez Macquart. A non-commissioned officer mentions that a Roman Catholic Father gave his chum and him a bottle of wine at 10.30 p.m., which gave them sleep. "May God bless him for it," he observes.

The 4th Division held the line from L'Épinette to the Lys at a point 400 yards south of Frelinghien and thence to a point on the Lys half a mile south-east of Le Gheir. The Corps Reserve was at Armentières station, with its right flank in touch with Conneau's Cavalry Corps. South-west, at Aubers, began

the left wing of Smith-Dorrien's force, which during the 18th was violently but unsuccessfully attacked by the Germans between Lille and La Bassée. The left of Pulteney's Reserve joined hands with the Cavalry Corps, and, beyond the Cavalry Corps on the north bank of the Lys, the 7th Infantry Division was advancing on Menin.

On October 19 Sir H. Rawlinson—with Byng's Cavalry Division on his left—tried to carry out Sir John French's orders to drive the enemy through Menin, but the task was beyond his power. His Corps (the IV.) was worn out by constant marching and fighting, and the Germans were in overwhelming force. By 10 a.m. the 7th Cavalry Brigade, attacked by bodies of the enemy from Roulers, which had been occupied by the Germans, fell back three-quarters of a mile to a strong position. "K" Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery, which had been attached to the Brigade, came into action north of Moorslede and rendered great assistance. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, with "C" Battery, advanced from St. Pieter and, after a brisk little action captured Ledeghem and Rollegheincappelle. But the enemy from Roulers continued to press on, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade was withdrawn to the high



BRITISH MOTOR-AMBULANCE WRECKED BY GERMAN FIRE.

ground east of Moorslede. This exposed the flank of the 6th Cavalry Brigade and, as large hostile forces were reported advancing from Courtrai, it was ordered to fall back gradually on Moorslede and thence to withdraw to billets at Poelcapelle. Its retirement was covered by the 7th Brigade, which, under heavy shell fire, retreated to Zonnebeke. The French took over Passchendaele, north of Zonnebeke.

The pressure of the Germans on Byng had decided Sir Henry Rawlinson not to attack Menin. "He probably exercised a wise judgment," says Sir John French, "in not committing his troops to this attack in their somewhat weakened condition; but the result was that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid reinforcement of his troops, and thus rendered any further advance impracticable." Through Menin ran the railway from Lille to Roulers, and one from Courtrai.

The I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's) had completed its detrainment on the 19th and was concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck. "A question of vital importance," writes Sir John French, "now arose for decision." To which point of the line of battle should the I. Corps be dispatched? The enemy on the Lys, it was apparent, were in very superior numbers, and the II., III., IV. and the Cavalry Corps were holding a much wider front than their strength warranted. Should the I. Corps be sent to the line of the Lys? The objection was that the German 3rd Reserve Corps and at least one Landwehr Division were known to be operating in the region north and east of Ypres, and that the enemy were bringing up large reinforcements from the east, which for several days could only be opposed by two or three French Cavalry Divisions, the two Territorial Divisions and the Belgian Army, which was badly in need of a rest after its heroic exertions. Unless some substantial resistance could be offered on the Yser and between the Yser and Ypres the Allied flank

would be turned and the Channel Ports laid bare to the enemy. "I judged," says Sir John, "that a successful movement of this kind [on the part of the Germans] would be fraught with such disastrous consequences that the risk of [the II., III., IV. and Cavalry Corps] operating on so extended a front must be undertaken."

On the evening of the 19th Sir John had a personal interview with Sir Douglas Haig, and the latter was instructed to advance with the I. Corps through Ypres to Thourout. His immediate objective was to be the capture of Bruges. If Bruges were taken the communications of the Germans attacking the line of the Yser would be cut. When Bruges was captured Sir Douglas was, if possible, to drive the enemy towards Ghent. But it was left to him to decide after he had traversed Ypres whether he would move on Bruges or towards the Lys. Sir John had arranged for de Mitry's Cavalry to operate on the left, and Byng's Cavalry Division on the right of the 1st Corps. The 7th Infantry Division (Capper's) was to "conform generally" to the movements of the I. Corps. As for the Cavalry Corps and the III. and II. Corps on the north and south banks of the Lys, they were to remain on the defensive. The forces which the enemy had accumulated on their front precluded any other course. The Lahore Division of the Indian Expeditionary Force was arriving in its concentration area in rear of the II. Corps on October 19 and 20.

The I. Corps on October 20 reached a line from Elverdinghe to the cross-roads one-and-a-half miles north-west of Zonnebeke. Why Sir Douglas Haig was unable to carry out Sir John's plan for the capture of Bruges will be described in a subsequent number. The Battle of Ypres was about to begin; the Battle of the Yser had been in progress for four days. The reader must not forget that during the fighting from La Bassée to Nieuport the Battles of Arras and Roye-Péronne continued to the south along a line of about 100 miles



CHAPTER XLIX.

THE INTERVENTION OF TURKEY.

TURKEY AND GREECE—THE CRISIS IN 1914—GERMAN POLICY AT CONSTANTINOPLE—GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKISH SHIPS—GOEBEN AND BRESLAU IN THE DARDANELLES—GRAND VIZIER'S PROMISES OF NEUTRALITY—DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS—ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS—GERMANY FORCES WAR—ENTENTE AMBASSADORS LEAVE TURKEY.

WHEN the European crisis grew to a head in the closing days of July, 1914, it obscured a minor, but very acute, crisis between Turkey and Greece, which seemed to mean that we were on the eve of a war between those two countries. There had been a series of shameless persecutions of Greek Christians in Asia Minor, and there still remained as a legacy from the war of the Balkan Allies against Turkey the question of the future ownership of the islands of the Dodecanese. The dispute was further aggravated by a contest for naval supremacy. Turkey had ordered two battleships in England, which were expected to be ready for delivery in the autumn, but Greece had retahated, and forestalled her rival, by the purchase of two cruisers from the United States Government, which were expected to reach Greek waters at the end of July. Both countries had British naval missions hard at work, increasing the efficiency of their fleets, and it was obvious that if war were declared in the summer the arrival of the American cruisers would give the advantage in the Aegean Sea to Greece, while if Turkey protracted the crisis until the delivery of the British-built Dreadnoughts a superiority, at least in tonnage and in guns, would rest with

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Turkey. M. Venezelos, who always showed high qualities of moderation and statesmanship, made a final and, as it was then believed, despairing attempt to compose the quarrel. A meeting was arranged to take place at Brussels between M. Venezelos and Prince Said Halim Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier. M. Venezelos duly left Athens for Brussels, and proceeding up the Adriatic to Trieste reached Munich. The Grand Vizier, however, who was to have left Constantinople at the same time, was so much impressed by the growing gravity of the crisis that he failed to keep his engagement, and did not leave Constantinople. By the time M. Venezelos had reached Munich the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia had been launched. Europe was on the eve of war, and the railways in Austria and Serbia were already in the hands of the military authorities.

Greater evils drive out less, and not the least astounding result of the outbreak of the great war in Europe was the fact that the minor danger of war between Greece and Turkey disappeared for a time. Yet neither country could be indifferent to the great conflagration, and here, too, as might have been expected, their sympathies were on opposite sides. Turkey had for years past been to all intents and pur-



THE SULTAN

Leaving the Mosque after the declaration of war.

poses a member of the Triple Alliance, and if not a very effective partner she had in her sympathies been a much more real ally of Germany and Austria than had Italy—the nominal third member of the Triple Alliance. It is true that there was somewhat of a diplomatic tangle. With Italy Turkey was at war from 1911 to 1912, and with Austrian diplomacy also she had had stormy passages in recent years, notably after the Young Turk Revolution when the Dual Monarchy in October, 1908, suddenly declared the annexation of the already occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with Germany, since the advent of William II. to the throne, she had increasingly intimate relations. Bismarck may have declared that the Eastern Question was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, but in this domain as in others Bismarck's politics were entirely discarded in modern Prussia. It had been long decided that Germany was to be Turkey's patron. In the days of Abdul Hamid's tyranny it was a simple matter to buy the Palace clique at Yildiz Kiosk, and by this means she had begun the policy of securing political and commercial ascendancy, of advancing her trade interests, and of exploiting the great mineral wealth of the Empire. The Kaiser himself went to Constantinople and visited Palestine, for it was to Asiatic

Turkey that Germany's longing eyes were turned. "Peaceful penetration" was her method, and with the ever pecuniarily embarrassed Turk she found many opportunities of strengthening her hold in his country. To build and own his railways, to be his banker, to teach his soldiers drill, to sell him Krupp guns, and to dominate his diplomacy, were the objects which she pursued, in the hope that one day, either by some dramatic turn of events or gradually and almost imperceptibly, the Sultan's sceptre in Asia would pass from the feeble Oriental grasp into her own firm hands. The advent to power of the Young Turks in 1908 temporarily checked the march of German influence at Constantinople, and the friends of Abdul Hamid were out of court. But Germany had the good fortune to be represented at Constantinople by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, a singularly able diplomatist, who rapidly gained the confidence of the new party, and cleverly represented to it that whether Old Turks or Young Turks were in power the interests of the Empire in its relations with foreign Powers remained precisely the same, and that, whatever might have been the defects of Abdul Hamid's internal administration, his foreign policy had been conducted with real regard to the safety of his country. Yet it



THE CROWN PRINCE OF TURKEY
(centre).



CONSTANTINOPLE,
Showing the Golden Horn and Stambul.

might have been apparent that this was precisely the reverse of the truth. For Abdul Hamid, in his long years of feeble tyranny, had not only brought Turkey to the direst straits internally but had greatly imperilled her international position, exposed her to a long series of humiliations and severely tried and chilled the once warm and well tried friendship of Great Britain and France, the two naval Mediterranean Powers which held Turkey in the hollow of their hands.

The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and the Italian declaration of war against Turkey placed Germany in an exceedingly difficult position, but she managed to maintain her influence at Constantinople through these trying periods. Then came Turkey's disastrous war with the Balkan Allies, in which Germany's sympathies were on the side of Turkey, though German friendship was confined entirely to good wishes and Turkey was left to stomach

her defeats as best she might. There followed the war between Bulgaria and her former Allies, Serbia and Greece, and when, at its conclusion, the Treaty of Bukarest was made, the German Emperor busied himself to secure the retention of Adrianople by Turkey. Doubtless he and the German General Staff had been sadly disillusioned as to the military capabilities of their friends, but they were still determined to continue their old programme of exploiting Turkey, and they had a definite plan for dragging her into the European conflict which was not far distant.

When at last the Great War broke out it became evident that Turkish neutrality was not likely to endure for long. Complications, also, very soon sprang up. On August 3 Sir Edward Grey instructed Mr. Beaumont, the British chargé d'affaires, to inform the Turkish Government that Great Britain desired to take over the Turkish battleship,



THE SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM PROCLAIMING A HOLY WAR.

Sultan Osman, then under construction by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co. The Grand Vizier gave an assurance that Turkey intended to observe a strict neutrality, and explained that the Turkish mobilization, already begun, had been ordered only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of any aggression. Sir Edward Grey replied by expressing his conviction that the Turkish Government would understand the necessity for Great Britain to keep in England all warships available for England's own use, and gave an assurance that all financial and other loss to Turkey would receive due consideration. Further, he added that if Turkey remained neutral no alteration would be made in the status of Egypt.

Germany, however, rapidly thickened the plot. At 8.30 p.m. on August 10 the German warships Goeben and Breslau reached the Dardanelles. It was the duty of Turkey, as a neutral Power, to see that they did not pass through, and that they should either leave before twenty-four hours, or be disarmed and laid up. The next day the world was astonished by the news that the Ottoman Government had bought the Goeben and Breslau. The Grand

Vizier informed the British chargé d'affaires that the purchase was due to Great Britain's detention of the battleship Sultan Osman. Turkey, he said, must have a ship to bargain with in regard to the question of the Islands on equal terms with Greece, and he declared that the purchase was not due to any intention to make war upon Russia. At the same time he asked that the British Naval Mission might be allowed to remain. To this request Sir Edward Grey replied that if the crews of the Goeben and Breslau were returned at once to Germany there would be no need to withdraw the Naval Mission. Thereupon Admiral Limpus received a message that crews would be made up for the Goeben and Breslau, and that there was no intention of sending the two ships outside the Sea of Marmora until the end of the war. This was on August 14, but on the very next day Admiral Limpus and all the officers of the British Naval Mission were suddenly replaced in their executive command by Turkish officers and were ordered, if they remained, to work at the Ministry of Marine. A delightful Turkish explanation of this *volte face* was given by the Grand Vizier, who, on the following day, solemnly assured Great Britain that Turkish neutrality would be

maintained. A certain number of German experts would be left on the Goeben and Breslau, owing to the inability of the Turks to handle these ships themselves. "It would," he declared, "have been an impossible position for Admiral Limpus if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps the reason of his withdrawal from executive command may lie in this consideration."

The Grand Vizier, who daily distributed smooth assurances to the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers, may have been weakly anxious to preserve neutrality, while the War Minister, Enver Pasha, carried on a strong propaganda in favour of immediate adhesion to the Triple Alliance. Not only was the army mobilized, but a new field of mines was laid in the Dardanelles in the first week of August, and warlike preparations were daily more and more in evidence. The attitude of England was one of marked forbearance. On August 16 the British chargé d'affaires was instructed, as were his colleagues of the Entente, to declare to the Turkish Government that if Turkey would observe strict neutrality during the war, England, France, and Russia would uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that might wish to use the European conflict in order to attack her. When the British Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, who



TALAAAT BEY,
Minister of Interior.

had been on leave at the outbreak of the European War, returned to his post he telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, on August 18, that he had been accorded a most cordial reception by the Grand Vizier, and that though the situation was delicate he had



CROWD LISTENING TO THE READING OF THE PROCLAMATION.



A VIEW OF THE BOSPHORUS.

great hopes that if His Majesty's Government would exercise patience it might yet be saved. In reply to his inquiry as to whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee the Grand Vizier would give that the Goeben and Breslau would be used neither against Great Britain nor Russia, the Minister replied that neither would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean. Sir Louis Mallet added, "His Highness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorized in your telegrams of August 16. He said that this would be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pass. I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of the Grand Vizier in these utterances."

Nevertheless, the fissure between the two parties was so great that on August 19 Sir Louis Mallet telegraphed: "In view of the possibility of a coup d'état being attempted with the assistance of the Goeben in cooperation with the military authorities under German influence, who exercise complete control, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the presence of the British Fleet at the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any misunderstanding as to the gravity of the situation notwithstanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier."

In order to avoid a conflict Sir Edward Grey was prepared to go so far as to recognize the sale of the Goeben and Breslau provided it were a genuine one. He informed the Turkish Ambassador in London that Turkey would have nothing to fear from Great Britain, and that her integrity would be preserved in any

conditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutrality during the war, made the Goeben and Breslau entirely Turkish by sending away the German crews of those vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels. Turkey, however, greeted this striking concession in a most remarkable manner, and on August 20 Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, called on Sir Louis Mallet and made the astonishing proposal that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately, that the two Turkish battleships acquired by Great Britain at the outbreak of war should be returned immediately; that interference in the internal affairs of Turkey should be renounced; that Western Thrace should be restored to Turkey if Bulgaria were to join the Triple Alliance, and that the Greek Islands should be restored. Even in the face of these extraordinary demands Sir Edward Grey replied that he did not wish to refuse all discussion, and the English, French and Russian Ambassadors addressed the following communication to the Porte: "If the Turkish Government will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the Goeben and Breslau, will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed

by Turkey during the present war, the three allied Powers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitulations, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration which will satisfy modern conditions is set up. They will, further, give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity."

This remarkable pronouncement was made in vain. The war party in the Cabinet, although in a minority, relied on the guns of the Goeben to overawe the Sultan himself, if necessary, and continued to drive their unwilling colleagues. On September 9 the Porte sent a Note to the Powers, in which it announced the abolition of the Capitulations, as from October 1. Even the German and Austrian Ambassadors made a show of resenting this unwarrantable act, and on the following day identical Notes were addressed by the six Great Powers to the Sublime Porte, in which it was pointed out that the capitulatory regime was not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements and contractual acts of different kinds. It could not, therefore, be abolished without the consent of the contracting parties, and, in the



RECRUITS AND RESERVISTS FROM PALESTINE, on the left;
Regulars on the right.



SIR LOUIS MALLET,
British Ambassador at Constantinople.

absence of any understanding between the Ottoman Government and their respective Governments, the Ambassadors refused to recognize the executive force of a unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte.

The whole area of the Dardanelles, Con-

stantinople, and the Bosphorus was rapidly becoming neither more nor less than a German enclave. Special trains full of German sailors with officers were run through Bulgaria, and by the end of August the total passed through, over and above the original crews of the Goeben and the Breslau, was over six hundred. In addition to these, many German military reservists arrived, and were posted to garrison the Dardanelles forts. The German admiral on board the Goeben and the German Government were the absolute masters of the situation and were in a position to force the hand of the Turks at any moment which might suit them, and steady pressure was exerted to prepare public opinion for hostilities. Sir Louis Mallet, in the dispatch wherein on his return to London he summarized the events which led up to the final rupture of diplomatic relations, showed clearly enough the methods employed. German success in the European war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries, represented as groaning under Christian rule, might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one Great Power of the East, even



TURKISH TROOPS LEAVING FOR THE FRONT.

as Germany would be the one Great Power of the West. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion and to inflame it against the Allies was set at work, with the connivance, and often with the cooperation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople became German organs: they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria and minimized every disaster or reverse. The semi-official telegraphic agency, which was practically a department of the Ministry of the Interior, was placed at the disposal of the German propaganda. Through all these channels unlimited use was made of Turkey's one concrete grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, the detention of the two Dreadnoughts, the Sultan Osman and the Reshadie. The populace had contributed freely to the fund raised by voluntary subscription to defray the cost of these much-desired vessels, and there is no doubt that bitter disappointment was felt when the turn of events prevented or postponed their acquisition.


The "Committee of Union and Progress," the chief organization of the Young Turk Movement, which had its origin in Salonika, had been torn by many intrigues and feuds since its first great public triumph in 1908. But a rump remained of which the most powerful members were Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance. Of these Djavid Bey alone was a champion of neutrality, and Berlin, finding his opposition uncompromising, in the end forced his resignation. Enver Pasha was an open and whole-hearted partisan of Germany. Talaat Bey, described by Sir Louis Mallet as "the most powerful civilian in the Cabinet and the most conspicuous of the Committee leaders," was no less real an adherent, though it was not till early in October that he was openly reckoned as a member of the war party. Djemal Pasha, likewise, wore the mask of neutrality for long, but only in order to attempt to conceal the preparations which were being made. Against these, at least apparently, were ranged the Sultan, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, and the remaining members of the Ministry—enough to constitute a clear majority against a desperate venture, but unfortunately the majority had no means of asserting itself against the folly of the



TEWFIK PASHA,
Turkish Ambassador in London, leaving the
Embassy.

fire-eaters, who in the last resort were prepared to train the guns of the Goeben upon Constantinople itself. Both the pro-Germans and the Germans themselves, however, were anxious to retain the Grand Vizier in office if possible, and to avoid a *coup d'état*. As Sir Louis Mallet later pointed out, it was clearly only as an extreme step that the Monarch whom Pan-Islamic pro-Germans acclaimed as the hope of Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard as hardly distinguishable from a true believer, would run the risk of scandalizing the Moslem world, whom he hoped to set ablaze to the undoing of England, Russia, and France, by using the guns of the Goeben to force the hands of the Sultan-Caliph.

On September 21 the British Ambassador saw the Sultan for the last time, and read to him a personal message from King George, who expressed his profound regret that "the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances" had compelled Great Britain to detain the two



MOBILIZATION.

Marching into Constantinople to join the Colours.

warships intended for the Turkish Navy, and expressed the hope that the decision to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the European War would suffice to prove that their detention was due to "no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to us by a friendship of more than a century." "My Sovereign," said the Ambassador, "trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and that there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish Government."

The Sultan listened to his communication in silence until the Master of the Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words "certain facts contrary to neutrality." He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. The rest of this interesting interview is best recorded in the Ambassador's own words:

On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officers and crews on board the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. The "captains" available in the Turkish Navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done. The German crews would be sent away in "five or ten days," and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak frankly, he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need

these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and his Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this more than once, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be supposed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey.

When referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, I expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on my referring to the circumstances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the admiral had left Constantinople without an audience. The admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, the Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King, who would be gratified at receiving them.

Just before I took my leave, His Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace rather lost than gained in force by the way in which the Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resentfully, worded.

Amongst the "facts contrary to neutrality" there was much more than the case of the

Goeben and the Breslau. British merchant vessels carrying cargoes from Russia to the Mediterranean had throughout August been subjected to delays and searches at the Dardanelles, and for one incident at the harbour of Chanak the Turkish Government had been compelled to tender an apology. On the other hand, the case of the Goeben and Breslau had compelled the British Navy to keep a close watch at the entrance of the Straits, which greatly perturbed the Turks. On September 26 a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside the Dardanelles and turned back. Thereupon the Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits, and in spite of assurances given by the Grand Vizier they were not re-opened. The Goeben and the Breslau made cruises in the Black Sea, and numerous German vessels, of which the most important were the *Corcovado* and the *General*, served as auxiliaries to this German Black Sea Fleet. Secret communications with the German General Staff were established early in August by means of the wireless apparatus of the *Corcovado*, which was anchored opposite the German Embassy at Therapia. Other German ships played with the Turkish flag as they pleased, in order to facilitate their voyages, or cloak their real character while in port, and a department was constituted at the German Embassy for the purpose of requisitioning supplies for the

use of the German Government and their ships.

By the middle of September it was calculated that there were over 4,000 German soldiers and sailors in Constantinople alone. The officers of the German military mission, under General Liman von Sanders, displayed "a ubiquitous activity," and were the main organizers of preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt, and became a source of pre-occupation and a theme of remonstrance to the British Government.

In October a new weight was cast into the scale by the importation of large quantities of bullion consigned to the German Ambassador, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank. The total amount was estimated at £4,000,000. A definite arrangement was arrived at with the war group of Ministers that as soon as the financial provision reached a certain figure Turkey could be called upon to declare war. The attempt to win over the Grand Vizier and induce him to make the declaration was finally abandoned, and by the last week in October it was decided that drastic steps to provoke the outbreak must be taken. On October 29 it was reported from Cairo that an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins had made an incursion into the Sinai peninsula, and occupied the wells of Magdala, and that their objective was an attack on the Suez



BEDOUIN INFANTRY.



[Barratt.]

PRINCE SAID HALIM PASHA,
Grand Vizier, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Canal. On the morning of the same day three Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa harbour, sank the Russian guardship Donetz, damaged the French ship Portugal, killing two of the crew, and also damaged three Russian steamers.


Some loss of life was caused in the town itself by shell-fire. Theodosia was likewise bombarded. The British Ambassador records that it was certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German admiral on the evening of October 27. The grave news reached Constantinople on the afternoon of October 29. M. Bompard, the French Ambassador, and Sir Louis Mallet immediately called on M. de Giers, their Russian colleague, and decided to ask for authority from their Governments to confront the Porte with the alternative of the rupture of diplomatic relations or the dismissal of the German naval and military missions.

In the following words the British Ambassador describes the end of that friendship of more than a century, of which King George had so lately and so vainly reminded the unhappy Sultan Mohammed V. :

On the morning of the 30th, however, I learnt from my Russian colleague that he had received instructions from his Government immediately to ask for his passports. He had written to the Grand Vizier to ask for an interview, which his Highness had begged him to postpone until the following day owing to indisposition. The instructions of my Russian colleague being in a categorical form, he had therefore been constrained to address a note to the Grand Vizier demanding his passports; and I and my French colleague, acting on the instructions, with which the Ambassadors of the allied Powers had at my suggestion already been furnished, to leave Constantinople simultaneously should any one of them be compelled to ask for his passports, owing either to a Turkish declaration of war or to some intolerable act of hostility, decided without further delay to



GENERAL LIMAN VON SANDERS (centre) AND HIS STAFF.



THE "BRESLAU" ("MIDILLU")
Flying the Turkish flag.

write to the Grand Vizier and ask in our turn for interviews to enable us to carry out these instructions. In view of his Highness's indisposition we had not expected to be received that day, but a few hours later the Grand Vizier sent us word that he would, nevertheless, be glad to see us, and notwithstanding the excuse which he had made earlier in the day he received the Russian Ambassador also in the course of the afternoon. My interview with the Grand Vizier partly coincided with that of M. de Giers, and preceded that of M. Bompard. It was of a painful description. His Highness convinced me of his sincerity in disclaiming all knowledge of or participation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable. I replied that the time had passed for assurances. The crisis which I had predicted to his Highness at almost every interview which I had had with him since my return had actually occurred, and unless some adequate satisfaction were immediately given by the dismissal of the German missions, which could alone prevent the recurrence of attempts upon Egyptian territory and attacks on Russia, war with the Allies was inevitable. My Russian colleague had already demanded his passports, and I must, in pursuance of the instructions I had received, follow the same course. The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent. In reply to the doubt which I expressed as to the means at his disposal, he said that he had on his side moral forces which could not but triumph, and that he meant to fight on to the end. He did not, indeed, hint at a possibility of immediately dismissing the German mission, but he informed me that there was to be a meeting of the Council at his house that evening, when he would call upon his colleagues to support him in his determination to avert war with the allied Powers.

The Council was duly held, and, as he had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand


Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favour of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey. But the powerlessness of the Sultan's Ministers to do more than vote in the Council Chamber was evident. The question of dismissing the German naval officers was discussed, but no decision to do so was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the expulsion of the military mission. In the interval the War party had sealed their resolution to go forward, by publishing a communiqué in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side. Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public.

It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German admiral's *coup*, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice.

The story of a Russian provocation was plainly an afterthought, and if the official report of the Russian Government were not sufficient to disprove it, I could produce independent evidence to show that the orders to begin hostilities were given at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the evening of October 27 as the result of a conspiracy hatched between the German representatives in Constantinople and a small and unscrupulous Turkish faction.

My Russian colleague left Constantinople without incident on the evening of October 31. My own departure was eventually arranged for the following evening, when I left for Dedeagatch, accompanied by my staff of sixty officials and their families; the British advisers in the service of the Turkish Government and some other British subjects also travelled with me. My French colleague and his staff left by the same train.

Owing to the wanton refusal of the military authorities at the last moment to allow the departure of a great number of British and French subjects who were to have left by an earlier train than that which had been



DJEMAL PASHA, MINISTER OF MARINE
 (fifth from the right), with Turkish and German Officers on board the "Goeben"
 ("Sultan Yawuz Selim").

placed at my disposal, the station was for some hours the scene of indescribable confusion and turmoil.

My protests and those of the French Ambassador were disregarded, and after protracted discussion, we agreed to leave matters in the hands of the United States Ambassador, who undertook to use all his influence to procure the departure of our fellow subjects on the following day. The "sous-chef de protocole" of the Sublime Porte and the "chef de cabinet particulier" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sent to bid farewell

to M. Bompard and myself at the railway station, and two Secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry accompanied us to the frontier.

Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador, was left in charge of both French and British interests at Constantinople. The Italian Ambassador fulfilled a like function for Russia,



CHAPTER L.

THE TURKISH ARMY.

TURKISH MILITARY SYSTEM—GERMAN REFORMS—DIFFICULTIES OF CONSCRIPTION—THE BALKAN WARS—THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM—ENVER PASHA AND THE REVOLUTION—SKETCH OF THE YOUNG TURK MOVEMENT—ENVER'S CAREER—GERMAN INTRIGUES—THE LIMAN MILITARY MISSION—ITS DIFFICULTIES—PEACE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY—DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY CORPS.

OF all military forces in Europe the Turkish Army is the most difficult to estimate with any approach to accuracy. No Government by skilful artifice could be more successful in baffling the curiosity of the outsider than is the Turk by the simpler means of statistical incompetence and a natural disinclination to make practice march with theory.

In the years immediately preceding the war the army had been subjected to a series of successive reforms, carried out under the guidance of German officers, and no exact accounts were ever published of the extent or nature of these reforms. Indeed, it may be said with confidence that so great was the tangle of Turkish military administration, so incompetent and weak the central control over provincial commands, contractors, and remote officials, that the German reorganizers of the Turkish Army must themselves have had but an inaccurate knowledge of the reserves in men and material at their disposal. There are many signs that, over a long period of years, both before and after the Balkan Wars, and into the present campaigns, they had con-

sistently overestimated the military possibilities of modern Turkey.

Theoretically the Turkish system bore a general resemblance to that of the rest of Europe. The principle of conscription had long been recognized, but during the reign of Abdul Hamid the Christian population of the Empire was not allowed to serve in the army and was forced to pay a heavy tax instead. With the advent of the Young Turks to power there came a supposed change, and under the Constitution Christians were liable for military service. The Balkan Christian, as might have been expected, did not prove a very enthusiastic defender of the Sultan's power, and the Turks complained bitterly that in the battles of Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas, fought in the Thracian campaign of 1912, the Christian soldiers deserted in large numbers to the Bulgarian standard. The Balkan War and the treaties of London and Bukarest deprived Turkey of the most warlike Christian population of the Empire. The Armenian and the Syrian added little strength, and since the disasters of 1912 and 1913 the Young Turkish experiment of using Christian material had been discredited.

Jews figured in the army, but they were not a very important element, and in the main it may be said that the Turkish Government had to rely for its defence upon a system of conscription applied only to the Musulmans of the Empire. This statement, unfortunately for the Turk, requires another important qualification, for the Turkish writ ran but lamely amongst the Arab provinces. The Yemen had for many years been in a state either of active or simmering rebellion, and instead of being a source of supply had been a grave for fine battalions of the Turkish Army. It may be calculated that out of an Empire which may be estimated as containing 20,000,000 inhabitants the Turkish Army could only draw soldiers from a population of some 8,000,000—men, women, and children.

Men were liable for service from twenty to forty years of age. Nine years were spent with the First Line or Active Service Army, of which in the case of infantry three were with the colours, in the case of cavalry and artillery four; six and five years respectively were spent in the reserve. Nine years were spent in the Redif, or reserve of the active troops (Nizam). There was, properly speaking, no second line, and the Redif corresponded to the German Landwehr. The last two years were spent in the Territorial Militia (Mustafiz). This line is sometimes referred to as the Landsturm, but it possessed no cadres in peace time, and was most generally found without arms in war time.

In principle a Turkish Army Corps consisted of three divisions or thirty battalions. It had thirty batteries of field, three of horse, and three of mountain artillery. A battery had six guns, and each corps had 216 guns. A field battery had four officers, and 120 non-commissioned officers and men; a mountain battery had three officers and 100 non-commissioned officers and men, and a howitzer battery had four officers and 120 non-commissioned officers and men. There were eleven battalions in all of pioneers, railway troops, telegraph troops, sappers and miners, etc. There were in 1912 140 quick-firing Krupp mountain guns of 7.5 cm., the majority of which fell into the hands of Bulgars, Serbs, and Greeks. Since then, however, 108 Schneider quick-firing mountain guns were received from France, and the Austrian Skoda Works had doubtless by the date when Turkey entered the war delivered the large order given them for 10.5 cm. quick-firing howitzers. Many batteries had, instead of the regulation 7.5 cm. quick-firing Krupp field gun, the old pattern field gun of 8.7 cm.

In October, 1912, only eight army corps took the field, and these lost the greater part of their field artillery. Under German reorganization most of the batteries seemed to have four guns, but some had six; a four-company organization appeared



TURKISH CAMEL TRANSPORT.



TURKISH AEROPLANE ABOUT TO FLY FROM ST. STEFANO TO CONSTANTINOPLE.

to have replaced the old five-company battalion. The infantry of the first line was armed with a 7.65 mm. Mauser magazine rifle. The Redifs were supposed to have the same, but many had the 9.5 mm. Mauser, and the supply was eked out with Martini-Henrys.

The cavalry consisted in 1912 of 40 regiments, or 200 squadrons, of 70 men, armed with a sabre and a Mauser carbine. One of the peculiar institutions created and fostered by Abdul Hamid was the Hamidian cavalry. They consisted of bands of Asiatic tribesmen, chiefly Kurds, whose official business was to protect the frontiers that look towards Russia and Persia, but whose actual duty, carried out with great zest, was to make life a burden to the Christian inhabitants of the Armenian vilayets, where they slaughtered, pillaged and ravaged to their hearts' content. Under the Turco-German reform scheme the Hamidian cavalry were abolished, and 24 regiments of tribal cavalry, organized on a militia system from the Kurdish and Arab tribes in Asia Minor, were substituted for it. The leopard, however, does not change its spots, and the Kurdish tribal cavalryman, whether styled Hamidian or not, probably remained very much as he was.

The Minister of War was entirely responsible for the army, but he was assisted by the Chief of the General Staff, and by an Under-Secretary, or Musteshar, who was always a general officer.

The General Staff department consisted of four sections, and outside these there was a director-general of military factories, a sort of master-general of ordnance, who was formerly completely independent, but was made by the Young Turks subordinate to the Minister of War. He still had his own independent budget, which was presented separately to Parliament. For the last two years, however, before the war the authority of the Minister of War had been daily abdicated in favour of General Liman von Sandars, otherwise known as Liman Pasha, who was the chief of a very numerous German military mission to Turkey. The history of European reform in the Turkish Army is a long record of failure. During the Crimean War, when Turkey and Great Britain were allies, British officers in considerable numbers were accredited to the Turkish Army, and succeeded, temporarily, in the face of intrigue, corruption, jealousy, and heart-breaking obstacles of every kind, in working considerable improvement and in making good use of the always magnificent material which the Turkish Army provided.

The story of General Fenwick Williams' heroic defence of Kars is a typical example of the work which Englishmen were called upon to do and of the tremendous obstacles which they had to fight, but there have been many minor parallels to this striking and well-known case. Williams was sent to Kars as a British Commis-



TURKISH INFANTRY.

sioner, and, strictly speaking, his only duties were to transmit to his own Government a report of the state of affairs in the Turkish camp. He arrived in the autumn of 1854, and it is more than probable that, if he had confined himself to his duties, there would have been no Turkish Army in the following year. But this remarkable man, who had spent the greater part of his life in the East and had been many years in Turkey, was not content to be an observer in such critical hours. He saw the key of Turkey in Asia defended by an armed rabble, which had already been ruined by its own officers and was rapidly dissolving owing to plunder and peculation. The position which he found was "an innovation in all military science." The artillery was nearest the enemy, the infantry close to the city, and the cavalry far away southwards on the road to Erzurum. The Commander-in-Chief was supposed to have a Staff, but the only plan of operations in his mind was the vague one that he had to fight the Giaours.

When the news was spread that a British Commissioner was arriving there were frantic efforts made to burnish up accoutrements and introduce a little order into the camp, but Williams was not to be deceived. He at once interfered, and, as has been well said, he thereby committed a breach of etiquette, but saved Asia Minor. Instead of accepting the muster-rolls of the troops which were handed to him, he had the men counted, and, summoning to his presence all the gang of corrupt officers and

contractors, he called them sternly to account and immediately established a strong personal ascendancy which he never afterwards lost.

In all the history of Turkish official corruption there has been no more disgraceful instance than that of Kars in the Crimean War. The Englishmen in the town came to the conclusion that dishonesty was the only system which appeared to be well organized. They were, in fact, thoroughly disgusted with their allies and acquired a great respect for their enemies, the Russians. Then, as now, the Armenians were strongly on the side of Russia, and one of Williams' officers records that the Tsar, throughout all his vast dominions, did not possess more staunch and zealous partisans than these Ottoman subjects. But, he added, "our indignation at their open and industrious partisanship in favour of the enemy was somewhat modified when we heard of the wrongs and oppressions which had been abundantly heaped on them." In spite of lies, treachery, and cholera within, and of the complete failure of Omar Pasha to relieve him from the coast or Selim Pasha from Erzurum, Williams held the fortress till the end of November, 1855, when at last he was compelled to surrender.

Later on another Englishman, General Valentine Baker, known as Baker Pasha, established, like Williams, a strong personal influence over the Turks, and during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 achieved a great military position. Yet so great was the Turks' distrust of foreigners that Baker complained

that up to the end his authority could only be exercised in an indirect manner, and that he was never actually allowed to command troops or to give a direct order.

A similar bitter experience befell the officers who at various times were the instruments of the reform schemes of the great Powers in Turkey. Their work, it is true, was not in the army, but in the gendarmerie, but what is true for one is true for the other. Owing to the turbulent state of the Empire and its lack of cohesion, it was necessary to maintain a large gendarmerie, and the force consisted actually of some 42,000 men, of whom 16,000 were mounted. After the Berlin Treaty in 1878, British officers under Baker Pasha for a short time attempted to reorganize the gendarmerie in the Armenian vilayets. They did extremely good work, and their presence afforded a measure of protection to the oppressed Armenians, but their successes were rather those of military Consuls than of commanding officers, for they were unable to get the reins of power into their own hands, and shortly after Mr. Gladstone's return to office in 1880 they were withdrawn for some reason which has never been sufficiently set forth.

In 1903 the Emperors of Russia and Austria met at Mürsteg, at a shooting box of the latter, and devised a programme for reform in Macedonia. As a result of this, the Macedonian vilayets were divided into sectors, and Austrian,

British, French, Italian and Russian officers were sent to undertake the reform of the gendarmerie. Germany refused to participate in this scheme, in order to avoid giving offence to Abdul Hamid, to whom all attempts at reform were thoroughly distasteful. The officers of the foreign Powers, in spite of stupendous difficulties, succeeded in effecting a certain measure of reform, and the British in their sector at least managed to turn the gendarmerie into a smart, well-dressed and well-drilled force, for which the insistence of the Powers secured regular pay. Nevertheless, the Sultan obstinately refused to allow any foreign officer to have any executive authority whatever, or to issue a single order. But the British took charge of the gendarmerie training school at Salonika, and in this manner succeeded in working wonders with the recruits, and thereby benefiting the gendarmerie throughout the sectors.

This gendarmerie reform scheme had tremendous political and military consequences, and was, indeed, the spark which kindled the amazing Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The presence of European officers and the forcible imposition of reform from without were insupportable mortifications to the Turks and established in the army a bitter hatred of the corrupt Hamidian rule at Yildiz Kiosk, which by its feeble tyranny was exposing the Empire to a long series of humiliations. The smartness



A TURKISH OFFICER WITH BEDOUIN SOLDIERS.




TURKISH SOLDIERS CROSSING THE EUPHRATES.

of the *gendarmerie* force under foreign officers, although their authority was hampered at every turn, was the most striking demonstration of the Turkish Government's ineptitude. The contrast between the condition of the *gendarmerie* under foreign officers and of the unpaid, ragged army under their own shiftless rulers was a very unpalatable one for both officers and men. There was also a conviction among the Turks in Macedonia, more particularly at Salonika, that the Sultan's handling of the Macedonian question would inevitably end in the loss of the whole of European Turkey. The meeting between King Edward and the Tsar at Reval, in June, 1908, when Macedonia was the subject of discussion and Russia and Great Britain agreed upon the necessity of imposing a much more drastic reform scheme, brought to a climax the anxieties of the Young Turks for the future, and in the following July they struck their blow.

It was in this Revolution that the much-discussed Enver Pasha, later to become Minister of War, made his first public appearance. It is commonly but inaccurately supposed that he received his education abroad, and he is often referred to as a product of German training. It is, however, a fact that until he took up his post as military attaché in Berlin after the Young Turk Revolution Enver had not been in Western Europe

at all. He was born and educated in Constantinople, and was a product of the Constantinople military school. He later learnt to speak and write both German and English, but in 1908 his only foreign language was French. When the Young Turks formed a secret committee at Salonika in 1905, Major Enver Bey, who was then stationed in Macedonia and was an A.D.C. to Hilmi Pasha, the Inspector-General of the Macedonian vilayets, threw in his lot with the committee, which concentrated all its forces upon a propaganda in the army. It saw plainly that a Constitution could be wrung from the Sultan only by force, and it conceived a plan for a general strike of the troops upon some very critical occasion. The Third Army Corps, which was stationed both in Macedonia and in the vilayet of Smyrna, was the special field of its operations, and the propaganda spread like wildfire among the officers. Small local committees were formed wherever there was a garrison of any kind. An infinity of trouble was lavished upon this secret society. Books could only be smuggled in with great difficulty, and officers sat up at night studying these perilous works, ransacking the literature of secret societies and the history of the French and other revolutions. The Balkans themselves provided models, and Prince Ypsilanti's Greek *Hetairia*, formed during the Greek struggle for independence, and the modern Macedonian and Bulgarian internal organizations were models fertile in suggestions. A ritual of signs and countersigns was created and Freemasons' lodges were also formed. These mysterious activities naturally could not continue indefinitely without coming to the notice of Abdul Hamid's spies, and in March, 1908, a series of raids was made and a Commission was sent from Constantinople to procure evidence against suspected persons. So widespread, however, had the conspiracy become amongst army officers and Government officials that it continued unabated, and in the following June the Sultan sent another Commission to unearth the Young Turk leaders at Salonika. One of the first to be denounced was Enver Bey. In the paradoxical fashion common in Turkey he was promptly invited to Constantinople with a promise of high promotion upon his arrival there. He realized at once that this treacherous offer probably meant that his body, like that of many another conspirator before him, would be dropped to the bottom of the Bosphorus. He therefore



MAP OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE, SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY CORPS.

saved himself by flight, and joined Niazi Bey, who raised the flag of revolution on July 3 in the Resna hills.

In the subsequent proceedings Enver appears to have had no leading part himself, but owing to his prominent position in the committee at Salonika and to his having had the honour of being denounced by Abdul Hamid he was universally acclaimed as a hero of the revolution, and his name was everywhere coupled with that of Niazi. In the middle of the night of July 3 Niazi, at the head of a small body of Turks from the 88th Regiment, seized the money in the battalion treasury, seventy-five Mauser rifles, and an ammunition chest. He distributed the rifles to his men and took to the hills. The same night, at Presba, Lieutenant Osman with the rifles and cartridges of his own detachment reached Asumativ, where he armed the villagers and proceeded to join Niazi. Next day 200 Muslims from Ochrida and Monastir joined the little army and swelled Niazi's force to the number of 700. On the night of the 5th the committee placarded the town of Monastir with its constitutional manifesto, and on the 6th the officers of the garrison deserted to Niazi with their ammunition.

Bands with officers at their head visited both the Christian and Muslim villages and quickly won over the population. Niazi met with no opponents, and consequently there were

no casualties except some assassinations at Monastir and the shooting of spies. Desertions of both officers and men in the gendarmerie increased daily and the Albanian bands came pouring in. Soon the officials who had remained faithful to the Government had no forces at their disposal. The Young Turk Committee decided to make a demonstration at Ochrida, and thence march on Monastir. On July 19 the Monastir garrison, previously reinforced by two battalions from Salonika, was further increased by 2,500 men from Smyrna, but these soon showed themselves partisans of the revolution. At midnight on the 22nd Niazi entered Monastir at the head of 2,000 men, captured the commandant, and returned with him to Ochrida. At noon on the 23rd a vast crowd of Muslims and Christians, the troops, the gendarmerie, the local officials, the clergy, and 1,000 insurgents assembled on the parade ground at Monastir, and the Constitution was proclaimed with a salvo of guns. An hour after midnight, after many telegraphic messages, and in the face of Niazi's threat to march on Constantinople, the Sultan sent an official telegram according the Constitution. At noon on Friday, July 24, Hilmi Pasha proclaimed this somewhat sorry concession from the steps of the Konak at Salonika.

This is not the place to write the chequered history of Turkey since that eventful day, but



INSTRUCTION IN THE USE OF THE GERMAN SERVICE RIFLE.

it is important to notice that from that time forth the army, by means of which the Young Turks came to power, remained the dominating factor in Turkish politics, and it never escaped from the mastership of the small Salonika group. Within the committee itself there arose many feuds and factions, but a rump ever remained, the principal members of which were Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, Djemal Pasha, and, for a long time, Djavid Bey.

At first it was the rôle of the committee to play the part of the power behind the throne, and to put forward elder statesmen as their puppets. None of the members took office, and Enver Bey disappeared to Berlin as Military Attaché. When the counter-revolution came, in March, 1909, he hurried back to Salonika and once more figured in the limelight beside Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, when the latter made his triumphal march to Constantinople, suppressed the counter-revolution, deposed Abdul Hamid, and put the present Sultan on the throne. After this success the Young Turks to a certain extent modified their policy, and a few of their own members accepted the responsibility of office, but in a large measure they followed their previous procedure of acting as an irresponsible and secret junta, outside of the Government which they controlled. Enver, despite ambition, declared by many to be his principal failing, still refrained from pressing his claims, and returned to his post at Berlin, from which in the spring of 1910 he paid a visit to London. In the autumn of 1911 Italy suddenly declared war and Enver Bey hurried to Tripoli, where, during the later stages of the campaign, he endeavoured to organize the Arab resistance to the Italian arms. A year later Turkey, menaced by the Balkan League, patched up a hasty peace with Italy at Ouchy, just before the outbreak of the Balkan war. Enver was still in Tripoli, and so swift were the blows of the Balkan Allies and so difficult did he find his return to Constantinople—he is stated to have crossed Egypt in disguise—that he was unable to take any part in the autumn fighting, thereby escaping the odium of any share in a disastrous campaign. When the first Balkan Conference met in London in 1913 Enver, who was then at Constantinople, directed all his energy to preventing any peace which should involve the cession of the beleaguered city of Adrianople to the Bulgars. When the Turkish Government finally made up its mind to this



ENVER PASHA,
Minister of War.

sacrifice he appeared at the Ministry of War at the head of a crowd of demonstrators, and in the tumult that followed Nazim Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, was shot, apparently by Enver's own hand. The generally-accepted version is that Enver was fired upon by someone standing directly behind Nazim, and that drawing his revolver upon his assailant, he shot the former by mistake. The Emperor William, at the time, spoke openly of Enver as an "assassin."

In any case the immediate object of Enver was achieved. The Ministry of Kiamil Pasha was ejected from office and Mahmoud Shevket Pasha became Grand Vizier and Minister of War. This *coup d'état* took place on January 24, 1913. Mahmoud and Enver gave Nazim a military funeral, at which they appeared as principal mourners. The Turkish Government refused to cede Adrianople, negotiations in London broke down, and the second campaign began. This brought no credit to the Die-Hard Party, for Adrianople fell, and when peace was signed in London the Turks had to agree to the loss of the fortress and to accept



PICKET OF TURKISH MARINES.

the Enos-Midia frontier line. When, however, the Balkan League broke up and Bulgaria came to blows with her former allies, Serbia and Greece, while Roumania marched almost to the gates of Sofia, Enver seized the chance presented to him, and at the head of a Turkish army recaptured Adrianople. There was no one to eject them, and by the treaty of Bukarest Turkey was allowed to retain Adrianople. In June, 1913, just before these events, Malimoud Shevket Pasha was assassinated as an act of vengeance for the murder of Nazim, and Enver became Minister of War, with the rank of Pasha. Prince Said Halim, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was made Grand Vizier, and still retained both posts at the outbreak of the war.

As has already been said, the Young Turks' was essentially a military revolution, and it was natural that the new party in power should concern itself with the question of army reform. Abdul Hamid first brought Von der Goltz Pasha to Turkey, and under the old regime Germany was already the model for the army. The Young Turks applied to Great Britain for naval reorganizers and to Germany for their army reformers. A military mission, consisting of some twenty German officers, arrived in 1909 and set to work, but their efforts were severely hindered by the political unrest, by successive rebellions in Albania, and finally by the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars. The culminating disaster of the Balkan War did not, however, diminish the determination of the

Young Turks to proceed with army reform on German lines. Enver Pasha redoubled his efforts, and in the autumn of 1913 the German military mission was very much increased and further powers were conferred upon its new head, General Liman von Sanders. Germany accepted the invitation to undertake this new responsibility without any reference to the other Powers, and when the facts became known considerable dissatisfaction was expressed. M. Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, was particularly indignant, because he had himself paid a visit to Berlin and discussed the field of international relations with the German Chancellor at the very moment when Germany had accepted the Turkish invitation, yet Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had never mentioned the matter to him. Russia accordingly made a formal protest, which was met by German assurances of the innocuous character of the German mission, but in reality Liman Pasha became military dictator of Constantinople, a city where martial law had reigned constantly for six years. The 42 officers with which he began his mission grew to an immensely greater number. The Turkish War Office was entirely under their control, and no important interview could take place without the presence of a German officer, nor could any contract be signed without his approval. Scores of Germans were distributed amongst the various commands, and the Turkish Minister of War was apparently the willing instrument of a definite

attempt to make the Turkish Army simply and solely a weapon at the disposal of the Kaiser's Great General Staff. For the first time in history we had the spectacle of the Turk yielding up authority fully and freely to a foreigner. In face of all the past experience of many able soldiers—English, French, and others—it would, in any case, have been safe to predict that no such experiment could work successfully, that however wholehearted in his German allegiance Enver Pasha might be, the Turkish Army and the Turkish people could not be counted upon to follow his example, and that the German exercise of authority could only work with tremendous friction and with poor success. But there is no longer any need to make predictions in the matter, for much testimony has been forthcoming that the German officers were regarded with jealousy and suspicion by those in high places, were detested and despised by the rank and file of the army and the mass of the Turkish people, and had to contend against all the obstacles which Oriental apathy, ill-will, and incapacity for deliberate obstruction could contrive to put in their way. They had, on the other hand, a thorough knowledge of their work, and strong determination, but they were utterly lacking in that experience of Musulman countries and that talent for the handling of native troops and for colonial soldiering which stood Englishmen

and Frenchmen in such good stead in the past.

It is not uncommon to hear the suggestion made that the Turkish Army had greatly decreased in efficiency since the advent of the Young Turks to power, and many people supposed that in Abdul Hamid's time it would have proved superior to the armies of the Balkan League. But this assumption must not be made too lightly. The Turks were once a great conquering race, of whom all Europe stood in awe, and we cannot forget that in the seventeenth century they were at the gates of Vienna. But the qualities of generalship and leadership on land and of seamanship on sea deserted them, and the nineteenth century witnessed a progressive and obvious decay. The fighting qualities of the Turk remained and appeared to suffer no eclipse, but he was no longer led or cared for, and though we found the Turks brave allies in the Crimean War, courage and patience were the only military virtues they possessed. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 it was the same story. The Russians had to cross two tremendous obstacles—the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains—and it was in stubborn defence, assisted by these great barriers, and in the trenches at Plevna, that the qualities of the Turkish soldier were displayed; but there were no signs of generalship and there was nothing worthy of



TURKISH ARTILLERY.

the name of organization. Even in the Greek War of 1897, although for the most part the Turks had no enemy in front of them, they advanced with extraordinary slowness. After this, year by year, the condition of the army grew worse. It had neither pay, uniform, nor commissariat. The infantry got no musketry training and the artillery had no ammunition for their guns. When the Revolution of 1908 came, an attempt was made to reform the army, but there was no time before the crisis arose. There were two rebellions in Albania to be suppressed, as well as an Arab revolt; then came the war with Italy, and lastly the life-and-death struggle against the Balkan League. No country had ever been in a strategic position at all comparable to that of Bulgaria for striking a quick blow at Turkey, and in a war with Turkey time is the essence of the matter. Unlike the Russians in 1878, the Bulgarians had to cross neither the Danube nor the Balkans. The Bulgarian Army was universally admitted to be a most efficient fighting instrument. It had been trained and disciplined for one object and one object only—to fight the Turk; and every Bulgarian soldier believed in his heart that the day of that fight would come. The Turks had an excellent plan of campaign ready, which had been prepared for them by the Germans; but it is one thing to have a good plan of campaign provided by someone else and another thing to have the generalship to carry it out. Abdulla Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief, failed in 1912 against the Bulgars in Thrace precisely as Enver Pasha failed in 1915 against the Russians in the Caucasus. The plan which had been the inadequately concealed purpose of the Turkish army manœuvres of 1909 and 1910 was fathomed by the Bulgars, and miscarried hopelessly, being in any case put out of court by the slowness with which Abdulla developed his offensive towards Kirk Kilisse. But it is probably true, as General Savoff and the Bulgarian Staff themselves stated, that the Turkish officers were superior, the men better fed, better clad and better trained, and their war stores and equipment of every kind more complete at the outbreak of the Balkan War than they had been for some years. It is, however, possible, although in 1912 the Turkish soldier showed himself by no means devoid of his old qualities, that the Young Turk Revolution, the deposition of Abdul

Hamid, and the spread of liberal ideas and “free thought,” had lessened his simple faith in, and self-sacrificing subordination to, the powers above him, more especially the officers who led him. From the Balkan War the Turkish Army emerged manifestly weakened, but, as has been indicated, much energy was afterwards spent upon it. We may take it that General Liman von Sanders and his Staff had, at any rate, given most excellent advice as far as organization goes, and had taught strategy on sound principles. But possibly they made too little allowance for local conditions and for Turkish characteristics, and in any case, however admirable their efforts, we may take it that they were hampered at every turn by a personnel none too honest, none too efficient, and none too earnest. It would be a mistake, however, not to assume that the Turkish infantry would, as always, fight well, and in particular it could be relied upon for a stubborn defence. The Turks had always shown great skill in entrenching quickly and ingeniously, and the tactics employed in 1914–15 on both sides in Flanders, for instance, were eminently suited to the Turkish military genius. The Turkish gunners, on the other hand, were not remarkable for their skill, since they got no special practice, and the Turkish cavalry had few modern triumphs to its credit.

The latest estimate of the total peace strength of the army in 1915 was 17,000 officers, 250,000 men, 45,000 horses, 1,500 guns, and 400 machine guns. Under the army scheme in operation since the Balkan War there were nominally four army inspections. The first had the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th army corps, with headquarters at Constantinople, Rodosto, Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople; the second army inspection contained the 8th corps at Damascus and the 5th and 6th corps at centres undetermined. All the above had their complement of three divisions. The third army inspection was at Erzinghian, and included the 9th, 10th and 11th army corps at Erzurum, Erzinghian and Van respectively. Of these the 10th corps had three divisions, but the 9th and 11th two only. The 4th army inspection was at Bagdad, and included the 12th army corps at Mosul and the 13th at Bagdad. They had two divisions. Lastly, there were the independent 14th corps, with three divisions at Sanaa, Hodeida and Ebka, and the Hedjaz division.

CHAPTER LI.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS.

WAR STRENGTH OF THE ARMY—FIELDS OF OPERATIONS—THE CAUCASUS FRONTIER—TIFLIS—DIFFICULTIES OF A WINTER CAMPAIGN—THE TURKISH ADVANCE—CONCENTRATION—GERMAN STRATEGY—NATURE OF THE OFFENSIVE—ENVELOPMENT FOILED—THE RUSSIAN VICTORY—SARIKAMISH—RUSSIAN NAVAL SUCCESS—THE PERSIAN FRONTIER—TURKS OCCUPY TABRIZ—RUSSIANS RELIEVE TABRIZ.

WHEN the European crisis developed at the end of July, 1914, the Turks immediately began mobilization. This proceeded with extreme slowness, but by the end of October, when Turkey herself joined in the European conflict, it was estimated by *The Times* Military Correspondent that there were some 500,000 more or less trained men in the Army, and another 250,000 trained men at the depôts. The army corps were distributed as follows. At and near Constantinople were the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Army Corps, and a portion of the 6th. There were also the Bosphorus Defence Troops, three or four cavalry brigades, some Kurdish levies, and a few depôt troops. In all some 200,000 men may have been in the Constantinople district. In Thrace there were the 2nd and most of the 6th Corps, with three cavalry brigades and frontier guards; these were distributed between Adrianople, Dimotika, and Kirk Kilisse. At Smyrna part of the 4th Army Corps remained, but the bulk of it was concentrated at Panderma.

In Palestine the 8th Corps was at its full strength of some 40,000, plus numerous Arab irregular corps and cavalry.

It is worth while to pause here and examine the object of this military distribution. In Europe the Turks still retained territory in Thrace as far as the Balkans in the north, and the towns of Adrianople, Dimotika, and Rodosto in the north and west. This was but a remnant of the former Turkey in Europe, and in a military sense it was, as has been said, little more than a glacis to the famous lines of Tchataldja, which defend Constantinople on the landward side. Both before and after the Balkan War the main mass of the Turkish troops had been kept in Europe with the object of defending the capital, and also because it was the burning desire of the Young Turks to regain the territory which Turkey lost in the last war. The second group of troops was in the Caucasus, directed against Russia, while the third group was concentrated in Syria and on the borders of Egypt. So long as Bulgarian neutrality could be counted upon the immediate task of the Turkish Army was in the Caucasus. The 9th, 10th, and 11th Corps were, by the beginning of November, brought up to three divisions, and each division to a strength of ten battalions. There were also three brigades of cavalry, and, in addition, the



DJAVID BEY,
Turkish Minister of Finance.

tribal horse was called out and partisans raised on the Persian frontier for a raid into Persia.

As Turkey entered the fray at the beginning of November it was generally believed that no extensive military operations could be undertaken immediately in the Caucasus, and that the real campaign must be postponed until the spring of 1915. With a long and arduous desert march before her towards Egypt, where the Suez Canal and all the other conditions piled difficulty upon difficulty, with Bulgaria and Greece still neutral, with the Russian frontier buried in snow, with the navy unable to take the open sea and incapable of more than Black Sea raids, it looked as if Turkey's participation in the war would be for months to come of little more than a nominal kind. In all of the numerous previous campaigns against Russia winter had checked the operations in the Caucasus. It must be set down as a testimony to the energy and determination of the Turks under their German leaders that, contrary to general expectation, they refused to let winter pass without putting forth all their strength and did not fear to face the unspeakable horrors of a mid-winter campaign in those frozen snow-bound heights. The Caucasian frontier is, indeed, of vast importance to Turkey. Between herself and Egypt she

has a desert barrier and far to the south-east, in Mesopotamia, she was probably unprepared for the swiftness with which the British sent an expedition from the Persian Gulf to the Tigris. But in the Caucasus she is for ever face to face with her ancient enemy, and when the fatal decision to make war was taken in Constantinople, every Turk knew well that, whether in the winter or the spring, a desperate struggle must come between the Sultan's hosts and the might of Russia. Doubtless Germany hoped and believed that by an immediate vigorous Turkish offensive in the Caucasus Russia could be forced to detach considerable bodies of troops from the Polish theatre of war, and thus relieve the pressure upon herself or Austria, but the Russians were fully prepared for Turkey, whose hand had been only too plainly shown from the very development of the European crisis. The Russian Army in the Caucasus stood fast at its post, and when Turkey declared war it was not thought necessary to transfer a single man from the Polish front.

There had been many alterations in the Russo-Turkish frontier in the Caucasus, but the wide isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian was still the inevitable theatre of war. Here Russia's southern frontier marched successively with Turkey and with Persia along a line that moved in a south-easterly direction from the Black Sea to the Caspian. The Russo-Turkish frontier was a mountain wall running from the Black Sea on the west to the great bulwark of Ararat on the east. At its western end there is a passage by the sea that may be compared to the road on the Franco-Spanish frontier which lies between the Western Pyrenees and the angle of the Bay of Biscay. The rest is a confused mountain wall dropping down through great ravines and climbing up again to Ararat. The Russo-Persian frontier, which followed on, ran through very level country along the course of the great river Araxes to the Caspian. The great Russian town of the Caucasus is the beautiful city of Tiflis, the old Georgian capital. Here was the half-way house between Batoum on the Black Sea and Baku on the Caspian, while northwards from Tiflis ran a road and the new railway over the Vladikafkas Pass into Russia proper. Southward runs another railway, through the great fortress of Kars to a railhead at Sarikamish, close to the Turkish frontier. At Alexandropol there is a bifurcation and a railway

runs eastward through Erivan to Julfa on the Persian Frontier. The Kars railway runs through high mountain ridges, and south of it there is a succession of peaks climbing up to the Armenian plateau on the Turkish side. Sarikamish itself is 6,000 ft. up, and beyond it are heights 10,000 and 11,000 ft. above the sea. There are no roads anywhere except across great heights, which in the winter are buried in snow.

A few days after the first Turkish raid on the Black Sea coast the Russian troops crossed the Turkish frontier and, after various skirmishes with advance bodies of Turkish troops, captured a position close to Koprukeui, on the road to Erzurum; but on November 13 they were compelled to fall back before superior forces; reinforcements, however, came up, and after three days' fighting the Russians were once more in possession of Koprukeui by November 20. This initial Russian success, however, was but a demonstration, and not an advance in force. Transcaucasia was to Russia but a secondary theatre of war, and her general policy was to act upon the defensive during the winter months. The Turks, however, had no intention of remaining on the defensive, and at the end of November they began to develop an advance. As has already been said, the 9th, 10th and 11th Army Corps had a month previously been concentrated at Erzurum.



SHUKRI PASHA,
one of the Turkish Commanders in the Caucasus.

Erzurum was Turkey's most important fortified place in Asia, and corresponded to Adrianople on her European frontier.

The Russian concentration had taken place at Kars, and it is important to note well these two frontier strongholds, as it is between them



TURKISH CAVALRY.

that the bulk of the early fighting took place. The intervening distance is over 100 miles. Both are situated some 6,000 feet above the sea, and the mountain road between them rises considerably higher. The whole intervening country is a tangle of mountain ridges and high snow-swept valleys. The plan prepared by the Germans for the Turks was the plan which is dearest of all to the heart of the German General Staff. Here they proposed to repeat with the Turks the procedure which von Kluck had followed against the French and English armies in France, and von Hindenburg against the Russians before Warsaw, and attempt the envelopment of the enemy. The Germans assumed, and rightly assumed, that the Russians would move forward their main army by the road from Kars to Erzurum, for, except on the Persian side, it is the only avenue for large masses of troops, and, moreover, the railhead at Sarikamish upon this road was not more than 15 miles from the Turkish frontier. To engage and hold the Russians on the Erzurum road with the 11th Turkish Army Corps, and at the same time to send round columns on the left for an enveloping attack against Kars and the Russian right flank, was

the essence of the German plan. In order to carry it out successfully it was clearly necessary that Enver Pasha should dispose of more troops than the enemy. The 37th Division of the 13th Bagdad Corps was brought up to strengthen the 11th against the Russian front, and a portion of the 1st Army Corps was brought by sea from Constantinople to Trebizond, to advance from the coast against Ardahan and complete the extreme Turkish left in the enveloping movement upon the Russians. It may be estimated, therefore, that Enver Pasha disposed of more than 150,000 men, while the Russian forces were probably at most 100,000. The 11th Corps, assisted by a division of Arab soldiers from the 13th Corps, was to contain the Russians from Kopruckeui, while the 10th and 9th wheeled on its left to the line from Olty and Id to Kopruckeui. The 10th concentrated at Id, and the 9th fell into place in the centre. Meanwhile far to the north another force, a portion of the 1st Corps, moved on Ardahan, with Kars and the cutting of the railway behind the Russians as its ultimate objective.

When the Turkish offensive began the 11th Corps pushed the Russians back towards Khorosan, which is about 30 miles south of



TURKISH EMISSARIES IN BERLIN.




TURKISH CAVALRY.

Sarikamish and held it through heavy fighting in Christmas week. Meantime the 9th and 10th Corps were struggling through icy winds and deep snow at tremendous altitudes through the mountains, and reached but did not enter Sarikamish on Christmas Day. The 1st Corps, coming from the valley of the Chorok river, crossed a mountain pass 8,000 feet up and bearing down upon Ardahan drove out a small Russian force of some 4,000 strong on January 1. It will thus be seen that with the Russian front checked at Khorosan, with the Saganuk heights at Sarikamish occupied by the 9th Turkish Corps, the 10th fiercely attacking the railway just beyond it, and the 1st in occupation of Ardahan, this extraordinarily ambitious scheme of envelopment came comparatively near success, in spite of the difficulties of carrying out a concerted occupation amongst the mass of mountains deep in snow, without roads or railways, and with little possibility of inter-communication between the columns or of synchronizing action. In the end, as might have been expected, these difficulties proved too much. The 10th Army Corps was the first to suffer. About the afternoon of December 29 it began to give way, and on New Year's Day it was driven right back. On January 3 the Russians came up in force and drove the 1st Corps out of Ardahan. With the 10th and the 1st Corps in retreat the 9th Corps, which


was still fighting desperately at Sarikamish, was completely surrounded and absolutely wiped out. The only unbeaten corps, the 11th, could as yet do nothing to aid it, for it was fully engaged by the head of the Russian column at Khorosan, and it made no progress for over a week. Iskan Pasha, with the whole of his Staff, including the German officers attached, and the 11th Corps which he commanded, or such portion of it as had succeeded in reaching Sarikamish, surrendered. The best *résumés* of these operations are the two following official communiqués dated January 6. The first is from the General Staff of the Army in the Caucasus :

At the end of November the main body of the Third Turkish Army was moved in the direction of the region to the east of Erzurum. The army was preceded by two army corps, with a reserve corps near Hassan Kala.

In accordance with the plan of Enver Pasha, the Third Army was to operate as follows: The 9th and 10th Corps were to advance in the direction of Olty in order to form the wing of the Turkish defensive, while the 11th Corps was ordered to maintain its position, which was strongly organized, and to draw upon itself, by a strategic demonstration, our troops. In case the Russian troops undertook an energetic offensive, the 11th Corps was ordered to fall back on the fortress of Erzurum, drawing our forces with it. The 10th Turkish Corps was to advance in two columns, the first, one division strong, marching towards Id, through the valley of the Olty Chai, while the second, two divisions strong, was to march on Ardost, through the valley of Servy Chai. The 9th Turkish Army Corps was to assume the offensive in the gap between the 10th and 11th Corps.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS.



FORT CHANAK, DARDANELLES.

Our troops in the region of Olty, in spite of the enemy's numerical superiority, courageously hindered a Turkish advance, and, by means of counter attacks, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

In the meanwhile, we ascertained that a strong Ottoman column, reinforced by the rebel Musulman population, was advancing over the Panjouretsk and Yalanuz-Djamsh passes towards Ardahan. Our garrison, which was occupying this point, fell back slightly after fighting 17 days.

The second communiqué of January 6 is from the Russian Headquarters' Staff :

In the Caucasus, having received reinforcements, we attacked, on Sunday, the Turkish troops concentrated at Ardahan and inflicted a complete defeat on the enemy, taking from him the colours of the 8th Regiment, which formed part of the garrison of Constantinople.

During the later development of the action we discovered that the bulk of the Turkish forces—namely, the 9th and 10th Army Corps—had taken the offensive against Sarikamish. This movement, undertaken by mountainous roads covered by snow, across extremely steep ridges, was carried out almost without supply convoys or field artillery, although the Turkish troops were abundantly supplied with war supplies.

The enemy planned this operation counting chiefly upon the sympathy and liberal help of the native Musulmans who had previously been approached by Turkish emissaries.

The task of our troops was to check the large forces of the enemy on this front and to create a barrier sufficiently strong to defeat the 9th and 10th Turkish Army Corps.

In spite of the extraordinary difficulty of this task, the rigorous winter weather, and the necessity of fighting in mountainous passes covered with snow and at an altitude of 10,000 feet, our gallant troops of the Caucasus, after desperate fighting, which lasted over 10 days, brilliantly fulfilled the exceptional task which had fallen to them.

Having repulsed the frenzied attacks of the Turks on the front and at Sarikamish, they enveloped and annihilated almost the whole of two Turkish Army Corps, taking the remainder of one of these corps prisoners, together with its Commander-in-Chief, three Divisional Generals, the Staff, numerous officers, thousands of soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, and baggage animals.

The intense struggle on the principal front naturally

necessitated a change in the formation of our forces in the districts of secondary importance, and the approach of certain of our detachments to the frontier.

Our trophies cannot yet be precisely stated.

The pursuit of the enemy continues.

Iskan Pasha himself stated that he considered his defeat mainly due to the cold weather and the almost impassable condition of the roads. Out of the 9th Corps only 6,000 reached Sarikamish. Here the Russians engaged him, and after six night attacks he surrendered. The prisoners, when captured, were scarcely able to stand from exhaustion and hunger. The officers were distracted by the insubordination of the men, who threw down their rifles and hurried to the Russians in order to surrender. Several times the Russians moved their kitchens up to the front line, and the Turks, smelling the food, instantly stopped fighting and surrendered. When they were fed they kissed the hands of their captors. Descriptions of scenes on the battle-field by eye-witnesses make the blood run cold. The slaughter was particularly great on two heights with a slight dip between them. Here the battle had swept with such fury that it was literally impossible to move without treading on bodies, and 1,500 dead were left in this small space alone.

It would appear that during the wonderful defence of Sarikamish from December 25 to December 28, a handful of Russians assumed the offensive against an entire Turkish division until reinforcements arrived. This heroic action alone saved the town. The Russians advanced by a forced march through deep snow, engaging



ADMIRAL SACHAN (centre) WITH HIS STAFF.

the enemy in the evening about thirteen miles from the town.

The ragged, hungry, half-frozen Turks rolled on in dense columns. The machine-gun detachments allowed them to approach within 300 paces, and then literally mowed them down; but ever new columns sprang up in their place. The Russians slowly retired eastward step by step. The enemy, realizing that every hour and minute was precious if Sarikamish was to be taken, came on with the madness of despair, fighting always in the darkness. The Turkish columns hurled themselves on the

slender Russian line, which, coolly falling back, sold every inch of ground dearly.

The Turks, drunk with fanaticism, fired standing. Thereupon the Russians resorted to the bayonet, and with ringing cheers charged home upon the enemy's masses, inflicting frightful slaughter. The enemy broke on several occasions, but German officers with loaded revolvers drove back defaulters till the Russians, under the pressure of sheer weight of numbers, were forced to retreat two or three miles from Sarikamish. More Turkish artillery arrived at this juncture, but too late to claim the victory as the Russian guns were covering their own infantry, and roared forth an effective reply. Reinforcements poured in steadily, and the protracted engagement culminated in a brilliant victory.

Russian valour thus upset the grandiose plan of the German strategists to inflict a sudden stunning blow on inferior Russian forces, envelop the vanguards, rear, and flanks, emerge by a forced march on Sarikamish, cut off the Russians, overwhelm Ardahan, and advance far northward from a direction where they were least expected.

The surrender of the 9th Corps at Sarikamish, however, by no means exhausted the effort of the Turks. Although the 11th Corps had been unable to move in time to save the 9th, it made a gallant effort to relieve the pressure upon the retreating 10th. It pressed on beyond Khorosan and forced its way to Kara-Urgan, some twenty miles from Sarika-



THE "MESSUDIEH," SUNK IN THE DARDANELLES BY SUBMARINE B11.



TABRIZ.

inish By this means the Russians were compelled to check in their pursuit of the 10th Corps, and instead of dispatching the troops which had wiped out the 9th on the heels of the 10th, they had to hurry them up to Kara-Urgan, where a long fierce struggle began. Desperate fighting took place throughout the whole of the second week in January, but it seems early to have turned to the advantage of the Russian troops, who on the 14th annihilated with the bayonet the whole of the 52nd Regiment, with the exception of the commander, staff officers, and some men, all of whom were made prisoners.

At Yenikoi a battle which was fought with great fierceness for two days ended in the defeat of a portion of the 32nd Turkish Division, which fled precipitately, after losing severely and abandoning two machine guns and its baggage train. In one cavalry charge alone, it is recorded that the Turks lost 300 killed and wounded by the sabres of a regiment of Siberian Cossacks. On January 17 a dispatch from the Army in the Caucasus announced that the battle of Kara-Urgan, which had been fought for three days in a ceaseless snowstorm, had ended in a victory for Russia. Thanks to the valour of the regiments of the Caucasus and Turkestan and the Siberian Cossacks the resistance of the enemy was shattered. His rearguards, which were covering his retreat, were annihilated, the remnants of the Turkish army harried, and the flanks and front put to flight towards Erzurum. The pursuit was pressed

vigorously, but the tremendous snow drift proved a giant obstacle, and the 11th Corps succeeded in making good its escape towards Erzurum. The Russians, however, harried it not only from the rear but from the right flank, thus depriving it of the opportunity of proceeding along the Kara-Urgan-Kopruckeui road. This accounted for the heavy fighting westward, at Yenikoi, which represented the last stand of the 11th Corps.

Meantime in the north the Russians had



A TURKISH SCRIBE READING THE WAR NEWS IN THE BAZAAR.



ARABIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.

continued their successes against the 1st Corps, which had been driven from Ardahan, and cleared the whole of the Chorok valley of the enemy. The difficulties of the Turks were greatly increased by the action of the Russians in cutting their communications by sea. In the first week of January, almost simultaneously with the signal defeat of the Turkish land forces, the Russians obtained a victory on the water. At Sinope a Russian cruiser engaged the Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh*, which was conveying a Turkish transport. The transport was sunk and the *Medjidieh* fled. On January 6 the Black Sea Fleet engaged the *Breslau* and the *Hamidieh* and severely damaged them both, while along the coast a number of small Turkish vessels were sunk. The *Goeben* was all this time out of action; she was reported to have struck a mine at the entrance to the Bosphorus in December and was still under repair at Constantinople. On Sunday, January 15, Russian torpedo boats sunk the large steamer *Georgios*, near Sinope, and several sailing vessels which were supplying the Turkish army and fleet with war stores, provisions, and coal. Before the destruction of these boats the crews were given the opportunity to go ashore, and those who remained were removed and conveyed to Sebastopol.

Such is the record of the main fighting in the

Caucasian area up to the end of the month of January, 1915. It left the Russians far on the road to Erzurum, where the Turks were hastily attempting a new concentration, while in the north-west the fragments of the beaten 1st and 10th Corps had effected a junction and were attempting a fresh offensive. In the country round the Chorok river and in the region of Sultan Selim the Turks on the morning of the 20th developed vigorous attacks, which were repulsed. At Olty they also resumed the offensive, pushing forward a column which, however, was thrown back with very heavy losses.


We have now to turn our eyes farther east. When the Russian main column crossed the Turkish frontier in November and pressed forward to Kopruckei, a second column entered Turkey 50 miles farther east, midway between Khorosan and Bayazid, and on November 8 seized Kara Kilissa. A week later it met the enemy 10 miles to the north of Dutakht, and, driving him back, seized the town. In this district the Turks employed the Arab regiments of the 13th Corps, and, taking the offensive, delivered a fierce blow on November 22. The result was indecisive, and for the next month desultory fighting took place in the Alashgird valley. Arab reinforcements kept coming in from Baghdad *via* Bitlis and Erzurum. Under the command of Hassan ed Din Pasha they

developed a vigorous offensive in the middle of December, and an engagement took place at Dutukht in which an attempt was made to envelop the Russians. The latter, however, were on their guard, and withdrew in time after inflicting heavy losses on the Arabs. During the month of January there was no news of any further fighting in this direction, and it is very probable that the Turkish forces had to fall back towards Erzurum.

A third Russian column advanced from the angle of the Russo-Turco-Persian frontiers, where the Makuli tribesmen are friendly to the Russian Army, and on November 3 occupied the famous, but now forlorn, town of Bayazid at the foot of Mount Ararat, and thence moved forward in the direction of Van. There is no further record of its achievements, and presumably it cooperated with two Russian columns which crossed the Turco-Persian frontier. The operations in this last and most easterly frontier must now claim our attention.

The fact that, though Persia was neutral, Turkey and Russia carried on war on Persian soil requires explanation. It is not a little curious, but on examination the cause of it can be easily seen, and the inwardness of the situation will be most easily grasped if we

represent the Russo-Turco-Persian frontier in the form of a T thus :



In this simple diagram the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian frontiers form the top of the T, and, if we neglect the niceties of geographical position, may be said to run from west to east. The Turco-Persian frontier is the leg of the T. Were Persia a country with a settled frontier, were it able to defend itself, and were it secure in its inviolability, then Russia and Turkey would only fight in the left section of the leg of the T, where the rival strongholds of Erzurum and Kars on either side are set to guard the frontier. But Persia was not inviolate, was incapable of defending herself, had a frontier the line of which had been the subject of dispute between herself and Turkey from time immemorial, and had suffered for years past from continued Turkish encroachments. Numerous Mixed Commissions to decide the question of the Turco-Persian frontier had sat in the last 50 years. Great Britain and Russia, as mediating Powers, had always been represented on these Commissions, and it has been calculated that during this period this miserable dispute, in



WOUNDED TURKS IN HOSPITAL.



TURKISH ARTILLERY.

which we had no direct concern, cost the British taxpayer £150,000 in expenses. In the year 1913 it really seemed as if the question was at last entering its final stage. An agreement was signed at Constantinople between the Turkish and Persian Governments, and still another Mixed Commission of the usual kind was formed to carry out the actual delimitation of the frontier on the basis of this agreement. The four nations, Russia, England, Turkey and Persia, were represented, and Mr. A. C. Wratislaw, formerly Consul-General at Tabriz, was the principal English member. It began its operations from the Persian Gulf,

taking the southern sections first, and was still at its labours when war broke out.

The Turks for the previous ten years had been particularly shameless in their aggressions on the northern sections of the frontier, and had steadily moved forward the frontier stones and their own Customs' Houses until they had made themselves masters of all the strategic points on the western side of Lake Urmia. The rich Persian province of Azurbeijan had sunk into a state of anarchy and weakness, and the authority of the Persian Government counted for nothing. From a military point of view, therefore, the eastern section of the T



TIFLIS.



RECRUITS FROM ANATOLIA.

became of vital importance both to Turkey and Russia. With the Turks in occupation of all the strategic points, and well across the frontier, it was clear that in the event of a Russo-Turkish war Turkey could attack not only along the western section of the top of the T where the frontier is mountainous and difficult, but also through Persia on the eastern section where the lie of the land is very much simpler. The Russians, therefore, had been forced to assert their influence and authority in Azurbeijan. An opportunity was offered in 1909 at a period of civil war in Persia, when the constitutional party in Tabriz was besieged by the forces of Mohammed Ali Shah. In April, 1909, the British and Russian Governments were exercising strong pressure at Teheran to force the Shah to grant a Constitution, but meantime Tabriz, which had stood a siege of three months, was reduced to the last extremities of starvation. The Shah procrastinated in his dealings with the two Powers, hoping for the fall of Tabriz, which would have immensely strengthened his position. In the city itself an attack upon the foreign consulates by the starving mob was feared, and both the British and Russian colonies made an urgent appeal to their Governments to secure them military protection. Great Britain and Russia, therefore, decided

that Tabriz must be relieved by the dispatch of Russian troops, and a military expedition was sent from Julfa to open the road and revictual the town. From that time onwards detachments of Russian troops were maintained in Tabriz, and later it was found necessary to send a strong military guard to the Consulate at Khoi, the Turks retorting by a similar step at Suj Bulak. Both Russia and Turkey were, therefore, in military occupation of parts of this Persian province when war broke out, and both were forced to treat it as part of the theatre of war. Just as it was important for Russia that she should not be attacked along the whole of the top of the T, instead of on its western section, so it was equally vital to Turkey that she should not have her whole flank turned by finding Russia not merely at the top, but also along the leg of the T.

Two Russian columns, therefore, were sent across the Persian frontier into Turkey by the Kotur and Khanesur passes, which are about 30 miles apart, and are between the north end of Lake Urmia and Van. These drove the Turks back in November and engaged them between Dilman and Kotur. On December 1 they again defeated the enemy at Serai and Bashkola. The Turks retreated towards Van, but were reinforced and again



A BEDOUIN.

assumed the offensive, only to receive another check.

Farther to the south a mass of Kurdish levies from both sides of the frontier advanced upon Tabriz from the direction of Suj Bulak, Apparently the Russians did not expect that the Turks would show such a total disregard of the neutrality of Persia as to make a wide movement through Azurbeijan, and they had, therefore, withdrawn their small detachment of troops from Tabriz for use elsewhere, relying

on Shuja-ed-Dowleh, the Persian acting Governor of Azurbeijan, to offer any necessary resistance to Kurdish forays. The Governor, however, was capable of no great effort, and after a skirmish at Maragha the Turks occupied Tabriz in the early part of January and proceeded to Sufian and Marand on the Julfa road. Their success was, however, a brief one. A Russian detachment routed them at Sufian, and re-entered Tabriz on January 30.



CHAPTER LII.

THE INVASION OF CHALDEA.

THE CHARACTER OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WHERE THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD BEGAN—HOW THE TURKS FIRST CAME TO THE GULF—THE RISE OF THE WAHABIS IN ARABIA—MIDHAT PASHA'S ANNEXATIONS OF GULF TERRITORY—THE DAWN OF GERMAN INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST—THE KAISER'S PILGRIMAGES AND THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY—THE FIRST GERMANS IN THE GULF—ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE KOWEIT AND VARIOUS ISLANDS—THE LURE OF THE GULF PEARLS—THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON—A PICTURE OF GERMAN WORLD-POLITICS IN MINIATURE—WHY GREAT BRITAIN CLAIMS PARAMOUNTCY IN THE GULF—ADMIRAL MAHAN'S GRAVE WARNING—THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AND THE SEIZURE OF FAO—THE ADMIRALTY OIL-WORKS ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB—THE FIRST TURKISH ATTACK—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL BARRETT WITH BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS—THE ACTION AT SAHAIN—THE BATTLE OF SAHIL, WHICH DECIDED THE FATE OF BASRA—THE FALL OF BASRA—THE ADVANCE UP THE RIVER TO KURNA—THE FIRST ACTION AT KURNA AND THE CALL FOR REINFORCEMENTS—THE FALL OF KURNA AND SURRENDER OF THE TURKISH GARRISON.

ONE of the immediate effects of the appearance of Turkey as a combatant was to extend the area of the war to the Persian Gulf. Hostilities quickly began between the Turks and a force of British and Indian troops at the head of the Gulf. In a very short time the British had defeated the Turks, captured the important port of Basra, gained possession of the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates, and driven the remnants of the Turkish forces a long way northward towards Baghdad. The operations thus initiated formed an entirely separate campaign. They were of great political importance, for they shattered at a blow Germany's dream of a dominion extending to the Middle East. Basra was to have been the terminus of the Baghdad Railway, which represented Germany's greatest enterprise in the domain of world politics. Its fall deprived the Germans of that access to the seas of Southern Asia which they craved. The campaign, even in its early stages, further brought to a head and finally disposed of various important issues which had produced differences between Great Britain and Turkey for more than three de-

ecades. Its political consequences are likely immeasurably to surpass its military significance.


The recorded history of the world probably began in the Persian Gulf. All through the ages the destinies of empires have been swayed from its lonely shores, to a degree far too little understood in the West. The Power that possesses maritime control of the Gulf can, if she chooses, exert a dominating influence upon the affairs of the Middle East. Germany perceived the value of the Gulf long ago, and for ten years before the war had striven with limited success to establish her influence there. During the twentieth century the political and economic problems associated with the Gulf are bound to attract increasing attention. The war did not finally dispose of them, but a better conception of the character of the Gulf and of past events in its vicinity is essential to a right understanding of the larger issues which lay behind the war.

No other inland sea is quite like the Persian Gulf, none possesses so ancient and so strange a history, and none is so little known or visited. Its narrow entrance lies in a far corner of the Arabian Sea, where the lees of the southern

oceans collect and strange marine monsters disport themselves. Approaching the entrance from the Gulf of Oman, a ship may shape its course past the land-locked harbour of Muscat, set like a sapphire in the midst of grim volcanic heights; or it may coast along the desolate shores of British and Persian Mekran, where dwell the Ichthyophagi, the fish-eaters, exactly as they did in the days of Alexander's retreat from Sind. Mark well the low, bare hills that fringe the beaches of Mekran. Behind them lie the long lateral valleys through which vast hordes migrated into India. They are perhaps the oldest of routes between East and West, a highway of trade along which were carried the silks and spices that delighted the nobles of Rome, although they knew not whence they came. The entrance to the Gulf is guarded on the Arabian side by the bastioned steeps of Ras Musendam, the head of the massive deserted peninsula which constitutes, says Mr. Hogarth, one of the few bits of compact exploration still left to the adventurous. The mighty headland looks across the straits to the Persian island of Hormuz, whose vivid rocks glow like jewels in the setting sun, save where a dark and massive keep that seems built for eternity recalls how tiny Portugal once held the East in fee until the effort drained her of

her manhood. Behind the Musendam Peninsula winds the wonderful tropical fiord called the Elphinstone Inlet, cleaving the barren mountains for nineteen miles, a sheet of water of unknown depth, where a whole fleet might lie concealed were it not the hottest place in the world. Across a narrow neck of land lies the huge landlocked expanse of Malcolm Inlet, less often furrowed by the keels of ships than the Antarctic Seas.

The eastern shores of the Gulf begin with the flat and sweltering sands of Bunder Abbas, which has sometimes been called the Gulf's southern key. It is not so in fact, for it is merely an open roadstead. The real key is formed by the islands of Kishm, Henjam, and Larak, and still more by the Clarence Straits which divide Kishm from the mainland. Great Britain holds on lease a patch of Kishm, known as Basidu, and also holds a square mile of Henjam, on which stands a telegraph station. From Basidu to the head of the Gulf the Persian coast is one sheer wall, fronted by a narrow strip of low-lying land. The great plateau of Persia ends abruptly and precipitously near the sea, and only the shallow open roadstead of Bushire partially redeems the Shah's dominions from the reproach of being without a harbour. Yet the low and scanty foreshores once bred a race of mariners, and long ago men of Arab blood sailed from these beaches and sacked Canton. One can still trace the ruins of the cities of Keis and Siraf, where swarms of Chinese junks once lay at anchor, as they used to lie in Bombay in the days before China partly lost the secret of the sea.



THE LAGOON AT SHARGAH, PIRATE COAST.

In the days of piracy the town was well sheltered.



THE ASSHAR CREEK AT BASRA.

The western side of the Gulf begins with the Pirate Coast, and though the pirates have been turred from their evil ways by the maritime truce imposed by the British Government, their strongholds remain unchanged in appearance. At Shargah, which is a typical example, there is a blue lagoon amid the sandhills, behind which lies the town, dominated by an old battlemented castle. A century ago British troops subdued these nests of wild corsairs, who were on one occasion strong enough to capture and destroy one of the King's warships. Even in these lonely seas, where travellers are rarely seen, German influence had been subtly at work in the ten years before the war. Off the Pirate Coast lies the islet of Abu Musa, of which a German firm secured a lease through bribed intermediaries, on the pretence of working deposits of red oxide. Next to the haunts of the pirates comes the peninsula of El Katar, where the Turks vainly tried to establish themselves. In the bight behind lie the Pearl Islands, the domain of the Sheikh of Bahrein, and the mart for all the treasures of the Great Pearl Bank, which stretches nearly the whole length of the Gulf. In the middle of Bahrein are hundreds of thousands of still inexplicable mound tombs, and on the mainland opposite lies the dead city of Gerrha, never yet visited by European archaeologists, although it was the earliest home of the Phœnicians. Northward

runs the long coast-line of El Hasa, hitherto claimed by the Turks, and at length there comes into view the splendid bay of Koweit, the finest harbour in the Gulf, long and actively coveted by both Turks and Germans. Finally, at the head of the Gulf sand and mountains are replaced by the green and smiling fields and palm groves which, with the desert and swampy lands beyond, form the delta of the Tigris and Euphrates. From the point where the two rivers unite the stream is known as the Shatt-al-Arab, and it flows through an alluvial land as flat as Holland. About 67 miles from its mouth stands the ancient city and seaport of Basra, the centre of Turkish influence in the Gulf.

The country round Basra was the scene of the first operations of the Mesopotamian and Gulf campaign, but the local issues which lay at its back affected the whole Persian Gulf. The Turks had long tried to dispute in various stealthy ways the predominant and pacific influence which the British had exercised in Gulf waters for three hundred years. After they entered into a thinly veiled partnership with the Germans the pressure against British interests steadily increased. When Turks and Britons fought before Basra, they were contending for domination in the Gulf, and the lure which lay behind was that of the short road to India. That is why a study of conditions



THE RIVER BANK AT FAO.

Much of the earlier fighting was in date groves of this character.

and events in the Gulf is an imperative prelude to a full comprehension of this particular campaign.

Let us first see how it was that the Turks came to emerge upon the Gulf at all: The Turkish course of empire long lay westward. From the time when Ertoghrul and his band of four hundred horsemen charged the Mongol army near Angora in the thirteenth century, and thus took the first step which led to the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Turks always looked towards the setting rather than the rising sun. Their roots were planted deep in Asia, but it was the lure of European conquest which constantly led them onward until the tide was stayed at the very gates of Vienna. Nevertheless, they did not neglect to extend their dominions in Asia and Africa. They conquered Egypt early in the sixteenth century, and in the same century Sultan Sulciman the Magnificent effected the first Turkish capture of Baghdad. He was ousted from the city by the Persians, and it was not until 1638 that Sultan Murad IV. appeared before Baghdad with an immense army, recovered it, and hoisted the Turkish flag. Thirty years later, in 1668, the Turks marched down to Basra, captured it, and came for the first time to the shores of the Persian Gulf.

It is not at all generally realised that the British were in the Gulf before the Turks. The first time British arms were carried to victory in the Persian Gulf was on January 19, 1622, when a British force laid siege to a Portuguese fort on the island of Kishm, opposite Hormuz, and captured it a fortnight later. Two months afterwards the British, fighting in alliance with a Persian army, seized and sacked the Portuguese city and island of Hormuz, and laid its almost fabulous glories low. It was at this time that the British made a treaty with Persia by which they undertook "to keep two men-of-war constantly to defend the Gulf." The number of warships was afterwards increased to five and, from that time onward, British seamen policed and protected the Gulf, and their power and influence were never seriously disputed.

The Turks made little use of Mesopotamia and the deltaic lands. As in other parts of their Empire, their influence always lay like a blight upon the country and stifled progress. Nor did they do anything effective to extend their rule beyond the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates in the direction of Arabia. The Turk has never been in any true sense the overlord of Arabia, and he never will be. Early in the eighteenth century the then Turkish Vali of Baghdad actually repudiated the control of

Stamboul, and made the city and all the lands southward to the Gulf a practically independent State. His successor appealed to the British in India to take him under their protection, and asked for British officers to train his armies. Some officers were sent, but when the British Government heard of the arrangement months afterwards it was severely condemned. London preferred to remain on good terms with the Porte, and cared nothing about the future of Mesopotamia. The officers were recalled, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Sultan had gradually recovered his old authority. Had it not been for the action of the Home Government, Mesopotamia would have been a British protectorate for the last hundred years.

The rise of the Wahabis in Arabia had a lasting effect upon the fortunes of the people on the Arabian shores of the Gulf and upon the Turkish position in these regions. The Wahabi movement was essentially an attempt to revert to the early simplicity of the Islamic faith, and in course of time it shook the world of Islam to its foundations. The Wahabis began to grow strong in the latter half of the eighteenth century. They propagated their doctrines by the sword, and when the nineteenth century dawned they had very nearly conquered all Arabia. They reached the Persian Gulf very early in their progress, and only dread of the growing power of the British kept them out of Muscat, the capital of Oman. They entered Mesopotamia in 1801, and sacked the sacred shrines of the Shiah at Kerbela. They took



LANDING AT BAHREIN.

The officer is Captain W. H. Shakespear, C.I.E., who was killed in Central Arabia.

Mecca and Medina, and desecrated the tomb of Mahomet, and at length they became so formidable that the Sultan of Turkey saw that his claims to the Caliphate were in danger.

He persuaded Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, to send Egyptian armies against the Wahabis. The Egyptian forces slowly overran Arabia, but it took them seven years to overthrow the Wahabi movement. They won their



104th WELLESLEY'S RIFLES MARCHING ACROSS THE DESERT.



AN ARAB COUNCIL ON THE BEACH AT HENJAM ISLAND.


The post is the British cable mark.

final victory in 1818, but neither Turks nor Egyptians were able to garrison Central Arabia permanently. In five years the Wahabi power was partially re-established, and for the remainder of the century the history of Central Arabia turned upon the rivalry between the great ruling Wahabi houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. Their quarrels have continued to the present day, though at present the family of Ibn Saud is almost completely in the ascendant. Yet little more than a decade before the war three British cruisers had to land a force with guns at Koweit, and trenches had to be dug round the town, to save it from an attack by an army under the then head of the Ibn Rashids.

These memories may seem remote and unimportant, but they are of very present urgency. The Wahabi movement did not die, but smouldered with modern modifications. The disputes between the houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud remained a dominating factor in Arabian politics. One of the many issues which must be settled as a result of the war was that of the future of Arabia. It was not a local issue, as it seemed. It affected the whole of Islam, for it involved the future guardianship of the Sacred Cities and the control of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In any settlement that was reached, the great chieftains of Arabia would have to be reckoned with. One of the desires of Ibn Saud was an outlet to the Persian Gulf, and he more than once sought British protection,

though it was never accorded to him. He would long ago have taken the Turkish ports of Bida and Ojeir, in the peninsula of El Katar, but he feared Turkish reprisals from the sea. Until 1913 the venerable and mildewed corvette which the Turks stationed at Basra was enough to keep him in his inland cities and oases. There was never a case where sea power of the most insignificant kind was so cheaply and successfully exercised.

The Turks, then, were never masters of any portion of the western shores of the Gulf until the 'seventies of last century. They held Basra. They held the little town of Fao, at the entrance to the Shatt-al-Arab, where they maintained a mud structure which by courtesy was called a fort. Beyond lay the sands of Arabia, where the iradés of the Sultan had no validity. The Sheikhs of Koweit preserved their independence, though prudence prompted them to keep on friendly terms with their neighbours. South of their town lay the region of El Hasa, with one or two fertile oases in which towns existed. South again of El Hasa came the peninsula of El Katar. In both El Hasa and El Katar the Arab tribes lived unmolested. Beyond El Katar came the territories of the chiefs of the Pirate Coast, with whom Great Britain held treaties under which they agreed to keep the peace at sea and to abstain from piracy. The Turks maintained intermittent relations with the Wahabi chiefs of Central Arabia, who took the advice tendered them by the distant Sultan, or disregarded it, precisely as it suited them.



THE PERSIAN GULF AND SURROUNDING REGIONS.
Inset is a Map showing the projected route of the Baghdad Railway.

Into this scene of comparative passivity came the late Midhat Pasha, and it was with his advent that modern Turkish aggression in the Persian Gulf really began. Midhat Pasha was an extremely able and energetic man, and in after years he incurred the inexorable hatred of the Sultan Abdul Hamid because he was the author of the first Turkish Constitution. He paid for his liberal ideas with his life, being imprisoned and eventually assassinated at Taif, in Arabia, in 1883. He was made Vali of Baghdad in 1869, and in the early 'seventies he set about extending Turkish rule in the Persian Gulf. He began by establishing closer relations with Koweit. Next he sailed down the Gulf, landed a force on the coast of El Hasa, conquered the Arabian tribes, and converted the region into a Turkish sandjak. Then he appeared with his flotilla off the island of Bahrein, which he "annexed," a proceeding which was very soon upset by the British Government. He laid claim to the peninsula of El Katar, but Great Britain declined to recognize his pretensions. The Government of the day did, however, most foolishly and unwisely accept his conquest of El Hasa, a decision which in later years there was every reason to deplore. We had never retained any territory in the Gulf ourselves. We had every right to object to any other Power filching great tracts of country in this region. But 1873 was a period when Britain was unmindful

of her larger responsibilities and duties, and temporarily forgetful of her own glorious past.

Midhat Pasha was summoned back to Constantinople in 1873, and was made Grand Vizier. The activity he generated in all the lands south of Baghdad quickly died away, and the Turks gave comparatively little trouble until the rise of German influence on the Golden Horn stimulated them to fresh aggression. They kept a battalion or two and some guns at El Hofuf, the town in the oasis of that name, which is regarded as the capital of El Hasa. They had a small garrison at their port of El Katif, and another at Ojeir, at the head of the Bight of Bahrein. These troops maintained Turkish sovereignty as far as the range of their weapons, and no farther. They collected taxes spasmodically and without much oppression, owing to the fewness of their numbers. In El Katar the sole evidence of Turkish claims consisted of a very small force in the town and port of Bida. It never went beyond the walls of the town. Had it done so, it would have been destroyed by the tribesmen, who fiercely resented the Turkish intrusion. To the Gulf peoples the Turks were a nuisance, but on the whole not a very troublesome nuisance.

The whole situation was gradually changed when, after the accession of the Emperor William II., Germany formulated her new world policies, and induced Turkey to enter into a veiled and subordinate alliance with her.



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[Cecil Burns, R.B.A.]

THE BAZAAR AT KOWEIT.



THE FORESHORE AT BAHREIN ISLAND.
From roof of British Consulate.

The Emperor's first visit to Constantinople in 1889 saw the dawn of the mighty Pan-Germanic scheme which was compendiously known in Berlin as the B.B.B. (Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad). After the war began a professor lecturing at Berlin said that Germany's aims might be summed up in four geographical catch-words: "North Sea, Constantinople, Baghdad, Indian Ocean." Another favourite definition, attributed to the Emperor himself, was "a Germanic wedge reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." The Deutsche Bank group had already acquired control of the railways of European Turkey, and the locomotive was to be the principal means of extending Germanic influence in the Middle East.

The scheme was grandiose. It was also in some respects exceedingly vague. Perhaps it owed its origin in part to chance seed dropped by von Moltke, who in his early days, when attached to the Turkish Army, had ridden through Anatolia, traversed the Gates of Cilicia, looked forth upon the Upper Euphrates Valley, and dreamed dreams of a day when these fertile but fallow lands might be won back to a progressive civilization. Marshal von der Goltz Pasha, who in 1883 had already begun his reorganization of the Turkish military forces, may have contributed to the growth of the conception. The idea that the Turkish soldiery might be utilised as a weapon in the hands of Germany was certainly destined to bear remarkable fruit. On the financial side there

were big profits to be made, for Germany supplied nothing to Turkey without exacting big and even excessive prices. The talk of founding German agricultural colonies in Asia Minor from the overspill of Germany's population was not very practical, and was always doomed to come to naught. A highly civilised European race, seeking to win subsistence from the soil of Asia, would be "underlived" by the indigenous population. Far more attractive were the dreams of controlling as administrators the fertile plains of the Lower Euphrates and Tigris, and making them once more the granary of the world. In the beginnings of recorded history man found wheat growing wild in this rich country, evolved the arts of cultivation, and made the wilderness a smiling garden. Herr Paul Rohrbach, whose eyes were always fixed upon Mesopotamia, was fond of telling the people of Berlin that so recently as the eighth century the land between the two rivers produced annually ten million tons of wheat, and supported a population of six millions. Now, he would add, it maintains only a million people.

The objects of the Germans were, therefore, to a certain extent economic, but they were above all political. They wanted to build a great trunk railway from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf, with a port in Gulf waters as its terminus. Whatever flag the port might fly, it was meant to be an essentially German stronghold. It would have at its back an army under



MALCOLM INLET, OMAN.

A huge unfrequented harbour. The distant shores are some miles away.

German influence, and in future years it would serve as a stepping-off place for India. The outward movement across the Indian Ocean was very rarely talked about. It was a development which lay beyond, and was perhaps never more than dimly conceived. The vital thing was to reach the Persian Gulf.

Yet the Baghdad Railway at first took shape very slowly. The year before the Emperor's first visit to the Sultan Abdul Hamid, a German company, backed by the Deutsche Bank, had obtained a concession for making a short railway along the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora. As a result of the Emperor's activities, this concession was developed into the scheme for the construction of a line to Angora and Konia, which was known as the Anatolian Railway. The Emperor paid his second visit to Constantinople in 1898, and afterwards proceeded on his famous pilgrimage through Syria and the Holy Land, in the course of which he won Turkish support for ever by proclaiming himself to be the protector of Islam. In 1899 came the sequel. The Sultan granted a concession for the continuation of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, to a German corporation which styled itself "The Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company." The concession was signed on behalf of Germany by Herr von Siemens, of the Deutsche Bank. By a further and more definite concession

granted on March 5, 1903, to Herr von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Turkey guaranteed interest on the cost of construction of the line at the rate of £700 per year per kilometre. The principle of kilometric guarantees, which Germany invariably exacted from Turkey, was iniquitous, and has always been strongly denounced. It should in justice be said, however, that the promoters of the railway were able to forego the guarantee on some of the earlier sections of the line within a few years of their being open to traffic. Whether the later sections would ever have made enough profit to free themselves from the guarantee is very much open to doubt.

It should also be acknowledged that in Anatolia the line had beneficent results. No reasonable man ever doubted that, whether it paid or not, the Baghdad Railway was on its economic side a most praiseworthy enterprise. Asia needs railways, and no part of the Asiatic continent is more in need of good railways than Asiatic Turkey. The British opposition to the Baghdad Railway scheme was based partly on its improper methods of finance, but far more on the undoubted fact that Germany's motive in promoting it was primarily political, and that it was meant to undermine British influence in the Middle East, and British paramountcy in the Persian Gulf.

The effects of the new German policy quietly

began to make themselves manifest in Gulf waters. The method adopted was to protest on every occasion that German aims in the Gulf were exclusively commercial, but British vigilance soon discovered another side to the occupations of German agents. They talked of commerce, but they surreptitiously sought at various points to obtain a territorial footing.

It is most interesting and instructive to trace the germination and the growth of German influence around the shores of this inland sea. The details may seem trifling, but they reveal German methods in a compact and illuminating manner.

The very first Germans who seem to have traded in the Gulf opened business under the name of Messrs. Wonckhaus & Co., and were understood to represent a Hamburg firm. Their proceedings were characteristic. They went in 1896 to Lingah, a little town on the Persian coast where no other European resided. Even the British Vice-Consul was, according to Lord Curzon's book on Persia, a "jolly old Arab." The Wonckhaus firm modestly began by dealing in shells and mother-of-pearl, said very little about itself, avoided all Europeans, but cultivated a large acquaintance among the roving Gulf population.

The next year the German Government quietly established a Vice-Consulate at Bushire. At that time there were exactly six German subjects in the whole of the Gulf.

In 1899, after the Baghdad Railway concession was first signed, things grew busier. The old German cruiser *Arcona*, not the warship of that name, came to the Gulf on her way home from China. It was understood that she was looking for a suitable terminus for the railway. She spent some time in various secluded bays, but was unable to get up the Shatt-al-Arab to Basra, as she could not cross the bar at the mouth of the river. A little later in the same year a party of Germans appeared at Bunder Abbas. They said they were "scientists," but they were certainly not astronomers. They disappeared as mysteriously as they came.

In 1900 Herr Stemrich, who was then German Consul-General at Constantinople, came overland through Asiatic Turkey at the head of a mission which was making the first rough inspection of the route of the proposed railway. The members of the mission included the German Military Attaché at Constantinople. Herr Stemrich went to Koweit, where he was courteously received by Sheikh Mubarak. He explained that the Baghdad Railway Company desired to establish its terminus on the shores of the Bay of Koweit. He wanted to buy a site at Ras Kathama, at the head of the bay, and to lease twenty square miles of territory around it. Sheikh Mubarak refused, for he mistrusted his plausible visitors. He knew, as all Mahomedans knew, that Germany had contracted some sort of mysterious alliance with the



MATRA, THE CENTRE OF THE MUSCAT DATE TRADE.



THE SHEIKH'S CASTLE AT SHARGAH, ON THE PIRATE COAST.

The ancient cannon is the Sheikh's sole piece of artillery.

Turks. He wished to have nothing to do with any friends of Turkey, because the Turks were constantly trying to undermine his position. Herr Stemrich was politely bowed out of the high council chamber, where the Sheikh was constantly wont to sit, with his gaze wandering over the wide expanse of his precious bay.

There was another and far more definite reason for Sheikh Mubarak's refusal. On January 23, 1899, he had signed a secret agreement with Great Britain, in which, in return for certain undertakings, he agreed, among other things, not to lease or dispose of any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any foreign Power without the previous consent of Great Britain. The agreement was part of the British response to the Kaiser's visit to the Sultan in the previous year, the results of which were not unknown in London and Simla. It was made within a month of Lord Curzon's arrival in India as Viceroy, and was almost the first matter he took in hand after assuming office.

The Germans were undefeated. If they could not get their terminus by purchase, they proposed to obtain it by force through the agency of their puppets the Turks. Towards the end of the year 1900 Sheikh Mubarak decided to take a hand in the warfare in Central Arabia between the houses of Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. He led a small army into the interior

in support of Ibn Saud, was ambushed in a deep defile while returning from the city of Hail, and suffered a severe reverse.

His temporary weakness made a German opportunity. Early in 1901 a Turkish corvette packed with troops sailed into Koweit Harbour, and its commander announced that he proposed to take possession of the town. Great Britain had been warned of the plot, and had made preparations. A British cruiser was lying in the harbour, and the Turks were told that their corvette would be sunk if a single soldier was landed. They sailed away. Later in the year the corvette returned, bearing a high Turkish dignitary who was carrying a menacing letter addressed by the Sultan to Mubarak. Again a British cruiser intervened, and as a result of its support Mubarak ordered the envoy to depart. Then the Turks incited Ibn Rashid to attack Koweit, and only the assistance of three British cruisers, as already related, saved the town from being sacked. The next move was to make use of Mubarak's nephews, who were in exile in Turkish territory. They sailed from the Shatt-al-Arab with a fleet of native craft to take Koweit, but the whole flotilla was dispersed by a single British gunboat. Thereafter, the German plots for seizing Koweit by force were abandoned.

A new method of obtaining access to Koweit territory was then instigated by the Germans.

They had, meanwhile, discovered a possible alternative terminus. The north side of the Bay of Koweit is bounded by the large and marshy island of Bubian. Behind Bubian are the long and deep inlets known as the Khor Abdullah and the Khor Zobeir, which penetrate a good deal of the way to Basra. The Germans seem to have thought that if they made their terminus somewhere on the Khor Abdullah they would have it in a place fairly safe against attack. Unfortunately for them, there were difficulties. Mubarak claimed jurisdiction to a point twenty miles north-west of the Khor Abdullah. He was also the indisputable owner of Bubian, which completely commanded the passage to the sea. His rights were violated, and Turkish posts were established at various points within his territory, including the island of Bubian.

The British Embassy at Constantinople was at that period exceedingly inactive, and the Home Government had passed from the "hot" fit to the "cold" fit. An incident which happened at a meeting between King Edward and the German Emperor is understood to have contributed to this change. The Emperor was eager to talk about Koweit, in which he took a deep and direct interest. King Edward was armed with certain notes on a sheet of paper. The Emperor asked if he might have the notes, and then promptly, but most improperly, recorded them as an official communication. The notes contained a questionable admission. It was thought best to condone the Emperor's sharp practice, but British policy at Koweit suffered in consequence. The posts on Bubian

were allowed to remain after a formal protest, much to the chagrin of Mubarak, who had faithfully stuck to us, but had been imperfectly supported. They were there almost until the war began, although, meanwhile, Germany had announced her intention of making her terminus at Basra. She never really abandoned her desire to reach Koweit. One of the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement about the Baghdad Railway, which was never signed owing to the outbreak of the war, provided for the residence of a Turkish official at Koweit. He would have been as constant a centre of intrigue as was the Ottoman High Commissioner in Cairo.

Elsewhere in the Gulf the Germans grew more active. The firm of Wonckhaus, which had begun so humbly by buying shells on the beach at Lingah, rapidly blossomed into a large and widespread enterprise. In 1901 the headquarters were removed to the island of Bahrein. A new "branch" was opened at Basra, and a big house was taken for it. The whole Gulf wondered where the money came from. It certainly was never obtained from profits. Another branch was opened at Bunder Abbas. The Bahrein branch very nearly became the scene of an "international incident." Sheikh Isa, of Bahrein, was having much trouble with a turbulent nephew, who had a following of truculent retainers. One of these followers violently assaulted one of the Wonckhaus coolies, and directly afterwards one Bahmsen, an assistant to Wonckhaus, was badly hammered. The incident sounds paltry, but it was just one of the pretexts for interference for



A DESERTED BRITISH NAVAL STATION AT BASIDU, ON KISHM ISLAND.
The R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" is lying beyond, in the Clarence Straits.

which Germany was eagerly watching. She was given no chance. Within three days a British gunboat arrived, bearing the British Resident in the Persian Gulf. A sum of £66 was instantly paid as compensation to the bruised Bahnsen, and the ringleaders in the disturbance were publicly flogged and then banished. In 1905 Germany showed signs of desiring to open direct relations with the Sheikh of Bahrein, but it was at once pointed out that the Sheikh's external relations were, with his consent, under British control.

The Persian Gulf was almost certainly the earliest home of the primitive civilization of the world. Some among the very few people who have really tried to study Bahrein believe that it was probably the real cradle of the higher development of the human race. Its extraordinary collection of mound tombs, stretching as far as the eye can see across its desert interior, puzzle the chance travellers who have examined them. All through the ages its rough tracks have drawn adventurers from many lands—British and Arabs and Persians, Portuguese and Greeks and Phœnicians, Babylonians and Chaldeans and Sumerians, and those "black-heads" who were perhaps the first progenitors of civilized humanity. Their footsteps ring down the ages, and yet they have left very few records. From the time when Alexander's famous admiral Nearchus,

who commanded the Greek fleet in its navigation of the Persian Gulf, visited Bahrein, the island figures hardly at all in history.

What brought the later comers to Bahrein? The answer is—pearls. Even to-day Bahrein has a world-wide interest as the centre of the Gulf pearl trade. In good years it sends to Paris and New York and London, by way of Bombay and Surat, a million pounds' worth of pearls. The Great Pearl Bank practically extends for more than half the length of the western side of the Gulf, commencing near Abu Musa, opposite Shargah, curving round to the island of Halul, then passing near El Katar, and finally terminating at a point near Musalamiya, where the territories of the Sheikh of Koweit begin. Very little of the Bank lies in territorial waters, and therefore the right to fish upon it raises a rather nice question of international law. The pearl fisheries had been worked for many centuries by the various Arab communities on the western shores of the Gulf, who may be said to have acquired a prescriptive right in them. A British gunboat policed the Bank during the fishery season, and preserved order among the pearling dhows. Various enterprising persons of British, Indian, and other nationalities, who sought to participate, were all warned off by the British Government. One writer observes: "The question really settles itself. I should be



MESSRS. WONCKHAUS AND CO.'S HEAP OF PEARL OYSTER SHELLS AT BAHREIN.



H.M. SHIPS "ESPIËGLE" AND "ODIN" LYING OFF BASRA.

sorry to go pearling amid a horde of retired pirates unless I had an escort of a squadron of cruisers."

Germany thought differently. When the Wonckhaus firm transferred itself to Bahrein, its heaps of mother-of-pearl shells, bought from the fishermen and piled high outside the dilapidated building which served as an office, seemed innocent enough. But German minds a long way off had been thinking very ardently about the Pearl Bank. Searching amid the records of Constantinople, Germans had come upon the story of Midhat Pasha's great cruise in the Gulf in the early 'seventies, when he professed to annex Bahrein to the Sultan's dominions. The hint was enough. A shadowy structure of Turkish claims was speedily reared. The enterprising Wonckhaus had not been settled for a year in Bahrein before the Sultan was formally asked to grant to a German syndicate a monopoly of the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf. The Germans explained that they proposed to work the Pearl Bank by "scientific" methods, and the Sultan was to have his share of the proceeds. The Sultan had not the slightest territorial or financial interest in the pearl fisheries. He had no more right to grant a monopoly of pearl fishing in the Gulf than he had to confer whaling privileges in South Georgia. Yet he was solemnly proceeding to accede to the German request when one sharp word from Great Britain quashed the whole scheme.

But the Teuton is not easily rebuffed. The

next that was heard of the German agents at Constantinople was that they were trying to persuade the Sultan to give them a lease of the island of Halul, in the centre of the Gulf, sixty miles east of Bida, the port of the El Katar peninsula. Halul is an island two or three miles in circumference, with plenty of flat ground. It has a useful boat-landing place, and a good anchorage well sheltered from the "shamal" winds, the terror of Gulf mariners. It has no water, but, as at Bunder Abbas and elsewhere in the Gulf, condensers could be used. Halul is right on the Pearl Bank, and within the 20-fathom line. It is really a rendezvous for the pearling fleet, and by long prescription is regarded as the joint property of all the Sheikhs sending dhows to the fisheries. It was no more Turkish than the island of Bombay, but the Power that held it would certainly control the pearl fisheries. It was, moreover, quite good enough for a coaling station, and might have been made into an Oriental Heligoland.

Again a British word in season stopped this little enterprise, but still the Germans persisted. Their next attempt was more definite, and for a time almost succeeded. They sought to establish rights on the island of Abu Musa, fifty miles north-west of the town of Shargah, on the Pirate Coast. Abu Musa is rather bigger than Halul, and there is ample evidence that it has been continuously in the possession of the Sheikhs of Shargah. It is at Abu Musa that the Great Pearl Bank begins. It was over Abu



[Loyal Fraser]

THE HOTTEST PLACE IN THE WORLD: ELPHINSTONE INLET, OMAN.

A wonderful tropical fiord nineteen miles long, but human beings can only live there for four months in the year. The R.I.M.S "Lawrence" in distance.

Musa that Germany first showed signs of openly questioning the predominance of British influence in the Persian Gulf. In ten years she had travelled very far from the "innocent" German traders buying shells on Lingah Beach.

There are red oxide deposits on Abu Musa, and the Sheikh of Shargah granted a concession for working them to three Arabs, who formed a partnership. Two of the men, father and son, resided at Lingah, and it is supposed that they applied for the concession on German instigation. The third partner was a Shargah man. In 1906 the inevitable firm of Wonekhaus appeared on the scene and openly acquired the concession. The Wonekhaus firm was believed to be acting for the Hamburg-Amerika Company, which had all the time been at the back of these pertinacious German activities in the troubled waters of the Gulf.

The Sheikh of Shargah protested against the transfer, and requested the British Government, as his protector, to intervene. He was one of the Trucial Chiefs, and by a treaty concluded in 1892 all the chiefs had bound themselves "not

to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power, nor admit the agent of any other Government, nor to part with any portion of their territories save to Great Britain." No notice was taken by Messrs. Wonekhaus & Co. of the Sheikh's stoppage of the concession. In October, 1907, therefore, H.M.S. Lapwing towed to Abu Musa a number of sailing boats containing 300 of the Sheikh's armed followers. The men working the oxide deposits were removed and conveyed to Lingah. According to the German account, a representative of Wonekhaus arrived at the island a few hours later in a boat flying the German flag, which was fired on by the men from Shargah.

Here, at last, was the "international incident" for which Germany had been working. The German Government called for explanations. The German Foreign Office quickly mobilised its Press, and a small rock in the Persian Gulf, of which hardly anyone in or out of Germany had ever heard, was made the subject of many columns of portentous articles. The *Cologne Gazette* was mild, and said that the German purpose was commercial. The *Neueste*

Nachrichten, rather more severe, spoke of "the incomprehensible violation of German rights." The *Berliner Tageblatt* grew a little violent, and announced that Great Britain was trying to undermine German prestige and to demonstrate her own supremacy. It said that the English "seem to have had the intention of showing Germany that she can do nothing in the Middle East without Great Britain's consent." It cryptically declared that "commerce and politics can no longer be divided," and that Germany could only attain commercial success by "energetic political action."

The hubbub was reflected in the London Press, but it soon ceased. The German case had not a leg to stand on. The island had clearly been in the possession and the continuous occupation of the Sheikhs of Shargah for many generations. The Sheikh had an equal right to make the concession and to object to its transfer without his consent. In one respect

the incident still served the German purpose. It had enabled Germany publicly to question for the first time the British claims to paramountcy in the Gulf. She made a formal protest, but did not then pursue the matter.

About the time that Germany became interested in the Pearl Bank her hand also became visible on the Karun River, in Persian territory, at the head of the Gulf, in the region where the British Admiralty afterwards acquired extensive oil interests. The Karun River is in the territory of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, a semi-independent chieftain who has special relations with Great Britain, though he nominally acknowledges the overlordship of Persia. The German Legation in Teheran was busily engaged in endeavouring to extend German influence in Persia, more particularly in the south. A Dutchman named Van Roggen, who was understood to be a German agent, arrived on the Karun River, and worked out a scheme



TRIBESMEN IN ELPHINSTONE INLET, OMAN.
They are Shihiyins, the most primitive people in Arabia.

(Loyal Fraser.


for irrigating the river valley at a cost of two millions sterling.

The episode was again typical of German arbitrary methods. Germany applied to the Persian Government for a concession for the irrigation scheme. It was not in the gift of Persia at all. The Sheikh of Mohammerah said that if he wanted his territory irrigated he would do it himself, with the aid of British financiers. At his request one of the Punjab irrigation engineers spent eighteen months on the Karun working out a separate scheme. Germany still pressed Persia for the concession. The Sheikh made it quite clear to the Teheran authorities that if they tried to alienate his rights in favour of Germany he would offer active resistance, which he was well able to do. The German position was seen to be quite untenable, and after a time the Van Roggen scheme was withdrawn.

The time came, after ten years of spade-work, when the Hamburg-Amerika Company publicly entered into the Gulf trade. In September, 1906, a line of steamers was started, plying between Hamburg, Aden, Muscat, and all the principal Gulf ports. The ubiquitous Wonekhaus, his humble beginnings in a native

house at Lingah entirely obscured, blossomed forth as the accredited agent of the famous Hamburg-Amerika Company, with the benedictions of the mighty Herr Ballin himself. The arrival of the first German steamer was long remembered in the Gulf. It entered each port with a band playing "Deutschland über Alles," and an air which the listening Britons fondly supposed to be "God Save the King." Its cargo appeared to consist chiefly of unlimited quantities of rosy German champagne, which was lavishly dispensed to all and sundry. A dinner of innumerable courses was served at every stopping-place. All were welcome. It was a wonderful time for the satellites of the patient Wonekhaus.

The Hamburg-Amerika cargoes were not long confined to champagne. The service was soon reduced to a monthly one, but the German trade grew, although the disturbed internal condition of Southern Persia greatly affected business at all Persian ports. In the year 1911-12 German imports at Bushire were valued at £39,000; those of the United Kingdom and India at £707,000. Exports from Bushire to Germany were valued at £67,000; those to the United Kingdom and India at £394,000. At Bunder Abbas in the same year German imports amounted to £20,000, and British and Indian £322,000; exports to Germany £14, to Great Britain and India, £147,000. On the other hand, German trade with Basra and Mesopotamia increased very rapidly, showing in 1912 a growth of 33 per cent. in imports and of 28 per cent. in exports. The figures were: imports, £528,415; exports, £375,760. The British figures were vastly larger, but German trade made steady progress at Basra until the war stopped it.



BRITISH TELEGRAPH STATION ON HENJAM ISLAND.

The island of Kishm lies across the channel.



CROWD AT BASRA WATCHING THE BRITISH ENTRY.


The Hamburg-Amerika steamers are believed to have been heavily subsidized.

When the negotiations between Great Britain, Germany, Turkey and other countries, with regard to the Baghdad Railway, gradually took shape in London, Germany for the time being abandoned her clumsy attempts to obtain a foothold in the Gulf by surreptitious means. It will be seen that by the vigilance of the British representatives on the spot she was invariably foiled at every point. She saw, however, that the advantages she had failed to gain by direct action might probably be stealthily obtained in course of time by diplomatic action. British interests in the Persian Gulf were less understood and less rigidly guarded in London.

During the three years before the war an agreement between Great Britain and Turkey was drafted after very long discussion. It provided that the terminus of the Baghdad Railway was to be at Basra, its natural outlet, and that no extension to Koweit was to be built unless the consent of Great Britain was first obtained. Turkey further agreed to abandon her entirely mythical pretensions to suzerainty over the Bahrein Islands, Muscat, and the territory of the Trucial Chiefs, a valueless concession, because her suzerainty had never existed, the claim was quite modern, and it had never been acknowledged by the rulers directly concerned. She also undertook

to evacuate the peninsula of El Katar, an almost equally empty offer, because she had never held more than a couple of tiny ports. On the other hand, Great Britain agreed to recognize the suzerainty of Turkey over Koweit, while Turkey promised not to interfere with the internal affairs of Koweit, and said she would recognize the conventions (there is believed to be one later than that of 1899) between Great Britain and Koweit. The expediency of the British admission was strongly questioned by those who hold that Turkish pretensions to suzerainty over Koweit are vague and indefensible. The agreement further provided that a representative of the Turkish Government should in future reside at Koweit. It has been objected to this provision that it would have opened the door to intrigue, and that it was at variance with the spirit of the convention of 1899. A British naval officer in 1901 ordered off the Sultan's representative. Ten years later the British Government were proposing to admit him, although in the Gulf every Turkish official had become a German agent.

The agreement with Turkey, which had been drafted with the full cognizance and practically in consultation with the German Government, was never signed, although the negotiations were intermittently continued almost until the outbreak of war. At the same time an agreement between Great Britain and



Lowat Fraser.

EARLY MORNING AT MUSCAT.

Germany with regard to the Baghdad Railway, Mesopotamia, and other matters, was also drafted. A telegram from Berlin stated that it was initialled in London by Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in the middle of June, six weeks before the war. It was not signed, and the precise character of its contents was not disclosed. During the two or three years before the war the construction of the Baghdad Railway was steadily continued, and work was begun on the section between Baghdad and Basra. The full story of the Baghdad Railway, which has far wider ramifications than have here been touched upon, does not require recital in connexion with the campaign in the delta.

It is interesting to note that while Turkey was demonstrating in London her inalienable claims to the Arabian region of El Hasa and to the western shores of the Gulf south of Koweit territory, she was rudely evicted from these areas. In the summer of 1913 the redoubtable Ibn Saud crowned his victorious career by sweeping the Turks, lock, stock and barrel, out of El Hasa and all Eastern Arabia, probably never to return. The remnants of their troops arrived on the Gulf coast in a sorry plight, and were rescued by a British steamer. Their disappearance did not prevent the British Government from solemnly assenting to the demarcation of the Turkish "possessions" in Eastern Arabia, and from continuing to discuss at inordinate length the Turkish "right" to a long section of the Gulf coast which the Turks had filched less than forty years before, and from which they had been ingloriously expelled.

The story of the advent of Germany into the Persian Gulf, and of the results which followed therefrom, has been told at some length and in considerable detail for a special reason. It is probably the only instance on record—except perhaps Morocco—in which German methods of "world-expansion" can be traced from the very earliest beginnings down to the latest phase. We see the whole process at work, from the modest arrival of an obscure gentleman from Hamburg upon the sun-steeped shores of the Clarence Straits, down to the noisy appearance of the big steamer with its stewards' band, and the cargoes of railway material which were meant to make Basra and its river the Hamburg of the East. We see the first crude attempts to seize unconsidered islets; the schemes for obtaining concessions by illicit means; the quiet manufacture of "international

incidents"; the initial half-hearted attempts to question the validity of the British position; the tentative unleashing of the German Press; the entry of the great financiers, with their web of intrigue; the transference of issues which seem unimportant, but are really vital, to the European Chancelleries; and, finally, the dangerous stage of agreements, by which Great Britain is to be tempted by smooth words to open the door for the destruction of interests patiently won by centuries of effort. It is all there—a picture of German world-politics in miniature. Each isolated incident is trivial in itself; collectively they mean much.

It may be argued that Germany had an entire right to establish and extend her trade around the shores of this inland sea. Of course she had. No one has ever dreamed of questioning her right to trade or to build railways. What was questioned was her motives and some of her acts. It was the combination of commercial effort with political action, so lucidly explained by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which roused British hostility to the doings of Germany in the Persian Gulf. On innumerable German platforms the ultimate aims of Germany in the Middle East were expounded with arrogance and without reserve. Countless German books dealt with the same theme. The intention was to supplant and replace British influence in these regions, and not to supplement it. To that great end all the German efforts were in reality directed.

By what right, it may further be asked, did Great Britain endeavour to resist German expansion in these waters? Had she any real authority for her claims to paramountcy beyond self-interest and the need for guarding India? It remains to answer these natural questions and to define the solid grounds upon which the British position in the Persian Gulf is based.

Great Britain had taken nothing for herself in the Gulf, had preserved peace around its shores, and had given equal opportunities to all. That is the sum of her ease. She kept the peace of the Gulf unaided and unsupported. She sought no peculiar privileges. She acquired no territory. She held point after point in the Gulf, and gave them all back, save only a patch of land at Basidu, on the island of Kishun, and her telegraph station on the island of Henjam. Every nation was able to benefit by her efforts, and trade was unrestricted. But if she imposed a self-denying ordinance



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JUNCTION OF TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES AT KURNA.

Union Jack floating on Governor's House, afterwards occupied by British General and Staff. All the houses were loopholed, and much damaged by British fire. Two Krupp guns among the palm trees; mountain gun near Governor's House.

upon herself, she imposed it equally on others. She could brook no rivalry in the Gulf, and, above all, she could not contemplate the creation of territorial interests by any other Power.

The first Englishman who ever visited the Gulf was Ralph Fitch, who traversed it from end to end in 1583, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in the company of three other Englishmen. They were captured by the Portuguese and sent to Goa, being the first of the English to set foot in India. Thus they made the acquaintance of the country from the inside of a Portuguese gaol. The object of Fitch was the development of trade, and his journey was one of the occurrences which led to the formation of the organization which ultimately became the East India Company. It was not, however, until 1618 that the British flag was

first flown in the vicinity of the Gulf. In that year one of the Company's trading vessels was sent from Surat to Jask, near the entrance to the Gulf, where nowadays Great Britain maintains a telegraph station. Trade with Jask continued for three or four years, but the obstruction of the Portuguese, who held the city and island of Hormuz, became so pronounced that it was resolved to attack them. An arrangement was made with the Shah of Persia, who had already sent an army to besiege Hormuz. Part of this arrangement, duly embodied in a treaty, was that the Company were "constantly to defend the Gulf" with warships, as already noted.

After the sack of Hormuz, a British factory was established at Bunder Abbas. Subsequently there were frequent encounters between



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SCENE OF ACTIONS ON THE SHATT-AL-ARAB ON NOV. 15 AND 17

the British squadron and the Dutch and Portuguese, as well as the Arabs, although it was with British aid that the Arabs expelled the Portuguese from Muscat. British prestige steadily increased in the Gulf during the next century and a half, and the British flag was both respected and feared. Frequent help was given to the Persians, who owed it to the British that they did not become a nation without a seaboard. The survey of the Gulf was begun by the Indian Navy in 1785 and thus was set on foot an undertaking which continued to the time of the great war. Both the charts and the lights of the Gulf were solely the outcome of British enterprise.

The greatest work Great Britain undertook in the Gulf was the suppression of piracy. The Arab tribes seem to have always fought one another on sea and land, and to have occasionally united to attack the passing stranger; but they never really entered upon organized and persistent piracy till they were, at the beginning of last century, welded together by the great Wahabi movement in Arabia. All along the Pirate Coast there are lagoons and backwaters, in which the pirates sheltered their vessels, and behind which their towns were built. The boldest of the pirates were the Joasmi tribe, whose headquarters were at Ras-ul-Kheima.

By 1806 the pirates had become so aggressive that the British cornered a Joasmi fleet off the island of Kishm, and a treaty was signed at Bunder Abbas. The pirates, however, cared little for treaties, and soon recommenced their work of depredation. At times they even attacked the Company's cruisers, and when they boarded and captured the small British warship *Sylph*, part of a squadron carrying Sir Harford Jones's Mission to Persia, it was felt that strong reprisals were necessary. A military expedition, which included the York and Lancaster Regiment and the Loyal North Lancashires, was dispatched to Ras-ul-Kheima, and burned the town and the pirate fleet.

The expedition then crossed the Gulf, and the town of Lingah was destroyed. The fortress of Laft, on the island of Kishm, was captured in an extraordinary manner. The force attacking the fortress was beaten off, but next morning the British were astonished to see the Union Jack waving from its walls. An officer had gone ashore in the night, found that most of the defenders had fled, obtained admission, and hoisted the flag.



THE PALM GROVE AT SAHIL CAMP.

Afterwards the piratical craft at Shargah and other towns on the Pirate Coast were destroyed, and finally at Shinas, on the coast of Oman, a thousand Wahabis were killed. It was on this occasion that the Wahabi leader, the then Ibn Saud, wrote to the British authorities: "In truth, then, war is bitter; and only a fool engages in it, as the poet has said."

Even this lesson did not suffice for the Joasmis. By 1812 they were sweeping the seas once more, and in 1815 they had even captured a vessel so far away as the coast of Kathiawar, Western India. In 1816 a British squadron menaced Ras-ul-Kheima again, but made no impression. In 1817 the Joasmis built a fort at Basidu, on the island of Kishm. In 1818 they were ravaging the west coast of India, and in 1819 a fleet of sixty-four pirate vessels, manned by seven thousand men, was off the coasts of Cutch and Kathiawar.

But the cup of the iniquities of the Joasmis was full to overflowing. A powerful force was assembled at Bombay under Sir William Grant Keir, including the two British regiments which had fought in the Gulf seven years before. Ras-ul-Kheima was cannonaded and finally carried by assault, 300 of the Arabs being killed and 700 wounded. The other Joasmi ports were visited in turn and their fortifications blown up. At Sohar, on the Oman coast, there was considerable fighting. Finally, in 1820, a



[Elliott and Fry,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR
BARRETT, K.C.B.

general treaty of peace was concluded with the pirate chiefs. The York and Lancaster Regiment still bears the word "Arabia" on its colours in commemoration of these forgotten campaigns.

Sir William Grant Keir's expedition dealt piracy in the Gulf its death-blow. The Beni Yas at Abu Dhabi made a desperate attempt to hoist the blood-red flag again in 1834. Anticipating a suggestion afterwards heard in


comic opera, they even prepared boiling oil in which to place the Christians they captured. They were promptly suppressed, however, and an episode which began with cauldrons of boiling oil ended in a trial in the Bombay High Court. The various treaties entered into with the leaders of the tribes on the Pirate Coast, known as the Trucial Chiefs, were consolidated in the general treaty of 1853. To this was added the treaty of 1892, by which the chiefs agreed to place their external relations in British hands, and not to alienate any portion of their territories to foreign Powers.

It would be too much to say that piracy entirely disappeared from the Gulf. Isolated acts of piracy occurred almost every year, and they generally emanated from the territory which was alleged to be under Turkish control. They were usually swiftly punished, but there could be little doubt that if the strong hand of the British was withdrawn, Arab fleets would again commence their depredations.

In suppressing piracy in the Gulf, Great Britain was not only seeking the protection of her own trade, but was "solicitous for the common good, and was serving other nations as well as herself." An almost equally long story might be told concerning the strenuous British efforts for the suppression of the slave trade, extending over many years and still unfinished. The British control of the arms traffic involved heavy expenditure and most laborious patrols. Sometimes the whole East Indies Squadron was occupied in this work, and in 1911 Admiral Sir Edmond Slade led a



FAO, THE FIRST POINT CAPTURED BY THE BRITISH.



THE DELTA OF THE TIGRIS AND EUPHRATES.

combined naval and military expedition into Persian Mekran to punish gun-runners.

The British sanitary organization did much for the health of the Gulf, and for ten years kept at bay the repeated appearances of plague. The duties of the British Resident in the Gulf, whose headquarters were at Bushire, were many and varied. He was by general consent the arbiter in the quarrels between the different local rulers, and was alike their counsellor and their friend. His influence was always directed towards the preservation of peace and order. He composed the occasional differences between the Trucial Chiefs, protected the coasts of Arabia and Persia from external aggression, saved the native dhows from being plundered in the date season, and, as has already been said, maintained order at the annual pearl fisheries.

The British claim to paramountcy in the Gulf thus rests on a long sequence of events by which, at a heavy expenditure of blood and treasure, we made it a haven of peace. Our flag was flying in the Straits of Oman when the

Germans plunged into the Thirty Years' War. We had shouldered our burden there before the Mayflower sailed from Plymouth. If we were to lose our grip, piracy, slave-dealing, raids and counter-raids, all the characteristics of the days of barbarism, would at once reappear. The flare of burning coast-towns, scenes of rapine and bloodshed, would instantly remind us of our abandoned obligation. Having taken up the burden, we owed it to the peoples of the Gulf, living in security under our guardianship, not to abandon it. There is no part of our work in the world that can be contemplated with greater satisfaction. After we had performed it for three hundred years, Germany deliberately prepared to challenge our presence and our purpose there. The Gulf was her goal, and she was not satisfied with the opportunities for trade which were open to all nations alike. The resistance we offered to her plans was no more than our bounden duty.

There is no need to contend that Great Britain exercised peculiar unselfishness in



THE DAMAGED CUSTOMS HOUSE AT KURNA.
How the Royal Navy left it.

this self-imposed task. We were unselfish in our manner of performing it, but the fact need not be disguised that we were driven to assume responsibilities in the Gulf mainly by considerations of self-interest. The maintenance of British predominance in the Gulf is an essential part of the defence of India. The mere presence of another Power in the Persian Gulf, whether its post be fortified or unfortified, would have a gravely unsettling effect upon India. The people of India would not stop to think whether, from such a post, their country could be really threatened. The fact that another flag was flying in a region where the British had been dominant for three hundred years, and supreme for more than a century, would suffice to persuade them that our strength was declining, and such confidence as we now inspire would instantly be diminished. It is not from strategic reasons alone that we are compelled to maintain our special position in the Gulf. We have to think also of the moral effect which the intrusion of another Power would produce upon India.

The truth of these contentions has been demonstrated by a dispassionate and entirely impartial observer. So long ago as 1902 the late Admiral Mahan declared that he saw "the question of the Persian Gulf, and of South Persia in connexion with it, clearly visible upon

the horizon." He warned us that "concession in the Persian Gulf, whether by formal arrangement [with other Powers], or by neglect of the local commercial interests which now underlie political and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval situation in the Farther East, her political position in India, her commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between herself and Australasia." Unfortunately his warning, and all warnings, were disregarded when the British Government began to dabble in Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-German agreements.

In a striking passage he defined the question thus :

Great Britain, in the clear failure of Turkey and Persia, is the nation first—that is, most—concerned. She is not so only in her own right, and that of her own people, but in the yet more binding one of Imperial obligation to a great and politically helpless ward of the Empire—to India and her teeming population. In her own right and duty she is, as regards the maintenance of order, in actual possession, having discharged this office to the Gulf for several generations. Doubtless, here as in Egypt, now that the constructive work has been done, she might find others who would willingly relieve her of the burden of maintenance ; but as regards such transfer, the decision of acceptance would rest by general custom with the present possessor, and to her the question is not one merely of convenience, but of duty, arising from, and closely involved with existing conditions, which are the more imperative because they are plants of mature growth, with roots deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil of a past history. These conditions are doubtless manifold, but in last analysis they are substantially three.

First, her security in India, which would be materially affected by an adverse change in the political control of the Gulf.

Secondly, the safety of the great sea route, commercial and military, to India and the Farther East, on which British shipping is still actually the chief traveller, though with a notable diminution that demands national attention.

Thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare of India, which can act politically only through the Empire, a dependence which greatly enhances obligation.

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality, a fleet in being there based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a political system; and although Great Britain unquestionably would check such a fleet, so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position.

Such a weighty pronouncement needs no further emphasis. It only remains to add that among the numerous declarations made by Great Britain on this subject, the chief is that spoken by Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, in the House of Lords on May 5, 1903. He said: "I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." That is our Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East, and from it we cannot depart. It may fitly close this preliminary examination of the problems of the Persian Gulf and the countries around it.

On October 29, 1914, the German warships had bombarded Russian towns on the Black Sea coast, and on October 30 Sir Louis Mallet asked at Constantinople for his passports. The rupture of relations between Great Britain and Turkey had been fully expected by the small British community at Basra, and many of the British subjects there left for Mohammerah, in Persian territory, on October 27. H.M.S. *Espiègle* had been lying in the Karun River off Mohammerah for some weeks. She is a gunboat of 1,070 tons, with a speed of 13½ knots, and is armed with six 4-inch guns. When the people at Mohammerah noticed the little *Espiègle* clearing for action on October 31, they knew that a conflict was near. Late that afternoon several more Englishmen arrived at Mohammerah from Basra, but when others tried to leave Basra still later in the day they were detained. On Monday, November 2, the British Consul, Mr. Bullard, and the remaining members of the British colony, embarked on a Turkish steamer. All save the Consul were

compelled to disembark again, as the Governor of Basra announced that he had received telegraphic instructions from Constantinople to detain everybody except Mr. Bullard. It is satisfactory to be able to add that all the persons detained were found safe when Basra was afterwards captured.

The same thing was reported to have happened at Baghdad. Only the British Consul and his family, and the French Consul, were allowed to leave. They made the voyage down the Tigris in one of the launches of Messrs. Lynch, the *Ishtar*. The launch was commandeered on arrival at Basra, and the party continued their journey in a Turkish steamer. The detained Europeans were afterwards reported safe, but it was subsequently said that they had been removed to a city in Asia Minor.

The Government of India, which had charge of the Gulf operations, had been equally forewarned. Some time before the outbreak of hostilities they had deemed it prudent to strengthen their forces in the Gulf. The Poona Brigade, under Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, had been sent to the island of Bahrein. It included the 2nd Dorsets, the 20th Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis), the 117th Mahrattas, and the 104th Wellesley's Rifles. It was accompanied by the 23rd (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, and the 30th Mountain Battery.



[Elliott and Fry.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. S. DELAMAIN.



[Elliott and Fry.]

COLONEL SIR PERCY COX,
British Resident and Consul-General in the
Persian Gulf.

In due course the Brigade re-embarked, and reached the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab on November 7. The bar is an immense and increasing obstruction of extremely soft mud, through which there is only one good navigable channel. The Turks have often been rightly blamed for not dredging it, but on the other hand it must be admitted that the mud is so liquid that dredging operations will not be easy. At the outer edge of the bar no land was visible, nothing but an expanse of brown silt-laden waters. The aspect was very like that of the Taku bar, outside the Peiho river which leads to Tientsin.

As the ships drew nearer the shore low green banks were revealed, and a flat country which might have been mistaken for the shores of the Scheldt were it not for the green date groves. About three miles along the bank the village of Fao came into view. It is a small place with about 400 inhabitants, chiefly herdsmen and cultivators. The Turkish mud fort was almost hidden. The cable station consisted of a couple of two-storied buildings, occupied respectively by the Turkish operators and the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Company. Persia lay on the other side of the broad and muddy stream. Its defences were represented by a square fort with bastioned corners, nearly opposite the cable station.

The taking of Fao was a very brief epi-

sode. H.M.S. *Odin* (Commander Cathcart R. Wason), a sister gunboat to the *Espiègle*, together with the armed launch *Sirdar*, bombarded the Turkish fort and reduced it to silence in about an hour. A portion of the brigade together with a force of marines from the battleship *Ocean*, which lay outside, was landed, and the town was occupied. The invasion of Chaldea had begun. It was not the first time that a British force had sailed into the Shatt-al-Arab. During the war with Persia early in 1857 Sir Henry Havelock entered the river with 4,000 men and took Mohammerah. On that occasion the Seaforth Highlanders and the Staffordshire Regiment participated. The Seaforths afterwards actually ascended the Karun River and captured the city of Ahwaz, an exploit which was almost immediately forgotten owing to the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny.

Having made good his position at Fao, where he left a detachment of native infantry, General Delamain proceeded more than thirty miles up the river with the bulk of his brigade. The voyage cannot at any time be called picturesque. The Turkish bank is clothed with trees, largely date groves, behind which stretch swamps and desert. The Persian bank is less wooded, but rather dreary, though the land is green enough. These lower areas of the delta provide excellent snipe shooting, as many an exiled naval officer has found. The edges of the banks are soft and muddy, and rather steep. Landing is exceedingly difficult, as General Delamain discovered when the time came for him to disembark his force.

The reason he had hurried on became plain to all after the expedition had steamed onward for three or four hours. There on the bank of the island of Abadan, on the Persian side, stood the new and spacious refinery of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which is destined to supply oil for the ships of the Royal Navy. Its large electric power station, and the installation for making tins and cans for kerosene and benzine, offered the enemy tempting opportunities for destruction. H.M.S. *Espiègle* was guarding the works when the expedition arrived. The night before, two small Turkish motor gunboats, built by Thornycroft, had come down the river after sunset. The *Espiègle* was waiting for them, and after an exchange of shots drove them off. That morning the *Espiègle* had gone up stream and round the bend and shelled a small Turkish

post, and also a custom-house. The Turks had some guns concealed, and replied with vigour.

The oil refinery at Abadan is the outcome of a concession granted in 1901 to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, a British subject, to exploit petroliferous areas throughout the Persian Empire. Mr. D'Arcy commenced the work himself, but the concession was acquired in 1909 by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a purely British organization. The late Lord Strathcona was largely instrumental in forming the company, and remained its chairman until his death. When the project was placed before him his characteristic question was, "Will it help the Empire?" On being assured that the project had Imperial importance, he supported it with enthusiasm. When the Board of Admiralty sought to adopt oil fuel on a large scale for British warships, it became desirable for the Government to acquire direct access to some source of oil supply which would save them from the danger of being at the mercy of oil monopolists. At the instance of Lord Fisher, an Admiralty Commission, of which Vice-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade was the head, was sent out very quietly in October, 1913, to report upon the Anglo-Persian oilfields. Their report was so favourable that in June, 1914, the House of Commons, at the request of Mr. Winston Churchill, decided that the Government should

acquire share or loan capital in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the extent of £2,200,000.

Though the company "proved" oil at various points in Southern and Western Persia, its first large source of supply was at Maidan-i-Naphtun (the Plain of Naphtha), about 150 miles north-east of the refinery at Abadan. A pipe-line was constructed between Abadan and Maidan-i-Naphtun, but the supply was so enormous that only a very few wells had been tapped. The oil flows from the wells to large storage tanks on the field, whence it is pumped into the pipe-line from a pumping station at Tembi, four miles away. The capacity of the line is about 350,000 tons per annum, and the oil available seems illimitable. The Abadan refinery is able to deal with about 1,000 tons of crude oil daily. The chief offices of the company are at Mohammerah, and there is a large British staff at Abadan. After the Government acquired an interest in the company, preparations were begun for the construction of a second pipe-line which would increase production by about a million tons a year.

It was always recognized that the pipe-line and the Abadan works would be to a certain extent vulnerable in the event of a sudden outbreak of war with Turkey. The subsequent invasion of Persia and the temporary capture



ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY'S REFINERIES ON ABADAN ISLAND.

of Tabriz, showed that, as was anticipated, Turkey had no more intention of respecting the neutrality of Persia than Germany was willing to refrain from molesting Belgium. The Government, however, felt reasonably confident that they could protect their own property, and they were instantly successful on this occasion at Abadan. As a matter of fact, the Royal Navy was not in the least degree dependent upon Persian oil when the war broke out. Great Britain entered the war with immense reserves of fuel oil stored in the United Kingdom, which was an essential feature of Admiralty policy.

General Delamain proceeded past the Abadan oil works and round the bend of the river, anchoring half an hour later at Saniyeh, about 35 miles from the sea. Here he disembarked his brigade on the Turkish bank without opposition, but with some difficulty, the bank being about ten feet high, and very muddy and slippery. The brigade at once proceeded to make a strong entrenched camp close to the river, while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements. It was not left long in peace. At dawn on November 11 the outposts were attacked by a considerable Turkish force, which had evidently hurried down from Basra. The Turks were quickly checked by the 117th Mahrattas, but they had estab-

lished themselves in a village from which they could only be dislodged by a considerable effort. The 20th Punjabis made a counter-attack, supported by fire from a mountain battery. Major Ducat was mortally wounded at close quarters while gallantly leading a company of the Punjabis against the village. The enemy were finally routed, and as they withdrew the maxims got in on their flank. The Turkish casualties were believed to amount to about 80. The British casualties were very few, but Captain Franks, of the Mahrattas, was seriously wounded.

On November 13, soon after daybreak, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, who had been placed in command of the operations against Basra, arrived with several transports off the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. The reinforcements included the Ahmednagar Brigade, under Brigadier-General W. H. Dobbie, C.B., consisting of the 1st Battalion Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the 119th Infantry (the Mooltan Regiment), and the 103rd Mahrattas; and the Belgaum Brigade, under Brigadier-General C. I. Fry, consisting of the 2nd Norfolks, the 110th Mahrattas, the 120th Rajputana Infantry, and the 7th Rajputs. There were also three batteries of the Royal Field Artillery, the 48th Pioneers, the 3rd Sappers and Miners, and the 33rd Light Cavalry, the



PREPARING RIVER STEAMERS FOR THE KURNA ADVANCE.

Two field guns on S.S. "Medjidieh" in foreground. Two other guns on S.S. "Blosse Lynch" beyond. Vessels protected with grain bags and bales.



THE HAMBURG-AMERIKA S.S. "ECKBATANA," SUNK BY THE TURKS IN THE SHATT-AL-ARAB.

Three vessels were sunk here, but the obstruction proved inadequate.

last-named regiment being under the command of Lieut.-Col. Wogan Browne. The 33rd Cavalry won distinction in the Gulf in 1857, and their charges at the battle of Khooshaub have a very special place in Indian cavalry annals. The troops named by no means represent the total force employed in Mesopotamia, but they were the first reinforcements to arrive.

On the 14th the transports crossed the bar at 6 a.m., and accompanied by various warships steamed up the river. A cold breeze was blowing, and the troops began to notice the change from the climate of India, and to put on thicker clothing. It can be very cold in the Shatt-al-Arab in the winter months, and from the tropics the expedition had passed to a region where fires are almost a necessity at such a season. Saniyeh was reached at 10.30 a.m., and Colonel Sir Percy Cox at once came off to see Sir Arthur Barrett.

Sir Percy Cox had long been British Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, and had a knowledge of Persian, Arabian, Mesopotamian, and Gulf problems to which no other living Englishman could lay claim. Though perhaps little known outside India, he had filled a distinguished and honourable place in the more recent chapters of the story of Great Britain in the Middle East. He was at once soldier and diplomatist, but peacemaker most of all. For years he had held the Persian Gulf in the hollow of his hand. There was

not a sheikh upon its shores who did not both fear and respect him, and, above all, repose entire confidence in his justice and impartiality. He had been a court of appeal in all their quarrels, and composed their differences with firmness and fairness. His responsibilities ever since 1899, when he first went to Muscat to establish a better understanding with the ruler of Oman, were heavy and varied. Often he was in most critical situations, for Germany was not the only Power which during that period sought to practise an aggressive policy in the Gulf. He emerged from every trial successfully, and overcame difficulties which in the hands of a weaker or less prudent man might have caused an international explosion. Patience, tact, vigilance, and an infinite capacity for laborious work were the secrets of his years of toil. Silent and modest, fearless in emergency, never afraid of responsibility but endowed with unflinching restraint and caution, he was a striking figure in the long line of India's soldier-politicals, and served Great Britain in the Gulf and Southern Persia better than she knew.

After a consultation with Sir Percy Cox, on November 14, General Barrett decided to postpone the disembarkation of his forces until next day. The camp of the Poona Brigade was wet and muddy, having suffered two days' heavy rain. On the 15th the troops began to go ashore, but were not all landed until 2 p.m.



TURKISH OFFICERS AT KURNA.

In the meantime, General Barrett, on hearing that the enemy were occupying a post about four miles northward at the village of Sahain, ordered General Delamain to move out against them with the Poona Brigade. General Delamain marched after breakfast, taking with him his two mountain batteries, the Dorsets, 117th Mahrattas, and the 104th Wellesley's Rifles. The 20th Punjabis followed later in reserve. The Turks were found to be about 2,000 strong, about one-third of their force being Arab auxiliaries. They were holding a position on the outer edge of the date plantations, which extend back from the river at this point for about two miles, beyond which the country is open desert.

The Dorsets advanced against the Turkish right, half the 104th attacked their centre, and the rest of the 104th, with the 117th, moved against the enemy's left through the date groves, which were full of riflemen. The *Espiègle* and the *Odin* joined in the action from the river. The Turks did not hold their fire, but opened with rifles on the Dorsets at 1,000 yards, while the latter were skirmishing across the plain in open order. The enemy's guns fired shrapnel, though not with any marked success, although their general resistance was quite stubborn enough. The 117th, who were eventually reinforced by the 20th, reached the village of Sahain, but did not succeed in entirely clearing

it, though it was set on fire. Along the rest of the front the Turks fell back, but as the action was only meant to be a reconnaissance in force the brigade then marched back to camp. The British casualties were two officers wounded; rank and file, eight killed and 51 wounded. Of these the Dorsets lost five killed and 35 wounded.

November 16 was a day of rest, but news came down the river which appeared to make an early movement imperative. The bulk of the Basra garrison was advancing, and there were fears about the fate of the Europeans detained in the city. On November 17 the whole force started northward at 5.30 a.m., and the action was fought which decided the fate of Basra and the delta. The position at Sahain, which had been attacked on the 15th, was found to be completely evacuated. After a march of about nine miles contact was established with the Turks at Sahil, near the river. They were in a strongly entrenched position, and had with them twelve guns, chiefly Krupps. Two of their guns were near the trenches, but the rest were in a date-grove about 2,000 yards in the rear.

General Fry and a portion of the Belgaum Brigade led the advance, much of which had to be made over the open plain. The ground was heavy, and just as the action began a heavy rain and hail storm, lasting half an hour, turned it into a quagmire. The Turks opened fire between 9 and 10 a.m. with shrapnel. It was noticed that the shrapnel burst far too high, and when common shell was used much of it failed to burst at all. The British batteries covered the advance, the mountain guns paying attention to the Turkish trenches, while the field guns were turned on the Turkish battery in the date grove. The two gunboats had moved up the river and enfiladed the Turkish left flank. The Turkish rifle fire, which presently began, was on the whole also bad.

An onlooker afterwards wrote: "The country over which our infantry advanced was flat as a table, and would not have given cover to a mouse, much less a man. It was just grand to watch them move forward. It might have been a field day." It was during this advance in open order, without a chance of cover, that most of the British casualties occurred. It was like moving through a snipe marsh, and it took hours to get near the almost invisible Turkish trenches. The guns stuck, and men tugged at their wheels.


The Turks at length were pouring in a heavier

and more accurate fire. They had some sharpshooters in their trenches, who began to do a good deal of execution. The attacking infantry, both British and Indian, advanced steadily and indomitably, and were quite unperturbed. General Barrett afterwards telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that "the troops behaved splendidly." The gallant Dorsets, who learned at Dargai, on the Indian frontier, what it means to face heavy fire without cover, were the principal sufferers. An officer in an Indian regiment, who took part in the action, wrote: "The Dorsets were simply wonderful." Nearer and nearer drew the British skirmishers. The Turkish trenches were being heavily bombarded. All the guns from the batteries and the ships were now concentrated on them, as well as a heavy rifle fire. A British battery got round on their right. The British infantry were within four hundred yards. They were ready with their bayonets, but the Turks would not face the cold steel. Just as our troops expected to charge, the enemy broke from their trenches and fled. The fight was won, and though none present then realized it, at that moment Basra was won too. From the time the Turks broke at Sahil they never really stood fast again.

When the enemy fled they ran at first, but soon slackened into a walk, for it was impossible

to run far over such heavy ground. The British troops rose and poured a withering fire into them, while the batteries sprayed them with shrapnel. Effective pursuit was out of the question, though the enemy were followed for about a mile. The 33rd Cavalry were eager, but horse-men cannot charge through a sticky swamp. Presently even the British batteries ceased firing, for the oddest but most imperative of reasons. The fugitive Turks had passed from their view, and were lost in a mirage. To the gunners it seemed as though there were trees and shining water where shortly before there had been nothing but the bare plain and the scattered and retreating enemy. Every traveller in these regions knows how curiously deceptive the mirages are, and how they often obliterate the real view. The curious thing was that the watchers perched high on the distant transports saw no mirage at all, and wondered why the guns had stopped firing on the routed enemy, who were quite visible from the ships. This also is a common and quite understandable experience.

The action at Sahil was over by 4 p.m. The British losses were: killed, officers, three; rank and file, about 35; wounded, officers, about 15; rank and file, about 300. General Barrett had a narrow escape, a shrapnel shell burying itself in the ground at his feet, at a



MATERIAL FOR BAGHDAD RAILWAY AT MAGIL, NEAR BASRA.

The Germans brought these rails, etc., for the Baghdad-Basra section.

range of about 3,500 yards. The casualties among the Dorsets were about 130. Three Dorset officers were killed, including Major Mercer, who was present at the storming of Dargai, on the Indian frontier, and Captain Frank Middleton, who saw much service in South Africa. Most of the losses were in General Delamain's Brigade, but General Fry's Brigade also suffered considerably. The 104th Wellesley's Rifles reached the Turkish camp and got about 80 tents and large quantities of stores, some rifles, 20 camels and 40 mules. Two mountain guns were captured. The Turkish losses can only be guessed, but their dead numbered hundreds, and the Europeans at Basra afterwards said they brought back large numbers of wounded, estimated at 2,000, though the figure seems excessive. About 150 prisoners were taken, including three officers.

A portion of the expedition camped near the battlefield, and the rest marched back to Saniyeh. A heavy storm that evening sank a number of boats in the river. Ten men were drowned, and a considerable quantity of stores and kit was lost. The next three days passed quietly, for the men needed rest. Some amount of reconnaissance was done, and the force was troubled a little by stray Turkish snipers.

On the morning of November 21 came the

unexpected news that the Turks had evacuated Basra in a panic, and that Arabs were looting the city. General Barrett decided to push on at once. He had at his disposal two river paddle steamers belonging to Messrs. Lynch, the *Medjidieh* and the *Blosse Lynch*. He embarked the Norfolks, with General Fry and the staff of the Belgaum Brigade, and a couple of mountain guns, on the *Medjidieh*, and the 110th Mahrattas on the other vessel. The rest of the expedition was ordered to cross the desert to Basra, marching all night.

The Turks had made an awkward obstruction in the river at Baliyanyeh, about eight miles beyond Sahil. They had sunk the Hamburg-Amerika s.s. *Eekbatana*, 5,000 tons; the *John O'Scott*, Turkish-owned; and an old lightship from Fao. On the bank at this point they had a battery of Krupp guns in position. Like all things Turkish, the obstruction was imperfectly made. The *Espiègle* and the *Odin* managed to get past it and disposed of the battery. The river steamers left Saniyeh at 9.30 p.m., and reached the obstruction at 1 a.m., where they were met by the Royal Indian Marine paddle gunboat *Lawrence*. They waited for daylight, and at 7 a.m. passed the obstruction. At 8.15 they were met by a boat bearing an urgent message from the American Consul, who said that the Arabs were still looting and that lives



TURKISH PRISONERS AT KURNA.

Some are probably Arab irregulars.



RIFLES TAKEN AT KURNA.

On the left is one of Messrs. Lynch's river steamers.

were imperilled. At 9 a.m. they came in sight of Basra, and saw black clouds of smoke rising from the Turkish Custom House, which had been fired; but the *Odin*, *Espiègle*, and *Lawrence* had already arrived, and the city was saved. A quarter of an hour afterwards the German flag flying over the imposing German Consulate was lowered, and the British naval ensign hoisted in its stead.


The desert column reached Basra at noon, and camped outside the city that day, being somewhat exhausted after a forced march of 30 miles. The Europeans in the city were all safe, having been detained in their houses under a guard.

The city and port of Basra have been famous in the East for centuries. The port was originally created by the Caliph Omar in 638, on a site some miles from its present position. In the days of the Baghdad Caliphate it was a great emporium of trade and commerce, and from Basra Sindbad the Sailor, who was no mythical personage, sailed on his memorable and highly coloured voyages. The Turks soon brought about the decay of the port after they captured it in 1668. In modern times its prosperity has greatly revived, largely through the date trade, of which it is the central mart. Visitors have often said that the European community of Basra talk dates and nothing else. The export

trade of Basra reached a total volume of £3,246,000 in 1912, of which barley represented £1,118,000. The imports in the same year amounted to a total of £2,653,000. The conquest of a city with a total annual trade of six million sterling was therefore a substantial achievement.

Basra has been called the Venice of the East, but the title is far too flattering. It has no fine buildings, and the flat-roofed houses are unimpressive. It derives such beauty as it possesses from its setting of palm-trees, its gardens, and its numerous intersecting canals; though these same canals are a constant source of fever. The main portion of the city, a quarter with narrow, unpaved streets, lies up the contracted Asshar creek, two miles from the river. The suburbs, bowered in palms, are more attractive. The population is probably about 60,000, but there are many more people in the suburbs. It is a curiously mixed community, including many Jews and Armenians. The Turks were always few and exclusive, and consisted mainly of Government officials and the garrison. The Turk had long been overlord of the Euphrates delta, but his race never sought to settle there.

The Germans were perfectly right in their dreams of the future of Basra, and had their purpose not been primarily political, they need



PROCLAIMING THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AT BASRA.

Troops lined up on Asshar Creek. The Union Jack was hoisted on building on left.

never have sought to emerge upon the shores of the Gulf at all. They could have made Basra an Oriental Hamburg, as they often declared. In situation it closely resembles the city on the Elbe. The bar needs dredging, as does also the channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, but miles of magnificent quays might be constructed on both sides of the river frontage of Basra, where the river is half a mile wide. When the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates are won back to cultivation by irrigation, Basra will have a great and prosperous future. The work will still be done, though not by German hands.

The British expedition made a formal entry into the city on November 23, after which the troops were billeted, some occupying the deserted Turkish barracks and other public buildings. At the close of the entry half the force was lined up on the Asshar Canal bank, facing north, and the notables of the city were assembled, being greeted by General Barrett and Sir Percy Cox. A proclamation stating the reasons for occupation and the friendly intentions of the British Government was read aloud in Arabic. The Union Jack was hoisted in the presence of guards of honour furnished by the Royal Navy and the Norfolk Regiment. The troops presented arms, three cheers were given for the King-Emperor, and the warships

fired a salute of 31 guns. The inhabitants took the change very calmly, and as there were no Turks left among them, they gave a cordial welcome to the British. Major Brownlow was appointed Military Governor, and took up his residence at the German Consulate. The German Consul and five German prisoners were removed to Bombay. The expedition started a little newspaper, the *Basra Times*, printed in English and Arabic, for the use of the troops and the populace.

At the beginning of December a camp was formed for a portion of the force, and two mountain batteries, at Magil, about four miles farther up the river. Magil was a depôt for material for the Baghdad-Basra Railway. The troops found there large quantities of railway stores, including thousands of rails and sleepers. The Germans had made a wharf, and they had landing-cranes and other structures. The staff had fled, and the two spacious and comfortable houses they had built were empty. Near Magil the new channel of the Euphrates enters the Tigris, and thenceforward to the sea the united rivers are known as the Shatt-al-Arab.

Intelligence was received at this time that the retreating Turks had reassembled at Kurna, a point 49 miles above Basra, where the old and now partially blocked channel of the


Euphrates joins the Tigris. The Arabs profess to believe that Kurna is the site of the Garden of Eden, though Sir William Willcocks places it far above Hitt on the Euphrates, and considerably to the north-west of Baghdad. Just at Kurna the Tigris is about 300 yards wide. Above Kurna it narrows, but the difficult part of the navigation only begins 30 miles farther on, and continues for about 80 miles. The Tigris winds greatly between Kurna and Baghdad, and is said to cover 490 miles between the two places. The land route across the desert from Kurna to Baghdad is only 300 miles in length. The Tigris is at its lowest from September to November, and then gradually begins to rise. It is at its height in May and June. Sea-going steamers can ascend to Kurna, but higher up shallow-draught vessels are required.

On December 2 it was decided to send up a column on the two river steamers to deal with the situation at Kurna. It embarked next day, and sailed at 8 p.m. The force consisted of a section of the Royal Field Artillery, a half-company of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Wellesley's Rifles, the 110th Mahrattas, and a detachment of the Norfolks, with an ambulance party. It was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, of the 110th Mahrattas. The river steamers each had a couple of 18-pounder field guns on their upper decks, and were protected by parapets of grain and fodder bags and bales. The naval flotilla accompanying the column consisted of the *Espiègle*, *Odin* and *Lawrence*, the armed launches *Miner* (54 tons) and *Shaitan*, and the yacht *Lewis Pelly* (100 tons). The *Lewis Pelly* is the dispatch boat of the British Resident at Koweit, and on this occasion she carried two 3-pounders and a Maxim. Not much opposition was expected, but the expectations were wrong.

The expedition reached a point about four miles below Kurna early next morning, and the troops were landed on the left (eastern) bank. While the military advanced, the *Espiègle* and the *Lawrence* steamed ahead, with the armed launches. The *Odin* was left behind to guard the landing-place. She had damaged her rudder, and it was not safe to take her round the sharp bend of the river. The navigable channel was at this point very narrow, and the ships were constantly touching the mud. They anchored at a suitable spot, and engaged the Turkish guns on the left bank, which were concealed in date-groves and extremely difficult to locate. They also shelled Kurna. The

paddle-steamers could move more freely owing to their shallow draught, so they went closer inshore and used their guns in support. The launches were even more daring, but the *Miner* was holed below the water-line and had to withdraw. The *Lawrence* was also hit by a shell.

There was a village called Mezera some distance from the bank, on the left of the Turkish position. Colonel Frazer signalled to the warships to shell it, and it was saluted with lyddite and destroyed in half an hour. "I have never seen such a bonfire," wrote one of the naval officers who was aloft "spotting." The troops meanwhile advanced across the plain, and cleared the village and the Turkish trenches. The survivors of the enemy crossed the river to Kurna in boats. The column was then opposite the town of Kurna, which lies amid thick trees at the point where the old channel of the Euphrates meets the Tigris. It was evident that Kurna was far more strongly held than was supposed. It was entrenched, and the houses, few of which could be seen, were loopholed. A tremendous fusillade came whistling across the stream. There was no means of crossing, and there was nothing for it but a withdrawal to the original landing-place. The camp was then entrenched, because the Turks were in superior numbers, and an attack was feared. They did not attack, but it was afterwards found that during that night they were strongly reinforced. Colonel Frazer's column was not strong enough for the task. Nevertheless, it captured two of the Turkish guns, which had been silenced by the ships. One was brought in, but the other had to be left,



PLAN OF ACTIONS AT KURNA.
From a Sketch Map by a British Officer.



WOUNDED INDIAN SOLDIERS.

and an attempt to obtain it next day failed owing to the heavy fire.

A hasty message was sent down to Basra for reinforcements, and meanwhile casualties were examined. The *Miner* had a shell in her engine-room, and had settled on the mud, but was patched up and floated the same night. The *Lawrence* had received a shell below, and her dynamo was wrecked. The launches were struck several times. The casualties among the troops were one British officer and three British rank and file wounded, one Indian officer and 19 rank and file killed and about sixty wounded.

On December 5 (a Saturday) little happened, and on the 6th Brigadier-General Fry arrived from Basra with considerable reinforcements, including the 7th Rajputs, the remainder of the Norfolks, a field battery, and a mountain battery. By this time the Turks had crossed the river again and reoccupied Mezera. They made a half-hearted attempt to advance against the camp, but were dispersed by a few rounds of shrapnel.

Kurna was not yet taken, and it took some stiff fighting to capture it. On the morning of the 7th the action of the 5th was fought all over again, exactly in the same way, though this time the British were in greater strength, while the Turks were somewhat handicapped by the loss of the two guns silenced in the previous engagements. Exactly the same result

followed. Mezera was taken once more, the Turkish trenches were cleared, and the survivors fled across the river; but a terrific fire across the stream from the loopholed houses of Kurna stopped any further operations for the day. On this occasion a portion of the British forces bivouacked near Mezera and held the left bank opposite Kurna. Three guns were taken on this day, as well as 100 prisoners, including three officers. During the night the Turks fired a few shells, but otherwise remained inactive.

The flotilla, which was again busily engaged during the action of the 7th, had plenty of excitement. The *Espiègle* was hit several times. The *Miner* went aground, but got off again. The *Lewis Pelly* had her share of damage. The launch *Shaitan* was struck on the bridge by a shell, which killed her commander Lieutenant-Commander J. G. M. Elkes, R.N.R. The man at the wheel was wounded, and part of the wheel was carried away. A later shot smashed the *Shaitan's* rudder, and she had to retire. The *Odin* joined in this day's action.

It was clear that the only way to take Kurna was to cross the River Tigris higher up. Early on the morning of the 8th, two battalions, the 104th and 110th, were marched a long way up the river with two mountain guns. Some sappers then swam the swift stream, a feat in itself. They carried a line across, to which a steel hawser was attached. With the aid of a commandeered dhow a flying bridge was constructed, and the two battalions, with the guns, were ferried across without opposition. They then marched back down the right (western) bank, threatened the Turkish position in flank and rear, and seized the approaches to Kurna. No attempt was made to carry the town that night, but the little force entrenched itself in the palm groves near the town.

About midnight on the 8th the watchers on the warships below Kurna saw a small steamer coming down ablaze with lights. She carried three Turkish officers bearing a message from Subhi Bey, the late Governor of Basra, then commanding the forces at Kurna. He offered to surrender the town, but wanted his troops to march out with their arms. General Fry insisted on an unconditional surrender, and after an hour's parley in the small hours on board the *Espiègle* this was agreed to.

At 1 p.m. on the 9th the remnants of the Turkish garrison appeared in front of their trenches on the river bank and laid down their

arms. A large proportion must have fled during the night into the surrounding country, and it was known that many barge-loads went upstream to Baghdad. The two Indian battalions on the Kurna side formed up round the garrison. General Fry, Sir Percy Cox, and the senior naval officer, then went on shore with their staffs. The Turkish officers came up and handed over their swords. General Fry returned Subhi Bey's sword in recognition of his gallant defence. The compliment was deserved, for, as subalterns would say, the Turks "put up a good show" in their last resistance. The captives numbered 42 officers and 1,021 men. Several more guns were taken. The Turkish casualties in and around Kurna and Mezera are believed to have been at least a thousand, and were perhaps more. An officer wrote that he had charge of a party which buried 200 dead found in one trench alone. Kurna was wrecked by the British fire. The prisoners were taken to India.

The British casualties on the 7th and 8th numbered one British officer killed and three wounded, and 40 Indian rank and file killed and 120 wounded. The operations at Kurna gave the British complete control of the deltaic region, but it was considered necessary to leave a strong column at Kurna, and another across the river at Mezera. They made big entrenched camps and prepared to settle down. The neigh-

bourhood was on the whole not inviting. The camps were pitched beyond the date groves, and one officer wrote: "This is a most desolate spot. Sitting here, all I can see is miles and miles of perfectly level desert, absolutely unbroken." Many Canadian prairie farmers might have said the same thing in the early days. The country is not desert, but one of the most fertile regions in the world. The British troops liked the life as a welcome change from India, but the mosquitoes troubled them greatly. One very still night, when the camp was asleep, a man was heard to say to his neighbour: "'Ere, Bill, if this is the Garden of Eden, I wonder what Adam and Eve did with these 'ere mosquitoes a-buzzin' around them."

In January a force of about 5,000 Turks, with six guns, established itself on the Ratta Canal, about seven miles north of the Mezera Camp. The British troops, aided by the three gunboats, made a reconnaissance in force from Mezera on January 20. The enemy's outposts were driven across the canal, and his camps and dhows were shelled. The British had about 50 casualties.

His Excellency Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, under whose direction and supervision the invasion of Chaldea was begun, made a tour of the Persian Gulf and the conquered territory at the end of January. Lord Hardinge visited Muscat,



GUN CAPTURED AT KURNA.

The Officer seated on the Gun is Brigadier-General C. I. Fry.

Bahrein, Koweit, Mohammerah, and other places, and eventually arrived at Basra on February 4. He was received by the native community with an address of welcome, in which the hope was expressed that the British occupation would be permanent. He said, in reply :

The British occupation has raised problems which require prompt consideration and settlement. I have come here to see local conditions for myself in order the better to judge what measures are necessary. You are aware that we are not engaged single-handed in this great struggle, and we cannot lay down plans for the future without a full exchange of views with the other Great Powers, but I can hold out the assurance that the future will bring you a more benign rule.

Lord Hardinge afterwards went up the river to Kurna and Mezera, so that he visited the most advanced outposts of the expedition. He also, while at Basra, rode across the desert to Shaiba and elsewhere.

Attacks on Muscat on January 10 and 11, which were repulsed by detachments of the 95th Russell's Infantry and the 102nd Bombay Grenadiers, had only a remote connexion with the great war. They were the outcome of a

local revolt against the Sultan of Oman which had begun nearly two years before, and was perhaps stimulated into renewed activity by the news that half the world was in arms. The town and district were perfectly quiet when Lord Hardinge arrived some time later. Captain William Henry Shakespear, C.I.E., British Resident at Koweit, was killed in Central Arabia during February while on a special mission to Ibn Saud, who was at strife with some of his neighbours. Captain Shakespear was a fine type of the young soldier-political, and his death was a great loss.

There was much relief at the end of February when the Europeans who had been at Baghdad, about fifty in number, reached the shores of the Mediterranean. They were unexpectedly released from detention by order of Djemal Pasha, who was formerly Vali of Baghdad, and perhaps did not forget old friendships. Nine Englishwomen and some children were left in Baghdad in charge of Dr. Johnson, an elderly missionary. They were not allowed to depart, but it was believed that they were quite safe.

THE (تيمس البصرة) BUSRA TIMES عدد ٣٩٨٠٠ كانون ثاني سنة ١٣٥٥ هـ

no 38. 19th January, 1915
REUTERS
 January 12th. German offensive in Poland is concentrated on narrow zone 10 miles wide, 30 miles west of WARSAW. 2 Army Corps are operating with heavy guns, and the German line practically follows the line of the RAWKA. The Germans are straining every nerve to possess the BOLLINOFF WOODS. Prisoners state that the enemy are confident of thus piercing the Russian line. One night 15 consecutive attacks were repulsed, the Russians inflicting enormous losses on the dense formations of the enemy.
 The American papers say that the British reply to their Note was most conciliatory and friendly.
 The Germans are furiously bombarding SOISSONS, and the Germans are severe.

روتر ١٢ منه احد الالان بصيرتون خطهم
 الحجوم ليدبولونيا ويملون برصه عشرة
 اعيال وهو على مسافة ثلاثين ميلا عن برنو
 وحيشتم بمالك سكان من بلنيس وسجيبها
 مدافع ضخمة وهناك الخط يعمل نمرأاً بنظر
 عوا وكوالالمان مرادلون آتسني بمهددتم
 احوال... مشاربه وصانتهه الاخالفه لا دو
 منشرة في البلاد العثمانية وللدنيا الاملى
 شيخ الاسلام . ليس من سالك
 الجلبا وهو من احد افراد الملكية
 انور بك . ليس من عصر الانراك
 وهو اصلا من بولونيا وبسي مثلاً للابة
 ١٣ منه -- ارسل النمر ادوار عنقواى
 وغيره برقيات التهانى الى روسيا على
 اعمال الحربه الناهره
 اطلن نيبيل حمة صاطانكيزيين
 بعد سجنهم حمة اشهر سبه انانيا
 ومقاتلتهم الجفراء والنا.

Portion of Title-Page of Newspaper Started by Expedition after the Fall of Basra.



CHAPTER LIII.

THE SECOND THREE MONTHS OF NAVAL WAR.

LORD FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY—TSING-TAU AND THE JAPANESE NAVY—THE GERMAN LOSSES—
CAREER AND END OF THE EMDEN—THE COCOS-KEELING ACTION—ACTION OFF THE COAST OF CHILE
—LOSS OF GOOD HOPE AND MONMOUTH—VICTORY OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS—END OF VON
SPEE'S SQUADRON—ADMIRAL STURDEE'S DISPATCH—MINOR OPERATIONS—EAST AFRICA—KONIGS-
BERG IN RUFIGI RIVER—WEST AFRICA—RED SEA—PERSIAN GULF—THE GOEBEN IN THE BLACK
SEA—TORPEDOING OF MESSUDIYEH BY B 11 IN THE DARDANELLES—BRITISH LOSSES IN HOME
WATERS—BULWARK AND FORMIDABLE—RAIDS AND COUNTER-RAIDS—YARMOUTH, SCARBOROUGH
AND CUXHAVEN—ADMIRAL BEATTY'S ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA—SINKING OF THE BLUCHER.

ON October 29, 1914, Prince Louis of Battenberg was succeeded in the office of First Sea Lord by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. Of the reasons which caused the resignation of Prince Louis there is no occasion to write; but that fine seaman and most able tactician carried with him in his retirement the good wishes and the admiration of the whole service, of which he had so long been an ornament. Lord Fisher was now called upon by his country to wield the weapons that he had had so large a share in bringing into being.

During the second three months of the war events of great importance happened in the North Sea, but the main feature of this period was the practical completion of the task of destroying Germany's naval forces in the outer seas. To the taking of Tsing-Tau had to be added the destruction of the naval force which had been based upon that Eastern stronghold. Its ultimate fate was sure, but its existence constituted a menace to commerce and involved risks and responsibilities which directly and indirectly affected the whole work of the British Navy. Tsing-Tau was from the beginning of German occupation administered by the German Admiralty, not by the Colonial Office, and the cost was a charge upon the Navy, not the Colonial, Estimates. It was, in fact, above all a naval base, and the home of the German "East Asiatic" squadron. This

force consisted of the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers Emden, Nürnberg and Leipzig, four gunboats and two destroyers. As will be seen, the cruisers did not remain to be destroyed at Tsing-Tau, and their careers and fates are the central features of the ensuing narrative.

The full story of the fate of Tsing-Tau has been told in Chapter XLIV. We must now describe briefly the work of the Japanese Navy, which assisted the fleets of the Allies so materially by clearing the waters in the vicinity of its own shores, and which afterwards cooperated in the convoy of troops from the Dominions and in hauling down the German flag in the islands of the Pacific.


It was not until August 23, 1914, that Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war; but as soon as this happened our Far-Eastern Allies acted with the promptitude and startling efficiency that we have learned to expect from them when warlike operations have to be undertaken. The First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Baron Dewa, strung itself out on a line from the Shantung Promontory in the Yellow Sea to the Chusan Archipelago in the Eastern Sea; while the Second Fleet, under the command of Admiral Kato, had by August 27 spread itself in front of the Bay of Kiao-Chau—in which Tsing-Tau is situated—and had established as close a blockade of that port as modern con-

ditions of sea warfare permit. The objective of the Japanese was, naturally, the German Far-Eastern Squadron, but von Spee, the Admiral in command of this force, succeeded in hiding himself and his cruisers somewhere in the south of the China Sea.

The Japanese Fleets remained on their stations as described until the end of August, when the transportation of the army destined for the capture of Tsing-Tau began. The First Fleet took up a position in Southern Korean waters, while a squadron of the Second Fleet, cruising in the Yellow Sea, rendered assistance to the men-of-war conveying the transports. Rear-Admiral Kamimura's Squadron, cooperating with the detachment from the Port Arthur naval station, assisted in the landing of troops at Lunkiang. While these movements were in progress—they lasted till September 13—a detachment under the direct command of Admiral Kato, Commander-in-Chief of the Second Squadron, with the Tochinai and Okada detachments and a further contingent specially commissioned for this service, concentrated on Kiao-Chau Bay and the immediate vicinity. In spite of extremely bad

weather, gale succeeding to gale, the mine sweepers worked almost uninterruptedly to clear the sea in front of the point where the second detachment of the army was to be landed. Scouting was also kept up by means of aircraft, and eventually the enemy was cut off from all communication by way of the sea.

When, in September, the transportation of the second portion of the army was begun, the First Fleet was employed again in conveying the transports; the Kamimura and Port Arthur detachments assisted in the landing of troops at Laoshan Bay, while the main force of the Second Fleet, which was now able to operate inshore owing to the success of the mine sweeping, cooperated with the land forces in bombarding the fortresses on the right wing of the line of the enemy. In this operation, the Kamimura and Port Arthur detachments assisted. The Marine Batteries which were working with the besieging army opened fire on October 14 upon the enemy warships in the harbour, and having rendered them useless, turned their attention to the bombardment of Tsing-Tau fort. On October 31 a general cannonade was begun, and on November 7 the



THE INDIAN OCEAN.



LANDING PARTY ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE "EMDEN" AFTER DESTROYING THE WIRELESS STATION AT COCOS-KEELING ISLANDS.

fortress surrendered. The British battleship *Triumph* and the destroyer *Usk* cooperated with the Second Fleet and took part in the blockade as well as in the bombardment.

During these operations there were lost the old light cruiser *Takachico*, 3,700 tons, date 1885, the destroyer *Shiratai*, torpedo boat No. 33, and three specially commissioned steamers. On the enemy's side there were either sunk or destroyed, the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, five gunboats (the *Cormoran*, *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Tiger* and *Luchs*), and two destroyers.

This satisfactory action was only a part of the activity displayed by the Japanese. On the outbreak of hostilities Japan's Third Fleet was sent to protect the trade route from the Southern Seas, through Chinese waters, until one of its units came into touch with the guardship at the Makoh Naval Station in Korea. Although by the beginning of November all enemy ships had been cleared out of Far-Eastern waters, as far as was known, still this surveillance was kept up. A detachment of this squadron detailed for operations in the Southern Seas proceeded to Singapore on August 26 and carried on operations in concert with the British Eastern Squadron. At first nothing was known of the movements of the enemy in these regions, and the work consisted of general surveillance and supervision of important ports. When the *Emden* became

active in the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean the detachment assisted in the hunt for that elusive cruiser, and on October 25 a reinforcement under Vice-Admiral Tochinai was dispatched to the scene, and on November 9 the *Emden* was destroyed at the Cocos-Keeling Islands by H.M. Australian cruiser *Sydney*.

When hostilities began certain ships of the enemy were at large in the Pacific in the neighbourhood of Hawaii; but it was not known where they were, nor what was the position of the squadron that had escaped from Far-Eastern waters. A squadron of the First Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy was accordingly told off to hunt the enemy on the trade route between Japan and North America. No trace of German ships could be found, so the squadron occupied itself usefully by taking possession of those places in the sun which Germany had seized in the Pacific in her efforts to form a greater Germany beyond the sea.

One of the ships of the German Far-Eastern Squadron that escaped the attentions of the Japanese in these waters was the light cruiser *Emden*. Allusion has already been made to her in a previous chapter, but it remains to tell the story of her destruction. The resourcefulness of the captain of this ship has often been dwelt upon, but it was probably never displayed to greater advantage than when she left Kiao-Chau. There was every chance of



[Lafayette.]

CAPTAIN JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP,
of H.M.S. "Sydney."

her being met by a Japanese vessel, with whom she could not hope to come to action with success. The expected happened, and shortly after leaving the anchorage she fell in with a Japanese armoured cruiser. But it was not the three-funnelled Emden under the black, white and red German man-of-war ensign that passed the enemy warship; but a vessel with four funnels, flying the British white ensign, whose crew, as she steamed by the Japanese, lined the rails and gave her three hearty British cheers. Much may be forgiven to seamen as clever as this.

In the Bay of Bengal the Emden took and sank between September 10 and September 14 the Indus (3,413 tons), the Lovat (6,102 tons), the Killin (3,544 tons), the Diplomat (7,615 tons), and the Trabboch (4,028 tons). On September 12 the Kabinga, of 4,657 tons, was taken and released. On September 14 the Clan Matheson, of 4,775 tons, was sunk. On September 30 there were taken and sunk the King Lud (3,650 tons), the Foyle (4,147 tons), the Ribera (3,500 tons), and the Tymeric (3,314 tons). On the same date the Buresk (4,350 tons) was captured, and the Gryfevale (4,437 tons) was taken and released. The Pontoporos, taken by the Emden, was released by H.M.S. Yarmouth on October 16. On October 20 were taken and sunk the Troilus

(7,562 tons), the Clan Grant (3,948 tons), the Benmohr (4,806 tons), the Chilkana (5,220 tons), and the Ponrabbel (473 tons). On the same date the Exford (4,542 tons) and the Saint Egbert (5,596 tons) were captured but not sunk. Thus some 70,000 tons of British shipping were destroyed in seven weeks; it is fortunate indeed for the Empire that other commerce raiders were not so successful.


Some further exploits of the Emden are described in the following extracts from a log kept by one of her petty officers:

September 22.—This night off Madras. One of the crew had worked there, and he informed the captain of the oil tanks situated at entrance to harbour. At 9.30 p.m. Emden crept in, turned searchlights on to tanks, and fired two broadsides to find the range. Searchlights then shut off, and 125 shells fired in salvos, some hitting a ship. Tanks set on fire, and tremendous blaze arose. Emden retired at full speed to north-east. Shore batteries opened fire, but shells fell short, and none hit the Emden.

September 23.—This morning the glare of the fire at Madras could still be seen on the horizon, though about 100 miles away. Emden sailed north-east to give impression that she was going towards Calcutta, but when out of sight turned southwards round the east coast of Ceylon.


October 10.—Visited island of Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean, about half-way between Africa and Sumatra. The few European families here had not yet heard of the war, as they only get a steamer in three months. Emden coaling all day. Some of the engineers repaired the local motor-boat, and were given baskets of coconuts and fish.

October 28.—At 4 a.m., 10 miles outside Penang, extra funnel hoisted to make the Emden appear like British cruisers. From the entrance of the harbour at 5 a.m. could be seen in the distance several ships, and well in front of them an unknown cruiser. On steaming in to a range of about 600 yards, this was found to be the Russian cruiser Jemtchug. The Emden fired two torpedoes, the first hitting the cruiser just under the after funnel, whereupon she was seen to sink about 4 feet. The second, fired at closer range, struck just under the bridge, when a terrible explosion occurred. During this time the Emden fired salvo after salvo—in all 100 shots. The Jemtchug fired a few shots, some of which hit ships in the harbour behind the Emden, but none hit the Emden. The Emden had no idea that the Russian cruiser would be in Penang, but expected to find the French cruiser Dupleix and the French destroyer Mousquet. The Mousquet was on patrol duty outside the harbour, and was afterwards reported to have seen the Emden, but thought she was a British cruiser. The Emden had now turned, and was leaving the harbour at full speed. Thirty miles out she met a steamer. On approaching it she hoisted the red flag, meaning that she was a powder steamer. The stranger, which was the British steamer Glenturret, had signalled the shore for a pilot, and the launch had just reached her. The Emden had got out her boats when a warship appeared on the horizon. The Emden immediately ordered her boats to return, and made off, as the warship appeared to be a large one. This was, however, only the effect of the early morning *mirage*. As the ships closed at about 3,800 yards the stranger was found to be the French destroyer Mousquet. The Emden opened fire. The first few shots hit the Mousquet's engine-room, and after several salvos the Emden ceased fire, expecting the Frenchman to be wrecked and to surrender. Instead, the Mousquet went on firing about 10 shots. None,



THE LAST OF THE "EMDEN"

Left top corner: Deck of the "Emden" after the battle: right top and centre: "Emden's" crew removing stores at Cocos-Keeling Islands; bottom: the "Emden" aground.



SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHT BETWEEN H.M.S. "SYDNEY" AND THE "EMDEN."

The numbers denote corresponding relative positions.

however, hit the Emden, although some fell 150 yards in front of her. The Mousquet's crew afterwards said that they had fired two torpedoes, but the Emden did not see these. The Emden began firing again, and the Mousquet sank, bows first. The Emden ceased fire, and rescued 36 Frenchmen, three of whom died afterwards. This involved delay, and another destroyer was seen approaching from Penang. The Emden at once steamed for the Indian Ocean at full speed. After being chased for four hours by the destroyer the Emden entered a heavy rainstorm, and the destroyer was lost to sight.

The last act in the drama of the Emden took place off the Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean. They are situated in latitude 12 South, some 500 miles south-west of Java Head and Sunda Straits. They were discovered by the English, and consist of a group of coral islets where the coconut palm grows in abundance. They are in possession of Mr. Ross, a descendant of Captain J. C. Ross, who, in the good ship

Borneo, belonging to Hare & Son of London, took possession of the islands and settled here in 1825. When the island of Krakatoa exploded like a bomb in the year 1883, and altered all the topography of Sunda Straits, ashes and pumice floated feet thick on the surface of the Indian Ocean. In spite of the remoteness of Cocos-Keeling from the scene of the explosion, 500 miles at least, the lagoons in Cocos were so choked with the floating pumice as actually to reclaim a portion of them.

It was to this desolate spot in the Indian Ocean that Captain von Müller brought his ship in the early days of November; with him was one of his captures, the Buresk, which was full of coal. The object of this visit of the Emden was the destruction of the important wireless

station that is established on the islands, and on the morning of November 9 the officials in charge were unpleasantly surprised by the landing of an armed boat's crew from a cruiser which had come to an anchor, and which they first imagined to be H.M.S. Minotaur. They were quickly undeceived by the German officer in charge of the party, who informed them that their operations from the wireless station had greatly hampered the movements of the cruiser. One detachment of the Germans then rounded up all the officials and their servants, placing them under a strict guard, while a second party prepared to blow up the wireless installation and to smash the instrument rooms of the cable office. This they did most thoroughly, but the officials seem to have kept their heads in the most praiseworthy manner, as, just as soon as they discovered that the enemy was upon them, they sent out distress signals by wireless, and warned adjacent stations by cable that they were about to be smashed up. The landing party now blew up the wireless mast and the store in which spare cable and cable gear was kept; a third explosion wrecked the wireless hut and completed the destruction of the installation. The dynamo rooms and workshops were destroyed with flogging hammers and axes, everything breakable, including clocks, being smashed to atoms. Their next proceeding was to cut the shore ends of the submarine cables,

and this was done in full view of the prisoners. There are three cables from the Cocos—to Perth, to Batavia, and to Rodriguez—and the pleasure of the prisoners can be imagined when they saw the Germans spend much hard labour in destroying a dummy cable. Eventually the Perth cable and the dummy were cut, the others being left, presumably because the Germans did not know that they existed.


The party from the Emden had landed at 7.30 a.m., and by 9.20 their mission of destruction was accomplished. At this time a signal was blown on the siren from the ship; the officer in command collected his men, marched them down to the beach, and re-embarked. The telegraphists report that they were fairly and courteously treated. On arrival the Emden was still using her now famous fourth funnel, a dummy, and this it was that caused the telegraphists to mistake her in the first instance for the Minotaur, which is a four funnelled armoured cruiser. As she steamed away in the bright light of the tropic morning for what was so shortly to prove her last cruise, the Emden hauled down and stowed away her dummy.

The action that ensued between the Sydney and the Emden is here given in the official dispatch of Captain Glossop, dated from Colombo on November 15 :

I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver,



OIL TANKS AT MADRAS.



THE CORONEL AND FALKLAND ACTIONS.

H.M.A.S. Melbourne, at 6.30 a.m. on Monday, November 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. Emden, coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she

was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows, and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat, and found her to be the s.s. Buresk, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her, and returned to Emden, passing men



VALPARAISO HARBOUR.

The "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the distance on the left.

swimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from Buresk.

3. On arriving again off Emden, she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal? No signal books." I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left Emden and returned and picked up the Buresk's two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.), who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to Emden, manned by her own prize crew from Buresk and one officer, and stating I would return to their assistance next morning.

5. I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10, to find that the Emden's party, consisting of three officers and 40 men, one launch and two cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the *Ayesha*), having four Maxims with two belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The wireless station was entirely destroyed, one cable cut, one damaged and one intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to Emden's assistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in Sydney they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I therefore set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of island and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the Emden were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5.0 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Darkness came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m. on November 11, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10.0 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m. Wednesday, November 11.

8. Total casualties in Sydney: Killed, 3; severely wounded (since dead), 1; severely wounded, 4; wounded, 4; slightly wounded, 4. In the Emden I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men from captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to Sydney's hull and fittings was surprisingly small; in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

10. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying.

It will be seen from Captain Glossop's dispatch that he was on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, of



[Elliott & Fry.]

THE LATE REAR-ADMIRAL SIR CHRISTOPHER CRADOCK.

H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*. This convoy was carrying Australian and New Zealand troops to the scene of the great conflict in Europe. The act of self-denial on the part of Captain Silver in sending the *Sydney* to engage the *Emden* instead of taking that duty upon himself certainly deserves to be noted. This officer denied to himself and to the officers and men under his command the privilege of dealing with the notorious raider, and in so doing he was actuated solely by his high sense of duty and the responsibility that he owed to his country. In his judgment the *Sydney* was the more suitable ship, so she was sent, and the *Melbourne* remained with her convoy until the affair was concluded.

ACTION OFF THE COAST OF CHILE.

On Friday, November 6, the Admiralty received "trustworthy information" that an action had been fought on the Chilean coast on Sunday, November 1, between H.M.S. *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, and *Glasgow*, in company with the armed liner *Otranto*, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, and the German vessels *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Dresden*. The following is a description of the vessels that took part in the affair:

GOOD HOPE.—Armoured cruiser of 14,100 tons. Built at Govan and launched in 1901. Length, 515 ft.;

beam, 71 ft.; draught of water, 28 ft. Her armament consisted of two 9.2-inch guns, sixteen 6-inch, twelve 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, two machine guns, and she was also fitted with two torpedo tubes. The 9.2 gun throws a shell of 380 pounds weight, the 6-inch one of 100 pounds weight.

MONMOUTH.—Armoured cruiser of 9,800 tons. Built in Glasgow and completed in 1903. Length, 440 ft.; beam, 66 ft.; draught of water, 24½ ft. Her armament consisted of fourteen 6-inch guns, eight 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, eight machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. Her best speed was 23.9 knots.

GLASGOW.—Light cruiser of 4,800 tons. Built by Fairfield and completed January, 1911. Length, 430 ft.; beam, 47 ft.; draught of water, 15½ ft. Her armament consists of two 6-inch guns, ten 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes. Her speed is 25 knots.

OTRANTO.—Of the Orient Line. Twin-screw steamer of 12,100 tons, launched from Workman & Clark's yard at Belfast in 1909. Commissioned August, 1914, as an auxiliary cruiser.

The German armoured cruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, of 11,600 tons, were sister ships, and were completed in 1907. Their length was 449½ ft.; beam, 71 ft.; draught of water, 25 ft. Their armament consisted of eight 8.2-inch guns (weight of projectile 275 pounds), six 6-inch, twenty 24-pounders, four machine guns, and four torpedo tubes.

DRESDEN.—Third-class cruiser, 3,600 tons. Sister ship to the Emden. Completed 1909. Length, 387 ft.; beam, 43½ ft.; draught of water, 17½ ft. She was armed with ten 4.1-inch guns, eight 5-pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes.

NURNBERG.—Same type and armament as Dresden, but 3,450 tons displacement.

LEIPZIG.—Third-class cruiser, 3,250 tons. Completed 1906. Length, 341 ft.; beam, 43½ ft.; maximum draught, 17½ ft. She was armed with ten 4.1-inch guns, ten 1-pounders, four machine guns, and two torpedo tubes.


The first news that reached this country of this disastrous action was hardly credited in

official circles, and in an official statement the Secretary of the Admiralty stated:

The Admiralty cannot accept these facts as accurate at the present time, for the battleship Canopus, which had been specially sent to strengthen Admiral Cradock's squadron, and would give him a decided superiority, is not mentioned in them, and further, although five German ships are concentrated in Chilean waters, only three have come into Valparaiso harbour. It is possible, therefore, that when full accounts of the action are received they may considerably modify the German version.


Unfortunately for official optimism the obsolescent Canopus* was not with the cruisers in the action. The moral of this battle was the same as that of those by which it was succeeded—that, given reasonably good shooting and skill in the handling, the ship with the better artillery will win any action. The Good Hope represented one of the worst and most expensive types of ship ever built for the Navy in modern times. She was an immense target and much under-gunned for her displacement. The Monmouth, also of nearly 10,000 tons, carried no gun larger than a 6-inch.

* CANOPUS, battleship of 12,950 tons, built at Portsmouth, and completed in 1900. Length, 400 ft.; beam, 74 ft.; draught of water, 26½ ft. Her armament consists of four 12-inch guns (mark 8, 35 calibre, weight of projectile 850 pounds), twelve 6-inch, ten 12-pounders (12 cwt.), two 12-pounders (8 cwt.), six 3-pounders, two Maxims, four torpedo tubes. Speed (when new) 18.5 knots.



I. H.M.S. "MONMOUTH."

II. H.M.S. "GOOD HOPE."



PLAN OF THE ACTION OFF CORONEL.

The comparison of guns in the two squadrons runs thus :

German.	British.
16 8·2-inch	2 9·2-inch
12 6-inch	32 6-inch
30 4·1-inch	10 4-inch
40 24-pounders	20 12-pounders
16 5-pounders	10 3-pounders

The British ships were outclassed, as their 6-inch guns of an old mark were unlikely to inflict damage on the enemy at long ranges, no

matter how well served; while at the same time the comparatively modern 8·2's of the Germans would be finding their target, the gunners being unhampered by the disturbing factor of hits on their own ships. The Scharnhorst had won the gold medal for big-ship shooting presented by the Kaiser, and the Gneisenau was also extremely efficient in gunnery.

On Sunday, November 1, 1914, the Good

Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow came up with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Dresden. There was a strong wind and a very considerable sea; both squadrons were steaming to the southward, and the Germans kept out of range and declined action until sunset, when the light gave them an important advantage. Early in the battle, which lasted about two hours, both the Good Hope and Monmouth caught fire, but they continued fighting until nearly dark, when a serious explosion took place in the Good Hope and she foundered. It was stated that the Monmouth hauled off at dark, making water badly, and appeared unable to steam away. We now know, however, that she closed with the enemy with the greatest gallantry with the intention of ramming; that she was sunk in the attempt quite close to the enemy ships; and that although the sea was by no means too bad, no attempt was made to save the English sailors struggling in the water.

On November 17 the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the following report had been received from Captain John Luce, of H.M.S. Glasgow:

Glasgow left Coronel 9 a.m. on November 1 to rejoin Good Hope (flagship), Monmouth and Otranto at rendezvous. At 2 p.m. flagship signalled that apparently from wireless calls there was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were given for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following order: Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, and Glasgow, speed to be worked up to

15 knots. 4.20 p.m. saw smoke; proved to be enemy ships, one small cruiser and two armoured cruisers. Glasgow reported to Admiral, ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on Good Hope. At 5.0 p.m. Good Hope was sighted.


5.47 p.m., squadron formed in line-ahead in following order: Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto. Enemy, who had turned south, were now in single line-ahead 12 miles off, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau leading. 6.18 p.m., speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship signalled Canopus, "I am going to attack enemy now." Enemy were now 15,000 yards away, and maintained this range, at the same time jamming wireless signals.

By this time sun was setting immediately behind us from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in light, but range too great. 6.55 p.m., sun set, and visibility conditions altered, our ships being silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see.


7.3 p.m., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in quick succession by Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow. Two squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made firing difficult, particularly for main deck guns of Good Hope and Monmouth. Enemy firing salvos got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred on Good Hope amidships, flames reaching 200 ft. high. Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite dark.

Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns. Monmouth was badly down by the bow, and turned away to get stern to sea, signalling to Glasgow to that effect. 8.30 p.m. Glasgow signalled to Monmouth: "Enemy following us," but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now seen approaching, and as Glasgow could render Monmouth no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. 8.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m., observed 75 flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack on Monmouth.

Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct of officers and men throughout. Though it was



A DESTROYER'S TORPEDO TUBES.



MAP SHOWING POSITION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

most trying to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The serious reverse sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the enemy again as soon as possible.

The Admiral, the gallant and well-beloved Cradock, had gone to his long home with a guard accompanying him of hundreds of those seamen he had led in action. No end could have been more consonant with his own wishes than that he should die for the country he had served so well.

The Glasgow, sorely battered, stood away out of action to the southward. It was a miracle that she lived to tell the tale; but not only did she do so, but we see from the concluding paragraph of the report of Captain Luce in what manner the action had been viewed by those on board. We are told that owing to internal damage from the fire of the enemy a good deal of strutting with timber had to be resorted to, in order to shore up her decks and stiffen damaged bulkheads. An officer finding his way along the next morning

discovered the following inscription chalked up on one of these struts: "Epping Forest, no Germans admitted on any pretence."

It will be remembered that the cruisers Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue were sunk in the North Sea by submarines on September 22: and that this feat was received with delirious joy in Germany. The satisfaction on that occasion was nothing to the outburst when the news was received in Berlin of the destruction of Admiral Cradock's two ships. The hated English had once more been defeated on their own element, the sea, and loud were the boastings and the predictions of further disasters in store for the British Navy in the future.

There was no minimising the fact that our arms had received a serious reverse, or that the enemy had legitimate cause for jubilation. Admiral von Spee had not been heard of for nearly six weeks before the battle off the Chilean coast, and his reappearance and success were a mortifying blow to British prestige. The German squadron, as we know, had eluded the Japanese squadrons in the Far East, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau having left Kiao-Chau just before war broke out.

They were not heard of again until September 22, when they arrived off Papeete in the island of Tahiti, where they sank a small and unarmed French gunboat and bombarded the defenceless town. Later on it was discovered that the two vessels had visited Apia harbour on September 14, but had remained only a short time. In October the Leipzig sank a steamer called the Bankfields off Peru, homeward bound from Eten with a cargo of six thousand tons of sugar. In September she sank the oil-tank steamer Elsinore, and in November the Vine Branch, off the Chilean coast, while that vessel was outward bound from England to Guayaquil. The Dresden sank the Hyades off Pernambuco on August 16, while the vessel was bound from the River Plate for Holland with grain, and the Holmwood on August 26 near Santa Maria, on the voyage from South Wales to Bahia Blanca with coals. The Nürnberg cut the cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and Fanning Island early in September, but there is no record of her having captured anything. The large cruisers do not seem to have gone in for commerce destruction.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS VICTORY.

High speed in scouting vessels, wireless telegraphy, the aeroplane, the captive balloon, and the dirigible have rendered it increasingly difficult in the twentieth century to conduct warlike operations with anything approaching to secrecy. Not only is the general on land no longer unaware of what is happening on the other side of the hill, but the admiral at sea is overlooked by aircraft when the weather is at all suitable for the purpose. Aircraft, however, have distinct limitations. In ideal weather for the purpose a Zeppelin airship might scout with most satisfactory results in the North Sea, and might even pursue her researches until they included a peep at the harbours on the western shores of Scotland. But the open ocean remains, and, at all events for the present, seems likely to remain, the province of the ship which sails upon its waters. Therefore the problem of coming up with and destroying the squadron of von Spee was a matter that had to be settled without adventurous aid from the firmament of heaven.

Very seldom had retribution followed so



THE KAISER AMONGST HIS SAILORS.



PORT STANLEY, FALKLAND ISLANDS.

[Mrs. Walter.

swiftly on the heels of action as it did on this occasion. The destruction of this German squadron, an imperative necessity from the first, had now to be accomplished in the shortest possible time. Von Spee had signed his own death warrant. First we will set down the bald Admiralty announcement, which runs as follows :


At 7.30 a.m. on December 8 the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Leipzig* and *Dresden* were sighted near the Falkland Islands by a British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee. An action followed, in the course of which the *Scharnhorst*, flying the flag of Admiral Graf von Spee, the *Gneisenau*, and the *Leipzig* were sunk. The *Dresden* and the *Nürnberg* made off during the action, and are being pursued. Two colliers were also captured. The Vice-Admiral reports that the British casualties are very few in number. Some survivors have been rescued from the *Gneisenau* and the *Leipzig*.

Thirty-eight days only had elapsed between the action in the Pacific and that which took place in the South Atlantic. On November 1 the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope* were sunk by the German squadron ; on December 8 they were followed by their destroyers. The Falkland Islands, where the battle between Sturdee and von Spee took place, are well over 7,000 miles from England ; yet in a little over five weeks from the time of the disaster to Cradock a sufficient force had been dispatched, had found the enemy, and had dealt with him to his entire discomfiture.

During the war a policy of silence was maintained that sometimes proved irksome to the public. A more striking justification of this attitude on the part of the authorities could hardly be found than in the success of the Falkland Islands action. Until it was over no unauthorised person so much as knew that

Vice-Admiral Sturdee was on his way, or indeed that any squadron had been dispatched to deal with the situation. In the upshot the right force arrived at the right place at the right time, thus solving the strategical side of the problem, while its tactical outcome was all that could be desired.

The Governor of the Falkland Islands had heard from the Admiralty that he might expect a raid on the Islands, and had done what he could to prepare for such an eventuality. Women and children by an order dated October 19 were ordered to leave Port Stanley, and in the meantime the men in the island prepared



ADMIRAL STURDEE'S SQUADRON IN PORT STANLEY HARBOUR.

1. "Invincible." 2. "Inflexible." 3. "Carnarvon."
4. "Glasgow." 5. "Kent." 6. "Cornwall."
7. "Bristol." 8. "Macedonia." 9. "Canopus."



SAFEGUARDS AGAINST TORPEDOES.

Putting out nets.

to make the best fight that they could, supposing the enemy were to appear. A wireless message was received on November 3 acquainting the people on the island of the loss of the Good Hope and Monmouth, and this was followed by another from the Glasgow saying that that ship and the Canopus were on their way to the Falklands. The presumption was that these ships were being followed by the victorious Germans. A letter from a lady in the Falkland Islands gave the following description of the state of the Glasgow on arrival :

The Glasgow was very badly damaged, one enormous hole in her side being 3 ft. by 9 ft. Another shell had gone through the side of the ship and through the captain's cabin, demolishing his roll-top desk, and giving off such fumes that several men who rushed in to put out the fire were rendered unconscious. There were only four slight casualties, fortunately, and both men and officers said of each other that they were heroes. The Glasgow men said that after the Good Hope sank with Admiral Cradock on board their captain became senior officer. When he found himself damaged, and noticed that the Monmouth was in a similar condition, he signalled to the latter ship to steer a certain course away from the enemy, but received a reply that as the ship was not under control it was impossible to obey the order. He therefore steamed close to the Monmouth, which was in a sinking condition, her bows being under water, with the men assembled in the stern. There was a heavy sea running; the enemy was still firing, and they had to leave the Monmouth to her fate. As the

Glasgow left to seek safety in flight three cheers were raised by the Monmouth, and that was the last they knew of the ship.

Impartial evidence that the British sailors were left to drown by the enemy is that of the German seamen themselves. On arrival at Valparaiso they were asked by a German pastor why none of the English had been saved, and whether it had not been possible to rescue any of them. To this they replied that it would have been quite possible to do so, but that they were not permitted by their officers to hold out a helping hand.

The force at the disposal of Admiral Sturdee comprised the battle cruisers *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, the battleship *Canopus*, the armoured cruisers *Kent* and *Cornwall*, sister ships to the ill-fated *Monmouth*, the armoured cruiser *Carnarvon* (10,850 tons, armed with four 7.5-inch, six 6-inch, two 12-pounders, twenty 3-pounders, and two torpedo tubes), the sister light cruisers *Glasgow* and *Bristol*, and the armed liner *Macedonia*. The *Invincible* and *Inflexible* are two of the three battle-cruisers (the *Indomitable* being the third) which were completed in 1908, and have a displacement of 17,250 tons. Their speed is over 28 knots, and the price of this

increase over the 21 knots of the battleship Dreadnought was the loss of two 12-inch guns and lighter armour—a 7-inch belt amidships instead of an 11-inch, and a 4-in belt forward instead of a 6-inch. Owing to the arrangement of their turrets all their eight 12-inch guns can be fired either to port or starboard.


The details of the German squadron have already been given. It is interesting to note that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were almost contemporary with the Invincible class, having been completed in 1907, but at that time Germany had not been able to copy and adopt the all-big-gun ship, either as battleship or as battle cruiser.

What information Admiral von Spee had been able to gather concerning enemy movements since the day on which he sank the Good Hope and the Monmouth has never become known, but what is quite certain is that he was unaware of the arrival of the squadron commanded by Admiral Sturdee. It is evident that the German commander was on his way to annex the Falkland Islands, and to use them as his much-needed base. Secrecy and silence were weapons as potent as the guns of Sturdee's squadron, and the nation owes a debt of gratitude to those who succeeded, totally unknown to the enemy,

in getting a powerful squadron away from home waters to the far-distant Falklands—a squadron which arrived exactly in time, and which was thus enabled to clear the southern seas of a menace to British trade and British supremacy.

At the time of the battle between von Spee and Cradock, the Canopus was 200 miles to the southward, and after the action she was picked up by the Glasgow, both ships then proceeding in company to the Falklands, where they arrived on November 8. On the evening of that day a wireless message was received directing them to proceed to Monte Video, and the inhabitants of the colony were left with the pleasing prospect of awaiting the arrival of the victorious German squadron, to which they could offer only such resistance as might be raised locally. Before, however, the two ships arrived at Monte Video, they received a wireless message ordering them to return to the Falklands and help to defend the colony, which they accordingly did; and then, on December 7, to the immense relief of everyone, the Invincible and Inflexible arrived from England, and the other ships from Brazil.

At 8 o'clock on Tuesday morning, December 8, it was reported from the signal station on shore that the look-out on Sapper Hill had



From a photograph by a Naval Officer present.

BOATS FROM THE "INFLEXIBLE" AND "INVINCIBLE" PICKING UP SURVIVORS FROM THE "GNEISENAU."

The "Inflexible" standing by.



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR F. C. DOVETON
STURDEE.

observed a four-funnel and a two-funnel man-of-war steering northwards, and the Kent, which was acting as guard ship in Port William, was at once ordered to weigh anchor, and a few minutes later passed down the harbour to a station at the entrance, while a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed. It was most important to conceal, if possible, from the enemy the fact that two battle cruisers were present, and accordingly those two vessels raised steam with oil fuel. Those who have seen the volumes of black smoke that pour out from the funnels of a ship raising steam with oil fuel will realise how black was the cloud that soon enveloped the harbour.

At 8.20 the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and still another column half an hour later. The Canopus, which was lying in Port Stanley, with the Glasgow and Bristol, the other vessels being in Port William, with the Macedonia at anchor as look-out ship at the mouth of the bay, reported at 8.47 that the first two ships were about 8 miles off, and that the smoke

reported at 8.20 appeared to be that of two ships about 20 miles off.

The subsequent course of events may be given in the words of Admiral Sturdee's dispatch:

At 9.20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (Gneisenau and Nürnberg), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbour but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9.40 a.m. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9.45 a.m. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order:—Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the Bristol at 11.27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant, probably colliers or transports. The Bristol was therefore directed to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the Glasgow.



At 12.47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The Inflexible opened fire at 12.55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 p.m. she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

Action with the armoured cruisers.—The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1.25 p.m., with the Scharnhorst leading, they turned about 7 points to port in succession into line-ahead and opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line-ahead, with the Invincible leading.



PART OF ADMIRAL STURDEE'S FLEET.

Top : H.M.S. "Invincible" ; centre left : H.M.S. "Canopus" ; centre right : H.M.S. "Glasgow" ;
bottom : H.M.S. "Inflexible."



[Russell Southsea

**REAR-ADMIRAL ARCHIBALD P.
STODDART,**

(in the uniform of a Captain)

who flew his flag on H.M.S. "Carnarvon."

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2.10 p.m.) turned away about 10 points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until at 2.45 p.m. the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2.53 p.m., to turn into line-ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 p.m.

The Scharnhorst caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible.

At 3.30 p.m. the Scharnhorst led round about 10 points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.4 p.m. the Scharnhorst, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4.17 p.m. she disappeared.

The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5.8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5.15 p.m. one of the Gneisenau's shells struck the Invincible; this was her last effective effort.

At 5.30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a

heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5.40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5.50 p.m. "Cease fire" was made.

At 6 p.m. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the Gneisenau report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

Action with the Light Cruisers.—At about 1 p.m., when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the Invincible and Inflexible, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the Dresden was leading and the Nürnberg and Leipzig followed on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall at once went in chase of these ships; the Carnarvon, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The Glasgow drew well ahead of the Cornwall and Kent, and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged with the Leipzig at 12,000 yards. The Glasgow's object was to endeavour to outrange the Leipzig with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the Cornwall and Kent a chance of coming into action.

At 4.17 p.m. the Cornwall opened fire, also on the Leipzig.

At 7.17 p.m. the Leipzig was on fire fore and aft, and the Cornwall and Glasgow ceased fire.

The Leipzig turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 p.m. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3.36 p.m. the Cornwall ordered the Kent to engage the Nürnberg, the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the Kent was able to get within range of the Nürnberg at 5 p.m. At 6.35 p.m. the Nürnberg was on fire forward and ceased firing. The Kent also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the Nürnberg, the Kent opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The Nürnberg sank at 7.27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The Kent had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the Nürnberg and Leipzig, the Dresden, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The Glasgow was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the Leipzig for over an



ADMIRAL GRAF VON SPEE AND HIS FLEET.

Top, "Scharnhorst"; centre left, "Leipzig"; centre right, "Nürnberg"; bottom, "Gneisenau."

hour before either the Cornwall or Kent could come up and get within range. During this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the Dresden to get away unobserved.

Action with the Enemy's Transports.—A report was received at 11.27 a.m. from H.M.S. Bristol that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The Bristol was ordered to take the Macedonia under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. Macedonia reports that only two ships, steamships Baden and Santa Isabel, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer Officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.


In connexion with Admiral Sturdee's tribute to the work of the engineering staffs of the ships, reference may be made to the expedients to which the Kent was put in her chase of the Nürnberg. She was woefully short of fuel, and when it was reported to her captain that the supply of coal was becoming exhausted, he replied, "Very well, then, have a go at the boats." The order was obeyed; the boats were broken up, smeared with oil, and passed into the furnaces. After them went the wooden ladders, the doors, and the chests of drawers from the officers' cabins, and the Kent steamed at 24 knots.

It was on the Kent, also, that Sergeant Charles Mayes performed an act that won him the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal. A shell


burst and ignited some cordite charges in the casemate, and a flash of flame went down the hoist into the ammunition passage. Sergeant Mayes picked up a charge of cordite and threw it away. He then got hold of a firehose and flooded the compartment, extinguishing the fire in some empty shell bags which were burning. The extinction of this fire saved a disaster which might have led to the loss of the ship.

The sinking of the Leipzig is described in the following extracts from a letter from H.M.S. Cornwall:

At about 9 p.m. she loosed off a rocket as a sign of surrender, and so we lowered what boats we could and sent them to her aid. I shall never in all my life forget the sight of that ship going down. All the ship's company had gathered on the fore's'le, and one or two boats were still being lowered when the captain leant over the side of the bridge and said: "It's no good, she's going." The men in the boat which was half lowered stood up and every face was turned towards the blazing ship. You can't imagine what she was like. It was nearly dark, about 9.25 p.m., and the red glare from the flames lit up the remains of what had been the home of some 300 human beings a few hours before. As we saw her then she lay like an inferno on the sea. She had only the veriest stump of her second funnel left. The other two had been knocked completely away. Her mainmast was gone, and the upper half of her foremast. Aft she was blazing like an oil factory, and forward she was also burning furiously. Her ports showed up like faint red circles, and occasional spurts of steam and sparks ascended from her waist. How any ship could have floated like it Heaven alone knows, and how anyone can have lived through it simply astounds me. Suddenly she heeled to port and her stump of a foremast slowly dipped into the water as she sank with scarcely a ripple by the head. There was no cheering or anything



A BATTLESHIP'S GUNS IN ACTION.



GERMAN WARSHIP IN KIEL CANAL.

of that sort. We just stood there in absolute silence, and, personally, I thought of the poor devils who had been chased for five months only to end like that. There is no doubt whatsoever that they fought like heroes. As for ourselves they hit us fair and square eighteen times, and yet we had not one single casualty.

The same writer makes the following general reflections on the engagement :

When one remembers that the action in the Pacific was fought on November 1, and that the German fleet did not appear off the Falklands until December 8, when they were free to have come any day previous to that, and that the British fleet had only arrived twenty-four hours earlier it does seem obvious that our luck was in. If we had arrived forty-eight hours later and they had arrived twenty-four hours sooner, the Falkland Isles would have been in German hands, and hundreds of lives would have been lost regaining them.

Of course, we had every advantage on our side both in weight of guns and speed and armour, but even so it argues good management on somebody's part to sink four German ships with a loss of over 2,000 Germans as against a British loss of seven or eight killed and four wounded.

It cannot be denied that a satisfactory roundness would have been added to the victory had all the five German ships been sunk, and on this point the comments of the Naval Correspondent of *The Times* may aptly be quoted :

It is not unfair, nor does it detract from the gallantry of Admiral Sturdee, or the skilful manner in which he fought the action, to describe the escape of the Dresden as a regrettable incident. It is explained as being partly due to the fact that the Glasgow, the only light cruiser with sufficient speed to have caught her, engaged the Leipzig before the Cornwall or Kent came up, and during this time the Dresden was able to increase her distance and get out of sight. Moreover, the weather changed about 4 p.m., the visibility was much reduced, and the sky became overcast and cloudy. Her escape

had two unfortunate results. It locked up several ships for her search which could have been otherwise employed, and indirectly led to the loss of a fine Japanese cruiser. We treasure two sayings in the Navy, one of Drake's, who said there was time to finish his game and beat the Spaniards too; and the other of Nelson's—"Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed the eleventh to escape when it had been possible to have got at her, I could never have called it well done." It seems quite likely that Admiral Sturdee has since regretted those brilliant hours in the forenoon when he slowed down to enable the other cruisers to get into station. But this matter apart, it was a well-fought action, giving every opportunity for the display of the admirable qualities of all engaged in it.

SOME MINOR OPERATIONS.

One of the most interesting of the minor events of the war at sea was the bottling up and subsequent destruction of the German light cruiser Königsberg in the Rufigi River on the East Coast of Africa in November. This vessel escaped from Dar-es-Salaam at the beginning of the war and did a good deal of mischief among shipping, including the shelling of H.M.S. Pegasus in Zanzibar, when that vessel was laid up repairing boilers and was unable to reply to her fire. Chased by British cruisers she took refuge in the Rufigi River and managed to force her way up stream until she was out of range. As the depth of water was insufficient to permit of her being followed, it was decided to prevent her escape by blocking the channel. A vessel named the Newbridge, with 1,500 tons of coal in her, was requisitioned for this service, and for the trip down from Zanzibar to the river her crew was replaced by naval officers and blue-




SERGEANT CHARLES MAYES,
H.M.S. "Kent."

jackets, though her captain, Captain Willett, remained. The operations were in charge of Lieutenant Lavington of the Pegasus.

The preparations were made with secrecy, but the Germans received notice of what was

intended and got ready accordingly. In order to reach the position where it was proposed to sink her the Newbridge had to pass close to a small island in the mouth of the river, and on this a number of the crew of the Königsberg entrenched themselves with Maxims and quick-firers landed from their ship. The Newbridge went in under her own steam, and the Germans opened fire as soon as she got within range; a seaman was badly peppered with coal dust owing to a shell exploding in a coal bag, but that was the only casualty. Coolly and dexterously the ship was manœuvred into position to block the channel. Bow and stern anchors were let go, and water was admitted to her tanks so that she took a list to port, the object being to sink her with her deck up stream, in such a way that sand might be carried against it by the four-knot tide and promote the rapid silting up of the channel. Then, when all was ready, her crew took to the boats and exploded three charges of guncotton that had been placed in her hold against the outer skin. She sank rapidly. Several casualties occurred in the boats as they passed out under a hot fire from the island, two bluejackets being killed and several wounded. The Duplex, a cable ship which accompanied the Newbridge, had five Lascars killed and a lieutenant R.N.R. severely



HOISTING NAVAL AEROPLANE ON BOARD H.M.S. "HIBERNIA."



GERMAN BATTLESHIP SQUADRON.

wounded. Almost immediately afterwards the Duplex ran on a reef; she was got off, but as she was found to be badly damaged, she also was sunk in the fairway to complete the bottling up process. In the meanwhile the Königsberg concealed herself by fastening palm branches to her masts and funnels. The difficulty that she thus became indistinguishable from the sea was overcome by an aeroplane brought down the coast in the Kinfauns Castle. Flying inland this machine marked the position of the German cruiser by smoke bombs, enabling her to be destroyed by bombardment overland from the coast by the British cruisers.

On the other side of Africa, on October 26, a French force under Colonel Mayer, with the cooperation of a British naval and military force, occupied Edea, a town on the Sanaga River, West Africa, and an important station on the railway to Duala. On November 13 preparations were completed for extensive operations to the north and north-west of Duala. After a bombardment by the French cruiser Bruix and the Nigeria Government yacht Ivy, a force of Royal Marines seized and occupied Victoria, the seaport of Buea, the seat of the German Colonial Government. On the same day a column advancing along the Bonaberi railway from Susa drove the enemy north and occupied Mujuka, a station about 50 miles from Bonaberi. Meanwhile large allied naval and military forces, advancing from different points, proceeded to occupy Buea. The occupation was effected on November 15, the enemy being scattered in all directions. A German missionary attempted to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf with an infernal machine, and when asked how he found such an action compatible with his profession replied that he was a soldier first and a missionary afterwards.

About the same time two successful operations were carried out in the Red Sea. In the first of these, against the Turkish garrison at




Sheik Seyd, Indian troops were engaged, assisted by H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh. According to the official account issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty on November 16, the Turkish fort (Turba) is situated on the rocky heights to the eastward of Cape Bab-el-Mandeb, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and is close to the boundary line between Turkish territory and the Aden protectorate. The Sheik Seyd Peninsula consists of a group



[F. N. Birrell.]

FLIGHT COMMANDER
FRANCIS E. T. HEWLETT, R.N.



BRITISH AEROPLANE RAID ON CUXHAVEN.

of rocky heights joined to the mainland by a low sandy plain, the greater portion of which is covered at high water by a shallow lagoon. The guns of the fort command the isthmus connecting the peninsula with the mainland. Three battalions of troops were landed in face of opposition, but under cover of fire from H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh, which had previously disabled Turba Fort, and which assisted during the operations. After landing, one and a half battalions of infantry attacked the enemy positions, and were opposed by well-concealed artillery and infantry fire. When the hills commanding Manheli were occupied, opposition weakened, and about 200 of the enemy escaped on camels by the isthmus or in boats by sea. Six of the enemy were reported killed, and the majority of the remainder wounded and prisoners. The forts were occupied by the British forces, and large amounts of munitions of war and six field guns captured. The heavy guns were probably put out of action by the Duke of Edinburgh. The British casualties among the troops were one officer and fifteen men wounded, and four men killed. There were no naval casualties.

In consequence of a report that mines had been sent to Akaba to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba, and possibly in the Red Sea, the cruiser *Minerva* was ordered to proceed to

Akaba to investigate and stop any such action. According to an account published at Cairo on November 17, on arriving at Akaba the captain found it occupied by a small detachment of troops. Negotiations for a surrender were attempted, but were frustrated by German officers present. The *Minerva* was compelled to open fire, but confined her attack to the fort, the post office, and the Government buildings. Later a landing party reconnoitred in the direction of Wadi-el-Ithm, but encountered only a few armed men, who rapidly disappeared. The patrol returned to the town and re-embarked, after posting a proclamation inviting the inhabitants to return and assuring their safety. The town and wells were not damaged, and there were no British casualties.

In the Persian Gulf, as already recorded, successful operations were carried out on November 8 against Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, by a military force from India covered by H.M.S. *Odin* (Commander Cathcart P. Wason), the armed launch *Sirdar*, a force of marines with a Maxim gun party, and a boat from the *Ocean*. The guns of the enemy were silenced after an hour's resistance, and the town was occupied by the troops and the naval brigade. There were no naval casualties.

At the end of October the Turkish Fleet. at

the instigation of its German masters, started bombarding undefended coast towns in the Black Sea. The Goeben bombarded Sebastopol and threw 116 shells into the town on November 1, and in answer a combined British and French squadron bombarded the Dardanelles forts at long range at daybreak on November 3. The forts replied, but the Allies suffered no loss, only one projectile falling alongside. A large explosion, accompanied by volumes of black smoke, occurred at Helles fort, but the amount of material damage done could not be estimated. Probably the intention of the attack was not so much to cause damage as to ascertain the range of the guns in the forts.

Nearly three weeks later the Goeben and the Breslau were engaged by the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. According to the statement of the Naval General Staff at Petrograd, about noon on November 18, when the Russian battleship division was returning from a cruise along the Anatolian coast and was abreast of Sebastopol, it sighted, 25 miles off the Chersonese lightship, the Goeben and the Breslau. The ships immediately took battle formation, and holding a course which placed the enemy to starboard, opened fire at a range of forty cables (*i.e.*, 8,000 yards). The first salvo of the 12-inch guns of the flagship *Evstaffi* hit the Goeben, bursting on the centre of her freeboard and causing a fire on board. The other Russian ships then opened fire, and made excellent practice, a whole series of explosions being noticeable on the Goeben's hull. After some delay the Goeben opened fire with salvos from her big guns, which she concentrated on the Russian flagship. The battle lasted 14 minutes and then the Goeben swiftly changed course, and, thanks to her superior speed,




[Russia, Southsea.]

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER
NORMAN D. HOLBROOK, V.C.,
of Submarine B 11.

disappeared in the fog. The Breslau, which had taken no part in the action, remained in the offing. Only slight damage was suffered by the *Evstaffi*. The Russian casualties were four officers and 24 men killed and wounded.

The strength of the Russian squadron on this occasion is not stated, but in any case the Goeben was nearly twice the displacement of



SUBMARINE B 11,
Which torpedoed the Turkish Battleship "Messudiyeh" in the Dardanelles.



CLEARING FOR ACTION.

All spare wood and furniture is thrown overboard or sent ashore.

the Russian flagship. Also, she was apparently caught napping, as the Russian, who kept the better look-out, got in the first blow. At the range indicated the Goeben's guns should have made a smashing reply, but they evidently failed to do so, while the shells of her antagonists seem to have done her considerable damage. Subsequently she appeared off Batum, but from the fact that she was quickly driven off by the shore batteries it may be inferred that her big guns had not all been repaired, or replaced, since the engagement near Sebastopol.

On December 13 the British submarine B11, Lieutenant-Commander Norman D. Holbrook, entered the Dardanelles, and, diving under five rows of mines, torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the minefield. Although pursued by gunfire and torpedo boats, B11 returned safely, after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours. When

last seen the *Messudiyeh* was sinking by the stern. What was not known at the time, and what is nevertheless the fact, is that during the operations the compass of B11 went wrong, and Lieutenant Holbrook had to find his way out of the Dardanelles without it; at one time his frail vessel was actually bumping on the bottom. All his brother officers concur in regarding this as one of the finest individual feats performed during the war. The underwater navigation of the Dardanelles is most perilous and difficult at all times, owing to the swift currents which never cease racing through the Straits, and when, in addition to the whirlpools and eddies caused by these currents striking projections and points, the presence of five rows of mines is considered, such a feat would seem quite impossible of accomplishment were it not for the hard and undeniable fact that it was accomplished. That the torpedoed battleship was "guarding the minefield" adds a touch of comedy to the proceedings that must have been singularly gratifying to Lieutenant Holbrook and his gallant companions who crept along the sea floor with him on that eventful day. The *London Gazette* of December 21 announced that the King had approved of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook; his second in command, Lieutenant Sydney Thornhill Winn, being made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order for his share in the achievement.


BRITISH LOSSES IN HOME WATERS.

About this period several naval losses in home waters have to be chronicled. On the last day of October the old cruiser *Hermes*, Captain C. R. Lambe, was sunk in the Straits of Dover by a German submarine as she was returning from Dunkirk. She was struck by two torpedoes and immediately began to settle down. The S.O.S. signal was made, and two destroyers and the cross-Channel steamer *Invicta* came to the rescue. She remained afloat for about two hours after being struck and then foundered, her captain being the last man to leave her. About 44 of her crew were lost, 400 being saved and landed at Dover. On November 11 the torpedo-gunboat *Niger*, Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Moore, was torpedoed by a submarine in the Downs and foundered. There was no loss of life, and, curiously enough, the occurrence was witnessed by thousands of people at Deal, who had assem-

bled on the beach on hearing the sound of heavy firing out to sea. About noon the sound of an explosion was heard and volumes of black smoke were seen rising from the Niger, which was lying two miles from the shore opposite to the pier head. A stiff breeze was blowing with a considerable sea. Instantly the Deal and Kingsdown lifeboats put out, together with a swarm of boats from the shore, and by these the crew were rescued. The Niger sank about twenty minutes after the explosion.

On November 24 the Secretary of the Admiralty reported the sinking of the German submarine U18 on the northern coast of Scotland. At 12.20 on the morning of the preceding day a British patrolling vessel reported having rammed her, but she was not sighted again until 1.20, when she was seen on the surface, crew on deck, and flying a white flag. Shortly afterwards she foundered just as the destroyer Garry came alongside and rescued three officers and 23 of her crew, only one being drowned. The survivors were landed and interned in Edinburgh Castle.

A terrible disaster occurred at Sheerness on November 26, the Bulwark, a battleship of 15,000 tons, being blown up and destroyed, with the loss of all her company of some 750 officers and men, save fourteen. Many theories were advanced to explain the blowing up of the magazines of the ship, but it remained after all an impenetrable mystery. Lieutenant Benjamin George Carroll, assistant




GERMAN WARSHIP COALING AT SEA.

coaling officer at Sheerness, in his evidence at the coroner's inquest, said that he was passing down the Medway at 7.50 a.m. on the morning of



GUNS OF H.M.S. "NEW ZEALAND."



THE "TIMES" COPYRIGHT

THE SINKING OF THE BLÜCHER.

the 26th. The Bulwark was then lying in Rithole Reach, and there was nothing alongside her. Just as he was noticing a signal indicating the number of tons of coal on board her he saw a spurt of flame abaft the after barbette. Then the whole volume of flame seemed to rush towards the after funnel. The whole interior of the ship seemed to be blown into the air, and everything seemed alight. He observed no disturbance of the water. It was quite calm, and there was no tide. He at once turned his boat back to render assistance, and was able to pick up two men, including an officer. He was convinced that there was an internal explosion. The 12-inch charges were in brass cases, and he did not see how possibly the throwing away of cigarette ends could have anything to do with the explosions. The Admiralty Court of Inquiry which made an exhaustive and scientific research into the causes of the disaster, could not account for it by any known theory; one of their witnesses, Commander Wilton, said that they had been able to trace every cartridge on board, and there was no evidence of loose cordite. The only definite conclusion arrived at was that the ignition which had taken place was internal and not external.

The first day of the New Year was marked by the loss of the Formidable, a battleship of 15,000 tons, which was torpedoed and sunk in the Channel. Completed in 1901, she was virtually a sister-ship to the Bulwark, and although pre-Dreadnought battleships are now obsolescent they have still a considerable fighting value, and it would be folly to underestimate the loss that her destruction meant to the Fleet. She went down between 3 and 3.30 a.m., and of her complement of nearly 800 only 201 were saved. After she was struck everything was done that was possible in the circumstances, and that high standard of discipline which never fails in the Navy in the face of serious emergency was fully maintained. Captain Loxley was on the bridge directing operations to the last and went down with the ship. Of the four boats launched, one, a barge, capsized, and several men were thrown into the sea; the second, also a barge, got away with about seventy men, who were picked up by a light cruiser; the third, a pinnace with some sixty men, reached the shore at Lyme Regis, and the fourth, a cutter with seventy men, after being in a rough sea for about eleven hours, was rescued off Berry Head by the




[Russell.]

REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. H. L. HOOD.

trawler Providence and brought into Brixham.

The splendid behaviour of the master of this trawler, William Pillar, and his crew, was the one bright spot in the tragedy. They were some fifteen miles from Berry Head, and running before a gale to shelter in Brixham when they were amazed to see an open boat adrift. This turned out to be the cutter of the Formidable. Only a seaman can appreciate the difficulties with which Pillar was now confronted. He had, in heavy weather, to take in another reef in his mainsail and to hoist a storm jib; otherwise he could not have brought his vessel to the wind and so manoeuvred as to get into touch with the cutter. By superb handling and entire disregard of danger, he actually managed to gybe his vessel in his endeavour to establish communication with the cutter (this means passing stern to the wind from one tack to the other, and is most dangerous in heavy weather), and at last a rope was passed and made fast. One by one the mariners of the Formidable leapt from the open boat to the smack, and when the transfer was at last accomplished the boat was cast off and the Providence made for Brixham. The officer of the cutter commended the gallant seamanship of the Brixham fishermen, which he described as being beyond all praise, and the King, when he pinned the silver medal for gallantry on the breast of the skipper, Pillar, at Buckingham Palace, addressed him and his crew in the following words: "I congratulate




THE "BLÜCHER."

you most heartily upon your gallant and heroic conduct. It is indeed a great feat to have saved seventy-one lives. I realize how difficult your task must have been because I know myself how arduous it is to gybe a vessel in a heavy gale." This was not only the King of England speaking to a Brixham fisherman, but also one seaman speaking to another; and to have been thus addressed must have enhanced the value of their well-earned medals to the crew of the Providence. An Admiralty award of £250 was made to Pillar, £100 each to the mate and seaman, and £50 to the boy.

There was at first some doubt whether the loss of the Formidable was due to a submarine or to a mine, but subsequently the Admiralty

came to the definite opinion that she was sunk by two torpedoes fired from a submarine. In this connexion Lord Charles Beresford remarked in the House of Commons on February 15 that :

the submarine was considerably overrated if proper precaution was taken against it, but if such precaution was not taken, it was a most fatal weapon in naval warfare. It was problematical whether a submarine would ever hit a ship going at speed; certainly, it would never hit ships accompanied by their proper quota of destroyers and small craft. These were the two safeguards. He wanted to know why the squadron, of which the Formidable formed part, disposed of them. It was common knowledge where she was going, and what she was going to do. She went out and then sent back the destroyers, which were her first defence. Afterwards, when she was farther out in the Channel, in an area known to be infested with submarines, she slackened speed. The Admiral would not have done that if the Admiralty had given definite orders after the loss of



THE "BLÜCHER" SINKING.

[From an actual photograph.]

the three cruisers (Aboukir, Cressy, and Hogue) that no ship should proceed except at speed and with her screens.

RAIDS AND COUNTER-RAIDS.

We now come to the series of raids made on our East Coast by the German Navy. The first, on November 3, was directed against Yarmouth. This place has been persistently described in the German Press as "the fortified port of Yarmouth"—in order, it is to be imagined, that the subjects of the Kaiser may think that special daring was necessary to attack so redoubtable a fortress. The story of this raid has already been dealt with (Vol. II., pp. 358-362); there is, therefore, no occasion to make more than passing reference to it here. In it eight ships were employed, including the three battle cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von der Tann, the armoured cruisers Blücher and Yorek, and the cruisers Kolberg, Graudenz, and Strassburg. They bombarded Yarmouth at such long range that they did no damage; they even failed to do any serious harm to the ancient torpedo gunboat *Haleyon*, though she should undoubtedly have been sunk. They then turned and fled, dropping mines as they went. The submarine *D11* which started in pursuit, struck on one of these and was lost with all her crew save two. Two fishing boats also struck on mines and were lost with fifteen hands. As the cruisers returned to their own waters the *Yorek* struck on a mine and was lost, carrying with her some 300 men.

The second raid, on December 16, was made on Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepoons. As this, too, has been exhaustively treated in the chapter above referred to, there is no need to do more than record it here, and to note the horror which this cowardly attack caused not only in England, but throughout the whole civilized world. Fog unfortunately prevented a British squadron from coming in contact with the marauders, but a reply was delivered on Christmas morning, when a combined attack was made on the German warships lying in Cuxhaven harbour by seven seaplanes piloted by Flight-Commanders Douglas A. Oliver, Francis E. T. Hewlett, Robert P. Ross, and Cecil F. Milner, Flight-Lieutenants Arnold J. Miley, and Charles H. K. Edmonds, and Flight Sub-lieutenant Vivian Gaskell Blackburn. The attack was delivered at daylight, starting from a point in the vicinity of Heligoland. The seaplanes were escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together



[Symonds, Portsmouth.]

CAPTAIN A. S. M. CHATFIELD,
of H.M.S. "Lion."

with submarines. As soon as these ships were seen by the Germans from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, three or four seaplanes and several submarines attacked them. It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neighbourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy aircraft and submarines on the other. By swift manœuvring the enemy submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the *Undaunted* and *Arethusa*. The enemy seaplanes succeeded in dropping their bombs near our ships, though without hitting any. The British ships remained for three hours off the enemy coast without being molested by any surface vessels, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen. Three more pilots were picked up later, according to arrangement, by the British submarines which were standing by, their machines being sunk. Flight-Commander Hewlett was missing at the end of the day's operations, but he eventually returned in safety, having been picked up by a Dutch fishing vessel. What damage was done is not known; but the moral effect was great. Cuxhaven, unlike Yarmouth and Scarborough, is very strongly fortified; and shoals make it impossible for a ship to pass up the Elbe without coming within the range of the guns



[Russell, Southsea.

CAPTAIN LIONEL HALSEY,
of H.M.S. "New Zealand."

mounted there. It will be noticed that the much-vaunted Zeppelins were put to flight almost at once.

In connexion with this counter-raid on Cuxhaven reference may be made to the support that was lent by British warships at sea to the land forces of the Allies on the coast of Belgium. When, established on the coast, the Germans proceeded to make their plans for the capture of Calais, as a preliminary for the destruction of our Fleet and the invasion of our country, they did not reckon on the British Navy taking a hand in the game. As was briefly recorded in a previous chapter, a naval flotilla, including the three monitors which at the outbreak of war were being built in British yards for Brazil, and mounting a large number of powerful long-range guns, was brought into action off the Belgian coast in October in support of the left flank of the Belgian Army. Observation was arranged from the shore by means of naval balloons, and the squadron under Rear-Admiral Hood was able to render the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Westende a "perfect hell of fire and smoke," bombarding the German right and enfilading their lines. Although the enemy replied with heavy guns and sought to damage the attacking ships with submarines, destroyers, and mines, our vessels received only trifling

structural injury, and our casualties throughout were slight. This bombardment was continued intermittently for weeks. On November 23 all points of military significance at Zeebrugge were bombarded, and though the official report stated that the amount of damage done was unknown, there was reason to believe that, at least for the time being, the port was rendered useless as a naval base.

There is a curious resemblance between the work thus done by Admiral Hood in the twentieth century and that accomplished by Admiral Rodney in the eighteenth. On July 3, 1759, Rodney arrived off Havre which was full of stores, fodder, provisions, field guns, ammunition trains, horses, harness, and small arms, ready for embarkation in hundreds of transports and flat-bottomed boats for the invasion of England by the army under the Duc d'Anguillon. Rodney was provided with a number of "bomb vessels," which threw bombs guaranteed to set fire to anything inflammable with which they came into contact. Like our modern Admiral, he was young and full of energy; under him the men worked so splendidly that in one night they had all their bomb vessels in position, and the next day the rain of bombs set fire to and consumed everything which would burn, including the transports and flat



[Russell, Southsea.

REAR-ADMIRAL OSMOND DE B. BROCK
(in the uniform of a Captain),
of H.M.S. "Princess Royal."



H.M.S. "LION,"
Flagship of Sir David Beatty.

boats. It was said that it took Havre over a century to recover from Rodney's attack.

THE NORTH SEA ACTION.

The third German raid took place on January 24, or rather it should be said was attempted, for the attack was foiled by a British patrolling squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty. Presumably the intention was to repeat the achievement of December 16, which caused so much delight in Germany, and it has been suggested that the objective was the Tyne, or even the Firth of Forth. In Germany it was spoken of as "an advance in the North Sea," as if it were nothing but a reconnoitring excursion.

A British squadron of battle cruisers and light cruisers with destroyer flotillas was patrolling the North Sea on Sunday morning, January 24, 1915, when at 7.25 a.m. the flash of guns was observed to the south-south-east, and shortly afterwards the light cruiser Aurora reported to Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty that she was engaged with enemy ships. He at once altered the course of his ships to south-south-east, increased his speed to twenty-two knots, and ordered the light cruisers and destroyer flotillas to chase south-south-east in order to get into touch with the enemy and report their movements. Almost immediately reports followed from the Southampton, Arethusa and Aurora, which had anticipated these instructions, that the enemy ships consisted of three battle cruisers, the Blücher, six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers. The British fleet included the battleships Lion,

Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable; the light cruisers Southampton, Nottingham, Birmingham, Lowestoft, Arethusa, Aurora and Undaunted, and destroyer flotillas, the last being under Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt. The following are particulars of the large ships engaged on both sides:


BRITISH.

LION.—Battle cruiser, launched at Devonport 1910, completed 1912. Displacement, 26,350 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 88½ ft.; draught, 28 ft.; i.h.p., 75,685;



[Russell, Southsea.]

CAPTAIN HENRY B. PELLY,
of H.M.S. "Tiger."



H.M.S. "IRON DUKE."

(From the *Painting* by C. R. Wylie.)

speed, 28.5 knots. Armament: Eight 13.5-inch sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounders, and five machine guns, and two torpedo tubes. Complement, 980.

TIGER.—Battle cruiser, launched at Clydebank 1913. Displacement, 28,000 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 90½ ft.; draught, 28½ ft.; i.h.p., 100 000; speed, 28 knots. Armament: Eight 13.5-inch and twelve 6-inch guns. These particulars are unofficial.

PRINCESS ROYAL.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Lion, launched at Barrow 1911 completed 1912. Displacement, 26,350 tons; length, 660 ft.; beam, 88½ ft.; draught, 28 ft.; i.h.p., 76,510; speed, 28.5 knots. Armament: eight 13.5-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder, and five machine guns. Complement, 980.

NEW ZEALAND.—Battle cruiser, built at Govan at the charge of the New Zealand Government, launched 1911, completed 1912. Displacement, 18,800 tons; length, 555 ft.; beam, 80 ft.; draught, 26½ ft.; i.h.p., 46,894; speed, 25 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, four 3-pounder, and five machine guns and two torpedo tubes. Complement, 780.

INDOMITABLE.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Invincible and Inflexible, which took part in the action off the Falkland Islands. Launched at Govan 1907, completed 1908. Displacement, 17,250; length, 530 ft.; beam, 78½ ft.; draught, 26 ft.; i.h.p., 41,000; speed, 26 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch, and five machine guns and five torpedo tubes. Complement, 780.

GERMAN.


BLÜCHER.—Armoured cruiser, launched at Kiel 1908, completed 1910. Displacement, 15,550 tons; length, 499 ft.; beam, 80¼ ft.; draught, 26.2 ft.; i.h.p., 40,000; speed, 25.3 knots. Armament: Twelve 8.2-inch, eight 5.9-inch, and sixteen 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes.

MOLTKE.—Battle cruiser, sister ship of the Goeben, launched at Hamburg 1910, completed 1911. Displacement, 22,640 tons; length, 610¼ ft.; beam, 96 ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 86,900; speed, 28.4 knots. Armament: Ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,013.

SEYDLITZ.—Battle cruiser, launched at Hamburg 1912, completed 1913. Displacement, 24,640 tons; length, 656 ft.; beam, 93½ ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 65,000; speed, 26.2 knots (best recent speed, 29 knots). Armament: ten 11-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. Complement, 1,108.

DERFFLINGER.—Battle cruiser, launched at Hamburg 1913. Displacement, 28,000 tons; length, 700 ft.; beam, 96 ft.; draught, 27 ft.; i.h.p., 100,000; speed, 27 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch, twelve 5.9-inch, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, and four torpedo tubes. All the turrets of the Derfflinger are stated to be in the centre line, and not superimposed; otherwise the vessel has much the same outline as the Seydlitz.

When the enemy ships were first seen they were steering north-west, but they quickly changed their course to south-east. The British battle cruisers, working up to their full speed, steered to the southward. At 7.30 they sighted the enemy on the port bow about 14 miles distant and steaming fast, and as the prompt reports they had received had enabled them to attain a position on the enemy's quarter, they altered their course to south-east parallel with that of their quarry, and settled down to a long stern chase. The speed was gradually increased to 28.5 knots, and thanks to the efforts of the engineer staffs of the New



INTERIOR OF A GERMAN SUBMARINE.

The Commander looking through a periscope.

Zealand and Indomitable, those two ships were able to attain a speed greatly in excess of their normal. The result was that the squadron gradually closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship (the Blücher) of the enemy, who were in single line-ahead, with their light cruisers ahead and a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam. The first shot was fired by the Lion at 8.52, but fell short, and from that time single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, until at 9.9 the Lion hit the Blücher for the first time. At 8.20 the Tiger, which was following the Lion, had drawn up sufficiently to be able to open fire on the Blücher, and the Lion now turned her attention to the third ship in the German line, which was hit by several salvos at 18,000 yards. The Princess Royal, in turn getting within range, opened fire on the Blücher, and as this latter ship now began to drop astern somewhat, she became exposed to the guns of the New Zealand, the Princess Royal then shifting her fire to the third ship in the German line and inflicting considerable damage on her. During these operations the British flotilla cruisers and destroyers gradually dropped back from a position broad on the beam of the battle cruisers to the port quarter, so that their smoke might not foul the range, but as the enemy destroyers threatened attack, the Meteor and M destroyer division passed ahead, skilfully handled by Captain the Hon. H. Meade.



GROUP OF GERMAN SAILORS RESCUED FROM THE "BLÜCHER."

About 9.45 the *Lion* was engaging the leading German ship, which was on fire; the *Tiger* had first fired at the same ship, but, when smoke interfered, at the *Blücher*; the *Princess Royal* was engaged with the third German ship, which also was on fire, while the *Blücher*, already showing signs of having suffered severely, was also the mark of the *New Zealand*. The enemy's destroyers were now emitting vast quantities of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, which appeared to alter their course to the northward, with the object of increasing their distance; the rear ships, according to Sir David Beatty's dispatch, certainly hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, and thus increased their distance from the British line. To meet this manoeuvre our battle cruisers were ordered to form a line bearing north-north-west and to proceed at their utmost speed. The German destroyers then giving evidence of an attempted attack, the *Lion* and *Tiger* opened fire on them, causing them to retire and resume their original course. The light cruisers, maintaining their position on the port quarter of the enemy line, were able to observe and keep touch, or to attack any vessel that fell out of line.

The *Blücher*, which by this time had dropped considerably astern of her companions, was seen to be on fire, to have a heavy list, and to be

apparently in a defeated condition. As she hauled out to port and steered north the *Indomitable* was ordered to break to the north and attack. A few minutes later submarines were reported near the line, and Admiral Beatty, who himself saw the wash of a periscope two points on the starboard bow, at once turned to port. Then the *Lion* suffered an injury which at three minutes past 11 was reported as being incapable of immediate repair, and, in consequence, her course was shaped north-west. Admiral Beatty also found it necessary to transfer his flag to another vessel; accordingly, at 11.20, he called the torpedo boat destroyer *Attack* alongside, and shifting his flag to her at about 11.35, proceeded at full speed to rejoin the squadron. He met them at noon retiring north-north-west.

Boarding the *Princess Royal* at about 12.20 p.m., he learnt from her captain what had happened in his absence since the *Lion* fell out of the line. The *Blücher* had been sunk, and on the vessels that went to rescue her survivors (of whom about 250 were saved) a Zeppelin and a sea-plane endeavoured to drop bombs. The three German battle cruisers had continued their course eastward, in a considerably damaged condition, the *Derfflinger* and the *Seydlitz*, it is believed, suffering in particular.

Undoubtedly, as Sir David Beatty remarked in his preliminary report, the *Lion's* mishap deprived our ships of a greater victory than that which they actually put to their credit.

It cannot be said that our success was dearly bought. None of our ships was lost. The *Lion* and the *Tiger* were both hit, but although the former had to be towed to port by the *Indomitable*, the material injury to both ships was only such as could be repaired in a comparatively short time. No member of the *Lion's* crew was killed, but 21 were wounded; on the *Tiger* one officer, Engineer-Commander Charles G. Taylor, and nine men were killed, and three officers and eight men were injured. On the destroyer *Meteor*, which also was disabled, three men were killed and two wounded, one of whom died.

Referring to the action in the House of Commons in February, Mr. Churchill said:

The action was not forced, because the enemy, after abandoning their wounded consort, the *Blücher*, made good their escape into waters infested by their submarines and mines. But this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival systems of design and armament and upon relative gunnery efficiency. It is the first test we have ever had, and without depending too much upon it I think it is at once important and encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the theories of design, and particularly of big-gun armament, always identified with Lord Fisher. The range of the British guns was found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting-smashing power of the heavier British projectile is

decidedly greater, and—this is the great thing—our shooting is at least as good as theirs. The Navy, while always working very hard—no one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these years—have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a feeling after the combat of January 24 that perhaps our naval officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill in gunnery.

Then the guns. While the Germans were building 11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13½-inch guns. Before they advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed with the 13·5. It was said by the opposite school of naval force that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and therefore the greater destructive power. Krupp is the master gunmaker in the world, and it was very right and proper to take such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material.

In Germany the action caused a disappointment even disproportionate to its real naval importance. For some weeks the Press Bureau of the German Admiralty noisily claimed that, at any rate, one British battle cruiser—to say nothing of two or more destroyers—had been sunk. In reality it was seen that, for the time at any rate, even brief and occasional excursions to British waters must be abandoned. It was no longer possible to pretend that the raids on Yarmouth and on Scarborough and the Hartlepoons had been the prelude to greater things. Such enterprises, even while the German cruiser squadron was intact, involved great risk and little profit. Faced by a strength



FUNERAL OF CAPTAIN ERDMANN OF THE "BLÜCHER."



PAY DAY ON BOARD A MAN-OF-WAR.

of even five to four in representative ships a German raiding force could not but retire, and in all the circumstances of January 24—they would have been even less favourable if the squadron had advanced further—the Germans might think themselves fortunate to have escaped with no greater losses.

The German naval authorities now reconsidered the whole situation. They decided, as we shall see in another chapter, to abandon a few more of the rules of civilized warfare, and to threaten British and neutral commerce with indiscriminate extermination by submarines and mines.



CHAPTER LIV.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AND THE BELGIAN BATTLE OF THE YSER.

GENERAL VON MOLTKE SUPERSEDED BY GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN—THE NEW PLAN OF THE KAISER—ADVANCE ON CALAIS—POSITION OF THE ALLIED TROOPS ON OCTOBER 16—RETREAT OF FRENCH MARINES FROM GHENT TO THE YSER—THE BATTLE OF THE YSER BEGINS—INTERVENTION OF BRITISH FLOTILLA—RONARC'H'S DEFENCE OF DIXMUDE—THE GERMANS FORCE THE YSER AT TERVAETE—ARRIVAL OF FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS—CONSIDERATIONS ON THE FIGHTING.

DURING 1914 the greatest and most decisive battles in the Western Theatre of War were those of the Marne and Ypres, of which the former has been described in Vol. II., Chapter XXXII.

Under the title of Battle of Ypres are included the fighting from October 16 onwards between the sea at Nieupoort-Bains and Dixmude, popularly known as the Battle of the Yser, and the struggle which commenced on October 19 from Dixmude through Ypres to Armentières on the Lys, and thence to La Bassée.

The Battle of the Yser may be considered in two parts. In the first the Belgians, with the aid of a brigade of French Marines under Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h, defended the lower course of the Yser and its canal from October 16 to 23. In the second, the bulk of the wearied but dauntless soldiers of King Albert were withdrawn and their places taken by a portion of the Army of General d'Urbal.

It was not till November 17 that the Battle of Ypres came to an end.

The Battle of the Marne lasted a week; the Battle of Ypres a month. The credit for the former victory rests with the French, though the British Army rendered them most valuable assistance. The Battle of Ypres, on the other hand, was won by the united efforts of the British, French, and Belgians, and each of the Allied nations may look back on it with the proudest feelings. It was—so Joffre is reported to have said—"the greatest battle of the world."

During the month of October the Emperor William himself appeared on the western front to supervise the operations, and on the 25th it was announced that the Chief of the General Staff, General von Moltke, had fallen ill, and that the Prussian Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, had taken over his duties. It soon appeared that Moltke had in reality been superseded, and it was clear that sharp differences of opinion had arisen about the plan of campaign. Moltke, it seemed, had insisted that the first and main strategic object should be to break the Allies' lines at Verdun, while the



THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAVARIA,
Reviewing Troops.

Kaiser, unable to reach Paris, was obsessed with the desire to gain possession of the Channel coast for the better prosecution of the war against England. Moltke disappeared, and until December, when he was definitely appointed Chief of the Staff, Falkenhayn

nominally united the posts of Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff. Falkenhayn was fifty-three years old, and had only been in office about a year. He had at one time been Chief of the General Staff of the 16th Army Corps at Metz, but he was best known for his work in China on the staff of Count Waldersee, in the expedition of 1900, when the German troops had been bidden by the Kaiser to emulate the Huns of Attila.

The strategy now adopted by the Kaiser and Falkenhayn has been severely and justly criticized. They struck simultaneously at Warsaw and Calais, and found that in neither theatre were they strong enough to achieve the desired success. Pitilessly, but in vain, they sacrificed troops of all sorts, including large numbers of old men and young boys who had volunteered for service at the outbreak of war. Although the success of the enterprise would undoubtedly have produced enormous results, its initiation must be ascribed largely to political rather than military considerations. It was necessary to appease the Emperor's own impatience, but it was no less necessary to provide the German people with some fresh promise of dazzling success.

The preparations for ensuring success at the outset of the war, to impress the world with Germany's might, had been enormous and made regardless of expense. Though the German infantry tactics were obsolete, the German



From a Sketch by John S. Sargent, R.A

BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOWKE, C.B.,
Chief Engineer British Expeditionary Force.

military machine was, on the whole, the most perfect that had ever been constructed. Men with the brains of captains of industry had toiled unremittingly to provide the German Army with every advantage that foresight and experience could suggest—from the gigantic howitzers which were to batter down the permanent fortifications of Belgium and France to the stick of liquorice which the sentry was to suck lest by a cough he should betray his presence to the enemy. The countries to be invaded had been examined with meticulous accuracy. They were honeycombed with spies and traitors of both sexes, in all ranks of Society. Innumerable wireless installations and telephones had in peace-time been hidden on foreign soil to signal to the Germans the movements of their potential enemies. Soldiers had been even trained to utilize the arms of windmills for the purpose of conveying information. The innumerable disguises—British, Belgian, French, Russian uniforms, women's dresses, priests' robes—in which the German soldiers often presented themselves during the War, show how thoroughly detail had been worked out.

And now—in October, 1914—what must have been the thoughts and sensations of those who had brought on this war? They had intoxicated the German people, and its enthusiasm, if not "irresistible," had been tremend-



MAJOR-GEN. SIR THOMPSON CAPPER.

ous. Treaties to which the Prussian Government had been a party had been torn up; the rules of International Law treated as schoolmasters might treat the resolutions of a group of children. The horrors of the French Revolution had been renewed by the Armies of the Sovereign who had up to August, 1914, posed as



GERMAN PRISONERS AT FURNES.



[Photo S. M.A.]

GENERALS JOFFRE, FOCH AND D'URBAL (from left to right) REVIEWING TROOPS.

the guardian of European Law and Order. "When we left Belgium," wrote a Saxon officer in his diary, under August 26, "we left all the villages in flames. It is," he added, "like the Thirty Years' War—murder and fire everywhere."

An airman who flew over the German lines at Charleroi during August said that the Germans "covered the plains like a moving sea." This sea of human beings—murdering, burning, burgling, raping—had flowed on towards Paris. "The measures," so the German General Staff had instructed the German soldiers, "which can be taken by one State against another in order to obtain the object of the War, to compel one's opponent to submit to one's will, may be summarised in the two ideas of Violence and Cunning." *

And now it was that the eyes of the Kaiser began to be opened to the real proportion of the task he had undertaken. Despite the barbarous example made of Louvain, the easy-going Belgians (as they had been surmised to be before the War), had continued their heroic resistance. The British "rifle club"—to use a Prussian expression for the British Army—had taken a terrible toll of Kluck's masses. They had pursued it with slackening zeal as they began to discover the prowess of the British soldier. Inspired by the cool and resolute Joffre, the Armies of France had refused to know when they were beaten, Verdun had remained untaken, and the Germans under the Kaiser's eyes had failed to penetrate through the gap of Nancy. The desperate effort to pierce the French centre beyond the Marne had been foiled by Foch; Manoury's stroke at Kluck's communications had forced the invaders to retire behind the Aisne. There they had held their own and battered Reims Cathedral.

Meanwhile East Prussia had been invaded by the Russians and, though Hindenburg in the district of the Masurian Lakes had inflicted on them a serious defeat, no further successes had been gained by him or his Austrian colleagues in the Eastern Theatre of War.

Far from it. The Russians in engagement after engagement had crushed the Austrians, overrun Galicia, captured Lemberg, invested Przemysl, and approached Cracow. Their advance guards were on the Carpathians. If they crossed them they would harry Hungary; if, masking Cracow, they entered Silesia they



CONVENT OF THE LITTLE SISTERS
OF THE POOR AT NIEUPORT,
Damaged by a German Shell.

would be in the midst of one of the two most important industrial districts of Germany.

Not even from the Serbian frontier had come good news. The mountaineers had repulsed the Austrian so-called punitive expedition with heavy loss. Turkey had not yet decided to throw in her lot with the Dual Alliance, and each day the anti-German feeling in Italy and Roumania was rising.

If the War Lord turned his eyes to the sea the outlook was still more unfavourable. The "Admiral of the Atlantic" saw the magnificent commercial fleet of Germany hiding, interned, sunk, or captured. The Emden and a few cruisers were still at large, but most of the German War Fleet was lurking in the Kiel Canal or under cover of the coast fortresses. It had not even obtained complete command of the Baltic! To all intents and purposes, the British and French Navies were ruling the German Ocean, the Channel, and the Mediterranean. As a consequence the businesses of Germany and Austria-Hungary began to suffer from a creeping paralysis. Cotton, the basis of

* "The German War Book," p. 64.



BELGIAN TROOPS LANDING AT OSTEND.

all modern explosives, without which the only useful propellant could not be manufactured, and copper, which was necessary for the driving bands of shells—to make them take the rifling—were daily becoming scarcer.

Beyond the sea the German Colonies one by one were falling into the hands of the Allies. The Japanese had closed in on Tsing-Tau, and its capture could not long be delayed. The United States had been shocked by the Belgian atrocities, and the Kaiser's old friend, the ex-President Roosevelt, had denounced the authors of them in no measured language. India, loyal from Cape Comorin to Peshawur, was sending a contingent of warlike troops to the theatre of war; her Princes were vying with one another in placing their persons and their wealth at the disposal of the Empire. Egypt, far from throwing off the British yoke, was preparing to resist invasion, and in a brief two months Abbas was a refugee in Constantinople, and his uncle ruled in his place independently, and no longer the feudatory of the Caliph. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were sending their stalwart youths to the front. In a few months army after army would be pouring across the Channel to join Sir John French's, General Joffre's and King Albert's forces. Luxemburg, nine-tenths of Belgium, with Liège, Brussels, Antwerp, Ostend and a considerable tract of France were, it is true, in the

possession of the Germans, but how long would it be before the Germans and Austrians would be overwhelmed by numbers in both theatres of war? But there was no going back.

At this critical moment the Kaiser may have remembered the words of M. de Faramond, the French Naval Attaché at Berlin in 1913, "the German soldier is no longer naturally what he had been 40 years ago—a simple, religious man, ready to die at the order of his King." Death he was still ready to meet, but chiefly for hope of the gain to be expected from victory.

The modern Moltke, animated by the spirit of his illustrious uncle, might point out that military considerations required that the main effort of the Germans should be directed by Verdun; political exigencies demanded something more spectacular. While Hindenburg was to capture Warsaw, the Kaiser himself would clear Belgium of the Allies and annex it, capture Calais, and thence strike both at England and at Paris.

Accordingly, from the beginning of October corps after corps was brought into the space between the Lys and the sea until fifteen were assembled, grouped in two armies, and with them four corps of cavalry. The army nearer the coast was under the Duke of Wurtemberg, the other being commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. The whole formed a force equal

to, if not greater than, the host which Napoleon led across the Niemen into Russia in 1812.

Such were the conditions when the Battles of the Yser and Ypres commenced.

As an example of the sort of hopes which were filling the German mind we will quote an article written towards the end of October in the *Sächsischer Staats-Anzeiger* by General Baron von Ardenne :

If the English watch on our naval position Borkum-Wilhelmshaven-Heligoland-Brunsbüttel is almost impossible in the present circumstances—up to now it has not been at all successful—it will become quite impossible when Belgium and the north coast of France to the mouth of the Seine are in German hands.

The somewhat improbable report that the French have retreated from Boulogne opens up a wide view over Germany's future position in the fight. In the course of time we shall be in possession of Calais, probably also of Dieppe and Havre. At Calais the Channel narrows down to a width of 35-40 kilometres (22-25 miles). Our 30.5 (12 in.) howitzers have a range of 14 miles (height of such a shot 4,370 yards). The range of our 42 cm. (17 in.) howitzers is still greater. England can expect still further artillery surprises.

Even if we cannot shoot from the French coast to the English, a safety zone can be made for German ships which will cover more than half the navigable water. In the French harbours bases can be had for torpedo-boats and submarines, cruisers, scouts, etc., and—last but not least—bases for our Zeppelins. These bases on the French coast can be made absolutely impregnable from the sea by double or triple rows of mines, especially anchored mines. To anchor mines in these waters is comparatively easy.

That this will be no joke for the British Isles can easily be seen from the fact that England is, so far as its food is concerned, dependent chiefly on foreign

countries. Any disturbance in its supplies would be badly felt. Even now our commerce-destroyers and the sinking of ships carrying contraband, including food, are proving a thorn in Great Britain's side. When private property is no longer safe at sea there will be a severe collapse in the import of foodstuffs.

In spite of all England's mine-laying, in spite of her great Fleet, she is always afraid of a German force landing in the United Kingdom. When the French north coast is in our hands, such an invasion—which is now considered a foolish romance—will be easily possible, especially when England continues to send troops away from the island.*

To stimulate the enthusiasm and patriotism of the German masses the most extravagant rumours were circulated by the Imperial Government. For instance, some days before the appearance of Ardenne's article there was published in a Hamburg paper what purported to be a "Stockholm telegram." It was headed "The German Sword of Damocles over England" :

For nearly a week past enormous fleets of transports have formed almost a connected bridge over the Channel between Ramsgate, Dover and Folkestone on the English coast, and Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne on the French coast. The English Press declares that this is for Great Britain a fight for life or death.

* The *Hamburger Nachrichten*, on January 31, 1915, published a communication from Berlin which, among other things, stated that "an expression of expert opinion had been recently made regarding the range of German naval and coast guns, the chief point of which lies in the assertion that from Calais the harbour defences of Dover and the country to the North of Dover could be bombarded over a front of five and a half miles."



BELGIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH.



THE WAR-WORN KAISER.

But, extravagant as may have been the ideas of the Germans on the value to Germany of the coast line from Ostend to the Seine, it must be admitted that if their troops could have seized Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Etaples, the mouth of the Somme, Dieppe and Havre, the chances of Germany succeeding in her scheme for the domination of the world would have been enormously increased. The chief naval bases of the British fleet were within reach of Calais and Boulogne, and once these won and used as German submarine and airship bases, the main communications of the fleets guarding the east coast of England and Scotland would have been endangered. Harwich, Chatham, Dover and Portsmouth would certainly have been bombarded by aircraft, and the nerves of the vast population of London would have been constantly shaken by the visits of Taubes and Zeppelins, for the distance between Calais and the capital of the British Empire is under a hundred miles, little more than two hours' journey. There would have been more than a possibility that German aviators from Calais or Boulogne might have caused sensational, if

not important, damage to London. Raids by sea on the coasts of Essex, Kent, and Sussex would, too, have been hazarded by men, careless of the lives of their troops, to strike terror into the British nation.

If, in addition, the Germans had repeated their success of August and had forced their way down to Amiens, the communications of the British troops in France would once more have had to be shifted to St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire. Maud'huy's Army would, it is likely, have had to evacuate Arras and join Castelnau's in the plain between the Somme and the Oise. The prestige of the German arms, impaired at the Battle of the Marne and not improved by the Battles of the Aisne, Roye-Péronne and Arras, would have been rehabilitated.

The Battles of the Yser and Ypres brought all these by no means visionary plans to an untimely ending.

The forces dispatched by the Kaiser to follow the Belgian Army, Rawlinson's Corps, and Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h's Marines, retiring from Antwerp or Ghent towards the Franco-Belgian frontier, necessarily collided with them and the other Allied troops moving forward to the north of the Lys. These comprised General Bidon's two Territorial Infantry Divisions (the 87th and 89th), De Mitry's four Cavalry Divisions, the British Cavalry Corps, and the III. Corps.

Thus two long lines of men in mutual hostility were advancing towards one another, each endeavouring to act on and against his adversary's outer wing.

A brief account of the events immediately preceding October 16 is needed to make the situation clear to the reader.

On September 20 Joffre had commenced his turning movement between the English Channel and the Scheldt against the German communications. The enemy, after investing Antwerp, had replied by a counter-movement on Lille and Ypres, thus threatening Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. To ward off the German offensive Lord Kitchener had dispatched British Marines under General Paris and the 3rd Cavalry and the 7th Infantry Divisions under Sir Henry Rawlinson to Ostend and Zeebrugge.*

* The 7th Infantry Division, under Major-General Sir T. Capper, C.B., D.S.O., was constituted as follows:
20th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. J. Ruggles-Brise, M.V.O.):

The 7th Division was outside the six regular Divisions which formed the Expeditionary Force. It had been stated some years previously in the House of Commons that it was intended to complete that Force by bringing home various units from foreign stations, and this was actually done. The 20th Brigade was, however, made up of battalions on home service, except the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, who came from Cairo. In the 21st Brigade two

- 1st Grenadier Guards.
 2nd Scots Guards.
 2nd Border Regiment.
 2nd Gordon Highlanders.
 21st *Infantry Brigade* (Brigadier-General H. E. Watts, C.B.):
 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment.
 2nd Yorks Regiment.
 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers.
 2nd Wiltshire Regiment.
 22nd *Infantry Brigade* (Brigadier-General S. T. B. Lawford):
 2nd Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment.
 2nd Royal Warwick Regiment.
 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
 1st South Staffordshire Regiment.
 Northumberland Hussars Yeomanry.

This appears to have been the first of the non-regular regiments to take the field.

- The Cyclist Corps.
 14th Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.
 22nd Brigade Royal Field Artillery.
 35th Brigade Royal Field Artillery.
 3rd Brigade (Heavy) Royal Garrison Artillery.
 111th Brigade Royal Garrison Artillery.
 112th Brigade Royal Garrison Artillery.
 A pom-pom detachment.
 7th Divisional Ammunition Column.



GURKHAS SHARPENING THEIR KNIVES.

battalions were drawn from Gibraltar, one from the Transvaal, the fourth from Guernsey. The 22nd Brigade had two battalions from the Transvaal and two from Malta. The Artillery was made up from various sources, home and foreign.



BRITISH INFANTRY ENTRENCHING.



A FRENCH MACHINE GUN SECTION IN ACTION.

The Marines had assisted in the defence of Antwerp, but, owing to the delay in sweeping the mines which the Germans had managed to lay in front of Ostend, Sir Henry Rawlinson could not operate boldly against the enemy, but was obliged to confine himself to the minor alternative of protecting, with the French Marines of Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h, the retreat of the Belgian Army and British Marines.

Antwerp had succumbed on October 9, but, shortly before, the bulk of the Belgian Army had retired, and from this date Rawlinson and Ronarc'h were able to cover the further withdrawal of these troops to a position on and behind the banks of the canalised Yser between Dixmude and the sea at Nieupoort-Bains.

Ghent, Bruges, Ostend were lost in succession, and the Belgian coast from Ostend to the Dutch frontier fell into the hands of the foe. Already, on October 15, the advance guard of the German III. Corps was moving through Ostend on Nieupoort and Dixmude.

In the meantime, on the night of the 11th-12th, Ghent was being evacuated by part of the 7th Division (Capper's) and Ronarc'h's Marines. The Marines led the way. To encourage their men the officers left their motor-cars and marched on foot. The moon was shining and the air chilly. At daybreak they reached Aeltre, where they halted for refreshment. At 4 p.m. the column touched Thielt, which was entered by Capper's troops

two hours later. Hot-foot behind them pressed some 50,000 Germans, but the night was passed without the enemy disturbing the French or British. A village Mayor had at the cost of his life put the enemy on a false scent. The next morning (the 13th) a Taube, whose observer was doubtless trying to locate the column of which the pursuers had lost contact, was shot down by the British. At 3 p.m. the Marines reached Thourout.

The 7th Division, which had been preceded the day before by Byng's Cavalry Division, marched on Roulers.

An extract from the official diary kept by Byng's Cavalry Division and another from Mr. C. Underwood's narrative published in *Blackwood's Magazine* for March, 1915, bring clearly before us the movements of the Cavalry and Capper's Divisions. Mr. Underwood was an Interpreter appointed to the Headquarters Staff of the 21st Brigade. The diary below should be read in connexion with the map on pp. 180-1:—

October 6.—After mobilizing at Ludgershall Camp the Division was railed to Southampton, and sailed on October 6 for Ostend and Zeebrugge, where it disembarked early on the 8th, and came under the orders of the IV. Corps.

October 9.—On the 9th the Division concentrated at Bruges, marching from there to Thourout (6th Cavalry Brigade) and Ruddervoorde (7th Cavalry Brigade) on the following day.

October 11.—On the 11th Divisional Headquarters, which had stayed in Oostcamp on the previous night, moved to Thourout. The armoured motors, which had

joined the Division on the previous day, succeeded in drawing first blood, capturing two officers and five men in the direction of Ypres.

October 12.—On the 12th headquarters moved to Roulers, the 6th Cavalry Brigade to the line Oostnieuwkerke-Roulers, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade to Rumbeke-Iseghem.

October 13.—The enemy were reported to have fought an action near Hazebrouck and to be retiring towards Bailleul, and our 2nd Cavalry Division to have captured a place some 10 miles south-west of Ypres. Accordingly on the 13th the Division reconnoitred towards Ypres and Menin with patrols towards Comines and Wervicq, but no signs of the enemy were found, and after a long day, during which many of the troops must have done at least 50 miles, the Division withdrew to the line Dadizeele-Iseghem, the 7th Infantry Division having in the meantime moved to Roulers.

October 14.—Considerable hostile forces, believed to be in the XII. Corps, were reported to be moving from the vicinity of Bailleul towards Wervicq and Menin. In consequence of this the Division, followed by the 7th Infantry Division, was ordered to move on Ypres and to reconnoitre to the south-west. This necessitated a very early start. The Division reached Ypres at 9 a.m., and the 6th Cavalry Brigade, which formed the advanced guard, moved on toward the line La Clytte-Lindenhook. Shortly after leaving Ypres this brigade, assisted by rifle and revolver fire from everybody in Ypres, succeeded in bringing down a Taube aeroplane. Its pilot and observer escaped into some woods, but were captured later on in the day. The advance guard, assisted by the armed motors, pushed on towards Neuve Eglise and succeeded in killing or capturing a considerable number of the enemy during the day, but no formed bodies were met with, though heavy firing was heard from the direction of Bailleul. At dusk the Division moved into billets at Kemmel (7th Cavalry Brigade) and Wytshaete (remainder of the Division) in touch with the 2nd Cavalry Division, with whom communication had been established during the day.

October 16.—No movement took place on the 15th, but on the following day the Division, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade as advance guard, moved *via* Ypres and Wieltje to the line Bixchoote-Poelcapelle. The enemy were reported in considerable numbers in the Forêt d'Houthulst and Oostnieuwkerke, and a patrol of the 2nd Life Guards was obliged to withdraw from Staden. Intermittent fighting took place during the afternoon, and at dusk French troops, having relieved the 7th Cavalry Brigade, the Division moved into billets at Passchendaele (7th Cavalry Brigade), Nieuwemolen (6th Cavalry Brigade), and Zonnebeke (Divisional



ROYAL ENGINEER LAYING TELEPHONE CABLE.

Troops). The 7th Cavalry Brigade are known to have accounted for some 10 or 12 killed during the day, and it is probable that considerably more were wounded.

By the evening of the 16th Byng's Cavalry was disposed from Passchendaele through Nieuwemolen to Zonnebeke. From Zonnebeke to Gheluvelt and from Gheluvelt to



FRENCH INFANTRY RUSHING FORWARD TO SUPPORT THE FIRING LINE.



ON THE DUNES.
Belgian Cavalry.

Zandvoorde extended Capper's Infantry Division, behind which were the woods to the east of Ypres. Mr. Underwood, who incidentally bears witness to the disgraceful conduct of the Germans in Ypres when it was temporarily in their possession, provides us with a glimpse of part of the complicated operation which was involved in the withdrawal of Capper's Division to the neighbourhood of that city :

Next morning, the 13th, it was reported that a Taube had been shot down at Divisional Headquarters at Thielt. I saw the French Marines arrive on their retreat from Ghent, after which we left for Roulers, where the Divisional Headquarters were moving. It rained hard all the way, and we arrived and were billeted at 17 Rue du Nord, making this our headquarters for the night, Mr. Louis Masclis, a large corn merchant, being our host, who received us most cordially.

We left for Ypres at 9.30 a.m., and four Taubes flew over us on the road, but too high to be shot at. We arrived at Ypres at 6.30, and Headquarters were on the Railway Square. That evening I met Capitaine Bernaud, of the 79th Reserve Regiment, and saw our first lot of Allies, reserve dragoons, dismounted on the Square to receive us. The Germans had been through and stayed one night, the 7th, the day we landed at Zeebrugge. They had taken up their quarters in the famous riding school, and the first thing they had done was to break open the mess-room and cellars and take out all the wine, after which they broke up everything and stole the mess-plate. When I saw it a week later, the school *manèges* were strewn with broken bottles, champagne, claret, port, etc., and every drawer and cupboard door burst open and ransacked. They had cut all communications at the station, demanded an indemnity of 65,000 francs (£2,600), and stolen all the money they could lay hands on from the Banque Nationale. 6,000 loaves were requisitioned in the evening to be ready next morning, failing which there was a penalty of £800 (20,000 francs).

At 10.30 a.m. a Taube, with pilot and observer, had been brought down, but they were not captured until 4.30, as they concealed themselves in a wood. They were both brought in, furious with rage, as each was seized by the collar and a revolver pointed at their heads by Belgian officers in the car, which was driven at the rate of 60 miles an hour at least !

Next day the whole brigade marched out to Halte, on the Menin-Ypres road, dug trenches, and remained in them all night. The Headquarters of the brigade I billeted in the Secretary of Ypres' Château, not 500 yards away.

In the morning I had a good deal of trouble to requisition oats, as it was pitch dark when we were ordered to advance to attack patrol of Germans towards Menin. About a quarter mile beyond Gheluveld we engaged advance patrol of Uhlans at 8.30 a.m. in a thick fog.

Mr. Underwood on the 13th had seen Ronarc'h's Marines passing through Thielt on Thourout.

King Albert's idea was to fight a delaying action on a front roughly coinciding with the line Menin-Roulers-Thourout-Ghistelles, while the Belgian munitions and baggage were being withdrawn from Ostend and Bruges.* The village of Ghistelles lies on the main road from Bruges to Nieuport and on the railroad from Thourout to Ostend. In this scheme Ronarc'h's Marines were to occupy a position behind Thourout, resting on the Bois de Wijnendaale to the north and Cortemarek station to the

* See the first of the articles on Ronarc'h's movements, by M. Charles Le Goffic in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for March 1st, 1915. M. Le Goffic's articles should be carefully studied by all who are interested in the minute details of the Battle of the Yser.

south. At Cortemarck converge railways from Dunkirk and Ypres.

Soaked to the skin by the pouring rain and pursued by overwhelming masses of Germans, the French Marines left Thourout on the 14th to fill their place in the line of battle, but at midnight the Admiral received an order to continue his retreat to the region of Dixmude. From Menin to Ghisteltes is a distance of nearly thirty miles, and on the night of the 14th, when the Germans were in Bruges and approaching Ostend, the forces at the disposal of King Albert were too feeble to hold so extended a front. The marshes round Ghisteltes could be turned from Ostend, and, as the Germans held some of the bridges across the Lys west of Menin, the right wing of King Albert, even allowing for the assistance which might be rendered it by the British Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps, would also be in imminent danger. It was resolved to bring the whole of the Belgian Army to the Yser and to leave General d'Urbal with such portions of the 8th French Army as were on the spot and the British Commander-in-Chief with Rawlinson's Corps, the Cavalry Corps, and the III. Corps to fill the space between the Yser at Dixmude and the Lys. At 4 a.m., under heavy rain, the French Marines, with their rear protected by some Belgian Artillery, set out for Zarren and Wercken on the road to Dixmude.

The route was encumbered by refugees. They fell aside to permit the passage of the column. As day dawned, groups of these poor



SHELTER FROM THE RAIN AND FIRE.

wretches could be seen gazing with lack-lustre eyes at the retreating defenders of their unhappy country.

Leaving Ronare'h on the 15th approaching



THE OBSERVATION BALLOON.

Used for watching the effect of the British naval guns against the German trenches.



BRITISH MONITOR LEAVING A FRENCH PORT.

Dixmude, let us see what had been happening in the meanwhile in the district between Dixmude and La Bassée.

South-west of Dixmude the Yser is joined by a canal from Ypres, and from Ypres another canal runs into the Lys at Comines. On the 12th, when the vanguard of the Belgian Army reached Furnes—nine miles west of Nieuport by the road to Dunkirk—and when Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops had proceeded from Bruges and Ghent to the neighbourhood of Roulers—thirteen miles north-east of Ypres—a considerable body of German troops was located west of the line Comines-Ypres. Its right rested on the high ridge, eleven miles long, to the south-west of Ypres; its left was on the Lys at Estaires.

From the Lys southward to the Aire-Béthune-La Bassée-Lille Canal another force of Germans was entrenched. The left of this force joined the host opposing General de Maud'huy, whose army was disposed from Béthune through Arras to Albert on the Ancre, where it made contact with General de Castelnau's army operating between the Somme and the Oise.

If the Germans could have maintained themselves on the ridge south-west of Ypres and between that ridge and the Lys, they would soon have been reinforced by portions of the army which had captured Antwerp and by the corps which were about to enter Lille. From the line Mont-des-Cats-Meteren-Estaires they

might have pushed their way between the Yser and the Lys on Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, isolated the Belgians on the Yser, and menaced the left wing of Maud'huy's army.

Fortunately, as was narrated in Chapter XLVIII., the right of the German position north of the Lys was on October 13 turned by Byng's Division from Roulers and by General d'Urbal from Dunkirk, and was at the same time attacked by the British Cavalry Corps; while the III. Corps from Hazebrouck moved against its centre and left. Moreover, between the Lys and the Aire-Béthune-La Bassée-Lille Canal, the Germans were thrust back by General Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the II. Corps. As Lille was surrendering, the French from Dunkirk entered Ypres, the British Cavalry Corps captured Mont-des-Cats, the western end of the ridge, and the III. Corps took Meteren, south of the ridge. Sir Henry Rawlinson's Cavalry (Byng's Division) pushed patrols towards Comines, and on the next day (October 14) passed through Ypres and occupied Kemmel and Wytshaete at the eastern end of the ridge, from the remainder of which the Germans were dislodged by the Cavalry Corps. The same day Messines, south of Wytshaete, was taken and the III. Corps entered Bailleul. On the 15th, the day when the Germans seized Ostend, Sir John French directed the Cavalry Corps and the III. Corps to the Lys, and the line of that river from Aire to Armentières and

the north bank to a point five miles below Armentières were by sunset in the possession of the Allies.

On the 16th the Germans evacuated Armentières, and on the same date, while the British and French north and south of the Lys were still continuing their offensive, the Germans attacked Dixmude and the Battle of the Yser began.

The left wing of the Allies now stretched from Compiègne through Albert, Arras, Béthune, Armentières, Ypres, Dixmude to the coast at Nieuport-Bains. As the Allies possessed the command of the sea the Germans could no longer indulge in their favourite manœuvre of outflanking their enemy, and during the next month they were obliged to confine their efforts against the Allied line between the points Nieuport and Béthune, or between Béthune and Compiègne.

The district in which the Battles of the Yser and Ypres took place has been already described in broad outline. Between the Lys and the Scheldt the country is mostly industrial and agricultural, between the Lys and the sea agricultural and pastoral. Looking eastward from the Montagne de Kemmel (512 ft. high) on the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, to the right

are seen in the distance the tall chimneys and factory buildings of Lille, south of the Lys. On the Lille side of the Lys the land is a flat, and in rainy weather, water-logged plain sloping gradually upwards to the low ridge on which are the villages of Givenchy, Aubers, Fromelles, and Radinghem. Close to Givenchy, which is two miles west of La Bassée, huge slag heaps rise black against the sky. Radinghem is five miles or so due west of Lille and the same distance due south of Armentières. The La Bassée-Lille Canal is beyond the ridge.

Twenty miles away, in front of Kemmel, is Courtrai on the Lys, and, to its north, Roulers. South of the railway from Roulers to Ypres a wide belt of woods extends from Wytschaete to Zonnebeke. In the plain below to the left are seen, a little to the east, the towers and roofs of Ypres, once the capital of Western Flanders. Six miles to the north of Ypres and four miles east of the canal from Ypres to the Yser begins the forest of Houthulst.

Far off the Yser winds through Dixmude to the sea, and twenty miles due west of Dixmude, sixteen south-west of Nieuport-Bains, is Dunkirk.

Apart from the innumerable windmills and the poplar-lined roads, the landscape north of



WHEAT SEIZED BY THE GERMANS.



A BRITISH LOOK-OUT POST.

the Lys as far as the region of Dixmude has the aspect of the flat part of Essex. The ground is, however, broken and rolling and there are several slight elevations, for example the hill at Hooglede, north-west of Roulers.

Round Dixmude commence the fen lands of Western Flanders, a network of dykes and ditches, few of which could be passed without bridging material.

From the sea to Dixmude as the crow flies is some ten miles; from Dixmude to Ypres thirteen; from Ypres to Armentières twelve; and from the Lys at Armentières to Béthune fifteen miles—making a total of about fifty miles. But the actual length held by the Allied troops on October 16 measured nearly sixty miles, as it followed the northern bank of the winding Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude, and from this town round the eastern edge of the forest of Houthulst. From Nieuport to Dixmude the line was held by the Belgians, aided by the 6,000 French Marines of Ronarc'h, who occupied Dixmude and the neighbourhood with outposts thrown well out to the front. From this town it ran past Zonnebeke and

Gheluvelt, where were Rawlinson's troops, to Warneton on the Lys. In between the French Marines and British were the French Territorial Divisions and a part of the available French Cavalry. From Warneton the British Cavalry Corps, the III. Corps, Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the II. Corps held a curving line through the western outskirts of Aubers to Béthune.

On October 16 the actual position of the Belgians was as follows:


The 2nd Belgian Division was stationed round Nieuport; to its right was the 1st Division; beyond the 1st Division up to Dixmude was placed the 4th. Then came the French Marines commanded by Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h, with the 5th Belgian Division in support. The whole force could not have been much over 40,000 men.

A patrol of the 2nd Life Guards had been driven from Staden on the road from Roulers to Dixmude, and considerable numbers of the enemy were reported west of Staden in the forest of Houthulst and south-east of Staden at Oostnieuwkerke. The 7th British Cavalry Brigade on the 16th was, therefore, directed through Ypres to the south of the forest of Houthulst, and till nightfall occupied the line Bixchoote-Poelcapelle.

The movements of the French Territorials and Cavalry were to have an important bearing on the defence of Dixmude. As the sun was setting they relieved the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which was shifted in a south-easterly direction to Passchendaele. At nightfall the front of the Yser from Nieuport to Dixmude was held by Belgian detachments, who occupied the villages of Lombartzyde, Mannekensvere, Schoore, Leke, Keyem, and Beerst.

From Thourout, connected by a single-line railroad with Bruges and Roulers and by a double-line railway with Ostend, a main road runs to Ostend. Other main roads branch off this highway and proceed to the Yser. The villages of Beerst and Keyem are on the roads to the Yser at Dixmude. Between Schoore and Pervyse one of the main roads crosses the Yser. West of Schoore still another passes through Mannekensvere to Nieuport, while Lombartzyde is a mile east of Nieuport on the coast road to Ostend.

So long as the Belgians retained Lombartzyde (and the ground east of Nieuport), Mannekensvere, Schoore, Leke, Keyem and Beerst, the Germans could not use the roads to the Yser which branch off from the Thourout-Ostend highway, which runs south through Roulers to



RUINED CHURCHES IN BELGIUM.

1. Interior of a Church at Dixmude. 2. The Mins er at Nieuport. 3. Tomb in the Church of Rams cappelle, wonderfully preserved amongst the surrounding wreckage. 4. The Church at Pervyse.

Menin, being accompanied all the way by a single-line railroad. The Thourout-Ostend road is not, however, the only line from which the Yser may be approached from the east.

At Roulers a main road goes north-west to Dixmude, and this would naturally form the line of advance for the Germans coming from Ghent to attack Renard's.

Generally the German plan involved the capture of Dixmude, the crushing of the Belgians, and a further advance to turn the Allied left.

To the south of the Roulers-Dixmude road lies the forest of Houthulst, which could not be left by the Germans on their flank, and which therefore became the scene of many a fierce encounter between the opposing forces.

The significance of the villages north of the Yser has been pointed out. Behind these from Dixmude to Nieupoort-Bains was the canalised river Yser, which is from fifteen to twenty feet above the level of the land to the west of it. It has a broad towpath running all along it, which forms a fine rampart. Between the towpath and the rampart there is a bank about two feet high, which is enough to protect a man when he is firing. The canal moves in a slightly concave curve from Dixmude to Nieupoort.

About half way between the two towns it is pressed out to the eastward. At each side of the base of the loop thus formed there is a small village (Tervaete, Schoorbakke), clustered round a bridge. Westward of the canal lie flat fields, broken up into farms and intersected by minor water channels; and then the embankment of the railway which connects Dixmude with Nieupoort and is on the average about two miles distant from the canal. The embankment is, as it were, the string of a drawn bow of which the stave is the canal and the tips Nieupoort and Dixmude. The chief bridges over the Yser, so far as the fighting now to be described is concerned, are at Nieupoort, Mannekensvere, Schoorbakke and Tervaete (near Keyem), and Dixmude. Off the roads the country leading to these crossings was liable to flood. The possession of the bridges was, therefore, of importance to the assailants for attack or to the defenders for an active defence. The situation was like that at the bridge of Areola in 1796.

The railway formed a second line on which the Belgians could oppose the Germans if they crossed the canal. Behind the railway was the high-road, a tree-lined *chaussée*, from Dixmude through Pervyse and Ramsappelle to Nieupoort.



A GERMAN MOTOR ALTAR.
The Archbishop of Cologne on the left.



LADLING MUD OUT OF THE TRENCHES.

Nieuport and Dixmude were places of considerable interest. Round the former had been fought the "Battle of the Dunes" in 1600 in which the Dutch under Maurice of Orange had defeated the Spaniards. A Gothic Cloth Hall, a fine church with a massive tower, an Hôtel de Ville, and the remains of a Templars' Castle were the architectural features of this quiet little town of some 3,500 inhabitants. Dixmude possessed a church with a magnificent rood-loft, and formed a centre for the dairy-farms which carried on a brisk trade in butter with England.

A mile or so beyond Nieuport was Nieuport-Bains, where the Yser entered the sea. It was a small watering-place with a broad Digue, a golf course, several hotels, and tastefully built villas.

From Ostend to Dunkirk along the shore stretched the Dunes—great heaps of sand, some planted with trees. Skirting the Dunes on the south side ran the canal from Dunkirk through Furnes to Nieuport.

Furnes, where the Belgian reserves were ultimately stationed, was a town of some 6,000 inhabitants, with a quaint old Place. This, a belfry, the choir of the church of St. Walburga, and the huge tower of the church of St. Nicholas formed its chief attractions. It was connected with the Yser by the Canal de Loo, which formed a third barrier to an enemy after he had


crossed the Yser and the railway embankment between Dixmude and Nieuport.


A steam tramway, a canal, and high-road joined Furnes to Nieuport, a high road Furnes to Pervyse, a railway and a high-road (through Pervyse) Furnes to Dixmude; a high-road and light railway Furnes to Ypres.

Most of the roads in this district were usually not wide enough to admit two vehicles to pass.

If they left the roads, the Germans would have to fight their way across hedges, dykes, lines of polders, willow thickets, orchards and gardens, and the marshy character of the soil would prevent them making artificial cover. Trenches speedily filled with water, and, as the land at high tide was below sea level, the Belgians by opening the sluices could let the sea in, while the space between the Yser and the railway embankment might be flooded by closing up the culverts under the railroad and bursting the channel of the raised canal. Further, the flank of columns moving between the sea and Schoore would be exposed to fire from the guns of the Allied men-of-war.

The attacks on Dixmude or its immediate neighbourhood are comprehensible, but, remembering that Dunkirk was fortified, it is difficult to understand the reasons for the persistent German assaults on the Belgian position north of Dixmude. One explanation that can be





THE BATTLEFIELDS FROM NIEUPOORT TO LA BASSÉE, SHOWING APPROXIMATE POSITION OF THE ALLIES OCTOBER 16 (EVENING)

Miles 0 5 10 Railways — Chief Roads — Kilometres 0 5 10



[Swainc.]
MAJOR-GENERAL F. C. SHAW.

offered is that the Duke of Wurtemberg and his advisers imagined that the Belgians were demoralised. If that were the case, the German leaders were speedily to be undeceived.

There was one point in the Allied position on the Yser which was of cardinal importance—viz., Dixmude, the possession of which was needed for any really decisive advance of the German right-flank forces. But mere possession would not suffice, the power of debouching from it was necessary, and to acquire this the ground round it to the north, west and south had to be swept clear of the Allies so as to permit a German deployment in force. This would have given the Kaiser's leaders the initiative, and they would have been able to attack right, left, and centre, and the Allies, if they could not stem the current, must have retreated before them and thus have exposed the left wing of d'Urbal's force to flank attack.

On the 15th it will be remembered that Rear-Admiral Ronare'h and his 6,000 Marines were retreating from Thourout to Dixmude.

Near Eessen a battalion under Commandant de Kerros was left to guard the roads which at that point debouch from Vladsloo to the north, from Roulers to the south-east, and from Poelcappelle and the forest of Houthulst to the south. Commandant Mauros with another battalion crossed to the Ypres-Dixmude road and occupied Woumen. The remaining four

battalions with the machine gun company entered Dixmude about midday, and were posted behind the Yser. A detachment was placed near the village of Beerst to the north of the town and east of the canal. South of the chapel of Notre-Dame-de-Bon-Secours natural cover for the artillery was found.

Scarcely had the men been billeted than they were called up to help a company of Belgian Engineers to put the outskirts of Dixmude in a state of defence. There was not a moment to be lost. Already the Germans were throwing a few shrapnel shells into the town, and in the evening a German armoured car, coming from Zarren, fired at the outposts in front of Eessen.

On reconsideration Ronare'h thought the position which he had taken up too dangerous.

Only forty-nine years old and the youngest of the French admirals, he had had experience of land warfare, having, like Falkenhayn, fought in China. He had accompanied the Seymour column which had been sent to succour the European Legations besieged by the Boxers in Peking. A taciturn, meditative man of the stamp of Joffre, he recognized to the full that his men were in insufficient numbers and that the majority of them were ill-trained. It was not till the end of September that he had been ordered to form a Brigade of two regiments (six battalions and a company of mitrailleuses),



OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MARINES.



FRENCH MARINES WITH THEIR TROPHIES OF WAR.

and he had had to recruit them chiefly among lads under age.*

His Marines had fought bravely at the Battle of Melle, but he could scarcely have anticipated they would display the amazing courage, skill and energy which they were about to exhibit. The Belgians supporting him were wearied with constant fighting. To hold a line so long with the forces at his disposal seemed bold almost to temerity.

Ronarc'h represented his views to General Michel, who was commanding the Allies on the Yser, and received permission to shorten the line of defence round Dixmude. The last trains with the munitions of the Belgian Army had passed through to Furnes and there was no longer the need to keep any considerable body east of Dixmude along the railroad.


Accordingly the Admiral withdrew his outposts and divided the defence of Dixmude into two sectors. In the northern he placed Commandant Delage with the 1st Regiment, in the southern Commandant Varney with the 2nd. A battalion of the 2nd was retained by him at the station of Caeskerke, where the railways from Furnes and Nieuport meet. Of the two Belgian batteries one was placed south

* One of the Marines, Yves Lebouc, was 16 years old. The youth of France in this terrible war have behaved with extraordinary heroism.

of the railroad to Furnes, the other north of Caeskerke. A telephone connected them with the great flour mill of Dixmude, the concrete platform of which had been constructed by a German firm before the war. It was an excellent point from which the whole valley of the Yser might be cannonaded by heavy artillery, and the cost of building the flour mill was doubtless debited to the German War Office. For the moment, however, it afforded a capital post from which the fire of the Belgian guns could be accurately directed.

At the crossing of the roads from Dixmude to Pervyse and Oudecappelle was stationed the machine gun company. The canal of the Yser in the vicinity of Dixmude was guarded by the Belgian infantry of the 5th Division. To the south of Neucappelle French Cavalry held the road which at Loo crosses the canal from the Yser to Furnes and joins beyond Loo the Furnes-Ypres highway. Some of the Cavalry which General d'Urbal had boldly thrown into the forest of Houthulst had pushed as far as Clercken to the east of Woumen.

The efforts of the Germans against the Belgians and Ronarc'h's Marines on the 16th were at first confined to a reconnaissance and to entrenching themselves at Middlekerke on the Ostend Digue and at Westende, which faces Lombartzyde. A Taube had also flown over



DEVASTATION BY ARTILLERY FIRE IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE.

1. The Church of St. Jean, Dixmude. 2. Cottages in a street at Nieuport. 3. A street at Albert.
4. Wrecked house in the flooded area near Ramscappelle. 5. A street in Pervyse.

Dunkirk the supply source of the Franco-Belgian Army. One bomb had been dropped by its navigator on the sand, another into the sea.

Towards sunset from a fold in the ground near Eessen the heavy German artillery (10 and 15 cm. guns) shelled the French and Belgians defending Dixmude for some time. Suddenly the guns ceased fire and masses of infantry could be perceived advancing to the attack. They were repulsed, but the fighting went on through the night of the 16th. About midnight a desperate charge of the Germans was successful. The approaches to the French trenches were not protected by barbed wire, and sheer weight of numbers told. The defenders withdrew to the suburbs of the town and awaited reinforcements. At dawn a counter-attack was delivered and the lost trenches re-won.

No further assaults were that day made on Dixmude, and at 11 a.m. the German artillery ceased firing. "Afterwards," notes a Marine present at the action, "all noise ceases; Dixmude has suffered little."

In the course of the 17th five batteries of Belgian artillery under Colonel Wleschoumes were added to the few guns in position behind Dixmude. The Admiral had now at his disposal seventy-two pieces. But it must not be forgotten that the Belgians had no heavy artillery equivalent to the German, and so worn were their field-guns by constant use that the fire from them was inaccurate. Ronarc'h connected by telephone the new batteries with his headquarters at Caeskerke. He proposed to keep them under his own immediate direction, but he generally authorized the gunners to fire whenever the fusillade, and particularly the mitrailleuse - discharges, indicated that an infantry attack was proceeding. This day (the 17th) the advance posts of the Belgians in the villages to the east of the Yser were also shelled by the Germans.

The afternoon of the 17th and the whole of the 18th were spent in quiet by the defenders of Dixmude, who on the 18th were visited by King Albert. "He is a model King," writes a Marine, "I have seen him in the trenches. He's a real man."

The respite given to Ronarc'h, which permitted him and his Belgian colleagues to put Dixmude in a comparatively complete state of defence, was due to the offensive taken on the 17th, 18th and 19th by General d'Urbal and,



DR. HECTOR MUNRO.

to his right, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and, west of Sir Henry, the British Cavalry Corps and III. Corps.

The German troops who were marching through Roulers on Dixmude, and some of whom had driven the patrol of Life Guards from Staden and entered the forest of Houthulst on the 16th, were the next day attacked by four French Cavalry Divisions under General de Mitry. The French cleared the forest of the Germans and demonstrated towards Roulers and the road from Roulers to Dixmude.

De Mitry's left stretched to Clercken, north of the forest on the road from Poelcappelle to Dixmude, and on the 18th Ronarc'h was requested to assist in the advance on Thourout, at which town, as well as at Roulers, General d'Urbal was striking, while Rawlinson was moving on Menin. Accordingly Ronarc'h sent Commandant Mauros towards Eessen with a battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Marines and two Belgian cars equipped with machine guns.

A few corpses and dead horses on the road showed where the Germans had been. When the French entered Essen they found that the enemy had decamped.

Mauros halted at Essen, but two regiments of mounted African troops, temporarily placed under Ronarc'h's command, set out in extended order towards Bovekerke and the woods of Couckelaere. The Allies had almost recovered the position from Ghistelles to Menin which King Albert and his staff had at first chosen for defence and then abandoned, after the fall of Ghent.

Dixmude had not been attacked on Sunday (the 18th), but while the French were marching against Thourout the Germans from the line Thourout-Ostend attacked the Belgian advance posts from Lombartzyde to Keyem. The battle began in the morning. The Belgians fought with superb courage, but numbers told, and before sunset the Germans had secured Mannekenvere and Keyem. If they could cross the Yser west of the former place they would turn the centre of the Belgian position of Nieuport, while from Keyem they could either march on Dixmude or, crossing the southern side of the loop of the Yser, strike at Pervyse and break the Belgian line.

If the east bank of the Yser was to be held, Keyem had to be retaken at all costs, and the

Belgian 4th Division by a brilliant night attack drove the enemy from the village.

This success and the repulse of the Germans before Keyem on the next day were psychologically of the highest value to the cause of the Allies. Many of the Belgians had come to believe that the Germans must win in the end and they could hardly believe their eyes when the enemy turned and ran. They stopped firing, and shouted out in amazement: "See, see, they're running!"

On Monday the 19th, the Germans received the order to cross the Yser "at any cost," and, to facilitate the attack on Dixmude, columns from Bruges and Ghent were directed on Roulers. The town was attacked from three sides—from Hooglede on the north-west, from Ardoye on the north-east, and from Iseghem on the east. The artillery at these places commenced bombarding Roulers at noon, and towards evening the enemy entered the town. The French retired to Oostnieuwkerke, and the road from Roulers to Dixmude was again in the possession of the Germans, who had not been dislodged from Menin by Rawlinson. On the north and south banks of the Lys the Allies had made no further progress of a substantial nature.

The enemy from the Thourout-Ostend front also achieved a considerable success against the Belgians. Berst. between Keyem and Dix-



BELGIAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH.



FRENCH ENGINEERS REPAIRING A BRIDGE.

mude, was captured, and desperate efforts made to take Keyem and drive the Belgian 4th Division over the loop of the Yser. To save that division from destruction the French Marines and the Belgian 5th Division were ordered to advance from Dixmude and recover Beerst, cross the road from that village to Thourout, and occupy the Praet-Bosch woods to the north of the road.


Supported by the Belgian 5th Division, the battalion of Commandant Mauros moved at 10 a.m. from Eessen on Vladsloo and Hoograde, and two battalions of Ronarc'h's reserve traversed Dixmude and marched on Beerst, where the Germans had barricaded themselves in the houses and church. The ground in front of the village was quite flat and intersected by dykes overflowing with water, and the only cover was here and there a leafless hedge: so the Marines had to advance slowly, crouching. Lieutenant Maussion de Candé, who incautiously stood up, was struck down, and at every moment a Marine fell forward among the beetroots. Lieutenant Pertus had his leg blown to pieces as he was leading on his company; and Lieutenant de Blois was hit a few minutes later. The losses of Jeanniot's battalion were so heavy that Pugliesi-Conti's was brought up into the fight.

Thirsting for vengeance and animated by the

example of their officers, they were determined to perish rather than give ground. Following Commandant Varney, who was superintending the attack, the whole battalion pressed forward. House after house was taken, each after a terrible struggle.


Still the fight proceeded. The Admiral sent up a fresh battalion from his reserves to replace Jeanniot's sorely tried battalion, which was brought back to Dixmude. On the right Mauros debouched from Vladsloo, whence, with the aid of Belgian mitrailleuses, he had dislodged the enemy. The Belgian 5th Division prolonged the fighting front to the right and kept part of its strength echeloned in rear.


These happy dispositions soon produced good results, and by 5 p.m. Beerst was carried. Night was now falling, and the Admiral directed Commandant Varney to put the outskirts of Beerst in a state of defence to resist a possible counter-attack. But no sooner was work begun than the Belgian Commander ordered Ronarc'h to recall his Marines to their original position round Dixmude. The effect of the German victory at Roulers had become apparent. News had reached General Michel that a column was moving from the east on Dixmude. At 11 p.m. the Brigade of Marines reached its cantonments at Caeskerke and St. Jacques-Cappelle. Looking back, it was seen that



Miles 0 1 2 3 4 5

Kilometres 0 1 2 3 4 5

Railways 

Roads 

BATTLE OF THE YSER,
Showing approximate position of the Allies October 16th (evening).

Vladslou, which had fallen into the hands of the Germans, was burning fiercely.*

The retirement of the Marines and the Belgian 5th Division rendered Keyem untenable. During the night it was occupied by the enemy, and the 4th Belgian Division fell back behind the Yser.

At the other end of the battlefield the Germans between Keyem and Nieuport had been heavily cannonading the Belgian 1st Division, while their columns from Ostend were assaulting Lombartzyde, defended by the 2nd Division. These attacks were repulsed. There can, however, be small doubt that both Lombartzyde and Nieuport would have fallen into German hands but for a new and, to the Germans, unexpected demonstration of the naval supremacy possessed by the Allies.

On Sunday a naval flotilla, which included three Monitors, built for the Brazilian Government for river work, and taken over by the British Admiralty, had been dispatched under Rear-Admiral Hood to the Belgian coast. Consequently the Allied line on Monday had rested not only on the sea, but on a number of movable forts armed with 6-inch guns equal to the heaviest which the Germans then possessed at this point. The Monitors being of light draught could approach close to the shore. Aeroplanes, seaplanes, and captive or dirigible balloons signalled to the naval gunners the positions of the German troops and artillery.†

* For much of the account of the fighting round Dixmude we express our acknowledgments to M. Le Goffic, whose lucid and interesting article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* is based, not only on official reports, but on the written or oral evidence of Marines and others who took part in the Battle of the Yser.

† The stationary observation balloon was very useful both on sea and land. A correspondent of *The Times* was subsequently allowed to ascend in one of the latter and gives a graphic description of the observations made on the occasion.

"The officer whom I accompanied was engaged in making observations with a view to discovering the position of the German batteries.

"At a height of about 200 feet we could follow all the phases of the battle which was in progress along the other bank of the Yser, between Nieuport and Dixmude. In particular we were able to note the effect of the fire of the British warships off the coast.

"With my glasses I could see Ostend and the ruins of several coast villages, including Westende, Middelkerke, and Lombartzyde. As far as I could see, not a single wall remained standing in the villages of Westkerke, Slype, and Novie. All this damage had been caused by the effective fire of the British ships, which ultimately succeeded in dislodging the German forces.

"At 8 a.m. the engagement was in full swing, and as the air was clear I had a splendid view of what was going on. At 8.45 the observation-officer discovered the position of the German guns, and so we at once came down."

The dead-flat country permitted those positions often to be seen from the masthead. To baffle the aim of the German coast batteries the ships moved on diagonal courses and, to escape torpedoes launched by submarines, at a high rate of speed. So close in land did the Monitors and torpedo craft come, that their crews even fired with rifles at the enemy. How the British flotilla engaged the German forces is graphically described by Petty-Officer Cooper, of H.M.S. Falcon.

"After patrolling the shores," he says, with reference to the fighting on October 27, but which applies equally to the earlier date, "the Falcon took up a position two miles off Nieuport. A mile nearer the shore were the Monitors. They opened their attack, and we fired over them. We could see nothing of the batteries or the trenches, but we soon found the range, and were told by our officers that we were dropping our shells right into the trenches. On the first day we fired over 1,000 shells, and other guns were fired while their ships were proceeding at a high speed to and fro along the coastline. The Germans brought to bear on us some of their heavier guns which they used at Antwerp, and they dropped their shells round us. Several struck us, but did little damage."

Though the British flotilla opened fire at daybreak on the 19th, the Germans did not desist from their assaults on Lombartzyde and Nieuport. In the morning of the 20th they rushed the farm of Bamburg. It was retaken, but at night was abandoned by the Belgians. In the centre and on the right, the enemy, who now had gained Schoore as well as Mannekensvere, Keyem, and Beerst, shelled the Belgians defending the raised canal of the Yser, and launched columns down the Keyem-Dixmude and Roulers-Dixmude roads on Dixmude. Hitherto only field guns had been used by the Germans against Dixmude; but at this juncture heavy howitzers came up and rained shells on the town. General Meyser's Belgian Brigade had been attached to Ronarc'h's Marines, the trenches protected by barbed wire and provided with head cover. Repeated attacks of the Germans were easily beaten off.

In Furnes were posted the Belgian reserves. Before dusk Dr. Hector Munro's Field Hospital, which had already done such noble services for the Allies, had arrived. Dr. Munro, Dr. Bevis, and the rest of the party of twenty-five doctors and nurses, among them Lady Dorothea Feilding (a daughter of Lord Denbigh) were

busy converting a large convent into a base hospital. The gas in the town had been cut off, and the little shops were lit up by candles and oil lamps. Below, in the vaulted caves, soldiers were drinking soup, coffee, or wine. The place was packed with armoured and other motor-cars, military cycles, artillery, and provision wagons. The sound of the guns in the distance was terrific.

Wednesday, the 21st, was one of the most critical days in the gigantic struggle between the Lys and the sea.

General Joffre himself was on the spot to direct the operations of the Allies. French troops were hurrying up to the assistance of the Belgians, and King Albert and Joffre reviewed the 16th Chasseurs in the Place of Furnes. The same day he told Sir John French that he was bringing up the 9th French Army Corps to Ypres, and that other reinforcements would follow later. It was his intention with these and the Belgian and British troops to renew the offensive and drive the Germans eastward, but he stated that he would be unable to commence the forward movement until the 24th.

But the Germans had already thrust back the Allied line south of the Forest of Houthulst, and occupied Poelcappelle and Passchendaele. Partly to relieve the pressure on Dixmude, the four French Cavalry Divisions under General de Mitry and the two Territorial Divisions

under General Bidon, moved from the canal between Dixmude and Ypres on the Forest and to the north and south of it. Sir Douglas Haig from Ypres was on their right. He was to capture Poelcappelle and Passchendaele. Beyond Sir Douglas was Rawlinson, with the 7th Infantry and the 3rd Cavalry Divisions.

Up to 2 p.m. the advance was successful, but then the French Cavalry were ordered to retire west of the canal from Ypres to the Yser, and, owing to this and to the German attacks on Rawlinson, Sir Douglas was brought to a stop on the line Bixschoote-Langemarck-St. Julien-Zonnebeke. Thenceforth the battle from Béthune to Nieuport became an almost purely defensive one on the part of the Allies.

To return to the operations on the Yser during the 21st. The German occupation of Roulers and of the forest of Houthulst, coupled with the failure of Rawlinson to take Menin, had enabled Falkenhayn from the line Menin-Roulers-Thourout-Ostend to concentrate his enormous forces on any point between the Lys and Nieuport. The heavy howitzers which vomited high-explosive shells had arrived from Antwerp, but the presence of the British flotilla, which was provided with guns as powerful, rendered it advisable for the Germans to avoid the left and attack the centre and right of the Belgian Army.

At daybreak (the 21st) the enemy hurled



A FRENCH BICYCLE COMPANY.

The bicycle folded for marching.



THE SURPRISED GERMAN PATROL.

themselves on the French Marines and Belgians round Dixmude. Orders had been given to the gunners to level every house in the town. An American with the Germans remarks that "from a church steeple in a village just back of the artillery trenches you could see a continual flash of bursting shells in Dixmude—about fifty shells a minute."

Dixmude was not the only spot bombarded. From the tower of the church of Furnes that morning as far as the eye could reach over the flat horizon nothing was to be seen except bursting shells and burning villages and hamlets.

Eight separate attacks were made on the trenches protecting Dixmude. The Germans, most of whom had arrived from the Fatherland a few days before, and some of whom were mere lads of only seventeen or eighteen years, fought with magnificent courage, but the French Marines massed their machine guns in groups of four, and each column was in a few seconds reduced to a mass of corpses, writhing wounded, and panic-stricken fugitives. Had it not been for the deluge of shells on the trenches and on

Dixmude the struggle would have degenerated into a one-sided massacre.

As it was the heroism displayed by Ronarc'h's Marines and the Belgian infantry who beat off the furious assaults of the Kaiser's troops cannot be overestimated. Under a sky which literally rained shrapnel and fragments of common shell they continued to fight with unsurpassable gallantry. What they endured may be faintly understood from the narratives of two war-correspondents, Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett and Mr. Philip Gibbs, who accompanied Dr. Hector Munro on that day into Dixmude.*

Quite early Belgian ambulances had come up to the improvised hospital in Furnes laden with wounded. In the courtyard of the convent two motor ambulances and four cars were getting ready to move towards the firing line. A start was made at noon. One of the cars was driven by Lieutenant de Broqueville, the son of the Belgian Minister of War. Lady Dorothea Feilding, Miss Chisholm, Dr. Hector Munro, and an American (Mr. Gleeson) were of the party.

* These narratives appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Daily Chronicle*.



FRENCH SENEGALESE SOLDIERS.

Two British chauffeurs drove the motor ambulances.

Winding their way through the streets of Furnes crowded with soldiers and wagons, the cars and ambulances passed into the open country. The sun was shining, and the long, straight lines of poplars between the low-lying fields indicated the roads that traversed the marshes and meadows. As they proceeded they met a squadron of Belgian cavalry. The men were haggard and dirty, but looked hard and resolute. Next they encountered groups of the cheerful Belgian infantry, columns of French troops, and ever-rolling, seemingly endless streams of motors of every make and design. Here and there the military gave way to the civilian element. Old women, young women with babies and children, and peasants trudged slowly away from the scenes of carnage. A column of German prisoners escorted by mounted men marched past to the rear. "All of them had a wild, famished, terror-stricken look" in their faces. Four months before these unfortunate men had been peaceable citizens, members of a civilized community.

Emerging from Oudecappelle, Dr. Munro's party came upon the battlefield.

"Away across the fields," says Mr. Gibbs, "was a line of villages, with the town of Dixmude a little to the right of us. . . . From

each little town smoke was rising in separate columns, which met at the top in a great pall of smoke, as a heavy black cloud cresting above the light on the horizon line. At every moment this blackness was brightened by puffs of electric blue, extraordinarily vivid, as shells burst in the air. . . . From the mass of houses in each town came gusts of flame, following the explosions, which sounded with terrific thudding shocks. Upon a line of 15 kilomètres there was an incessant cannonade, and in every town there was a hell. The farthest villages were already alight. I watched how the flames rose and became great glowing furnaces, terribly beautiful."

Compared with such spectacles what were the greatest battles of the past? From Dixmude round the forest of Houthulst to the Lys, from the Lys to the slag heaps near La Bassée, from La Bassée through the battered Arras to the woods of Compiègne, from Compiègne to the Meuse, and from the Meuse to the Jura hundreds of thousands of men were killing and maiming each other under such earthquake conditions. The horrors on the plain of the Scheldt were being facsimiled on the Niemen, in the plains of Poland and Galicia, among the Carpathians, and on the Danube. At the eastern extremity of Asia cannon as powerful as almost any in Europe were

belching explosives at Japanese, British or Germans.

The Belgian artillery had been apparently silenced, and, on the Yser, the agents of Krupp had nothing to impede them in their diabolic work. The road from Oudecappelle to Dixmude was under the fire of the German howitzers. Every minute on or near the thoroughfare a great pall of black smoke rose up, leaving a dark cavity in which a couple of horses might have been buried side by side. One of the huge shells had burst on a Belgian battery. "All six horses of one of the guns," says Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, "had been blown into mangled heaps. Their remains lay scattered about the road like badly cut joints suddenly thrown about by the overturn of a gigantic butcher's cart." A Belgian gunner had been cut in two, and amidst fragments of dead horses were biscuits, tinned meats, coffee, sugar. Until the débris had been cleared from the road it was impossible to proceed further.

At last the way was open to the brave little party, and the ambulances and cars made a dash for Dixmude. They seemed to be rushing into a burning furnace. In the outskirts of the town were the French reserves.

Then they entered Dixmude itself. Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, who had been through the

Russo-Japanese and Balkan Wars, has left his impressions of Dixmude as it appeared on the afternoon of October 21, 1914 :

Well, I was all through the siege of Port Arthur, and I happened to be in Reims when the Germans destroyed the Cathedral. At Port Arthur the bombardments were terrible, but then the Japanese gradually worked their way towards the forts, and you had deep trenches which gave you some cover. At Reims you were fairly safe if you kept away from the immediate neighbourhood of the Cathedral, but at Dixmude it was Hell.

The town is not very big, and what it looked like before the bombardment I cannot say. But the point is this: An infuriated German army corps were concentrating the fire of all the field guns and heavy howitzers on it at the same time. There was not an inch which was not being swept by shells. There was not a house, as far as I could see, which had escaped destruction. The whole scene was so terrible, so exciting, and passed in such a dream, that it has left only a series of pictures on my mind.

The ghastly, inhuman character of modern warfare and the superhuman qualities displayed by the myriads of soldiers and civilians who have been subjected by the Kaiser and the conspiring castes in Germany and Austria-Hungary to the ordeal by fire and explosion, should be brought home to the conscience of the civilized world.

Says Mr. Gibbs :

We came into Dixmude. It was a fair-sized town, with many beautiful buildings and fine old houses in the Flemish style—so I am told. When I saw it for the first and last time it was a place of death and horror. The streets through which we passed were utterly



GERMANS IN A TRENCH ON THE YSER.

deserted and wrecked from end to end as though by an earthquake. Incessant explosions of shell fire crashed down upon the walls which still stood. Great gashes opened in the walls, which then toppled and fell.

A roof came tumbling down with an appalling clatter. Like a house of cards blown by a puff of wind a little shop suddenly collapsed into a mass of ruins.

Here and there, farther into the town, we saw living figures. They ran swiftly for a moment and then disappeared into dark caverns under toppling porticoes. They were Belgian soldiers.

We were now in a side street leading into the town hall square. It seemed impossible to pass, owing to the wreckage strewn across the road.

"Try to take it," said Dr. Munro, who was sitting beside the chauffeur.

We took it, bumping over the high débris, and then swept round into the square. It was a spacious place with the town hall at one side of it, or what was left of the town hall. There was only the splendid shell of it left, sufficient for us to see the skeleton of a noble building which had once been the pride of Flemish craftsmen. Even as we turned towards it parts of it were falling upon the ruins already on the ground. I saw a great pillar lean forward and then topple down. A mass of masonry crashed down from the portico.

Some stiff, dark forms lay among the fallen stones. They were dead soldiers. I hardly glanced at them, for we were in search of living now.

The cars were brought to a halt outside the building and we all climbed down. I lighted a cigarette and I

noticed two of the other men fumble for matches for the same purpose. We wanted something to steady us.

There was never a moment when shell fire was not bursting in that square about us. The shrapnel bullets whipped the stones.

The enemy was making a target of the Hôtel de Ville, and dropping their shells with dreadful exactitude on either side of it.


I glanced towards a flaring furnace to the right of the building. There was a wonderful glow at the heart of it.

Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett shows us the interior of the Hôtel de Ville of Dixmude:

Inside the hall was a scene of horror and chaos. It was piled with loaves of bread, bicycles, and dead soldiers. I have never seen so many bicycles. I suppose some cyclist troop had left them here on their way to the trenches. We rushed down to the cellars and dragged up the wounded, who were all lying down cases, and had to be placed on stretchers, which seemed under the circumstances, to take an endless time. All the while the shells were crashing overhead, and the bullets whistling through the square. Another officer ran up, and told De Broqueville that there were some more wounded in another building. De Broqueville ran off and disappeared down a side street.

Loading the ambulances was slow work, but at length it was completed. We were all ready, and only too anxious to depart, when we discovered that De Broqueville had not returned. We waited several minutes. He did not come. Then there was a terrific crash, and a shell hit the Hôtel de Ville just above our heads, bringing down more bricks and mortar.

M. Maeterlinck, the illustrious Belgian author, who has handled the French language with the skill of an Anatole France, has drawn a hopeful deduction from scenes like these. "One of the consoling surprises of this war," he says, "is the unlooked for, and, so to speak, universal heroism which it has revealed among all the



ST. PIERRE RAILWAY STATION, GHENT.
Arrival of the British.

nations taking part in it." The Germans who had studied humanity with meticulous care, had imagined that the Krupp inventions would paralyse the spirits of their adversaries. For forty years they had been accumulating unexampled stores of materials for the destruction of human bodies. They were prepared to use them in the same spirit that Nero had used his lions and his pitch against the Early Christians. They imagined that religion had lost its hold over Belgians, French, and British, and they confidently expected to terrorize the comfort-loving populations of Western Europe into submission. They were mistaken.

As the sun was setting the Germans delivered a final attack. They attempted to carry Dixmude, and they crossed the Yser south of the town. The village of St. Jacques Cappelle became the centre of a violent combat.

Such of the Belgian batteries as had not been put out of action opened fire on the German infantry. The German artillery redoubled its fire, and then ceased. Shouts which sounded like "Ja, Ja," and loud cheers were heard. The Germans were charging with the bayonet. Over the advancing infantry the Belgian shells burst in groups of red flame. The "pat-pat-pat-pat" of the machine guns showed that streams of lead were being poured into the yelling masses, thinned every moment by the repeating rifles of the French and Belgian soldiers. The cheers were replaced by shrieks; the attack came to a standstill, those Germans who had escaped death or wounds sullenly retired, and the shelling from the east of the canal recommenced.

It was now seven p.m. and quite dark. The scene was majestic in the extreme. Dixmude was a red furnace. The flames shot upwards, showing clouds of white smoke above. St. Jacques, farther south, was a smaller furnace. All along the line the shells were no longer bursting in clouds of white and black smoke. All had put on their blood-red mantles. Close at hand everything was bathed in inky darkness; farther off the burning towns and buildings showed up clearer than they had done during the day.

Behind Dixmude infantry were busily engaged constructing fresh trenches. I looked back on this awful scene for the last time. As far as the eye could stretch the horizon was a purple red from the burning homes of thousands of harmless and peaceful dwellers who are now poverty-stricken refugees in England and France. In this district not a village or a hamlet has escaped.*

Thus the frantic efforts of the Germans to seize Dixmude had failed. Away to the left, at 5 p.m., a violent assault, preceded by hours of shelling, had been made from Schoor on Schoorbakke, a village a little to the north of



LADY DOROTHEA FEILDING.

the loop in the Yser Canal. This attack had been repulsed with frightful losses to the enemy. By Wednesday night the Germans were still on the east bank of the Yser between Dixmude and Nieupoort-Bains: the canal, in places, and the dykes and ditches were choked with their dead or expiring wounded.

So far, the sole assistance received by the Belgian Army had been from Ronare's Breton Marines and the guns of the Allied flotilla. Joffre had kept the 16th Chasseurs in reserve. For one more day the wearied Belgians and the French Marines were unassisted to hold the line of the Yser.

On Thursday, the 22nd, the Germans gave particular attention to the section of the battlefield north of Dixmude. The area in the loop of the Yser between Tervaete and Schoorbakke was swept by a hurricane of shells, and the canal crossed at Tervaete. A counter-attack by the Belgian 1st Division was unsuccessful. The

* Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett.



CROSSING A STREET UNDER FIRE.

troops were rallied and ordered again to charge. This time the Germans were literally driven into the canal. At Schoorbakke the Belgians repulsed the enemy and pursued them towards Schoor, while the Allied flotilla continued steaming up and down firing at the German trenches and batteries on the coast and some distance inland. British aviators circled over the flat country, which was partly flooded, to give the range. The windows of Sluis, on the Dutch frontier, were shaken, and the people there listened to what seemed a distant thunderstorm. Fresh troops were passing hour by hour through Bruges to reinforce the German front, and the heaviest ordnance was being transported to assist the German batteries at Middelkerke, where a German General and his staff had been killed by a British shell in the duel with the Allied flotilla. From Ostend all available soldiers had been pushed westwards, and the hotels were being filled with wounded.

On the evening of the 22nd the people of Furnes witnessed a sight which must have filled them with pride.

Two battalions of the 1st Belgian Division—the 9th of the line and the 2nd Chasseurs—had, in view of the French reinforcements which were to arrive on the morrow, been relieved from the trenches. They were Brussels and Liège men who had held the gaps between the forts at Liège at the beginning of the war, and had won

for themselves a fine reputation. At about 7 p.m. they marched into Furnes, dead tired and covered with mud, but singing the *Marseillaise* at the top of their voices. The band of the Chasseurs played "*Sambre et Meuse*." Everybody turned out to watch them, and they were given an ovation.

A few hours later the absence of these brave men from the Yser must have been regretted. Reinforcements had reached the enemy. They were flung across the canal and, during the night, took Tervaete. They brought with them numerous machine guns to enfilade the Belgians in the loop of the Yser. Simultaneously under cover of the night which, to some extent, protected them from the fire of the Allied warships, the Belgian 2nd Division before Nieupoort and round Lombartzyde was subjected to a succession of desperate onslaughts. The Belgians were, however, well provided with mitrailleuses, and the attackers were mowed down. Among these were poor youths from the German schools and universities. One of them, a bright lad who was tended by the British nurses at Furnes, spoke bad French very politely. He had been wounded in the foot, and would be lame for life.

Help for the sore-tried Belgians was at hand. Joffre had railed up from Reims one of the finest of the French Divisions, the 42nd. Several batteries of heavy howitzers were also

coming up. On Friday the 23rd, General Grossetti with this Division was sent to relieve the Belgian 2nd Division round Nieuport, which had lost Lombartzyde and was to be brought back into reserve. Nieuport and the Belgian trenches behind St. Georges were being bombarded, and Grossetti could only pass his men in small groups across the Nieuport bridges. Not till evening did the French occupy the trenches of the Belgian 2nd Division. Meanwhile, south of Nieuport, the Germans were pressing the advantage gained by them during the night of the 22nd. They swarmed into the loop of the Yser, and the Belgian 1st and 4th Divisions were pushed back towards the railway embankment between Pervyse and Ramscapelle.

During the day the heavy French howitzers, which were now in position, had been dropping their high explosive shells on the furthest gun emplacements of the Germans, and the enemy's commander perceived that there was no time to be lost if victory was to be achieved. A huge cigar-shaped captive balloon had been sent up to a great height, and its occupants vainly endeavoured to locate the French howitzers. Between the howitzers and the guns of the Flotilla the situation of the Germans was becoming every moment more dangerous. That day German officers in Ostend had been unpleasantly reminded of the precarious tenure on which they possessed the town. Fifty of them were lunching at the Hotel Majestic, one

of those imposing structures which during the last quarter of a century had been erected wherever pleasure-seekers congregate. The restaurant was one of the most elegant in Europe. To the white and gold walls were attached delicately framed mirrors. Chandeliers with their glittering facets of cut glass hung from the ceiling. The floor was covered with rich red Brussels carpets, and over them waiters glided, serving their unwelcome visitors with commandeered delicacies and the most expensive wines. Here and there groups were standing about chatting. At a window in the eastern half of the room sat a naval doctor with the adjutant of the brigade to which both belonged.

Meanwhile from the British squadron, four or five miles in the offing, a torpedo-boat destroyer was swiftly approaching the shore. Another followed in its wake. The pace at which they were going was shown by the masses of foam at their bows. At the end of the Rue du Cerf, which slopes up to the great Digue, Admiral von Schröder, who had observed their approach, was directing men of the naval brigade to place two light guns, the only artillery available. With feverish haste the guns were pointed and fired at the first boat. Two shells fell close to it, and the vessels were promptly swung round. Their guns flamed out. The first British shells hit the water and struck the sea wall; then two of them crashed through the windows of the restaurant of the Hotel



GERMANS AT TARGET PRACTICE.



GERMANS FILLING A BALLOON WITH GAS CONCEALED BENEATH A HAYSTACK.

Majestic, and fell in the midst of the festive party.

The second of these struck the doctor, who with his companion had risen from table to seek a safer spot, right in the middle of the back and blew him to pieces.

Dr. Sven Hedin, the celebrated Swedish traveller, who later inspected the scene, paints

in "A People in Arms" a realistic picture of the havoc wrought by the two shells. "Splinters of them," he says, "had rent gaping holes in walls and ceilings. The plaster ornaments had fallen and lay in ruins, and the carpet almost disappeared beneath their heavy white dust. The windows had been shivered to powder and the mirrors had been burst into all kind of curious star shapes whose fragments threatened to fall at the least touch. Tables and chairs were smashed to atoms, the tablecloths rent to ribbons."

One of the killed doctor's legs had been blown under a table; his head was in a pool of blood, and "the rest of him was spattered about the walls, ceiling, and tablecloths."

With his base at Ostend liable to be reduced to the condition of Dixmude, with Grossetti's Division in Nieuport, with his rear and flank under the fire of the guns of the British and French warships and from the west by the heavy howitzers, the Duke of Wurtemberg during the night of the 23rd-24th directed no less than fourteen assaults on Dixmude. If Dixmude could be taken he might hope to turn the Belgians between Pervyse and Ramscappelle, to capture Furnes and drive the Belgians and Grossetti's Division into the sea, and, crossing the Yser where it is an uncanalised stream of little breadth or depth, fall upon the left wing and rear of the Allied Army deployed between Dixmude and La Bassée.

Fortunately Ronarc'h's Marines and the



BRITISH SOLDIER PUMPING OUT WATER FROM A TRENCH.

Belgian 5th Division held firm. Every assault was beaten off, and when day broke on the 24th the trenches and ruins of Dixmude were still in the hands of the Allies. The Belgian Battle of the Yser had closed; the French Battle of the Yser was opening.

No account of this battle would be complete without an attempted appreciation of the debt which the Allies owe to the Belgian Army and Ronarc'h's Marines. They had held at bay a vastly superior body of German troops flushed with victory, animated by the highest patriotism and supported by artillery which produced the greatest physical and moral effects. Fen country in October is always unpleasant, cold mists had covered the land, and heavy rain had fallen at intervals. At places the men had fought in trenches half filled with water, and the straw on which those in the open slept was never dry. For days many of them had tasted no hot food or drink. At night they were forbidden under penalty of death to smoke, because a glimmer would have betrayed the position to the pointers of the German guns. The stench from the canal, into which the German dead were thrown, was almost unbearable. Often the Belgians were separated from the enemy's sharpshooters by not more than fifty feet, and it was death to rise for a moment to stretch oneself.

The men in the houses of Dixmude and Nieupoort or in the villages were, if possible, worse off. With modern range-finders towns and villages are shell-traps, and the bursting of high-explosive shells among buildings is far more terrible than the explosion of a shell in the open, for if pieces of the shell miss the



THE ARMoured LOOK-OUT MAN.

occupants of a room, the chances are that they will be killed by falling beams, girders, bricks and mortar. If they have taken refuge in cellars, they may find themselves buried alive.

That in such surroundings the Belgians and the French Marines should have kept the line of the Yser for over a week was a feat which will always be remembered.



BELGIAN SOLDIERS ON THE MARCH.



GERMAN MACHINE GUN SECTION.
On the Coast.

The Belgians had most nobly answered to Joffre's call upon them to secure the line of the Yser and its bridge-heads for 48 hours. Since the night of the 16th they and Ronarc'h's Marines had struggled with a force at least double, and probably treble, their numbers—a force provided with field and siege artillery vastly superior to anything which from the

16th to the morning of the 23rd could be opposed to them on the Yser—and they had held that force at bay not for 48, but for nearly 200 hours. The Belgians had shown that neither the severe trials of successive battles nor the still greater stress of retreat had damped their ardour. They were still able and willing to meet the foe and put a stop to his most ardent efforts.



CHAPTER LV.

RUSSIA'S PROBLEM.

RUSSIA'S NUMBERS AND THE WILD STORIES THEY PRODUCED—THE DIFFICULTIES OF RUSSIA—THE WONDERFUL FRONTIER RAILWAYS OF GERMANY—THE VULNERABILITY OF POLAND—THE FOREST OF AUGUSTOWO, AND THE DESOLATE BORDERS OF THE NIEMEN—EAST PRUSSIA, THE IDOLIZED PROVINCE OF THE JUNKERS—THE EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF TANNENBERG—POLAND AND ITS CITIES—WHY THE RUSSIAN POLES HATED THE PRUSSIANS—HOW THE PRUSSIANS OPPRESSED THE POLES OF POSEN—GERMAN RISKS OF INVASION IN SILESIA—AUSTRIA'S POSITION IN GALICIA—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CARPATHIANS—GERMANY'S EASTERN LINE OF FORTRESSES—PRZEMYSL AND CRACOW—THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN, AND WHY IT FAILED—THE REAL PROBLEMS TO BE FACED BY RUSSIA—CRACOW THE TRUE RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE—RAPIDITY OF THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION—RUSSIAN UNITY AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—THE TSAR'S DECREE AGAINST LIQUOR—THE FIRST SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING.

WHEN the war began, the Allies in the West were for a brief space hypnotized by the thought of Russia's numbers. Little consideration was given by the public of London and Paris to her difficulties. The vast weight of the mighty Russian Empire fired the imagination of statesmen, combatants, and populace alike. Russia's trials and misfortunes in previous campaigns were instantly forgotten. When it was realized that the whole resources of a State numbering 173,000,000 of people were being thrown into the scale against the Germanic League, it seemed to many as though the war was already won. The Tsar, it was said, was mobilizing millions on millions of men. Countless hordes of Cossacks, so the wild stories ran, were to sweep across the Prussian plains and thunder against the gates of Berlin. Few paused to think, few indeed seemed to know, that, though there were myriads of Russians, the Cossack forces were by no means unlimited, and in any case were not Russia's mainstay. The vision of the conquering Cossack was so universal that fables about trainloads of Cos-

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sacks passing through England on their way to Northern France gained widespread currency, and had at last to be officially contradicted by the British Government. The conviction that Russia would instantly march from triumph to triumph was less easy to chasten. The Russian armies were likened to a steam-roller, and the phrase "the Russian steam-roller" obtained a great vogue in England and France. The popular impression was that the steam-roller would overcome all obstacles and ponderously pursue its course to the Prussian capital without a halt. It would be too much to say that these ideas ever produced any relaxation of effort in the West, but for some time they induced a rather mischievous belief that it was to Russia that the Allies must chiefly look for a final victory. Happily, as the war progressed and its relative aspects were seen in a truer perspective, all the Allies came to realize that the war would only be won by the united sacrifices and labours of every nation alike.

The difficulties of Russia soon proved to be manifold. She had the men, and they came in masses from every part of her Empire. There



THE TSAR AND THE GRAND DUKE
NICHOLAS.

were, however, embarrassing shortages of equipment of every kind, from clothing to great guns.

It was not that the Russian Army had not made immense progress during the previous decade. Since the Russo-Japanese War it had been transformed out of recognition. The trouble was that the material required for mobilization upon such an immense scale had not been accumulated in sufficient quantities; and no better proof could be cited that Russia not only did not enter upon a premeditated war, but drew the sword with the utmost possible reluctance. Next to difficulties of equipment came difficulties of transport. The German eastern frontier had been covered with a network of strategic railways. The Austrian province of Galicia was fairly well served by useful lines. The Russian railway system was woefully scanty by comparison, which was yet another proof that the Russian Government had not sought war. A railway map of Eastern Europe served by itself as convincing evidence of the relative intentions of Germany and Russia. The eastern provinces of Prussia were gridironed with lines whose purposes were military rather than economic. On the Russian side the map was comparatively blank, the very roads were few and poor, and

from end to end of the Russian western frontier there was no railway following the course of the Empire's boundary, as was the case on German territory. There were reasons for the sparseness of Russia's railways. Her territories were so spacious that they included one-sixth of the land regions of the globe, welded into one cohesive whole. All the energies of Russian railway builders had been thrown into the construction of great trunk lines throughout these wide dominions. Had some of the money spent upon the Siberian and Transcaspian Railways been expended upon railway-building in Poland, and especially on lateral railways parallel to the course of the frontier, Russia would have been better able to confront the first formidable German advance through Central and Southern Poland to the Vistula. She did not build strategic railways in her western provinces because her policy was essentially pacific. Her ultimate aim was internal development, and not war. In the end it was proved again and again that her abstention had unconsciously assisted her operations in the war. The German military machine was designed for dependence upon railways. When the Germans invaded Belgium and France they found ready to hand an elaborate system of railways almost as complex and as efficient as their own. When they entered Poland and had to march painfully over an almost roadless land, their efficiency was speedily impaired. Whenever the Germans were cut off from the locomotive, their offensive gradually lost momentum. The Russian soldiers marched to war on their own feet, and bore the hardships of slow progression more successfully.

Another difficulty which greatly hampered Russia was her isolation. She was everywhere cut off from the open sea save at distant Vladivostock, on the Pacific, where a passage was cut through the ice during the winter with very great difficulty. The Baltic was at once closed to her. After Turkey declared war, the Black Sea was hermetically sealed for the whole winter. Archangel was, ordinarily, shut in by ice from October to May, and was in any case inadequately served by rail, though steps were quickly taken to improve the railway line, and, by means of icebreakers, to keep the port open a longer time than usual. Russia needed vast quantities of supplies from her Allies, and for a long time very few of her requirements could be met, save to a small extent through Vladivostock and Archangel. Her difficulties

did not end here. Her crowning difficulty was the configuration and character of her frontier, to which attention must now be paid.

The dominating feature of the western frontier of Russia was the position of the province of Poland, which was thrust like a great broad wedge far into the territory of the Germanic Powers. From the point where the River Warta crossed from Russian to Prussian ground, the distance to Berlin was only 180 miles. Small wonder that the uninstructed, knowing nothing of Germany's means of defence, dreamed of Russian troops passing down Unter den Linden within a few weeks of the outbreak of war. The truth was that Russia was extremely vulnerable in Poland, as she realized with great poignancy very soon. On the north the provinces of West and East Prussia curved far over Poland. On the south the Austrian province of Galicia not only wrapped the whole Southern Polish border, but reached the Russian provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, and even touched Bessarabia. Poland was, in short, a dangerous salient for Russia. From three sides, well served by railways, blows could be struck at the great city of Warsaw, which was the heart of Poland. Before Russia could think of a march to Berlin, she

had to clear her flanks, and to make sure that she would not be assailed from either East Prussia or Galicia. As was to be expected, instead of marching on Berlin she found the greater part of the province of Poland overrun by the enemy. Her efforts to rid herself of the invaders not only constituted a great part of the first stages of the war; they were, in fact, almost as effective as the process of invading Prussia which the ignorant expected, because in the long and fierce combats which ensued Russia was able slowly but persistently to wear down the strength of her foes.

As a matter of convenience, it will be well to examine the frontiers of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary conjointly. The military and political problems they presented were so interdependent that a correct conception of the position can only be gained by passing in imagination at will across boundaries which were largely artificial. The Russian Baltic provinces of Kovno and Courland were flat plains with scarcely a ridge, and for the most part thinly populated. From a quarter to a third of their whole area was covered with forests, and the impression conveyed in a journey through them to Petrograd was of an almost empty thickly-wooded land.



AMMUNITION TRANSPORTS FORDING A RIVER.

There was a considerable German population, especially in the towns, and a good deal of the territory was held by magnates of German descent. German influence had for centuries been very marked in West Russia, and the factor thus presented was not without its influence upon the war. The natural, though not the actual, frontier of Russia in this direction was formed by the River Niemen. The Niemen ran roughly parallel with the eastern frontier of East Prussia, for a distance of about 80 miles, between the cities of Grodno and Kovno. Along that stretch its average distance from the Prussian frontier was about 50 miles. It then turned due westward and eventually traversed about 70 miles of Prussian territory before entering the Baltic. At the point where it entered Prussia it was about 500 yards wide. In that long strip of territory 80 miles by 50, between the Niemen and East Prussia, there was much desperate fighting during the first few months of the war. It was a wild and desolate country, full of forests and small lakes and marshes. Its southern half was nearly filled by the great forest of Augustowo, in the midst of which stood the town of Suwalki. The whole strip was classified as part of Poland. Napoleon knew it well, for the bulk of the Grand Army traversed it, and crossed the Niemen at Kovno and Grodno in June, 1812. It was through the

forest of Augustowo that Hindenburg rashly advanced to the Niemen in September, 1914, after his victory at Tannenberg. His main advance was by way of a causeway which ran through the marshes and woods from Suwalki. The opposing armies were actually firing at one another across the Niemen on September 25, but all the German attempts at a crossing failed, and in the end the enemy were pursued back through the forest to their own territory. The forest of Augustowo again came into prominence when von Hindenburg once more cleared East Prussia of Russian troops in the following February and March. On that occasion his operations included a march on Kovno along both sides of the Niemen from Prussian territory, but he failed to reach Kovno because he was opposed on the line of two small tributary rivers, the Dubissa and the Niewissa, which fell into the main stream from a northerly direction. During this phase of the campaign important Russian units were cut off in the forest of Augustowo, though sections fought their way out from its recesses for days afterwards. Hindenburg's troops again reached the Niemen during February, and even crossed it, but failed to make good their position. It should be understood that the whole of the fighting in this region turned upon the repeated German attempts to make good the passage of the Niemen. The statement that in this



RUSSIANS DIGGING TRENCHES.

area the Niemen was the natural frontier of Russia was not an idle one. The river was of the utmost value to Russia, for among other things, it protected in part the vital main line of railway from Petrograd to Warsaw.

Across the border lay East Prussia, the idolized province of the Prussian Junkers. Just as in the north the object of Germany was to make the passage of the Niemen, so the very first object of the Russians was to drive the German garrisons out of East Prussia, where they were believed to be weak. East Prussia was the most bleak and dreary of the German provinces. It was part of the great plain which sloped down to the sand dunes of the Baltic. On its open lands great quantities of rye and potatoes were grown, but its special characteristic, which played a great part in the war, was found in the tangle of lakes and woods and swamps in the south-eastern portion, all along the Russian frontier, which was collectively known as Masuria. This area was really a continuation of the Russian strip within the angle of the Niemen, but it constituted even more difficult country for military operations, and was believed to form a more useful defence of German territory than many artillery positions. A scheme for draining and cultivating it had been prudently rejected on military grounds. It was protected by a system of blockhouses, and there were garrisons in the various small towns in its recesses, while the Germans had not neglected to endow it with several of the railway lines upon which they so greatly leaned. When, however, the Russians swept into East Prussia in the first month of the war, they carried all before them. They moved along the main railway line to Berlin. They menaced the fortress of Königsberg. They drove in the frontier posts and overran the Masurian lake region. By the end of August they seemed masters of the greater part of East Prussia, and were even threatening West Prussia and the line of the Lower Vistula. Then came the sudden appearance of Hindenburg, and the series of movements which ended in the crushing defeat of the main Russian forces at Tannenberg. The result of the battle was that Germany recovered possession of her province, though the ravages of war had hit it sorely, and Berlin was filled with refugees from the East Prussian towns.

Whether the Germans were geographically justified in giving the name of Tannenberg to this memorable encounter was an open ques-



THE KAISER IN EAST PRUSSIA.
General von Mackensen in the centre.

tion. Historical reasons influenced them. East Prussia was the real cradle and stronghold of the Prussian race. From its chill plains and dense forests sprang the nobles and rulers who, under the leadership of the House of Hohenzollern, eventually welded the German Empire into an organic whole. When in the fourteenth century the German tribes were pressed back from the Rhone and the Meuse, the tide of migration swept eastward again. German colonists crossed the Elbe and the lower Vistula, and settled in the eastern forests and marshes, which were already occupied in part by their own near kinsmen, though still more by Slavonic tribes. The powerful Teutonic Order of Knighthood, which controlled the work of colonization, eventually came into conflict with Poland. The Knights were overthrown by the Poles in the great battle of Tannenberg on July 15, 1410. The conflict remains a landmark in the eternal struggle between Teuton and Slav. It finds a prominent though mournful place in German history. When Prince Bülow, in his retirement, wrote his famous book on "Imperial Germany," he could still refer with regret to "the black day of Tannenberg." The rejoicings over Hindenburg's victory were far more than the joyful reception of the news of a triumph.



["Times" photographs.]

THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.

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| 1. Conversing with a Priest. | 2. With his Staff officers. |
| 3. Arriving at Headquarters. | 4. Planning an attack. |
| 5. Reviewing Cossacks. | |

The battle of Tannenberg seemed to Germany to efface a bitter memory, and to compensate for the grief of five hundred years. East Prussia had, nevertheless, not been so easily defended as the Germans expected. They had thought that the small fortress of Boyen, standing near Lötzen in the middle of the lake region, would serve to check the passage of an army. The Russians took Boyen with the greatest ease. It needed great forces of troops, and some serious Russian mistakes, to recover the province and to hold it safely even for a limited time. But as the effect of the invasion of East Prussia upon the spirits of the Germans was very marked for political reasons, so the expulsion of the invaders had a correspondingly marked result in the return of German confidence. On the other hand, the battle of Tannenberg gravely affected the Russian plan of campaign. It meant a certain amount of confusion and postponement. It did not in the least depress the indomitable cheerfulness of the Russians, but it compelled their Commander-in-Chief to modify his strategy.

The next section of the frontier with which it is necessary to deal is the great wedge of Poland, at once the blessing and the bane of Russian strategy. Poland was advantageous because it stretched so far in the direction of the heart of the homeland of the foe. It was a perplexing problem because, as already explained, it was surrounded on three sides by enemy territory. Through its centre ran the great river Vistula, entering the province from Galicia, flowing north and north-west to Warsaw, and then passing westward until it entered Germany near Thorn. As the Niemen dominated strategy farther north, so the Vistula was the chief factor of strategy in the centre of Poland. The Germans were astride its lower reaches, and thus could enter Poland along both its banks: but where the river curved southward at Warsaw it presented an obstacle athwart the line of German advance which was to stand Russia in good stead. The Vistula had important tributaries. On the north the River Narew, which entered the Vistula below Warsaw, formed, with its feeder the Bobr, an important line extending almost to the Niemen at Grodno. West of Warsaw the small River Bzura, with its lesser tributary the Rawa, made a valuable line on which the Russians held the Germans in check during the latter part of the winter. The Pilitza was another river in Southern Poland whose course was the scene of repeated conflicts,

as was also the River Nida, which entered the Vistula on the Galician frontier.

Poland north of the Vistula was an open wooded plain, containing in the neighbourhood of the Narew marshes of great importance in relation to military movements. Marshes had a considerable effect upon the Polish campaign. There were extensive marshes to the west of Warsaw which greatly hampered the Germans in their attempts to strike at the capital of the province. There were others before Lowicz and near Lodz which served to contract the German movements when they were endeavouring to cross the Bzura in their second dash towards Warsaw. Southern Poland was of greater altitude, with more forests, and occasional deep gorges—a very difficult country for military operations. The population of Poland was denser than in any other part of Russia, showing an average of 200 to the square mile. Warsaw had 800,000 inhabitants, and many flourishing manufactures. Its central position, its command of road, rail and river, its bridge over the Vistula, and its great political importance, made it the goal of German ambitions in the eastern theatre of war. The capture of Warsaw would have implied a withdrawal of the Russian forces along the whole front in Poland, to a line resting on the River Bug and the huge Pripet marshes in its rear. When Hindenburg made his first advance through Central Poland to the Vistula, his troops were confident that they would enter the city. They almost reached the outskirts. The roar of the guns could be heard by the alarmed inhabitants, and for a few hours it was thought that the capital was lost. Reinforcements arrived by rail in the nick of time, marched straight into the firing line, and drove the Germans back. The second city of Poland was Lodz, which had 400,000 inhabitants. Lodz was a "mushroom" town of modern growth, with a great cotton industry. It was a straggling place, chiefly consisting of one wide main thoroughfare several miles long. There was heavy fighting before Lodz when the Germans made their second advance in Central Poland to the line of the Bzura. The German bulletins alleged that fierce conflicts occurred in the streets of the city, but the truth was that the Russians designedly evacuated it, and the enemy entered unopposed. For a long time they treated Lodz with peculiar tenderness, the reason being that it was more German than Polish. German immigrants had gone to Lodz in great numbers, attracted by its industrial



{After a painting by a German artist.

GERMAN REFUGEES FROM EAST PRUSSIA IN BERLIN.

possibilities. They welcomed the invaders, and the help given to the foe by German aliens throughout Poland was not the least of the Russian difficulties. Some of the smaller Polish towns had flourishing industries. Lublin and Plock possessed sugar refineries. Kalisz had a valuable trade in lace and embroideries. Radom, the centre of a tract of potato cultivation, had huge distilleries. Piotrkow lay in a great mining district. Bendzin, near the Silesian frontier, was in the centre of a prosperous coalfield. Both in the eastern and the western theatres the invading Germans seized and wrecked great manufacturing and mining districts. Just as they paralyzed the industries of Belgium and Northern France, so they devastated Western Poland. The scenes of desolation in Flanders and the Departments of the Nord and the Pas de Calais were surpassed by the misery wrought in Poland, where the countryside was left as bare as though it had been devoured by locusts.

Much was said, and rightly said, about the courage and devotion with which the people of

Belgium flung themselves in the pathway of the invading German armies. They suffered the ravaging of their country rather than make even a forced and involuntary league with the invaders. It was not so generally recognized that the equally gallant Poles found themselves called upon to make a similar decision. Germany counted upon a rising of the Poles in her own favour as soon as she crossed the Polish frontier. The Austrians had precisely similar expectations. Both Powers were so lacking in political perception that they believed they would be welcomed by the Polish people as deliverers from the Russian yoke. Their anticipation of an immediate Polish rebellion was one of the factors in their planning of the war. It must be admitted that they were not so completely without justification as was manifest in their error about Belgium. Even experienced Russians had many misgivings regarding the Poles, and feared either open or veiled hostility. What both sides overlooked was that, though the Poles believed themselves to have great and manifold grievances against

Russia, these were of comparatively modern growth, and the bitterness they engendered was steadily diminishing. Their hatred of the Prussians, on the other hand, was ingrained in every fibre of their being. It had been nurtured during a thousand years. It was as old as Polish history. If the Prussians never forgot Tannenberg, neither did the descendants of their Polish victors. When Russia marched to war, the hearts of all the Polish people flamed forth in her support. The nearest counterpart to the outburst of Polish loyalty to the Tsar was the equally ardent upheaval of enthusiasm in India for the cause of the King-Emperor, a demonstration which upset yet another of the calculations of Berlin. The Poles and the Russians found themselves at one, and they armed in a common cause. The promise of Polish autonomy was the sequel to the declaration of the Poles, and not, as was at first supposed, its inspiration. The promise was a reward, and not a bribe. Meanwhile, the unfortunate Poles had to endure the wholesale wrecking of their towns and villages by the Germans as the result of their fidelity.

The Germans had their Polish question too. Its heart lay in the province of Posen, on the westernmost frontier of Poland. There were 400,000 Protestant Poles in East Prussia, but there were over a million Poles, chiefly Catholics, in Posen. For a century attempts had been made, always without avail, to Prussianize the Poles of Posen. They were alternately cajoled and oppressed. On the one hand, measures were passed so recently as 1907 for expropriating their land in favour of German colonists, while they were also forbidden to use their own language at public meetings, and their children were flogged at school for refusing to answer questions in German. On the other hand, the Emperor William sought to conciliate them by building a flamboyant royal castle in the city of Posen at a cost of a quarter of a million sterling, and by other beguiling expedients. On the whole, the Poles remained obdurate enough, and their resistance to Prussian methods was maintained with varying success right down to the outbreak of war. They were dragooned severely, but they refused obedience. Prince Bülow plaintively declared that the Poles must be brought "to understand the German spirit," and he insisted that "German nationality" must prevail in the eastern provinces. If not, he said, they would have "a Polish danger," and he main-

tained that the whole future of the German Empire was bound up with the fate of the Eastern Marches.

There was no great physical obstacle to a Russian invasion of Posen, when circumstances permitted. South of Thorn and the Vistula, the frontier was barred for some distance by the inevitable marshes. Then came the River Warta, south of which again the marsh lands recurred; but the valley of the Warta (the river was 100 yards broad at the frontier) was practicable enough, and offered a natural means of ingress into Prussia. It may be added that Posen was a highly cultivated province, and from it Germany drew large supplies of rye.

Russia, however, was perhaps even more interested, both for strategical and economic reasons, in the province of Silesia, which lay to the south of Posen, and was contiguous to the south-west corner of Poland. Silesia was half as large as Ireland, and was the biggest province in Prussia. It contained a million Poles, mostly settled near the frontier. It was also, and the fact was of infinite importance, the greatest manufacturing and mining area of Eastern Germany. Mr. Hilaire Belloc acutely pointed out at an early stage of the war that the two main industrial districts of Germany were precisely those which the first shock of an invasion would strike. They were Westphalia in the west, and Silesia in the east. Of the two, Westphalia was the more important, because armaments were almost wholly manufactured in the western field. The ruin of Westphalia would mean a hundred times more than the occupation of Berlin. But the shutting down of the mills and manufactories and mines of Silesia would have an almost equally paralyzing effect upon Germany's capacity and desire for resistance. Silesia had the richest zinc deposits in the world, in the neighbourhood of Beuthen, quite close to the frontier. The greatest mining and smelting centres, at Zabrze, Königshutte, and elsewhere, and the glass industries of Gleiwitz, were within a day's march of Russian territory. The largest ironworks in Silesia, at Königshutte, could have been shelled from Russian soil, four miles away. There were flourishing textile industries of great magnitude in all the valleys of Southern and Central Silesia, worked chiefly by water power. The whole countryside was full of mills, and packed with a dense population. It was practically undefended, relied neither on fortresses nor on natural obstacles against invasion, and lay at



A GERMAN ENCAMPMENT NEAR THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER.

the mercy of a successful foe. The basin of the River Oder, which traversed the province in a north-westerly direction, led directly to Berlin, though it was guarded by certain fortified positions, of which more anon. Once firmly established in Silesia, the Russians could strike either north-westward at Berlin, or south-westward, through the Moravian Gate between the Carpathians and the Sudetic Mountains, at Vienna. Breslau, the capital, was the third city of Prussia, with half a million inhabitants and a huge trade. The province also contained many rich and powerful landowners with very great estates.

It will have been gathered that the eastern frontier of Germany was not so vulnerable as it looked upon the map. Its curious shape even conferred some advantages, and in sections it had useful natural protection in the shape of marshes, dense woodlands, and rivers. The case of Austria-Hungary, which must next be dealt with, was far otherwise. The natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy on the north-east was the Carpathian Range, which bordered the territory of Hungary. This barrier furnished by Nature was most unwisely passed at the time of the partition of Poland, towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the wide province of Galicia, on the northern side of the Carpathians, was acquired by Austria. By this change the Monarchy gave hostages to fortune. A portion of the northern frontier of Galicia was formed by

the Upper Vistula, but much of the rest had no natural line of demarcation at all. The province was traversed by several rivers rising in the Carpathians, and running from south to north until they fell into the Vistula. The chief of these were the San, the Wistoka, and the Dunajec. When the Russians poured into the province from the east, these rivers formed a series of lines on which the defeated Austrian armies successively rallied, exactly as Sir Frederick Maurice had foretold many years before. As a whole the province necessarily had a downward slope from the Carpathians to the rivers Vistula and Dniester. The winter climate was very bitter, with heavy snowfalls, followed usually by excessive rain in the spring. It produced extensive crops, and was the most important potato-growing area in Austria, but its manufactures were backward. The Galician oil-field was very extensive, and of much importance to the Germanic Powers. The principal centres of oil production were near Drohobycz, Krosno, and Kolomea. All these tracts fell quite early into the possession of the Russians, and though in February, 1915, they were compelled to fall back from Kolomea for a time, very little Galician oil got into Austria or Germany after the first two months of the war. As Galicia was producing two million tons of oil annually in time of peace, the loss to the Germanic League was considerable.

The means of communication in Galicia were

very good when compared with those of Poland. The principal railway route traversed the centre of the province from end to end, from Cracow through Tarnow, Jaroslau, Przemysl, Lemberg, and Kolomea to the Rumanian frontier, with a branch from Lemberg bifurcating into Central and Southern Russia. There was another railway route roughly parallel to the principal one, but running along the lower slopes of the Carpathians through Sandec, Sanok, Stryj, and Stanislaw, all of which places were important junctions. Besides these long lines, there were a number of transverse sections, and no portion of the province was very far from railway communication. There were 11 points at which rail-heads approached the Russian frontier, with no communication beyond it, and the fact throws an instructive light upon the industry the Austrians had expended upon the Galician railway system.

The two principal towns in Galicia were Lemberg, the capital, in the eastern area, with about 160,000 inhabitants; and Cracow, in the western area, with about 90,000 inhabitants. The Russians took Lemberg at the beginning of September, and at once pushed on to the investment of the fortress of Przemysl, which lay one-third of the way towards Cracow. Lemberg was the fourth city of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 80 per cent. of its population were Poles. Cracow was the coronation and burial place of the Kings of Poland, and was still "the intellectual centre of the Polish nation." Poles formed more than two-thirds of its population. Taking the people of Galicia as a whole, however, it may be said that the

Poles numbered about 45 per cent., and the Ruthenes about 42 per cent. Although the Poles predominated in both the chief cities they were mostly concentrated in the western half of the province, while the Ruthenes dwelt in the eastern half. The Ruthenes were racially akin to the Little Russians across the border. The relations between Poles and Ruthenes are explained in Chapter XXXVI., Volume II. It is enough to say here that the Poles had been encouraged by Austria at the expense of the Ruthenes, until a period shortly preceding the war. The Ruthenes welcomed the invading Russians, whose religion was the same as their own. The attitude of the Austrian Poles, who were Roman Catholics, was not so readily disclosed. They had fewer grievances than their brethren in Germany and Russia, and were not so restive under the yoke.

In a corner between Galicia and Rumania lay the Austrian crown duchy of the Bukowina, "the land of beeches," a region of the thickly-wooded foot-hills of the Carpathians. The Bukowina was unquestionably more Russian than Austrian in sympathy and spirit. Over 40 per cent. of the population was Ruthene, about 35 per cent. was Rumanian, and the Jews numbered 13 per cent. The German element was very small indeed. Nearly 70 per cent. of the people belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church. Czernowitz, the capital of the duchy, was a bright and flourishing little city situated on a height above the River Pruth, and extensively girt by marshes. Its size had much developed under Austrian administration, and its industries included the manu-



RUSSIAN SERVICE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

facture of paper. During the first eight months of the war Czernowitz twice passed alternately into the hands of Russians and Austrians, and when they first recaptured it the Austrians took bitter vengeance on those of the inhabitants who had shown cordiality to the invaders.

The whole of the struggle in Galicia and the Bukowina resolved itself, from the Russian point of view, into two main objects. The first was to reach Cracow, at the western extremity of Galicia, for the possession of Cracow was an imperative prelude to the invasion of Silesia and Posen, or to a march southward through the Moravian Gate upon Vienna. The second was to secure the passes of the Carpathians, which gave access into Hungary. The Russians were very anxious from the outset to bring pressure to bear upon Hungary. Possibly they were influenced in part by a belief that the near approach of hostile armies to Buda-Pesth would induce the Magyars to break away from Austria and conclude a separate peace on their own account. This belief was widely shared in England in quarters where the conceptions of the Magyar attitude were based upon romantic and quite misleading impressions derived from the records of the days of Kossuth. After the war had been in progress for some time it was more generally realized that the Magyars were largely responsible for the trend of Austro-Hungarian policy, and that their inclination

probably was to stand or fall by the fate of Vienna. The steady growth of the influence of Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, who was soon seen to be the most powerful man in the Monarchy, confirmed this conclusion. Moreover, the Magyar oppression of the Slav races of the Monarchy had been one of the factors which precipitated the war. The Magyars fought in politics for their own hand, but their bitter anti-Slav policy compelled them to range themselves beside the Austro-Germans. Yet it was not really necessary for Russia to seek a political motive of any sort for striking at Hungary. Military considerations sufficed to justify her plans. Hungary was the principal granary of the Monarchy. It was also the only large source of supply of horses left to the Germanic Powers. In times of peace Germany annually imported large numbers of horses from Russia. The Hungarian horses were of lighter build, but they were better than nothing. Once the Carpathians were crossed, the wide plains of Hungary offered an easy path for a vigorous foe. By invading Hungary, too, the pressure on the gallant little army of Serbia could be relieved. Finally, once the Russians held the crest of the Carpathians they would fully protect their left flank against menace during a forward movement through Poland against Prussia. It was not surprising, therefore, that throughout the long winter, the struggle for the Carpathian passes continued



PANORAMA OF LEMBERG.

with unabated violence, no matter what conflicts were raging elsewhere.

The Carpathians were part of the backbone of Europe, and yet they were very little known to travellers and tourists. They bore small resemblance to the Alps, and their scenery, though impressive, was not on the grand scale of Switzerland. No Carpathian height was covered with perpetual snow, and the whole range did not contain a single glacier. The highest peak, Mount Franz Josef, was in the Tatra group at the western end, and was 8,737 feet high. The passes were easy and low. The slopes of the mountains were thickly wooded, especially on the south. The winter in the Carpathians was always bitter, and if the passes were practicable enough from the point of view of the mountaineer, they were choked with snow. Fighting occurred at intervals along a section of the Carpathians nearly 300 miles in length, extending from a point south of the town of Tarnow in Galicia to the borders of Rumania. There were six principal passes the possession of which was at intervals contested, the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, the Volocz or Vereczke, the Delatyn or Körözmezö, and the Borgo. To these may be added the minor Kirlibaba Pass, at the south-western corner of the Bukowina. The Russians crossed every pass except the Borgo during the autumn and winter, some more than once, and though they were compelled to withdraw in every case, they rarely lost possession for any length of time of the northern approaches. Railways traversed the Lupkow, Uzsok, Volocz, and Delatyn Passes, and there was another railway crossing the range some distance to the west of the Dukla. By the Lupkow they reached Homonna and the verge of the Hungarian plain. By the Uzsok they came to Ungvar and beyond. By the Volocz they raided down the valley of the Latorza River to Munkács and still farther. By the Delatyn, more popularly known as "the Magyar Way," because it was the historic route for invading Hungary, they marched in considerable force to the important town of Máramaros-Sziget, where they treated the alarmed inhabitants with a restraint which won their confidence. It was not until strong German forces were brigaded with the Austrian troops early in 1915—it was believed on the direct representations of Count Tisza to the Kaiser—that the Russian pressure across the Carpathians was seriously checked. One reason for the movement of the Russians along



**NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS WITH
THE RUSSIAN ARMY.**

Back, Mr. Stanley Washburn, *The Times* correspondent; centre, Mr. Pares; left, Col. Asencheff; right, Mr. Soldatenkow.

the Magyar Way and the Volocz Pass was that on the southern slopes of the range in these neighbourhoods there dwelt large numbers of Ruthenes, who received them with conspicuous pleasure.

The whole of the terrain of the eastern theatre during the first months of the war has now been examined in detail. It is next necessary to explain concisely the fortified positions prepared in this area by each of the three Powers involved. The principal fortress in East Prussia was Königsberg, the second capital of Prussia, situated on the River Pregel. It possessed an inner and outer line of works beyond which were 12 detached forts, six on each side of the Pregel. In addition, there were two other large and powerful forts, that of Friedrichsburg, on an island in the river, to the west of the city, and the Kaserne Kronprinz, within the ramparts on the eastern side. Königsberg ranked as a first-class fortress, and was the headquarters of the 1st Army Corps. It lay far within the great Frische Lagoon, on a wooded peninsula, with a steep and forbidding coast. On the long spit of land forming the seaward side of the lagoon was the entrenched camp of Pillau, 29 miles from Königsberg.



RUSSIAN TRENCHES (SHOWING TRAVERSES).

The whole Königsberg area required to be treated with great respect, and when the Russians first entered East Prussia they only sought to mask the fortress. There were no other important protective works in East Prussia, although the difficult lake region of Masuria, with its blockhouses and the small fort of Boyen, formed a natural means of defence.

On the line of the Lower Vistula, in the province of West Prussia, there were further powerful fortresses. Danzig, at the mouth of the river, was a first-class fortress and entrenched camp, and its approaches could be inundated on the eastern side. There were powerful works opposite Dirschau, 20 miles to the south, forming a bridge-head guarding the main line to Königsberg and Petrograd. About 45 miles farther south was the strong fortress of Graudenz, on the right bank of the Vistula, forming another valuable bridge-head. At a point 92 miles south of Danzig, and 12 miles from the Russian frontier at Alexandrowo, stood Thorn, a fortress which was one of the chief features of the defences of Eastern Germany. The town was on the right bank of the Vistula, but both banks were fortified. There was the usual circle of detached forts, eight on the right bank and five on the left. At Thorn the railway from Warsaw entered Prussian territory, and the place, which was really a formidable bridge-head, formed the pivot of Hindenburg's railway strategy. Thorn and Danzig

have been compared to Metz and Strasburg, and have been described as "bastions, as it were, commanding the curtain between them." The whole Lower Vistula was, in short, very strongly held. A subsidiary but very important strategic point was Bromberg, 32 miles west-north-west of Thorn, and the centre of a network of railways. It guarded the railway bridges across the River Netze.

Below Thorn there was much marsh country on both sides of the frontier, but at the point where the valley of the Warta entered Prussian territory the need for artificial protection again began. Accordingly the great railway centre of Posen, which stood on an open sandy plain, was provided with an immense entrenched camp, which had to be reckoned with by any army marching due west from Warsaw on Berlin. South of Posen there were yet more marsh lands. An inner line of defence possessed by Eastern Germany was the line of the River Oder, which could, however, be very easily crossed by an invading army in its upper reaches in Silesia. Strong garrisons were maintained at Oppeln and Breslau, but these places had few modern fortifications. There was a big entrenched camp at Neisse, on the northern side of the Sudetic mountains. The principal obstacle to an advance down the Oder was the fortress of Glogau, to the north-west of Breslau. Glogau had been a fortress for centuries, and was built partly on an island and partly on the left bank of the Oder. Its

fortifications were extensive, for it was an important railway junction. The remaining fortified positions on the line of the Oder were Küstrin, 52 miles east of Berlin, the last shield of the capital; and Stettin, near the mouth of the river. It may be said that the true defences of the eastern frontier of Germany were provided by its incomparable system of strategic railways, which again and again enabled von Hindenburg to concentrate large forces quickly and secretly at various points from which his blows were launched like thunderbolts. Even Silesia, despite the scarcity of fortified positions, was astonishingly well served by railways. Seven lines of railway ran out of Breslau, and between that city and Cracow there was no point to which troops could not have been quickly hurried.

The defences of Austria in Galicia were to a great extent of comparatively modern date. Until the last half-century Austria had not attempted to provide substantial defensive positions in Galicia at all, and much of her works had been built since the twentieth century began. There was one fortified point in the Bukowina, at Zaleszczyki, on the Dniester, at the frontier, but it offered no more effective opposition to the Russians

than Maubeuge did to the Germans. Lemberg was stated to possess certain defences, but when the Austrians were routed before the city in September the capital instantly fell. The principal Austrian fortress in Galicia was Przemysl, situated in hilly country 60 miles east of Lemberg. The investment of Przemysl was begun directly after the fall of Lemberg, and though interrupted at times, and not made complete for a good many weeks, the fortress was never afterwards left alone for long. The real reason why Przemysl was able to offer such a prolonged resistance was that the Russians were at first short of heavy siege artillery, and still more of shells. The ultimate objective of the Russian struggles in Galicia was always Cracow. The city of Cracow was surrounded by a ring of six powerful forts on both sides of the Vistula, but the total length of the perimeter was comparatively small, and it was not believed that Cracow could withstand a prolonged siege. The Russians were drawing near to the city from the north early in December, and their cavalry were actually within five miles of it on the south, when von Hindenburg's second fierce rush on Warsaw compelled a hurried shortening of the Russian line. When von Hindenburg



DANZIG.

A view of the Langenmarkt, showing the Town Hall.

fought his way to the Bzura River and dug himself in, he was aiming, among other things, at the salvation of Cracow, and, therefore, of Silesia also; for with Cracow in their possession the Russians would probably have had Silesia at their mercy.

Russia had two great fortified positions in Poland, Novo Georgievsk and Iwangorod. Warsaw, though not entirely without defences, was practically an open town. Warsaw was the railway centre of Poland, but the fortified zone on which it relied was created 18 miles away at Novo Georgievsk, at the point where the Bug, swollen a few miles higher up by the waters of the Narew, flowed into the Vistula. It was the usual circle of detached forts, and was exactly 120 miles from Thorn. The forts of Novo Georgievsk were on a plateau which commanded the channels of the rivers for many miles. As it lay on the right (or north) bank of the Vistula, the Germans never came into contact with it during their repeated attempts upon Warsaw. It effectually blocked any prospect of advance on the north bank, and compelled them to select a line of advance to the south of the river, through Lodz and Lowicz. They were checked at the Bzura and the Rawa on their second advance in December, but had they made good the passage of these rivers they would still have had terrific obstacles to overcome. Marshes and woods

extending for a long way from the left bank of the Vistula gave some protection to the capital, but the Russians had enormously strengthened these areas by an elaborate entrenched line midway between the Bzura and Warsaw. This series of entrenched positions, which came to be known as the Blonie line, from the village through which it passed, was about 18 miles due west of Warsaw. It was believed that the Blonie line could be held for almost any length of time, owing to the support it would receive from Warsaw. Iwangorod was an entrenched camp 64 miles south-east of Warsaw, at the junction of the River Wieprz with the Vistula. It had nine forts on the right bank and three on the left, and it was near Iwangorod that von Hindenburg's initial attempt to seize the line of the Vistula first broke down. About 150 miles to the east of Warsaw, on the River Bug, was Brest-Litovsk, an immense supply depot ringed with forts, which was the real base of the Russian operations in Poland. Warsaw, Novo Georgievsk, Iwangorod, and Brest-Litovsk were sometimes described as "the Polish Quadrilateral," but Warsaw had no pretensions to the strength of the other places.

When in future years historians pronounce a final verdict upon the military and political strategy of the war, it will probably be declared that the greatest of the many mistakes made



WARSAW.
A view of the Vistula.



KÖNIGSBERG.

by Germany was her decision to hack through Belgium. From that initial blunder most of her other mistakes followed in a natural sequence. Germany's plan of campaign, compendiously stated, was to overthrow France first, and to settle with Russia afterwards. She would probably have had better success if she had reversed her plan. It was the supposed need for crushing France first which led to the invasion of Belgium, with all the evil results (from the purely German point of view) which ensued. Germany did not crush France, she found herself committed in the west to an enormous front of dangerous length, and by her brutal treatment of Belgium she alienated the sympathy of neutral nations throughout the world. Had she delivered her first great attack in the east, she might conceivably have paralyzed Russia and then turned westward with greater prospect of success; but the whole subject is only a matter of conjecture. By the course Germany took she deprived herself of any chance of ever achieving her full purpose. Probably in any case, she never had any chance of complete success from the time England entered the lists, a consideration which sufficiently accounts for the "Hymn of Hate."

The German plans on the eastern frontier were largely based on the assumption that the Russian mobilization would be slow. The German Staff seem to have proposed to hold East Prussia and the frontier from Thorn to Galicia, but not to undertake at first any offensive operations on a large scale. The Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia were instructed to push northward into Poland in the direction of Warsaw, and eastward into Volhynia, in the direction of Kieff. The main duty of the Austrians clearly was to keep busy such Russian forces as were available. It was even hoped that the Austrian columns based on Lemberg might take Kieff, for the calculation was that the Russians would be to a great extent preoccupied by the Polish insurrection which Berlin and Vienna confidently expected. If the 1st Austrian Army, based on Przemysl, succeeded in marching through Lublin and got near to Warsaw, then the Germans would have made a supporting move from Thorn towards the Polish capital. But all these hopes were largely conditional, and the broad purpose of the Germanic Powers was simply to keep the Russian armies contained while the flower of the German Active Army rushed



CRACOW.

through Belgium and Northern France and took Paris.

Nothing happened on the lines that the German Staff presupposed. It is true that the Austrian advance from Przemysl drew very near to Lublin, but the Austrians were soon hurrying back to their own territory. The march on Kieff remained nothing but a paper programme, for the invasion of Volhynia ended as abruptly as it had begun. What completely upset the German calculations was the swiftness and steadiness of the Russian mobilization, which astonished the whole world. Before the war had been in progress many days, powerful and impetuous Russian armies were pouring into East Prussia and Galicia, clearing the flanks of Poland. Until von Hindenburg won his signal victory at Tannenberg the Russians were carrying all before them. Tannenberg partly paralyzed Russian strategy for a time, but it never stopped the persistent Russian invasion of Galicia, nor did it prevent the Russians from entering East Prussia again as soon as they were ready. The whole problem which Russia had to solve was to clear both her flanks, and then to take Cracow. To that combined purpose she recurred again and again, and she never really abandoned it for a moment, even

when Central and Southern Poland were swarming with German troops and the people of Warsaw were preparing for flight. Throughout the whole of the first six months' campaigning, Cracow was the lodestone that attracted the Russians. Cracow was the heart of the Russian problem. While Cracow remained untaken, no advance on the grand scale into either Prussia or Hungary was possible, while the chance of reaching Vienna was too remote to be even discussed. With Cracow in Russian hands the whole situation would be changed. The roads through Silesia to Berlin, or through the Moravian Gate to Vienna, would become open. Hungary could be raided to the gates of Budapest. There could be an advance in force along the line of the Warta to Posen and beyond, without fear of a flank attack. The difficulties of the invasion of East Prussia would largely be overcome, because it was reasonable to suppose that in such an event the German forces in East Prussia would soon be compelled to fall back, in order to avoid being cut off. The key to Russian strategy was Cracow, and to take that city was the principal problem for which a solution had to be found. This was the theoretical side of the Russian movements. In practice the Russian

task eventually resolved itself into the problem of clearing Poland of an exceedingly stubborn invader.

Russia soon found that it was easier to mobilize her millions than to arm and equip them and place them in the battle-line. All the perplexities and obscurities of the early months of the Russian campaign turned upon the difficulty of converting mobilized men into efficient combatants, clothed in uniforms, furnished with rifles and ammunition, and ready to fight. The actual mobilization was a magnificent piece of organization. From the farthest confines of the Russian Empire came interminable train-loads of men eager to give their lives for the Tsar. Mr. Stephen Graham related how he was in a village in the Altai Mountains, in the very heart of Asia, when the mobilization order arrived. The men knew nothing of the troubles of Europe, and had not even been told against whom the Tsar had gone to war. They saddled their ponies and rode off cheerfully, never questioning the call. The cities in the rear of the line of conflict became choked with men, but it was long before they were all able to march forth as fighting units. The supply of clothing, of arms, and above all of ammunition, was insufficient for the countless hosts which had been gathered. The factories of Russia worked without ceasing. The Allies did their best to supply deficiencies, so long as there was any chance of getting supplies into the country. Japan sent great quantities of warlike stores. Huge purchases were made from neutrals. Yet it was a very long time before Russia was able to overcome her manifold needs; and the lack of material, and not the fighting qualities of her troops, was the chief explanation of such reverses as she


occasionally encountered in the earlier stages of the campaign. She had to fight on an incredibly long front. Her actual fighting line was at some points dangerously thin. She was particularly short of big gun ammunition, a difficulty which soon hampered all the combatants alike. A shortage of the means of waging war lay at the back of all her movements, and the knowledge gnawed at the hearts of her commanders. In course of time these obstacles were to a great degree overcome, and it was calculated that by April, 1915, she would be very near her maximum strength.

The war brought a solidarity to the Russian nation such as it had never known before. Never had Russia been so united. There were strikes in progress at Petrograd and in other cities when the hour of conflict came. Civil discontent was rife, and anxious observers believed that the country was on the verge of another internal upheaval. It was indeed, but not in the form which the vigilant watchers in Berlin had predicted. They had taken due note of the surface symptoms which were plainly visible, and believed that the war would find Russia rent asunder by disorder. They failed to understand the psychology of the Russian people, just as they failed to understand every other nation around them. The strikes at Petrograd vanished in a night, and the Cossacks who had been brought into the city to preserve order in the Nevsky Prospekt and the other main thoroughfares found themselves acclaimed by the populace. One of them was heard to say to a comrade: "Is it possible that these people are cheering us, or am I dreaming?" The Germans and Austrians had imagined that the Russian crowds would demonstrate against the war, and clamour for peace



THORN.

BALTIC SEA



at any price. When the fateful day came immense throngs were kneeling in front of the Winter Palace, and chanting the majestic and solemn strains of the Russian National Anthem. For the first time for a century a Tsar of Russia looked out upon a Russian Empire one and indivisible, animated by a common purpose, stung from indifference into an eager desire to face a common foe. In the Russo-Japanese War some of the Russian troops had to be driven into the troop trains at the point of the bayonet. In August, 1914, the Russian regiments marched forth gladly, fired by a burning desire to take up the burden of a war which appealed more strongly to the people than any campaign in which Russia had ever engaged.

One of the first fruits of the moral change which Russia underwent was the entire and ruthless prohibition of the liquor traffic. The Tsar's imperative order was accepted without a murmur, and was regarded as a symbol of the transformation which the country had undergone. It cost the Russian Exchequer a revenue of £68,000,000, but Ministers were speedily heard declaring that it was worth the price because of the increased efficiency it produced. Cheap vodka had been the bane of the populace. The ravages of drink in Russia cannot be compared with the consequences of liquor consumption in the United Kingdom, because in Russia the effects went considerably deeper. Really good vodka, drunk in small quantities, was not a particularly pernicious beverage. A tiny glass or two, taken with a dish of fresh caviare of a delicacy unobtainable outside Russia, had been said to be "as acceptable as strawberries and cream." The cheap spirits more widely consumed in Russia were of very different quality, and the quantities drunk both impoverished and debilitated masses of the people. At first the Tsar's decree only applied to the period of mobilization, but later it was extended for the duration of the war. The result was magical. From the Baltic to the Pacific not a public-house was open, and the order was rigidly enforced to the letter. It was accepted patiently and without complaint by the entire population. "The result was," wrote an observer, "that the army and the people were serious and sober when they faced the task imposed upon them. Rioting and dissipation were things of the past, both at the

front and in the capital." Such was the grave and earnest mood in which Russia braced herself for her tremendous task.

The story of the first few months of fighting in the eastern theatre falls naturally into certain definite sections. There was first the Russian invasion of East Prussia, followed by von Hindenburg's retaliatory stroke, the battle of Tannenberg, and the unsuccessful attempt of the Germans to reach and to cross the River Niemen. Then came, practically as a separate episode, the Russian invasion of Galicia and the first defeats of the Austrian armies. This was preceded by the brief Austrian invasion of Poland, after which followed the swift Russian advance, the fall of Lemberg, the investment of Przemysl, and all the confused fighting which carried the Russians to the crest of the Carpathians, and even enabled them to make brief incursions into Hungary. These first operations of the Russians in Galicia were as remarkable and as complete as the swift German invasion of France in 1870. The next extremely definite movement was von Hindenburg's first invasion of Central and Southern Poland, which very nearly reached Warsaw, and actually reached the Upper Vistula near Iwangorod. It was accompanied by fierce, simultaneous conflicts between Austrians and Russians on the line of the San. All these movements collapsed, and the failure of the Austrian and German offensive had as its sequel a general withdrawal. The Russians in their turn then struck south-westward from Warsaw, and westward through Galicia, at Cracow. They had all but reached the city when von Hindenburg, who had concentrated afresh, rushed once more at Warsaw, the movement constituting the second German invasion of Poland. It instantly compelled the Russians to fall back and straighten their line. They held the Germans before Lodz and around Lowicz for many days, and at one moment almost succeeded in encircling two German army corps, a brilliant effort which raised unfounded expectations in the west. Eventually the Germans dug themselves in on the line of the rivers Bzura and Rawa, south of the Vistula, and some distance west of Warsaw. The New Year found them still tenaciously entrenched in this position. All these operations will be related in detail, and in the order noted, in the chapters which follow.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE FIRST INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA.

MOTIVES OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY—THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN FRONTIER—POSSIBLE ROUTES AND TERRAIN—FIRST RUSSIAN SUCCESSES—THEIR EFFECT IN GERMANY—VON HINDENBURG TO THE RESCUE—HINDENBURG'S CAREER—GERMAN VICTORY OF TANNENBERG—ITS IMPORTANCE AND CONSEQUENCES—THE SUBSEQUENT GERMAN ADVANCE—RUSSIA'S REVENGE ON THE NIEMEN—BATTLE OF AUGUSTOWO—RESULTS OF FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF WAR.

EARLY in 1914 the reorganization of the Russian military system had already gone so far that the General Staff was able to announce that it would adopt an offensive strategy in the next European war. The Russian tradition that an aggressor is best defeated by luring him into the vast distances of the interior, there to be dealt with by Generals January and February, asserted itself again and again during the vicissitudes of the eventful struggle on the Eastern Front, but it was not the dominant idea in the early days of August. An invasion of East Prussia presented itself as a tempting and inevitable task. The Russians knew that the Germans had underestimated the rapidity of their mobilization. They knew that two factors had combined to induce the Germans to post inadequate forces in East Prussia—the imperious need of securing an early triumph in France, and the habitual German tendency to undervalue Russian efficiency. A march into East Prussia was all but imposed upon them. It was natural to argue that before any advance through Poland itself could be

contemplated, the northern flank must be cleared. Every army has its historical memories which are apt to govern the thinking of its chiefs. By this route Russian armies had advanced when they occupied Berlin in the Seven Years' War, and again when they pursued Napoleon after Moscow. Strategists have always a maximum and a minimum object before them. Civilians and journalists talked gaily of marching through East Prussia to Berlin, and in the ranks of the Russian Army that ambition gave a meaning to their advance. Scientific soldiers were more cautious, for they knew very well that the defensive lines of the Vistula, with the great fortresses of Danzig, Graudenz, and Thorn would not be carried without efforts and sacrifices inadvisable at this stage of the campaign. The lesser objects seemed none the less sufficient to justify the invasion. It was much to clear the northern flank of Poland and well worth while to occupy this thriving province, with its prosperous agriculture and its population of two million inhabitants. If no further military use were made of the invasion, a province securely held



THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN FRONTIER.

is always an article of barter when the moment of settlement arrives. East Prussia was, moreover, no ordinary German province. At Königsberg was the seat of the Prussian dukes, and there the King of Prussia was crowned. The gentry of the province, descended from the Knights of the Teutonic Order, were the flower and type of that stubborn, limited, but capable squirearchy which was the backbone of the Prussian State and the Prussian Army. A blow at this outlying province was in point of sentiment a direct thrust at the heart of Prussian confidence and Prussian pride.

The routes which an invasion of East Prussia must follow were dictated by the few main lines of communication of which the Russians disposed. Three railways only crossed the frontier. The first was the great trunk road from Petrograd to Berlin, which crossed the River Niemen at the fortress of Kovno, passed the frontier at Wirballen-Eydtkuhnen, and traversed the province through Insterburg, Allenstein and Eylau to Thorn. The second, and least important of the three, left the main Vilna-Warsaw line at Bialystok, passed the minor fortress of Osowiec, crossed the frontier beyond Grajevo, and at Lyck entered the intricate lake country, and continued to Königsberg. The third line ran from Warsaw

to Mława, and continued through Eylau to Danzig. The frontier nowhere presented an appreciable obstacle, nor had the Germans been at pains to fortify it. It was a purely conventional line, which marked the political division of the area between the Niemen and the Vistula. Nature knew nothing of it, and on either side stretched the same flat expanses of heath and forest, of lake and swamp, varied by fertile fields in which rye and potatoes were grown. The intricate chains of lakes were a formidable obstacle to an invasion. Artificial obstacles existed only in the shape of two small forts (Boyen and Lyck) commanding defiles among the Masurian Lakes. Königsberg, indeed, was a first-class ring fortress, but while an invader would be compelled to contain it and isolate it, it was so situated that it did not interfere with the occupation of the greater part of the province.

The Russian plan of campaign provided for the invasion of East Prussia by two armies along the two main routes. The first, or Vilna Army concentrated behind the Niemen, and had its bases at the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno. The Second or Warsaw Army concentrated behind the river Narew. It detached a portion of its forces to penetrate the Masurian Lakes by Bialla and Lyck, but its main line of advance was by Mława.

Both armies were commanded by generals who had made a certain reputation amid the failures of their colleagues in the Manchurian campaign.

General Rennenkampf had commanded a division which included some famous Siberian regiments, which did good service at Mukden. To him fell the leadership of the Niemen Army in the direct march from the east on Königsberg. The Narew Army, which invaded from the south, was under General Samsonoff, an officer who had won no small popularity and a considerable professional reputation. Born in 1859, he had passed from the cavalry to the general staff. His service had been chiefly in Turkestan, and he had commanded Siberian Cossacks with distinction in Manchuria.

The Niemen Army was the first to encounter a large force of the enemy, and it will be convenient to consider its march separately, bearing in mind that it was engaged in a concerted and converging invasion, in which it was all important to secure the proper timing of the move from the east with the move from the south. It was a complete army, and its composition was as follows :

The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 12th (active) Army Corps.

The 3rd and 4th Reserve Divisions.

Five Cavalry Divisions, including the Guard.

Its numerical strength must have been from 225,000 to 250,000 men, and further reserves were busily collected behind the Niemen.

The early days of the campaign, while mobilization continued, were employed in cavalry raids and reconnaissances. The Germans only once attempted an offensive; in these small affairs the enterprise was on the Russian side. A Russian cavalry division (the 3rd) crossed the frontier, south of Eydtkuhnen on August 6. Two days later (the 8th) a small force of Russian infantry with machine guns was skirmishing far to the north, almost up to the outskirts of the important town of Tilsit, memorable for an historic meeting between Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander. Its mission was to destroy the railway line. A cavalry reconnaissance on a larger scale, in which three divisions took part, on the 10th, helped to raise the spirits of the Russians, and gave confidence to its leaders. General Rennenkampf with his Staff visited the fighting lines, and the impression was general that these skirmishes had dissipated the legend of German invincibility. In one of these early engagements the Russian Cavalry of the Guard covered itself

with glory. A certain village in advance of the German lines was held by a strong body of sharpshooters with two field guns, which were doing terrible execution at short range against the Russian advance. To clear the village was infantry work, but the "Gardes à Cheval" and the "Chevaliers Gardes" were at hand and ready, and the infantry was far behind. Three squadrons were dismounted. They fixed the bayonets, which the Russian cavalry carry, to their carbines, and under the fire of the two guns and of a distant battery, attacked the village in open order, and cleared it house by house. They lost two-thirds of their officers in the process, but still they advanced, charging over the open space upon the German lines. At the psychological moment a mounted squadron was launched on the two guns. It sabred the men who served them, and then wheeling round, crashed into the flank of the German infantry, as the three dismounted squadrons reached their front. The exploit was costly, but it was one of many minor achievements which set Rennenkampf's Army marching forward with the confidence of victory.

The general advance may be said to have begun on August 16, the seventeenth day of




GENERAL SAMSONOFF.
Killed in East Prussia.

the Russian mobilization. On the 17th the Russian van encountered the German 1st (Königsberg) Army Corps, which fought a delaying action at Stallupönen. It was a stubborn contest while it lasted, and the Germans claimed to have taken the improbable number of 3,000 prisoners with six machine guns before they fell back on Gumbinnen. Here was fought the first considerable battle of this campaign. The Russian advance covered a front of about 35 miles, from Pilkallen on the north to Goldap on the south. The centre followed the line of main road and railway from Stallupönen to Gumbinnen. The ground was flat and nearly featureless, a country of rye and potato fields, with scattered farmhouses, little villages and windmills. The Russian left had to clear and traverse the pine woods which stretch for many a mile east and north of the important railway junction of Goldap. The Russians had at their disposal four corps of the active army and two reserve divisions. The Germans had only one first line corps (the 1st) with two reserve corps, and were therefore outnumbered by at least five to three. They relied in this, as in all the fighting on the Eastern Front, mainly on their second and third line troops. A force so manifestly inferior could only hope to fight an obstinate delaying action. The dispositions in this battle presented few features of interest. It began on the extreme right of the Russian lines at Pilkallen. The little town was cleared without much difficulty, and the Germans who held it fell back south-westwards towards Gumbinnen. The main battle was fought next day (the 20th) before Gumbinnen. It is a picturesque country town, with many fine old gabled houses, dating from the early eighteenth century, when it was colonized by Austrian Protestant refugees from Salzburg. It had 14,000 inhabitants, and was distant 22 miles from the Russian frontier. General Rennenkampf's tactics were extremely simple. He had a numerical superiority which might have suggested the possibility of an enveloping movement. He preferred a straightforward frontal attack on the enemy's centre. The fighting began at dawn with an artillery duel, but the Russian infantry charged with irresistible ardour without waiting for much in the way of artillery preparation, and carried position after position by the use of the bayonet and the hand grenade. The Germans counter-attacked with stubborn courage, and some of

the ground changed hands several times in the course of the day. One German brigade was caught in a cross-fire of rifles and Maxims, and left 3,000 dead on the field. The fighting lasted fourteen hours, and it was only at nightfall that the Germans withdrew. The German wings held out longer, and von François (the general of Huguenot descent, who commanded the Königsberg corps, and its two auxiliary corps) may even have hoped to outflank on the north. A German cavalry division retook Pilkallen on the 20th. It was expelled again on the 21st by a superior force of Russian cavalry, and had much difficulty in rejoining the main army. Round Goldap also the fighting continued obstinately throughout the 21st. The 1st Corps, with its supports, had meanwhile fallen back through the town of Gumbinnen, and thence on Insterburg.

It is hard to say whether von François could have achieved anything by attempting a further delaying action in the prepared positions east of Insterburg. The place was an important railway centre, the junction of lines to Königsberg, Tilsit, Goldap, and above all the key of the vital south-western line to Allenstein and Thorn. It was a dignified country town, with a fine market-square, and about twice the population of Gumbinnen (31,000). It would have been worth much to delay *Rennenkampf* here, but the importance even of these railways might be exaggerated. The East Prussian system was so amply designed that Königsberg was still very far from being isolated, even when it lost touch with Insterburg. The Germans, moreover, had lost heavily in men at Gumbinnen, and they could not afford to repeat that loss indefinitely. The Russians took 12 field guns and 400 prisoners there, some of whom were Poles who boasted that they had not fired a shot against their brother Slavs. One notes the puzzling statement in the German official news, that von François on his side took 8,000 prisoners and some heavy guns. An army which elects to retire may none the less have achieved some local tactical success, but this German claim was improbably high. A retirement was ordained, but the Germans must have imagined that they had inflicted a severe check on *Rennenkampf's* advance. A notice posted up in Insterburg stated that the German troops must "obey a superior order to march elsewhere," but told the inhabitants that the Russians could hardly arrive within a week,



EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN BOMBARDMENT IN EAST PRUSSIA.

Top left : A wrecked street ; top right : The last German Patrol leaving ; centre : Prussian refugees leaving their homes ; bottom left : Barracks at Soldau ; bottom right : A ruined town.



GENERAL RENNENKAMPF (marked with a cross) AND HIS STAFF.
In a town in East Prussia.

and counselled them to remain in their houses and welcome the invaders with "hospitality." The Russians reached Insterburg in point of fact late on the 23rd, and by the 24th had occupied it in force. Henceforward Rennenkampf's advance was practically unopposed. His left wing pressed on from Goldap to Darkehmen, and southwards to Angerburg, on the edge of the lake country. Thence it followed the cross-country strategical railway Nordenburg-Gerdauen-Allenburg. On the north it held Tilsit, and the Tilsit-Königsberg railway as far as Labiau. On the main line to Königsberg it reached Tapiau. The northern portion of East Prussia was securely held as far as the River Alle, and Rennenkampf's cavalry pushed downwards as far as Rastenburg and Korschan Junction. The claim was currently made for it in the Press that it had "invested" Königsberg. It hardly did that, for it left open the vital Königsberg-Danzig railway. But certainly it threatened Königsberg, and might soon expect to be able to contain its garrison, and to press on towards Danzig and the Vistula. It held the main railway line, but the use which it could make of this facility was limited. The gauge of the Russian differs from that of the German railway system, and though some rolling

stock had been captured, it is not probable that it sufficed for all the needs of a great army. The prospect was dazzling, for the only considerable German force in this portion of East Prussia had been defeated, and no longer ventured to give battle. The retirement of von François from Insterburg had moreover been hasty, and the road to Königsberg was littered with quantities of abandoned material.

Meanwhile the Army of the Narew was advancing rapidly and successfully from the south. It was of about the same strength as the Army of the Niemen, and consisted of five army corps of the active army, and three cavalry divisions, and cannot have fallen far short of a total of a quarter of a million men. General Samsonoff had to operate in a much more difficult country than General Rennenkampf—the region of the Masurian Lakes. He advanced along three lines :

- (1) North-west by the Warsaw-Mlawa-Soldau railway ;
- (2) To Lyck by the Osowiec line, and thence by a detour south of the larger lakes to Johannisburg ;
- (3) To Lyck, and thence by a still wider detour above Lake Spirding.



THE FLIGHT FROM EAST PRUSSIA.

1. A home in the fields.
2. Refugees in Berlin.
3. On the way to Berlin.
4. On the road.



GENERAL VON FRANÇOIS.

The Russians found the enemy in very inferior numbers. In the early stages of this invasion only one corps of the active army, the 20th, was present in this region, but as it was stationed in times of peace at Allenstein, it had at least the advantage of familiarity with this difficult country. The German defence depended for the rest upon Landwehr troops, the middle-aged men of the countryside, called to the colours to defend their own soil. A brigade of Landwehr fought a delaying action at Soldau, and were of course forced back by superior numbers of younger troops. Neidenburg was next won. Allenstein was taken by the Russians after a stiff contest with the Landwehr. The hardest of this series of engagements was at Frankenau, where Samsonoff's right encountered the German 20th Corps, entrenched in strong prepared positions with rifle pits and wire entanglements. It held them for two days (the 23rd and 24th) and then gave way partly to the determined frontal attacks of the Russians, and partly to an outflanking march of the Russian right. Its retreat to Osterode was somewhat hasty, and it was forced to abandon guns, stores, and prisoners. On the same day that Rennenkampf entered Insterburg, Samsonoff had broken the resistance of the weak forces which

opposed the advance of the Narew Army. His cavalry swung round by Sensburg and Bischofsburg, as far as Rothfliess, a junction station on the main line, from which a branch line ran up to Königsberg. The main line was also held more solidly at Allenstein, an important junction and garrison town, an air-ship station, and the headquarters of the 20th Corps. The Russians, in short, had driven the enemy from all that part of East Prussia which lay east and south of the main railway line. On the north they were far to the west of it. Rennenkampf's front now faced south-west, on the line Friedland-Gerdauen-Nordenburg-Angerburg. Samsonoff occupied the triangle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau. The intervening space was over-run by their cavalry, which had nearly, but not quite, met. In a few days the converging invasions would meet, and two Russian armies totalling nearly half-a-million men would be threatening the lines of the Vistula. The Germans had lost the use of nearly one-half of their elaborate system of strategic railways, and the intricate defences of the lake-country had not availed to stay the invaders.

It was a black week for German confidence which opened on Sunday the 23rd. The invasion of their territory was a heavy blow to their military pride. They were now suffering something of what they had themselves inflicted on the Belgians. The civil population of East Prussia was everywhere fleeing before the invaders. The townsmen poured into Königsberg and Danzig. The peasants packed a few belongings in their carts and trudged the roads in vast disconsolate columns, impeding the movements of the troops and dislocating the supplies of food. Few of these fugitives waited for the appearance of the Russians: they fled from their own terror of the Cossacks. For the modern German the Cossack was still what he was in the days of the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic campaigns, a pitiless and undisciplined marauder. The usual tales of atrocity, murder, and mutilation were told with the usual levity. Some frontier towns were destroyed by artillery or burned as a punitive measure against civilian combatants. There were, of course, the usual requisitions of food. Some pillaging there may have been when houses were found deserted, but the German newspapers stated quite candidly that in the towns at least the Russians paid for what they took, and one case is cited in which a Cossack

convicted of robbery was promptly shot as an example. The Mayor of Insterburg, Herr von Sachs, wrote an article in which he condemned the senseless cowardice of the fugitives, and went on to eulogise the "civility and consideration" of the Cossacks, the respectful behaviour of the Russian troops generally towards women, summing up with a formal statement that to his personal knowledge the behaviour of the Cossacks towards the civil population was "exemplary and irreproachable." The panic, none the less, was general, and even Berlin was soon called upon to provide for many thousands of refugees, who arrived from the occupied territory. So little secure did the Germans feel, even on the lines of the Vistula, that the sluices at Elbing were opened and the country flooded. An almost pathetic telegram from the Kaiser reflected the general mood. It expressed his "deep sympathy" with his "loyal provinces of East Prussia" on the infliction of this invasion, and bade them "steadfastly believe in the help of the living God, who up to the present has rendered the German nation such wonderful assistance in its just cause and defence."

It was not until after the defeat at Gumbinnen that the Germans began to take the danger to East Prussia seriously. They were absorbed in their offensive in France, and they

had left only five corps of the active army (the 1st, 20th, 17th, 5th, and 6th) to operate on the entire Eastern Front. Of these the 6th (Breslau) was sent to assist the Austrians in Galicia, and only two (the 1st and 20th) were at this moment available in East Prussia. On Saturday, the 22nd, the General Staff realized that serious measures must be taken to stop the Russian advance, and a telegram from the Kaiser summoned General von Hindenburg to conduct them. He was waiting for the call, and on Sunday, the 23rd, he reached his headquarters at Marienburg, a fortress town near the mouth of the Vistula, on the extreme edge of the invaded province. He arrived when the German fortunes were at their lowest ebb, and the story of how within a week he turned the tide and achieved one of the few really decisive victories in this war makes a brilliant page even in the rich military history of Germany.

Paul von Hindenburg was, when the war broke out, a well-preserved veteran of sixty-seven, living in retirement at Hanover. He came of a typical Prussian family, and for two centuries his ancestors had served the State, as officers and officials. Their estate was at Neudeck in West Prussia, on the edge of the province which he was called upon to save, a place rich in memories of the Napoleonic wars—of a



COMMANDEERING.



GENERALS VON HINDENBURG (left) AND VON LUDENDORFF (right).

grandfather who had dealt face to face with the Emperor, and of a wounded French soldier who had been nursed back to health after the retreat from Moscow. The General's father was a regimental officer who retired with the rank of major, and he himself was born in the garrison town of Posen. The traditions of the family are described in an engaging and very simple-minded biography by the General's younger brother. They were based on that curious amalgam of piety, loyalty, and militarism which was the moral foundation of the Prussian "Junker" class. Paul von Hindenburg entered the Service at the beginning of Germany's period of military glory. He left the military college to serve as a lieutenant in the Austrian campaign, and was slightly wounded and decorated for gallantry at his

first battle. He fought in the French war at St. Privat, Sedan, and Paris. Thereafter, he served on the staff of the 1st Army Corps at Königsberg. Here began the studies which absorbed his mind for the rest of his military career. He was fascinated by the problem of turning the mazes of the Masurian lakes and swamps to account for the defence of East Prussia. On duty and on holiday he tramped every mile of the country, and knew to a nicety what gravelly shore would bear the weight of a field-gun, and which swamp would engulf a battery. He lectured on this subject at the Staff College in Berlin, and in later life successfully led the military opposition to a promising scheme launched by an agricultural syndicate for the drainage and cultivation of these invaluable marshes. His military career was one

of regular but not brilliant advancement, and he retired in 1911 from the command of an Army Corps. Of genius no one suspected him, and his powerful, square-cut face suggests rather resolution and method than inspiration. How far his brilliant success in East Prussia is proof of a military talent of the first order, how far it was the outcome of very special study and minute topographical knowledge, it is not easy to decide. He soon became the idol of Germany, but there were many who thought that a greater soldier than Hindenburg was his brilliant Chief of Staff, General von Ludendorff.

The strategical problem that confronted Hindenburg was, with very limited forces, and those largely composed of second-line material, to beat two armies which had nearly united, each of them equal to his own in numbers and possibly a little more than equal. Clearly he must take them in detail, before they supported each other. The essence of success was rapidity of movement and promptitude in assembling his forces. He set to work to gather all the men he could muster, but so sure was he of his stroke, that he did not wait to secure more than a local superiority in numbers against one-half of the enemy's forces. He resolved to deal first of all with Samsonoff's army, and then, if that first stroke should prosper, with Rennenkampf. His chief strategical asset was the superb railway system of Prussia. It worked night and day collecting an army for him, and one German war-correspondent described the congestion at the end, when a solid and uninterrupted procession of trains filed back and forward on the main line from Thorn to Osterode. The available resources in men were, however, very limited. On the spot was the beaten 20th Corps and its Landwehr supports. The next step was to bring down von François' army from Königsberg—the 1st Corps and its Reserve auxiliaries. Some part of it was left in Königsberg to reinforce the garrison, but the equivalent of two corps undoubtedly came down to join in Hindenburg's *coup*. A choice of railway routes was open to it by Elbing and Marienburg. The sea was also open to Danzig. The garrisons of Graudenz, Thorn, and possibly of Posen were laid under contribution. They probably consisted mainly of Landwehr troops, but they supplied what was at least as necessary as men—heavy guns. The Russian General Staff, according to the military critic of the *Russkoe Slovo*, reckoned that by these

means Hindenburg was able to gather nine divisions. That is a maximum estimate. Of these, seven divisions had already been heavily engaged, and must have been much weakened. Two consisted of fresh troops from the fortresses. Of these nine divisions (if there were so many), four only were first-line troops. Hindenburg had, in short, the equivalent of about four full army corps (at most 160,000 men). Samsonoff had five corps (over 200,000 men) under his command. They were somewhat scattered, and it is said that not more than three and a half corps (seven divisions) were actually engaged in the disastrous struggle among the lakes which came to be known as the Battle of Tannenberg. Where precisely the other corps and a half was posted (if it was absent), it is not possible to say, nor why it failed to come up to take part in the battle. The Germans in their official accounts stated emphatically that they had been dealing with a superior force of five corps. The Russian military critics were no less insistent that Hindenburg had much the larger force. It is not possible to dogmatize on the point, though one may note that even if Hindenburg had this not very large numerical superiority, it was nothing more than a local and temporary superiority, achieved at one point by his energy, against an enemy who outnumbered him by two to one. More than half his force, moreover, was composed of Landwehr formations, while the whole Russian Army was drawn from the "active" first line. A theory grew up that Hindenburg drew his army largely from the Western Front, and the estimates of the number of corps which were sent to him from Belgium rose steadily from one to five or even seven. These corps were never named or identified. The theory was based on the statements definitely made and published at the time that on Friday night, the 28th, German troops were seen entraining in Belgium for the East. At that moment Tannenberg was virtually won. If these reinforcements (whatever their extent) were destined for East Prussia, rather than Galicia or Poland, they must have arrived at a later stage, when the Germans had already crossed the Russian frontier. The probabilities are heavily against this theory.

Hindenburg handled his tactical problem as skilfully—as he had conceived his broad strategical plan. The Russians had advanced with very little forethought, for their easy



THE MASURIAN LAKE COUNTRY.

A German trench with barbed wire entanglements in front.

successes against an inferior enemy had led them to suppose that they had nothing worse to fear than a repetition of the same aimless opposition. They learned, as the fight went on, that they were dealing with larger masses of the enemy than they had yet encountered, but they realized too late that they were fighting against a well-conceived idea. They had some aviators, and an abundance of cavalry, but their intelligence department was clearly defective. Samsonoff's army was massed within the triangle Soldau-Allenstein-Frankenau. No attempt had been made to occupy the good road which ran from Osterode through Gilgenburg to Soldau, still less the two railways which fed Soldau from Eylau, Graudenz and Thorn. Von Hindenburg's first step was to occupy this road (much of it concealed by forest) and to make himself master of Soldau junction. This line was gained on Wednesday, the 26th, only three days after Hindenburg had assumed the command. It was a line easily defended, for there were marshes before it and a good road behind it. Above all, there were railways at either end of it by which its flanks could be reinforced. Samsonoff saw that the loss of Soldau might be fatal to him, for it cut him off from his own main line of retreat and supply. He tried on the 27th to concentrate his forces to retake Soldau, but the tract within his

triangle was ill-supplied with roads, his forces were scattered, and he could not convert his total superiority in numbers into a superiority at the threatened place. He dislocated his forces to defend his left, only to be driven backwards to Neidenburg, and still further isolated.

The German line was also active on its left. One of the hottest corners of the great battle was at Hohenstein. In this pleasant village of 3,000 inhabitants the Russians were in considerable force, struggling to break Hindenburg's line by forcing a way to the north-west. Their opponents were at first Landwehr troops, and the fighting lasted for three days (26th to 28th). It was decided partly by the arrival of heavy artillery, which battered the place and its outlying defences to pieces, partly by the coming of reinforcements of first-line troops from Allenstein, which the Russians had evacuated. Two days after the battle a German war-correspondent saw the streets still full of dead Russians and dead horses. The village was carried eventually by a bayonet charge. Some of the Russian defenders hid in its cellars; many surrendered; the remainder were driven back upon the marshes and lakes behind it.

On the 27th and 28th Hindenburg developed the more formidable part of his plan. He had already taken the first step to surround Samsonoff, by turning him with his right wing

at Neidenburg. He now gave his left wing an enormous extension. The Russians had abandoned Allenstein more easily than Soldau, failing to realize that it was the key to their position. The Germans thus regained the use of their trunk railway as far as Rothfließ, and eventually of part of the branch line which runs down to Passenheim and Ortelsburg. They did not rely mainly on the railway, however. They had also the good main road which runs beside it, and they used petrol to give mobility to their infantry. From all the towns within reach they had collected every conceivable species of motor-vehicle. Omnibuses, taxicabs, and tradesmen's lorries were loaded with all the human burden they could carry, to the number of many tens of thousands of men, with a due complement of machine guns. This novel motor-infantry swept round the Russian right as far as distant Bischofsburg. It took Wartenburg on the railway and then moved down the road to Passenheim, which was captured only after a bloody and determined struggle. The Germans now held three good roads which ran round three sides of the Russian position. They could move their heavy

guns upon them, and they flung their shells at will upon the Russian masses, congested and bewildered in a nearly roadless area of swamps and woods. It seems at first sight incredible that anything but a very superior army could surround another so effectually. The achievement is, however, by no means impossible in these conditions even for a numerically inferior force. Hindenburg was able, as it were, to multiply his forces, partly by his foresight in providing motor transport, partly by his skill in manœuvring to secure the roads. His minute knowledge of the topography of the district enabled him, moreover, so to utilize the swamps and lakes that he need hold only the solid intervals between them; while the unlucky Russians, ignorant of the country, lost entire batteries in the marshes, and were drowned as often as they were shot. By the 30th whole battalions and even regiments were laying down their arms, and the only question was how many could escape by the only road open to them, *via* Ortelsburg and Johannsburg. On the 31st, in a last effort to rally his men and organize the retreat, Samsonoff, who had borne himself amid the disaster with steadfast



GERMAN SOLDIERS IN TANNENBERG.



COSSACKS ENTERING LYCK, EAST PRUSSIA.

gallantry, rode with his whole Staff into a fire-swept zone. "My place is with my men," was his answer to remonstrances. He was examining a map, when a shell burst in the midst of his Staff. It killed him on the spot, and with him General Pestitch, his Chief of Staff, and several junior officers. His personal reputation suffered nothing in this defeat, and Russian opinion inclined rather to blame his colleague, General Zhilinsky, for the disaster. A Corps-commander, General Martos, was captured in his motor-car as he sought to escape. The Germans made in all about 90,000 unwounded prisoners in this battle. The killed, wounded and drowned must have numbered another 30,000 at least. One corps escaped intact before Ortelsburg was taken and the way of escape finally sealed, and with it about half of another. Isolated fragments of other corps or eavalry divisions are said to have broken away south to the Russian frontier, or north to join Rennenkampf.

Hindenburg had destroyed one of the two armies with which he had to deal. He had won the most complete victory which had so far fallen to any commander in any single battle of the war. His prisoners were as numerous as those taken at Sedan. He now

turned with hardly a pause for rest or re-organization to the other half of his task. He advanced, as rapidly as the damaged railways allowed, against the Army of the Niemen, northwards with a trend to the east. His aim was to strike up past Nordenburg, Angerburg and Goldap to Gumbinnen or Eydtkuhnen, in order to intercept Rennenkampf's retreat. The manœuvre failed in the sense that this Russian army was not cut off. It succeeded in the sense that the threat to its left and rear compelled it to fall rapidly back on its bases and reserves on the Niemen. The fighting nowhere amounted to more than a rearguard action, but it cost the Russians the loss of some 30,000 prisoners, captured in bodies of 500 or 1,000 at a time in isolated positions. It hurried their retreat so that 150 guns and great quantities of warlike material were abandoned on the roads. On September 11 the Russians evacuated Insterburg, and in a general order dated from that town on the 15th, General von Hindenburg was able to announce that Prussia was free from the last of the invaders, and that German troops had penetrated Russia. A Reserve army from Grodno, including a fresh corps from Finland and a fine Siberian corps, had been defeated with some difficulty at Lyck, and

again in a small affair at Augustowo. Suwalki, the administrative centre of the Russian frontier province, was occupied by the Germans, who set up a permanent administration, and allowed the wives of officers to join their husbands. The signs of over-confidence may be read also between the lines of General von Hindenburg's orders. He had achieved a brilliant success, which his under-estimation of the enemy was soon to neutralize. The obscure, retired soldier had become in a short three weeks the idol of the German people, and the Kaiser confirmed the popular verdict by making him a Field-Marshal and entrusting him with the supreme command of all the German forces in the East.

The dashing Russian invasion of East Prussia had failed, and had cost our Ally the loss of an army. It is easy to see, after the event, by what altered dispositions the mischance might have been averted. Samsonoff paid little attention to the enemy's communications, which he neither occupied nor destroyed, and Rennenkampf lost time in making contact with the Narew Army. The larger question is whether, in spite of the disaster, this great enterprise had a salutary effect on the Allied position as a whole. It is probably a mistake to suppose that it caused any direct and immediate transference of troops from France to East Prussia. But without a doubt it did indirectly contribute to relieve the pressure on the Western front. It demonstrated the power of the Russians to assume an early offensive, and forced the Germans to provide against its renewal. It led the Germans to regard the whole Eastern front with a new anxiety and a new interest. It was the starting-point in adventure after adventure, in which they hurled their forces on Warsaw, wasting their resources in the process. It was a shrewd blow from the left against a boxer whose whole attention had been directed to his right. It forced him at length to direct his energies to both fronts, and to meet the offensive by a counter-offensive. It was at once a challenge and a temptation.

The sequel of Hindenburg's East Prussian campaign was destined to tarnish its glory, and restore the prestige of the Russian armies. They showed, as they often did in this war, their steadiness and imperturbability under reverses, their ability without a sign of any loss of nerve or confidence to resume the offensive after a costly retreat, their skill in

taking advantage of the natural difficulties of their country to repel an invader. Suwalki was occupied by the Germans on September 15, and von Hindenburg, who believed that Rennenkampf's big army had been "not merely defeated, but shattered," left the actual conduct of operations to General von Mörner, who had served under him at Tannenberg. The order was given for a resolute pursuit, but it is probable that the Germans aimed at something more than this. If they could force a crossing of the Niemen, they might hope to cut the Petrograd-Vilna-Warsaw railway, and even eventually to work southwards, so as to threaten the great fortified camp of Brest-Litovsk. But if that supremely imprudent idea was entertained, it was soon abandoned. The Germans had no forces to spare for such an operation. They had during the brief Campaign of the Niemen at most four army corps at their disposal, as the French General Staff stated in an official *communiqué*, and these were largely Landwehr and mixed formations. Rennenkampf had saved his army intact, and got it safely across the Niemen by the 23rd. Here he could refit, and fill up the gaps in its ranks from his depôts. To it we must add the corps and a half which escaped from Tannenberg, a corps from Finland, and a famous Siberian Corps, both composed of fresh troops, together with heavy artillery from the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno, cavalry, and an unknown number of reserve formations. It was a formidable force, acting in its own difficult country, and it must have had a superiority of quite two to one. It had, moreover, gained in leadership, for General Ruzsky, the victor of Lemberg, a brilliant scientific soldier, had been detached to command the defence. The Germans no longer had their admirable system of strategical railways at their disposal. They did indeed adapt their own rolling stock to the gauge of the Russian system, but of Russian lines there were hardly any in this region. Their troops were fatigued with hard marching, and when once the frontier was crossed, they discovered that only a few of the better main roads were practicable for their heavy motor transport. Most of the roads were nothing but beaten tracks, which had never been macadamized, and became in a wet autumn impassable sloughs of heavy mud. The good causeways, as it happened, were often narrow defiles between lakes and swamps, where no army could deploy. To add to the misfortunes of the invaders, it rained



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VON MORGEN.

heavily for three days, from September 27-30, the critical period of the fighting.

The Russian defences were formed primarily by two rivers, the Niemen and the Bobr. The latter is an inconsiderable stream, of no great width, but it is 12 feet deep, and it runs through a swampy valley of immense and impassable marshes. Across these marshes there is only one good passage, the high-road and railway from Lyek through Grajewo to Bialystok. The crossing is defended by the little town of Osowiec, which ranks as a third-class fortress. It has solid concrete forts, and these were provided, after the outbreak of war, with a new type of heavy gun, whose performances surprised the Germans. They guessed that naval guns had been brought up from the fleet, but the weapon was in fact a new siege gun, recently made at the Putiloff works. The Germans made an effort to take Osowiec, but it proved itself a more formidable obstacle than Liège. A place with impassable marshes before it cannot in the ordinary sense of the word be besieged, and an assault along a single causeway would be an almost impossibly costly operation. The defenders further improved a naturally strong position by opening the sluices of the Bobr. The attack on this gallant little fortress

earned a singular distinction from the fact that, while it was in progress, first the Kaiser and then the Tsar visited the opposing camps. The bombardment began on September 27, and lasted for four days and nights without a respite. It destroyed some outlying villages, but did singularly little damage to the solid and well-built forts. The 17-in. howitzers made their appearance as usual in the newspaper accounts of these operations, but the probability is that the largest guns used were the more generally serviceable Austrian pieces, on motor carriages. The guns were pushed up to within five miles of the fortress, and the infantry lines were never nearer than four miles. The last episode of the siege was a brilliant sortie by the garrison. Bodies of infantry, by following paths over the swamps known only to the inhabitants, contrived to get behind the advanced German lines, both from left and right. Another body charged up the causeway, and before the Germans had recovered from their surprise, contrived to capture three of the guns, while the rest went hurriedly northwards. It was the last event of the siege, and a Russian *communiqué* announced its end on October 1. It was abandoned not merely because Osowiec had proved to be unexpectedly obstinate, but also because the larger German operations against the Niemen had meanwhile failed even more hopelessly. A fortnight later the Russians were themselves pursuing a prosperous offensive over the road by which the Germans advanced, and were on German soil engaged in an attack on Lyek.

By September 23, when Rennenkampf's rearguard crossed the Niemen, the Germans occupied all the chief strategic points in the country between that river and their own frontier. The struggle which went on during the next week is generally known as the Battle of Augustowo. The idea of the Germans was to cross the Niemen, and presumably to cut the railway at or about Grodno. The idea of General Ruszky was not merely to repel them from the Niemen, but to drive them back to their own frontier, and to disorganize their communications by seizing the little town of Augustowo—a place of no intrinsic importance, but vital because it is the point at which several of the few good roads of this region cross. A curious circular strategic railway runs from Grodno to Augustowo, and thence through Suwalki back to the Niemen at Olita. Neither side could use it, for both had damaged it, and

the Germans had no rolling stock. The chief physical feature of this region is the immense forest, 30 miles long and 20 wide, on whose western edge Augustowo is situated. Intricate chains of lakes stretch on either side of the road from Suwalki to Seiny, begin again south-east of Seiny, and are found on either side of the road from Surino to the Niemen. It is not a country for rash adventures, and the Germans were to learn in it the lesson which the Russians learned amid the Masurian lakes. Above all, the Niemen is itself a formidable obstacle. It is more than 200 yards wide; it is too deep to ford, and bridges exist only at Grodno and Olita, both of them fortified places. The defence had a further advantage. The right bank, which the Russians held, was high, and in some places might almost be called a cliff. The left bank, on which the Germans had to operate, was low, and, what was worse, it was in most places swampy.

The attempt to cross the Niemen was made simultaneously at two points. The more northerly of these was Druskeniki, about 27 miles north of Grodno. Here on the morning of September 25 the Germans constructed a pontoon bridge. The Russians on the steep right bank reserved their fire until a dense column of men was already on the bridge. Then from cleverly screened positions the Russian field guns and machine guns fell to work. The bridge was swept clean. The German guns were then brought into action and a long artillery duel followed. Thinking that their artillery had at last silenced the enemy's fire, the German infantry again crowded over the bridge. They met the same fate as their predecessors, and it is said that thousands of German corpses floated down the river. A third attempt was made, after a further artillery duel, towards sunset, and with more determination and still heavier slaughter. The Cossacks crossed at nightfall by the German bridge, and pursued the Germans over a distance of eight miles. Two divisions were engaged in this attempt, and they are thought to have lost fully half their effectives.

The other attempt was made nearer to Grodno, not far from the village of Sopotskinie, where the Dubissa enters the Niemen. Here the Russian heavy guns were posted on the cliffs of the right bank. The field guns were on the sandy shore below them. Across the river on the left bank was entrenched the Russian infantry, doomed to destruction if its defence

should fail, and resolved at any cost to deny the Germans access to the river. The artillery began to fire on the afternoon of the 25th, and all through the night the Germans repeated their incessant efforts to take the Russian trenches. Twice the sound of a Russian cheer mingled with the thunder of the guns, as the defenders delivered counter-attacks against the Germans. The enemy retreated at dawn, and the Russians as they pursued counted his dead by thousands.

The rest of the operations which made up the "Battle of Augustowo" were little more than a retreat by the Germans along the few practicable roads, harassed by the fire of the Russian big guns, and pursued as occasion offered by the Russian cavalry. There was some hand-to-hand fighting in the forest, in which the Russians showed their usual superiority with the bayonet and the grenade at close quarters. The decisive action was fought in the clear spaces round Augustowo. The Germans had disposed themselves with considerable skill on three sides of a square, so that they commanded the exit from the forest with cross fire. The Russians crossed the canal, executed a wide turning movement by the south, and eventually bombarded Augustowo from the west and north-west with heavy guns. The town was taken by the Russians on the afternoon of October 1, and the infantry pressed on by the roads to Raczky and Suwalki, clearing the obstacles of barbed wire and felled trees as they went. The possession of the roads that



GENERAL N. N. MARTOS.

converge on Augustowo settled the "battle," if one can use that word to describe these contests. Deprived of these roads, the Germans could no longer keep touch with their forces before Osowiec, and these at once retired. Nor could they any longer supply themselves from the strategic railway Lyek-Marggrabowa, which runs parallel to their frontier within it. Defeated at Augustowo and Suwalki, their scattered forces farther north, towards Mariampol, were compelled on October 3 and 4 to fall back towards the frontier, with the Russians pressing hard behind them. The stroke at Augustowo was well planned, and the whole series of operations was managed with a skill worthy of the reputation which General Ruzsky had won in Galicia. A week of hard fighting and hard marching sufficed to hurl the invaders back to their own country, their glory not a little diminished and their numbers reduced by a heavy tale of casualties. Some of the credit belongs to General Ruzsky, some of it to the swamps and forests of Lithuania, but the real hero of this battle was the Russian infantryman. First in renown was the famous 3rd Siberian Corps. Its men towered in height above the European average. They had developed in their winters an endurance which laughed at fatigue and exposure. Imperturbable under fire, they displayed an irresistible impetus in the charge. Their crowning exploit at Augustowo was a march of 30 miles, with a bayonet charge at the end of it.

A pause of comparative inaction at this point followed Tannenberg and Augustowo. Throughout October and the early days of November the Russians and the Germans faced each other in entrenched positions, which followed approximately the line of the frontier. The Germans dug themselves in elaborately, with all the paraphernalia of wire entanglements, concealed gun-pits and deep trenches. They attacked the slighter Russian trenches every night by a sort of habitual routine, with the aid of their search-

lights, but they evidently had no thought of advancing. The real fighting on the Eastern Front was now in Poland, and it is probable that von Hindenburg had transferred thither most of the first-line troops in East Prussia. Towards the middle of November the German defence weakened. The Russians were again attacking at Lyek, while on their old road in the north they had reached Stallupönen (November 14). Early in December they were slowly penetrating the maze of the Masurian lakes, and the Siberians were performing prodigies of courage against the elaborate obstacles with which their defiles were now defended. It was a war of trenches, and by sapping slow progress was made against the nearly impregnable German positions. They were weakly held by recent formations, and when the Russians took prisoners they were often mere lads of seventeen. Neither side could spare large forces on this front, and it was a desultory advance which wore down the resistance of a limited garrison. The Germans had forbidden their fugitives to return to the frontier regions of East Prussia, and so long as the Russians did not advance beyond Gumbinnen, Angerburg, Lötzen and Johannisburg the Germans seemed to regard their presence with equanimity. The Russians held this area with some vicissitudes throughout December, and no serious effort was made to dislodge them. The fortunes of war in this region were now fairly balanced. Von Hindenburg had indeed destroyed a Russian army in a battle which was perhaps the most decisive victory, as it was intellectually the most brilliant performance, of the whole war. His error of judgment in attacking the lines of the Niemen went far to neutralize that fine exploit. The soldiers' battle of Augustowo had wiped out the memory of defeat, and at the end of the year the Russians in this region could congratulate themselves that they had cleared their own soil and once more carried the war into the enemy's country.



CHAPTER LVII.

THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF GALICIA.

AUSTRO-GERMAN MISUNDERSTANDING OF RUSSIA—PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN—CROSSING THE FRONTIER—ADVANCE OF AUSTRIAN ARMIES—RUSSIAN COUNTER-MOVEMENTS—BATTLE OF THE GNITA LIPA—HALICZ—THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG—AUSTRIAN REINFORCEMENTS—RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH—RETIREMENT OF AUSTRIAN FIRST ARMY—THE BATTLE OF THE GRODEK LINE—RAWA-RUSKA—THE CROSSING OF THE SAN—JAROSLAU—SIEGE AND FALL OF PRZEMYSL
—END OF THE CAMPAIGN—BEHAVIOUR OF RUSSIAN TROOPS.

WHEN the Austrians began their operations against Russia on the Galician frontier they made certain vital miscalculations. They grossly underestimated the quality of the enemy with whom they went to cross swords. They counted confidently on having the sympathy of the Polish people against their Russian "oppressors"; and they were quite unprepared for the rapidity with which Russia succeeded in massing her armies against them.

That Germany and Austria should have failed to understand at its true worth the wonderful regeneration of the Russian Army which had taken place since the Japanese War is curious; for, though events, especially recent events in the Balkans, had subjected to considerable strain that "wire to St. Petersburg," on the intricate working of which Prince Bismarck set so much store, the German General Staff had every opportunity of being thoroughly informed on Russian military affairs. Their failure to anticipate the enthusiastic loyalty to the Tsar with which all the peoples of the Russian Empire threw themselves into the war was only symptomatic of

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the incapacity which the Germans had shown to grasp the psychology of any people but themselves. They looked for a revolt of the Poles against Tsardom precisely as they counted upon revolution in Ireland and the blazing up of sedition in India and in Egypt. In the case of Poland the stupidity was, perhaps, a trifle aggravated, because, whatever justification the Poles may have had for grievance against Russia, Germany, as Sir Valentine Chirol has remarked, "had oppressed her own Poles not less ruthlessly than Russia, but a great deal more scientifically."*

In the third of the prime miscalculations mentioned above—namely, as to the length of time which Russia would take before she could oppose any effective opposition to their plans—the Austrians had the excuse of the visible inferiority for strategic purposes of the Russian railway system as compared with their own. On the Austrian side of the international boundary two main lines of railway ran practically parallel to the frontier at no great distance away, well built, with abundant

* "Germany and the 'Fear of Russia,'" by Sir Valentine Chirol (Oxford Pamphlets, No. 14).



ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS JOSEPH
The Austrian Heir-Apparent.

connecting lines to the interior of the Empire, and with spurs running to the frontier itself at half a dozen points. On the Russian side the main line from Warsaw to Kieff *via* Lublin is on an average between 50 and 60 miles from the frontier, and only at three points do branch lines project into that intermediate space between Poland and the Bukowina. A spur from Kovel runs to within 20 miles of the frontier at Vladimir-Volynsk; and further east a line from near Rovno runs to Lemberg, passing the frontier at Brody, throwing off on its way a small branch to the southward as far as Kremenez, while the main international Kieff-Lemberg line crosses the frontier near Tarnopol. Operating under like disadvantages, there is no knowing how long the Austrians would have taken to push any considerable armies into the enemy's country. But the rapidity with which the Russians, moving independently of railways, covered long distances with great masses of troops was one of the most remarkable features of the war. The efficiency of their seemingly irregular road transport was the admiration of observers. The Russian peasant soldier, too, was inured to hardship and scanty fare. It seems, however incredible, to be a well-established fact that a large part of the

Russian Armies, that of General Ruzsky, in the campaign which we are now discussing, having outdistanced its commissariat, lived for some six days of hard marching and stern fighting entirely on apples which it stripped from the orchards as it passed. At the end of the six days it executed one of the most arduous and most brilliant strokes of the war. Such performances had been left quite out of the reckoning of the Austrian General Staff.

The Austrians thus miscalculated the spirit and capacity of the enemy opposed to them; and it is doubtful if the plan of invading Russia at the beginning of hostilities originated with or had the full sympathy of the Austrian General Staff. There is some evidence that they would have preferred to wait within their own territory and meet whatever troops the Russians sent against them on ground of their own choosing. The plan adopted seems to have been forced on her ally by Germany.

The invasion was not intended as a blow at the heart of Russia. The operation was of an offensive-defensive character, having for its chief object the detaining on this front of as large a Russian force as possible, so as to prevent it from cooperating in the resistance to the German advance in the north. The chief offensive was entrusted to the 1st Austrian Army under General Dankl, consisting of some seven army corps with various additional units, or between 300,000 and 400,000 men. From its base on Przemysl and Jaroslau its business was to push upwards between the Vistula, on the left hand, and the Bug, on the right, to Lublin and Kholm. Here it would cut and hold the Warsaw-Kieff railway; and the road would lie open beyond towards Brest-Litovsk and the main communications in the rear of Warsaw.

While the 1st Army thrust forward to this position it would be protected from attack on its right and rear from the east and south by the 2nd Army under General von Auffenberg, which, advancing north-east from Lemberg, would dominate Eastern Galicia from the Bug to the Sereth and the Dniester. The constitution of von Auffenberg's Army at the opening of the campaign is uncertain. It was stated to contain no more than five army corps with five divisions of cavalry. Probably it then amounted to about 300,000 men. Whatever may have been its strength at first, however, circumstances soon compelled a very large increase in its numbers, and in the course of

the fighting, as it developed, von Auffenberg seems to have had under his command at least six full army corps (the 3rd, 7th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th), besides the five divisions of cavalry and some last reserves; and he was reported to have no fewer than ten.

This increase was drawn in the first instance from the 3rd or Reserve Army, in command of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. This army, as an independent unit, took an inconspicuous part in the operations. While General Dankl was advancing on Lublin, with von Auffenberg protecting his right flank, the Archduke's Army seems to have been similarly pushed out on the left. Crossing the Polish border, it moved, without meeting serious resistance, as far as Kielce and towards Radom. That was as far as it was destined or, perhaps, intended, to go.

In these three armies Austria had immediately available about, or nearly, one million men; and it will be worth while to stop a moment to consider the position which would have resulted from the successful establishment of these three armies in their respective spheres.

When gathering their forces for the campaign on the northern front, the Germans had left troops at both Posen and Breslau, not less than one army corps at the former place, and apparently two, with some additional units,

at the latter. If their offensive on that front had been successful and they had reduced or penetrated beyond Warsaw, Poland would have been at their mercy. While General Dankl from the direction of Lublin was joining hands with the main German Armies in the rear of Warsaw, the Austrian Army of the Archduke, advancing from Kielce, would have had the assistance of the Posen-Breslau corps in taking care of any Russian force which remained on the left bank of the Vistula. Any Russian troops thus surrounded in Poland must either have surrendered or been annihilated. With powerful armies on three sides of it, Iwangorod could not have resisted long, and Poland would have been a second Belgium. By that time, also, it was hoped that the "smashing" of France would be completed and the two allies, with an unbroken front on a straight line from the Baltic to the Carpathians, could have given their undivided attention to proceeding against Russia, with no fear of a flank attack. This they could not do, either from the north or south, so long as Warsaw, Iwangorod and Brest-Litovsk remained as a base from which the Russians could strike in either direction. This we know to have been the views of the German General Staff. The Austrian advance, then, was part of, or auxiliary to, the German movement in the north.

The outbreak of war had been received in



RUSSIAN ADVANCE GUARD IN KIELCE.



RUSSIAN GUNS IN THE TRENCHES.

Vienna with great enthusiasm. Those who had any forebodings when it was known that the enemy was to be something so much more formidable than "little Serbia" were laughed at. Russia was huge but without coherence. It was preposterous to suppose that the nation which had failed against Japan would be able to withstand Germany and Austria combined. She was unready and would be beaten before her great shadowy forces could be brought into the field.

All analogy to the Japanese War, however, was made fallacious, not only by the regeneration of the Russian Army, which has already been fully described, but, still more, by the different spirit in which the new war was accepted by the Russian peoples. After the fighting on the Galician frontier had been in progress for two weeks a Berlin newspaper quoted Austrian officers as saying that "Russian troops are simply growing out of the earth, without interruption." It was true. In a nobler and more beautiful sense than either the Austrian officers or the German journalist dreamed, the troops did in very truth grow out of the earth. Whatever differences of race or creed or politics may have separated various

sections of the Russian people, they were united in one passionate sentiment of devotion to Russia—the great spiritual entity, beyond and above all creeds and governments, of which the material symbol was the Russian soil. All Russians loved the soil of Russia. It was the violation of that soil by the tread of the invader—the thought of its subjection to a brutal enemy—which enraged the people and aroused them to a unity of religious fervour as in a holy cause. It was the soil which bade them go to war. They "grew out of the earth."

In a series of striking letters* to *The Times* Mr. Stephen Graham described the extraordinary spectacle of the stirring of the Russian peoples as he witnessed it in Cossack villages on the Mongolian frontier when the great news came and "a young man on a fine horse came galloping down the village street, a great red flag hanging from his shoulders and flapping in the wind; and as he went he called out the news to each and every one—War! War!" From another angle another special correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Stanley

* Subsequently published in a volume under the title of "Russia and the World" (Cassell).

Washburn, was at the same moment describing what went on in St. Petersburg (as the town still was) and comparing it with what occurred at the opening of the war with Japan. In the former war "the peasants had to be driven almost at the point of the bayonet into box cars for shipment to Manchuria." Now:

Before the Winter Palace, the great red house of the Tsars, stretches an enormous semicircle, which forms one of the greatest arenas in Europe. This is what we see now: More than 100,000 people of all classes and of all ranks standing for hours in the blazing sun before the building within which is their monarch. Quietly and orderly they wait, without hysteria and with the patience so characteristic of their race. At last the Tsar, moved by the magnitude of the demonstration, appears upon the balcony overlooking the square. Instantly the entire throng sinks upon its knees and with absolute spontaneity sings the deep-throated Russian anthem. For perhaps the first time since Napoleon's invasion of Russia the people and their Tsar were one, and the strength that unity spreads in a nation stirred throughout the Empire, from the far fringes of the Pacific littoral to the German frontier.*

Of all this in those last days of July and the beginning of August, 1914, the Austrians knew nothing. They knew that Russia was a giant, but attached no importance to any attribute of that giant-hood except its unwieldiness and supposed sloth. All the best Russian troops had, moreover, it was declared, already been sent to the East Prussian theatre. It would be

* From the volume of Mr. Washburn's correspondence to *The Times* as republished under the title of "Field Notes from the Russian Front." (Andrew Melrose.)

long before she could marshal new armies to oppose an advance on the south. As a matter of fact, by the end of August Russia had, chiefly from the districts of Kieff and Odessa, brought into the fighting line on the Galician front about 1,200,000 men. Not only did they outnumber the Austrian Armies brought against them, but they excelled them in fighting power, and, even more conspicuously, they were better generalled.

The Grand Duke Nicholas and the Russian General Staff took accurate measure of the Austrian advance from the outset, and the operations with which they met it will stand as a model for similar campaigns, even as it produced, perhaps, the most gigantic and most desperate fighting which up to that time the world had seen.

Against the main Austrian advance of General Dankl with 350,000 men (roughly) of the 1st Army no serious resistance was immediately offered. It was allowed to come on almost to Lublin, to within 11 miles of which it at one time penetrated. We have seen how the 3rd or Reserve Austrian Army had been sent, on a quite futile errand, into Poland on the left side of the Vistula to push towards Kielce, while General Dankl went due north. There is very little information as to incidents on either of these marches, but that is immaterial. We know that Dankl's Army crossed



RUSSIANS ENTERING A BURNING TOWN IN EASTERN GALICIA.

the frontier, on a front about 11 miles wide, to the west of Tarnograd, on August 10. The frontier posts hardly stopped to have a brush with the Austrian advance cavalry before falling back. A second brush, but no more than a skirmish, occurred at Goraj, and something a little more serious at Krasnik. The Austrians seem to have thought that those wisps of troops which met them (even at Krasnik, of which the authorities in Vienna made much, there were only a few battalions) constituted the real Russian resistance, and they marched joyfully. They were going through a beautiful country, it was superb weather, and the enemy, after doing no more than delay them for a day or two, fell away before them, either behind the fortified position of Zamose (which the Austrians kept on their right) or back towards Lublin and Kholm. Everything tended to verify the expectations with which they had set out. Russia, for all her vastness, was unready; and war was a fine thing.

Meanwhile, on the line from Lublin to Kholm, Russia had been massing an army—or two armies cooperating as one—under the dual command of Generals Ewarts and Plehve,

though General Ivanoff seems to have been in supreme direction of the combined force. Here the Russians had the railway behind them, to Warsaw in one direction and to Kieff and Odessa in the other, and every day, as the Austrians drew nearer, their strength increased. By the first days of September the Russian force here probably amounted to upwards of 400,000 men. The Austrians were within 15 miles of Lublin before they met real resistance and General Dankl became aware that he had a worthy opponent in front of him. But it was not in the Russian programme to strike on this line—not yet. The Austrians found themselves checked, and then definitely held up, by forces at least as great as their own; and the Russians waited till news came that certain things had happened further to the south-west.

There, it will be remembered, was the Austrian second army under General von Auffenberg. This was not intended to be immediately an army of invasion. Von Auffenberg's task was to threaten, but probably not push much beyond, the frontier in a direction in which the fortresses of Dubno, Rovno and Lutzk lay in the path of an advance, besides



RUSSIAN SOLDIERS KISSING AN IKON BEFORE GOING INTO BATTLE.



RUSSIAN TROOPS ADVANCING THROUGH A POLISH TOWN.

Vladimir-Volynsk, a fortified position of considerable importance. His chief object was to detain in this quarter any Russian troops which might come up from Odessa and the east, and to protect General Dankl's right flank and rear. He was lavishly provided with cavalry, with which he proceeded at once to harry and raid the frontier at various points.

Even before Dankl had reached Russian soil spluttering hostilities had begun all along the Volhynian border of Galicia. According to reports received in St. Petersburg the Austrians commenced operations 12 hours before the declaration of war, on August 6, by firing on the Russian frontier posts at Woloczysk, where the Lemberg-Odessa railway line crosses the frontier close to the border of Podolia. They also blew up an arch of the railway bridge, but did not cross the frontier. A few miles to the south of that point on the same day, however, the frontier seems to have been penetrated in both directions by raiding parties in the neighbourhood of Tornoruda and Satanov. These affairs, however, were mere fireworks. More serious matters soon showed that the 2nd Austrian Army in this quarter was to find no such complaisant reception as was being

accorded to the early advances of the 1st Army further to the north.

On August 11 reports from Vienna spoke of a Russian cavalry demonstration, backed by machine guns, against Brody, a town on the Lemberg-Kieff railway a couple of miles on the Austrian side of the frontier. Two days later more significant news came from St. Petersburg. An Austrian advance in some strength had apparently been meditated in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsk, but before the Austrians could cross the border the Russian cavalry struck them, and struck unexpectedly hard, at Sokal, the terminus of the railway line to Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg. Two Austrian infantry battalions and three regiments of cavalry are believed to have suffered here very severely, and the Austrian force fell back towards Lemberg in some confusion. The news of the affair at Sokal caused great rejoicing in Russia. In view of the number of troops engaged, its importance seemed at the time to be exaggerated. But these were early days of the war. A success at this point, moreover, on the flanks of both Austrian Armies, had evident strategic value, and the Sokal incident was much the most important

that had yet occurred on this front. The Russian success in it was smartly achieved and excellently complete. It was then accepted as of happy augury for Russia; while to von Auffenberg it showed, at least, that the enemy was less unready than had been supposed.


Russia was very far from being unready. Four days after the Sokal affair it was officially announced from St. Petersburg that the general advance of the Russian Armies against Austria had begun, as it also began against Germany in the north, it being then the seventeenth day after mobilization.

The chief command of the armies on this front was in the hands of General Nikolas Ruzsky. General Ruzsky had been Chief of Staff to General Kaulbars in the Japanese War and had taken a conspicuous part in the reform of the Russian military system which followed. What was, perhaps, more important, he had been for some time commander of the military district of Kieff, where he had not only brought the organization to a high degree of efficiency and was worshipped by his men, but he had made it his business to render himself thoroughly familiar with the topography of this southern frontier country. He had here the advantage which von Hindenburg possessed in East

Prussia. There was probably no highly-placed officer on the Austrian side who knew the configuration of Galicia to the last stream and hill and by-road as it was known to the Russian commander. General Ruzsky was already known as one of Russia's most conscientious and most scientific soldiers. He soon showed that he was also pre-eminently a fighting general, with a capacity for hard hitting and vigorous initiative.

Cooperating with Ruzsky on his left was General Alexis Brusiloff, a typical cavalry officer, whose active service record dated back to the war with Turkey in 1877.

The total Russian force under these commanders was probably not less than 650,000 men. There were certainly twelve and apparently fourteen army corps, with several divisions of cavalry. Ruzsky, under his personal command, seems to have had eight army corps. Brusiloff had not less than five, with at least three divisions of Cossack cavalry. The practice of adding extra divisions to regular army corps, alluded to in a former chapter, makes it difficult to estimate the actual number of men composing a Russian Army, which, it may be added, is one of its objects. But Ruzsky in the 2nd Russian Army (the



OIL-WELLS IN GALICIA.



RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE HILLY COUNTRY.

1st being that under Ivanoff, with Ewarts and Plehve, at Lublin) had probably over 400,000 men, and Brusiloff, in the 3rd Army, little if any less than 300,000, composed of regiments drawn chiefly from Odessa and Southern Russia. Combined they had, perhaps, double the strength which at the outset von Auffenberg, with the 2nd Austrian Army, would have been prepared to oppose to them. As soon as von Auffenberg became aware of the strength of the Russian Armies against him, however, he drew on the 3rd, or Reserve Army (which, as we have seen, had been pushed into Poland as far as Kielec) for reinforcements. These troops, crossing the Vistula by means of bridges of boats at Josefow, hurried to join him, and when the battle was really joined the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Army was operating in close contact with that of von Auffenberg. In the combined armies on both sides there were engaged then, in the operations which followed, not less than 1,200,000 men, some advantage in numbers still remaining on the side of the Russians.

The Russian offensive definitely began on August 17. At the moment when General Dankl to the north, with the 1st Austrian Army, was finding himself held up in his progress towards Lublin, General Ruzsky threw the whole weight of his attack against von Auffen-

berg. The Russian plan of campaign was simple but admirable. With his superiority in numbers, Ruzsky could afford to aim at enveloping the enemy on both flanks. With the 2nd, and larger, of the two armies he flung himself, advancing along the railway from Dubno, at the Austrian left and centre, crossing the frontier on August 22 and occupying Brody with only trifling opposition on the following day. On the 22nd also Brusiloff, on his left, had crossed the frontier at Woloczysk, the frontier station on the Lemberg-Odessa railway. As the railway line changed gauge at the frontier, the Russian locomotives and carriages were of no service beyond it, and the Austrians, on the enemy's approach, had rushed away as much of their own rolling stock as they could towards Lemberg and destroyed what they could not take away. As has been explained in a former chapter, however, the Russians were perforce less accustomed to rely on railways than were their opponents, and as soon as they were away from railways they much exceeded the Austrians in mobility and speed of movement. A good wagon road ran parallel to the railway towards Lemberg, pushing along which Brusiloff's advance cavalry on the 23rd hustled the retreating Austrians, after some three hours' fighting, out of Tarnopol. The Austrians



M. KRAVCHENKO, THE WELL-KNOWN RUSSIAN ARTIST, SKETCHING A SUSPECT.

then fell back on the line of the Ztota Lipa, an affluent of the Dniester, which runs almost due southward, and on the 25th and 26th there was heavy fighting along this stream, especially around Brzézany.

Up to this point Brusiloff's Army had encountered only the resistance of small detachments of the enemy, frontier posts and bodies of skirmishers thrown out to delay its advance. No considerable force of Austrians seems to have penetrated here much beyond the Ztota Lipa, on the eastern side of which there runs a line of small hills, which offered an excellent defensive position. Here the Austrians had set themselves hurriedly to make field works, and they were still at work on the trenches when the Cossack cavalry came driving the screen of Austrian skirmishers before them. The position was too formidable for the cavalry to handle alone, and they waited for the main body of the army to come up. Even then the Austrians offered an unexpectedly stubborn resistance, and it took two days of sharp fighting before the position, which extended some 20 miles from north to south, was finally carried by direct assault, and the Austrians fell back, seemingly at moderate speed and in good order, in the

direction of Halicz at the confluence of the Gnita Lipa with the Dniester.

While Brusiloff was thus beginning to press von Auffenberg's right, Ruzsky was hammering his left and centre. Of the details of the fighting there we know little or nothing. After crossing the frontier at and between Brody and Sokal, Ruzsky's Army spread out on a wide front, the centre pushing straight for Busk and Krasne in the direct line towards Lemberg, while the right, advancing almost due west, aimed at driving a wedge in between the army of von Auffenberg and that of Dankl to the north, and pressed with all its weight on von Auffenberg's left. Meanwhile Ruzsky's own left felt its way southward towards a junction with Brusiloff. The Austrians were forced back in all directions, but slowly and resisting gallantly. On Ruzsky's right and centre, especially, it is known that the fighting was sustained and severe and accompanied by very heavy losses on both sides. In his army were some of the very best of the Russian first line troops, and narratives of those who took part in the operations showed that the Russians attacked every kind of position with the same recklessness, and the Austrians, though continually overpowered, fought desperately. The

attention of the Western world was at this time engrossed in the stirring events which were occurring in France and Belgium, and so little was recorded of the operations in Galicia beyond the mere statement of the successive steps in the Russian advance that the impression was created that that advance was an easy one. This is far from being the truth. General Ruzsky had a week of such stern fighting as would at another time have fired the world's imagination before he had succeeded in forcing his way through on the line from Sokal to Tomaszow on the right, and had driven the enemy's centre back to the Bug at Krasne and across the railway at Zlocow. By that time Brusiloff had carried the position on the Ztota Lipa, and his right came in touch with Ruzsky's left. With this juncture closed what may be considered the preliminary stage of the Lemberg campaign.

Von Auffenberg's Army as yet not only was not beaten, but it was hardly shaken. It fell back into the strong and carefully prepared line of defences in front of Lemberg, stretching over a front of some 70 or 80 miles, from near Busk in the north to Halicz on the Dniester in the south. Along the greater part of its length

this line ran through a broken region of volcanic hills, in places very irregular and containing extinct craters, ending to the south in a ridge roughly parallel to the course of the Gnita Lipa as far as the Dniester. The railway running due east of Lemberg skirted the northern end of this broken country. North of the railway the Austrian left rested on the river Bug and the lake district about Krasne. It was a line of great natural strength, and mile after mile of trenches with extensive barbed wire entanglements, and here and there strong fortifications of steel and concrete, made it a most formidable position to take by assault at any point. After the juncture of Ruzsky and Brusiloff, on August 26-27, the Russians lost no time in opening the attack along the entire front.

Knowledge of incidents of the terrific fighting which filled the following days is almost entirely lacking. What is known is that the Russians attacked with fury and with a disregard for life which undoubtedly cost them very dearly. Again and again bayonet charges were pushed home, and individual positions were taken and retaken. At the end of two days the Austrian front was still unbroken, but the battle was decided.



RESERVISTS IN VIENNA.

To General Brusiloff and his corps commander, General Radko Dmitrieff (the Bulgarian hero of Lule Burgas and Kirk Kilisse), belong the honour of the crucial and brilliant operation which determined the fate of the battle. After forcing the crossing of the Ztota Lipa on August 26, while his right wing made connexion with Ruzsky in the north, Brusiloff's left swung wide to the south as far as the valley of the Dniester itself. It must have been an extraordinary march. The country is rough, and not only devoid of railways, but almost innocent of roads. On August 30 the main body of this flanking force had arrived before Halicz, and on the following day the assault began. During that day more guns came up, and a furious and, as it proved, irresistible attack was concentrated on a point on the enemy's position near the little village of Botszonce. The Austrians fought courageously, and the condition of the field afterwards, the ground everywhere ploughed up with shell fire, and almost every yard strewn with fragments of projectiles and tattered equipment, showed how desperate the struggle had been. The Russian 9th and 57th infantry seem to have carried through the final assault with the

bayonet under cover of a very torrent of shell fire. Their losses were terrible, but by nightfall of August 31 a breach some kilometres wide had been made in the Austrian position.

Once the line had been pierced the entire Austrian right gave way. A last despairing stand seems to have been made in the village of Botszonce itself, but the Russian guns, pushing forward, unlimbered on the very hills on which the enemy had fought so stubbornly, and the centre of the little town was quickly reduced to a heap of ruins. The retreat of the Austrians at this point then became a headlong flight. As the Russian official statement worded it: "The Austrian Army temporarily lost all fighting value." The road, strewn with abandoned guns, transport, and all the flotsam and jetsam of a routed army, showed abundant evidences of a panic-stricken stampede for safety. On the scene of the fighting around Botszonce and Halicz the Russians buried 4,800 Austrian dead, and they captured 32 guns, some of which had been mounted in positions from which they never came into use.

At Halicz a fine steel bridge spanned the river Dniester, and the only thought of the extreme right of the broken Austrian Army



HUNGARIAN LANDWEHR STARTING FOR THE FRONT.



SUSPENSION BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED BY AUSTRIAN ENGINEERS.

seems to have been to get across this bridge. But the Russian cavalry was pressing close on the heels of the fugitives, and in such haste were the Austrian engineers to destroy the structure and stop pursuit that, it is said, one party blew up the bridge while another party was still at work mining one of the piers, with the result that all the latter were destroyed with the bridge. The only other bridge in this part of the Dniester, at Chodorow, was also destroyed, and the pursuit southward was checked until the Russian engineers could throw pontoons across the stream. This they succeeded in doing on the following day, when Cossack cavalry to the strength, it is said, of three divisions, crossed the river and caught up with the rear of the retreating enemy. Not much behind the cavalry followed some divisions of Brusiloff's infantry, which, without giving the enemy time to take breath, pushed on across the south of Lemberg towards Stryj.

Once the extreme right of the Austrian line was shattered, the whole line disintegrated rapidly; the more so as at the other extreme Ruzsky had also definitely attained the mastery. There also, while every mile of the Austrian front was being pitilessly pounded, a wide

flanking movement was being executed, enveloping the Austrian left from the direction of Kamionka. While one end of the Austrian line was broken, the other was being bent back. On the shortening front the triumphant Russians redoubled the fury of their attack, and soon the whole Austrian Army was in flight, and the great city of Lemberg was in possession of the Russians.

At many points the retreat of von Auffenberg's Army became a panic-stricken and disorderly rout, the misery of which was intensified by a succession of storms and drenching rains, by which much of the country was flooded. The Russians had suffered tremendous losses in the two days, during which they had flung themselves in a continuous succession of reckless charges against the Austrian positions. But those losses were nothing compared to what they now inflicted on the enemy. On September 2 the Grand Duke Nicholas was able to telegraph to the Tsar:

I am happy to gladden your Majesty with the news of the victory won by the Army of General Ruzsky under Lwow (Lemberg) after seven days' uninterrupted fighting. The Austrians are retreating in complete disorder, in some places running away, abandoning guns, rifles, artillery parks, and baggage trains.



GENERAL DANKL.


The victorious Russians pressed, almost literally, upon their heels. There seems to have been, in the first moment of defeat, no attempt at any systematic retreat or delaying rear-guard action, though it is said that the Austrians adopted the rather crude device of placing their Slav regiments in the rear. When the Russian pursuers discovered the *ruse*, they are reported to have endeavoured to meet it by using a high-angle fire with their artillery, so as to reach the Austrian troops beyond. If this is true, it would in a measure explain the enormous number of prisoners that were taken; and there seems no doubt that considerable bodies of the retreating troops did surrender very willingly. Austrians afterwards made complaint that they had been betrayed by their Slav comrades, just as, in the disasters which were to follow, Germans made similar accusations against the Austrians. The Russians appear to have taken no less than 64,000 prisoners, and the lowest estimate of the total Austrian losses (including killed, wounded, and prisoners) was 130,000, and some authorities placed them at nearly double that number. They were certainly very heavy.

There was at the time much criticism of the Austrian commander for failing to rally at, and hold, the city of Lemberg itself. The criticism

is unjustifiable. Though it is true that the position which had been so stubbornly defended was over 10 miles east of Lemberg, after the line was once broken the city was indefensible. We have seen how Brusiloff's pursuing army swept to the west of the city. Ruzsky was already closing on the place from the north. The inner defences were not such as to enable the city to resist for any length of time. To have attempted to hold it would only have been to surrender it to the horrors of bombardment, and to sacrifice whatever troops were left to defend it. It could not have interposed any material obstacle to the Russian advance.

Lemberg or Lwow or Löwenburg was originally Leopoldis, and was founded in 1259 by the Ruthenian prince Daniel for his son Leo. It had had a chequered and stormy history, having been captured by Casimir the Great in 1340, besieged by the Cossacks in 1648 and 1655, and by the Turks in 1672, captured by Charles XII. of Sweden in 1704, and bombarded in 1848. Capital of the crown-land of Galicia, it had grown to be a beautiful city of parks and wide boulevards, with three cathedrals, many churches, and important public monuments. It was the seat of a University, and contained a most valuable library of books and manuscripts, and many treasures of antiquarian and historic interest. After its evacuation in September, 1914, the Austrians explained that it was in order to save all these treasures from destruction that the place had not been defended. That may have been taken into consideration. Certainly, the civil population was strongly opposed to its being defended. That population was extraordinarily cosmopolitan, and contained many elements—a minority probably, but a very strong minority—whose sympathy was with Russia, and who welcomed the Russians with enthusiasm. What was more important, however, was that from a military point of view the attempt to hold it would have been futile.

Apart from the moral effect of its capture, the actual strategical value to the Russians of the possession of Lemberg was of the greatest. From it railway lines radiated in all directions, giving the captors direct communication, subject only to the inconvenience of the change of gauge at the frontier, with Kieff and Odessa, with their fortified positions at Dubno and Rovno and thence with Petrograd (the name of which had now been changed from St. Petersburg), with



THE AUSTRIAN FAILURE IN GALICIA.

1. Distributing bread to the poor of Vienna.
2. Types of Austrian prisoners.
3. Refugees in Galicia.
4. Austrian guns captured at Lemberg.
5. Austrian prisoners from Lemberg.

Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw. Immediately after crossing the frontier the Russians had begun to change a number of railway engines and carriages to fit the Austrian gauge, but not least welcome among the trophies which awaited them in Lemberg were thirty locomotives and an immense number of railway vehicles of all kinds. The Russians are said to have rushed the station with such rapidity that they caught trains loaded with war materials ready to steam out. The ability of the Russian Armies to operate and move about without the help of railways has already been referred to. Throughout this campaign hitherto the transport both of ammunition and commissariat had been conducted by road, independently of any railways, chiefly in carts drawn by the tough little Siberian horses. Few more remarkable incidents were produced by the war than the achievement, mentioned above, of Ruzsky's column, which for five or six days "lived on the country" in the form of the fruit of the orchards, or the feat of Brusiloff in striking at Halicz with the rapidity with which he did.

Not only was no defence of Lemberg attempted, but very few of the retreating Austrian troops passed through the city. Various stories crept into contemporary reports of hand-to-hand fighting in the streets. These seem to have been wholly imaginative. On September 3 the Russians entered the city

without a shot being fired and without any sort of disturbance or any excesses on the part of the victorious troops. The results of the great victory were communicated to the public in the following brief official announcement:

Seven days of the most stubborn fighting in Eastern Galicia have resulted in a complete victory for the Russians. Five Austrian Corps were completely routed, and are retreating in disorder westward, abandoning their arms and baggage.


Besides an enormous number of killed, the Austrians lost not less than 40,000 prisoners, including many generals. The roads of retreat of the Austrians are so encumbered with carts, guns, and impedimenta that the pursuing troops are unable to use the roads.

Panic is spreading among the Austrian troops. During the seven days the Russians have taken over 200 guns, several colours, and about 70,000 prisoners. Lwów (Lemberg) is in our hands.

The news of the victory was received in Russia with almost frenzied jubilation. Grand Duke Nicholas conveyed the information of the occupation of Lemberg to the Tsar "with extreme joy and thanking God." General Ruzsky received the Fourth Class of the Order of St. George for "his services in the preceding battles" and the Third Class for the capture of Lemberg. General Brusiloff received the Fourth Class of the same Order. Thanksgiving services were held throughout the Russian Empire to celebrate "the reunion with Galicia" and General Count Bobrinsky was appointed Governor-General of the province. Everywhere it was felt that the impor-



OFFICERS' QUARTERS IN AN AUSTRIAN TRENCH.



AN ABANDONED AUSTRIAN REDOUBT NEAR LEMBERG.

tance of the indirect effects of this victory, in the disconcerting of all the German plans on both fronts, could hardly be exaggerated.

It is now necessary to turn to the theatre of operations further to the north. Here, it will be remembered, was the scene of the chief Austrian offensive, by the 1st Army under General Dankl, who was believed to have under his command between 300,000 and 400,000 men. We left him, in the middle of August, hung up by the armies of Generals Ewarts and Plehve, which barred his way towards Lublin and Kholm. For the moment the Russians were content merely to bar his way. They were gathering strength, and waited their time to strike until Dankl's Army was safely cut off from reinforcements and until their advance would synchronize with the fruition of the advance of Ruzsky and Brusiloff on Lemberg. It was not until September 6 that a characteristically simple official announcement was made in Petrograd:

Our armies on September 4 assumed the offensive along a front between the Vistula and the Bug.

The announcement was received by the Russian people, flushed and rejoicing over the victory of Lemberg, with immense enthusiasm.

It will be remembered that in the advance of Ruzsky's formidable army, part of the Austrian Reserve Army, under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, had been hastily withdrawn from its position in Poland on the left of the Vistula, across the rear of Dankl's Army, to help General von Auffenberg. The Austrian General Staff, in a *communiqué* published on September 3,

referred to this movement as an "advance." It seems undoubted that even at that early date some German troops were also being brought up on the same errand. Part of the Austrian reinforcements were absorbed into the army of von Auffenberg and had shared his catastrophe. Part remained to screen Dankl's right flank. From this time onward, however, it is extremely difficult to trace the organization of the Austrian Armies, the fact being that, under stress of the emergency, that organization was continually changing. The plans of the campaign had been drawn up on the assumption of a successful and victorious advance. As soon as things went wrong, their weakness appeared. When Auffenberg's Army began to get into difficulties and its advance was checked, the gap between its left and Dankl's right and rear grew uncomfortably wide. The hurrying of the troops from the left bank of the Vistula was an effort to fill that gap. Then, as the Russian strength grew daily more apparent, an entire new Austrian Army was hastily formed, composed, apparently, of parts of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's (3rd or Reserve) Army, increased by two corps withdrawn from the Serbian frontier and some indeterminate number of German troops. This 4th Army, which appears to have been under the command of the Archduke, was hereafter spoken of in the Russian official announcements as the "Tomaszow Army." German troops from Breslau were also brought up to strengthen Dankl's left, which lay upon the Vistula at Opolie.



BATTERY OF HEAVY HOWITZERS.

During the last days of August and the first few days of September there was a good deal of confused fighting between detached forces on either side in the frontier region between Zamosc and Sokal. From Berlin and Vienna official claims were made to some minor successes, which a semi-official statement from Petrograd immediately declared to be "wilful falsehoods." Out of the mass of reports and contradictions, claims and counter-claims, all that emerges clearly is that the Russian wedge was successfully driven through to Tomaszow, where the Austrians suffered a severe and definite defeat, contemporary reports asserting that among their slain were two generals. From here the Austrians seem to have fallen back to the swampy country about Bilgoraj and upon Tarnograd. These Russian successes put a final barrier between the two great sections of the Austrian forces. All interest now centred in the fate of Dankl's 1st Army.

The fighting on the Lublin-Kholm front, entirely defensive at first on the part of the Russians, had grown sterner day by day until it became one continuous battle along the whole line. With the defeat of von Auffenberg, and the threat to its right and rear, the situation of the northern army became so evidently critical that it was necessary for General Dankl to force a decision. Either he


must break through the Russian defence or fall back. A last desperate effort to pierce the wall of resistance between Lublin and Kholm was made on September 2, when the 10th Austrian Army Corps led the attack against the weaker portion of the Russian line, and it appears to have reached to within 11 miles of Lublin. There it was beaten back with heavy losses. In the retirement 5,000 prisoners were left in Russian hands. With this effort the Austrian offensive spent itself, and the game passed into the enemy's hands.

The Russian offensive definitely began, we have seen, on September 4; and it began auspiciously. "The enemy's centre, lying in the region west of Krasnostaw," said the imperturbable Russian official announcement two days later (Krasnostaw being almost due north of Zamose, about half-way to the centre of a line drawn from Lublin to Kholm), "was particularly disorganized. The 45th Austrian Regiment was surrounded and surrendered, including the colonel, 44 officers, and 1,600 men." The same announcement contained the interesting information that "a German Division, coming to the relief of the Austrians, was attacked on the left bank of the Vistula." The Russian troops there must presumably have come from Iwangorod. But Russian armies were indeed "growing out of the

earth": and nothing is more striking in the whole of this Galician campaign than the accuracy with which the Russian General Staff took the measure of their enemy's strategy at every point, and the promptitude with which it met and countered each move.

When once the Austrian 1st Army had started to retreat it was given no rest, and it is impossible to regard this phase of the operations in Galicia without profound sympathy with Dankl's Army and some admiration for it. In some ways it might be compared to the falling back of the British Army from Mons. There was not, however, on any part of the Austrian front the same terrible pressure from a hopelessly overwhelming force. There is good evidence indeed that over much of the front—the Austrian right-centre—the Russians were in a numerical inferiority. That was immaterial, however, retreat being necessary to the Austrians as the only alternative to being left isolated and ultimately destroyed. As in France, the movement was strategically obligatory in conformity with the movement of another army, which army was also falling back from the right. And the spectacle of the

Austrian retreat is made the more dreadful by the mere size of the army. The front on which the army of something over 300,000 men lay extended was approximately 80 miles. As it fell back, the left wing hemmed in by the river Vistula and the right subject to continuous pressure from the Russian forces to the east, where swampy country, moreover, barred a direct retreat, this front was continually contracting. By the time the army reached the San, the crossing of which, so far as the bulk of the force was concerned, had to be made by some four or five bridges at different points, the front had contracted to less than 40 miles. That such a movement might easily have degenerated into a panic, accompanied by awful slaughter, until the whole army had either been obliterated or had surrendered is evident. In Russia some such termination to the incident was looked forward to with something like confidence, and it was evident that in other countries also the fate of the Austrian 1st Army was regarded as practically sealed. General Dankl deserves full credit for, at least, escaping this final catastrophe, however serious his losses were.



AUSTRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN.

The high-water-mark of the Austrian advance on this front would be represented by a line drawn from Opolie on the Vistula, through Krasnostaw to Grabiowiec, whence the line curved southward in the direction of Tyszowce, in the region of which place it was that the Austrian General Staff had claimed one of the successes which Petrograd had so promptly denied. We have seen how the Russian advance against this front, from the direction of Lublin and Kholm, had begun with the "disorganization" of the Austrian centre at Krasnostaw. The next blow was delivered at the Austrian left, beginning at Opolie and thence developing all along the line to Turobin. With sound strategy it was on this wing of the Russian Army that the chief strength had been concentrated, leaving other parts of the line, as has already been said, comparatively weak. All new troops that came up had been hurried over to the right wing, on the reasoning that, even if the Austrians succeeded in breaking through the front where it was weaker, near Kholm, it would only make their being ultimately surrounded the more certain.

The Russian attack on this Opolie-Turobin section of the line seems to have been irresistible, the enemy being driven southward, parallel to the course of the Vistula, in confusion. Many of the fugitives threw away their arms in panic, and for nineteen miles the Russian cavalry was busy with the demoralized rear-guard of the flying enemy. From here on, it was a continual running fight, the Russians never ceasing to press, the Austrians defending their rear as well as they could while making all speed to get away, and they were now traversing again under vastly different circumstances the country over which they had advanced so easily and so triumphantly two or three weeks before. There seems to have been particularly desperate fighting at Suchodola and again at Krasnik, where two German Divisions appear to have been engaged, the officers of which afterwards declared that the Austrians broke and deserted them. At Frampol there is record of a brilliant Russian cavalry charge. Thence the Austrian left was forced back into the morasses about Bilgoraj, while the right and centre were crowded together as they neared the river San. By this time 10,000 prisoners had been sent back to Lublin. At Frampol one Cossack regiment is said to have captured 17 Austrian officers, 445 men, and many horses belonging to a trans-



COUNT BOBRINSKY,
Russian Governor-General of Galicia.

port train. At a point below Zamose one Russian infantry regiment took 700 prisoners, including many officers. One Russian subaltern with three orderlies is said to have taken 80 prisoners, and a spectator spoke of the Austrians as "surrendering in companies and battalions." Among the booty taken hereabouts was the treasure chest of the 17th Regiment of the Landwehr, containing 140,000 crowns. Such details give an idea of the character of the retreat, on which the Austrians are said to have suffered badly from dysentery, as was shown by the number of patients in the hospitals in towns which were occupied by the Russians.

It is necessary to stop here for a while in the narrative, because contemporary writers on this phase of the campaign developed a theory of what was known as "the battle of the Grodek line." It was declared that somewhere about Bilgoraj Dankl's retreating army got in touch with von Auffenberg's left and, uniting with it, rallied and took its place in the northern section of a carefully prepared line of defence which reached, from somewhere about this point, through Rawa-Ruska to Grodek at the extreme south. It was asserted that on this line both the shattered Austrian Armies pulled themselves together and again



A RUSSIAN SEARCHLIGHT.

offered a firm and united front to the enemy. Against them, it was said, the whole combined Russian Armies also fell into line, so that about 2,500,000 men confronted each other and then joined battle along their entire front. This is only very partially true.

While von Auffenberg's Army had been holding the position before Lemberg, there had, indeed, been prepared a new line of defence in its rear, which ran from Grodek to Rawa-Ruska, and thence, apparently, along the railway line towards Narol. It was a fine achievement on the part of an army which had been handled as roughly as this had been to pull itself together at once after a precipitate flight and resolutely take up this new position. Very probably, also, as the Russian wedge driven in between the two armies at Tomaszow had not as yet, apparently, penetrated as far as Tarnograd, the extreme left of von Auffenberg's forces, or those of the Archduke, which prolonged von Auffenberg's front at this point, may well at some time have been in momentary touch with the fringe of Dankl's Army on its way to the San. But there was at no time any definite and combined stand. The great mass of Dankl's Army fell back without pause, anxious only to get across the river. None the less, the "battle of the Grodek line," even though Dankl's Army must be excluded from any participation in it (as also must the pur-

suing Russian Army), was one of the great episodes of the campaign.

We do not know the extent of the reinforcements which had been sent up from Austria or what the "stiffening" of German troops amounted to. According to some accounts, von Auffenberg had no fewer than ten army corps under him around Lemberg. The total losses to the Austrian Armies by this time must have exceeded 200,000 men. But it was also said that additional troops, both German and Austrian, from Przemysl, had been hurried up after the fall of Lemberg into the position at Grodek, and that the troops which the Russians met there were largely new regiments which had not gone through the disheartening experiences of the campaign. It may well be that from Grodek to Rawa-Ruska and beyond there were engaged on this line in the combined armies on both sides over 1,250,000 men. The length of the line was about 60 miles, but over much of this distance the fighting was unimportant, as the struggle concentrated more and more on certain crucial points. The two most critical of these points were Grodek on the extreme south, where the Austrians occupied a position of great strength, and Rawa-Ruska.

The Austrians had the advantage of occupying positions which, if hastily, had been efficiently prepared since, and, perhaps, in anticipation of a retreat, before the battle of Lemberg. Their right at Grodek was protected by Nature against a turning movement, and they had good railway communications in their rear. On the other hand, they had already in the mass, if not all regiments individually, been defeated, while the Russians were confident and flushed with victory. On the whole front the Russians also appear to have had a numerical superiority. They attacked at all points with the same conquering impetuosity as they had shown since the beginning of the war.

The battle was joined first round the positions at Grodek, into which the Austrians had retreated, or been driven, immediately after the capture of Lemberg. It was the extreme north of the line, however, which first began to give way. The Austrians were unable to make any prolonged stand here, where the enemy, besides attacking furiously from in front, proceeded to envelop their left. The fighting here went on confusedly over a wide area. Of it we have only fragmentary glimpses of scattered units struggling in a broken and

marshy country. We know that at several places considerable numbers of Austrian prisoners were taken, and, long afterwards, the Russians were finding Austrian guns and batteries entangled in the swamps. In the result, this upper part of the Austrian line was steadily forced back, fighting desperately as it went, until the whole line became doubled back on itself at an acute angle from Rawa-Ruska. At this point the fighting was of a truly terrific character.

The town of Rawa-Ruska was a typical small Galician city, chiefly populated by Jews. Most of the town was very old, but a modern settlement had grown up near the railway station, for Rawa-Ruska was one of the important railway centres of this portion of Galicia. Two lines here crossed one another, one running north-westerly from Lemberg to the Polish frontier at Narol, the other a branch of the main line to Cracow, from a point near Jaroslau to the frontier at Sokal. Big railway works and round houses, besides extensive sidings and storage yards, made it an important centre of communication. To the east of the town a number of low-lying ridges commanded the approach from every direction except the

west. Both for its strategic importance and its defensibility, it was evidently marked out as a place to be held if possible, and as the northern wing of the Austrians was forced back, the fighting here became more and more acute.

It is not often that on the vast, extended front of modern battlefields one can put one's finger on any point and say: "Here the battle was decided." But in this battle of the Grodek line Rawa-Ruska was such a point. One can even pick out one bit of land, only ten acres, which was the key to the entire position. As the whole huge battle began to develop, the importance of this small area became accentuated, and it is probable that in the whole war there was no more bitter and furious fighting waged in such a small area as occurred around Rawa-Ruska, and especially on these bloody ten acres.

The defences on the point of the angle of the Austrian line, just behind which nestled the little Galician city, probably did not have a front exceeding six or, at most, eight miles. Yet we are told that for eight days between 250,000 and 300,000 men fought here continuously both night and day. After two days the Russians concentrated on the angle, the very apex of the whole, which had its point on



AUSTRIAN TRENCHES, SHOWING COVERED SHELTERS AND TRAVERSES.

the bluffs at the edge of the ten acres. What happened there was hardly less to the credit of the Austrians than it was to that of their victorious enemy. In view of the rapidity and comprehensiveness of the Russian successes in Galicia, there had been a tendency everywhere to decry the valour of the Austrian soldiery. The Germans seem to have shared this view. As a matter of fact, whatever shortcomings there may have been in the organization or the strategy of the Austrian Army, there was abundant evidence from a score of battlefields in Galicia that the men fought gallantly. Nowhere was the evidence more convincing than here in this angle at Rawa-Ruska. A special correspondent of *The Times* inspected the battlefield very shortly afterwards, and described it in detail.

For eight whole days the Russian infantry assaulted and stormed against the heights that defended this angle. The Austrians in a single mile made stands at no fewer than eight distinct points. Some of these were taken and retaken several times before being evacuated, and their evacuation then spelled only a retreat of a few hundred yards and a more determined resistance. There is one incredible position which the enemy held in a stubble field for hours, while a better position was being dug a few hundred yards behind in a small dip in the ground.

For a mile or more across this field one could trace where the Austrian line had lain, for there was not a yard unmarked by bloody bandages, relics of equipment, and exploded shell fragments, while so thick had been the rain of shrapnel that from almost every clod of earth broken in the hand it was possible to sift out a few of the little leaden balls. The reputation of soldiers who could lie in that hideous place needs no defending.

Two or three hundred yards behind this line, just over a small swell in the ground, is another line, this time of fairly deep trenches, and here the Austrians held on for several days. At one time the Russians took the trench, but were not strong enough for the moment to push beyond it, so they dug themselves in on their side, only to be dislodged again on the next day by the Austrians. So one saw the curious sight of a ridge of earth with a trench on each side, the one filled with Russian rems and the other with Austrian.

Once it became evident, however, that this was the strategic centre of the whole conflict, the Russians were not to be denied, and so, day after day and inch by inch, they drove back the Austrians until at last they had them in a deep trench on the slope of the crest of the final ridge of hills defending the town itself. Just over the ridge were concentrated the Austrian



SHELLPROOF TRENCH.



LEMBERG MARKET.

batteries. Standing on the gun positions one could, with a pair of field glasses, pick out distinctly the eight lines of defence which the Austrians tried to hold and the Russians had taken. But with their recoil the resistance of the blue-clad soldiers became more and more desperately stubborn. The last trench was not above 400 yards in front of their own guns, and the Russians seem to have been quite unable to make any headway against it until they brought up and massed a number of batteries of their heavy field howitzers. Then, deliberately, in a patient and painstaking way, they proceeded slowly but surely to destroy with their big shells the entire front of the Austrian position. It was possible to read the evidence of this operation afterwards, not in the trenches, for it was hard to see where they were, but in the unbroken line of shell holes, each 10 feet across and 5 feet deep, which extended for hundreds of yards along the former Austrian line. A man could walk for nearly half a mile stepping from one crater to another, while the ground in and between and all around was strewn with shreds and patches of blue uniform, with fragments of equipment and relics of humanity. Here a clenched hand, there a foot sticking out of a boot, and, again,

a soldier's overcoat ripped into ribbons, told what sort of execution the Russians howitzers did when once they came into action.

Yet, in spite of it all, it seems that the Austrians stayed on here for above a day, when at last, at the point of the bayonet, the Russians carried the whole crest of the hill and captured the few guns which had not already been put out of action. This was the decisive moment in the whole great conflict on the Grodek line, and when the grey-clad soldiers of the Tsar swept over this ridge the issue of the day was settled. From the centre, in those bloody ten acres, now strewn with dead and wounded men and mangled horses (for an effort had been made to support the position with mounted infantry), the Russian wedge spread north and south, and by nightfall the Austrian centre was broken and the Russians were dropping shells into the outskirts of Rawa-Ruska. Behind the shells came the ardent Russian soldiers with such promptness as to make any attempt to rally and hold the town itself impossible. According to the Russian official statement, the booty captured at Rawa-Ruska included 30 guns, 8,000 prisoners, and "enormous stores of ammunition and food."



A RUSSIAN PATROL.

Even had the Austrians been able to hold Rawa-Ruska against the direct Russian attack, however, it could not long have delayed the inevitable issue of the great battle. Already events were shaping themselves on the southern end of the line in such a way that the position of Rawa-Ruska would have been enveloped on the rear, and its defenders must have been surrounded and either annihilated or captured.

On September 8 the Russian official *communiqué* announced that "our armies attacked strongly fortified positions at Grodek." Apparently these attacks began as early as September 6, when the Russian northern army was engaged in driving the enemy back from Frampol to Bilgoraj. The defences of Grodek, including the position at Sadowa-Wisznia, were reported to be very strong, being protected by a series of six connecting lakes and much marshy ground cut up by dykes. The Russians were under General Brusiloff, who repeated here the tactics of massed and continuous assault with which he had overcome the Austrian resistance at Halicz. The Austrian position was on a cluster of wooded hills, to reach which the Russians had to cross a plain some three miles wide in a series of parallels under machine gun and rifle fire. It was only after five days' fighting that they succeeded in attaining a position from which their guns could effectively reach the Austrian trenches. These, when finally cleared with

the bayonet, were found to be almost choked with dead bodies. Austrian prisoners declared that they had had no regular supplies for four days, but had lived on wild pears and raw potatoes while they fought from the trenches, the living lying alongside decaying corpses, for the Russians had given them no time, night or day, in which to bury their dead. These are all the details which we have of what must have been truly terrible fighting, the successful issue of which was communicated to the world on September 14 in one of the simply-worded and restrained announcements in which the Russian Headquarters Staff habitually conveyed the news of most momentous events:

The army of General Brusiloff, against whom the Austrians made their last desperate onslaught, has on taking the offensive captured many guns, prisoners, and artillery parks, the numbers of which are now being reckoned. General Brusiloff testifies that his troops displayed the highest energy, stanchness, and gallantry. The corps commanders calmly and resolutely directed their troops and frequently wrested the victory at critical moments. General Brusiloff specially mentions the distinguished services of General Radko Dmitrieff."

From the references to the "desperate onslaughts" of the enemy and to "critical moments" we can gather something of the stubbornness of the fighting of the eight days since the attack on Grodek began. In a campaign on a less gigantic scale, less crowded with dreadful and sanguinary incidents, the carrying of the defences of Grodek would have stood out as an event of the first importance. It

will come to be recognized as one of the brilliant and critical episodes of the war. At the time, on the day following the unassuming communication quoted above, the Grand Duke Nicholas merely announced that, "The Russians, after occupying Grodek, reached Mocziska, and are now within one march of Przemysl."

At the same time, while Brusiloff's centre was "reaching Mocziska" (about 40 miles west of Lemberg), his left was pushing south-westerly along the railway line to Sambor, and on to Chyrow, which latter place, however, was not occupied until September 24, thus isolating the fortress of Przemysl from the south. Brusiloff's men, when Grodek fell, had been fighting and marching continuously for more than three weeks. They had already performed extraordinary feats of endurance, but they hunted the flying Austrians from Grodek with the same pitiless impetuosity as they had displayed in hunting them from Halicz.

Meanwhile, further north, as we have seen, Rawa-Ruska had fallen. Ruzsky was not, any more than Brusiloff, the type of commander to give a beaten enemy any rest, and while the latter was driving the Austrian right from Grodek to Chyrow on the south of Przemysl, Ruzsky, with equal vigour, was following up his success and sweeping the shattered remnants of the army which had opposed him along the railway towards Sieniawa, which was occupied on the same day, September 18, as Brusiloff captured Sambor, and Jaroslau, which latter place was carried by assault on September 21.

On the way there was heavy fighting around Javorow, 15 miles east of Przemysl, when the Russians claimed to have captured 5,000 prisoners and 30 guns. Thus Przemysl was cut off on the east, north, and south, and behind its defences the remnants of von Auffenberg's Army took refuge.

Events no less momentous, and equally disastrous to the Austrian arms, had also been going on where Dankl's Army had been falling back before Generals Ewarts and Plehve. We have seen that the continuity of the Austrian line of defence had not been made good in the region north-west of Rawa-Ruska, though it extended beyond the frontier between Tomaszow and Tarnograd. After the battle at Tomaszow the line of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand above Rawa-Ruska to that point had been bent back on to the Rawa-Ruska-Jaroslau railway, while the main body of Dankl's Army was falling back to the line of the San. The Russian pressure on its rear never relaxed. That pressure was particularly severe from the Russian right, which, after clearing the Opolie-Turobin district, had fought the battle of Krasnik. The greater part of the



AUSTRIAN TELEGRAPH CORPS.



LOADING A RUSSIAN GUN.

Austrian troops crossed the San close to its junction with the Vistula, and they must have hoped that while they, on the other side, would be in touch with the Austrian railways, the river behind them would form a barrier against their pursuers. But the operation of crossing was to cost them dearly.

Foreseeing the necessity of falling back across the San, General Dankl had, it seems, been sending his transport back in advance of his retreat almost since the retirement began. Some of the transport trains had been seen and shelled from the left bank of the Vistula as early as September 9. It was not until September 12 that the army itself reached the banks of the San. While the main body and the baggage were getting across, two strong rear-guards, to north and east, were left to hold back the pursuing Russians. One of these rear-guards had its left protected by the Vistula, the other's right was protected by the San; the two forming a bow or arch between the two streams. Attack on their front was made difficult by marshy ground. They seem to have been quite unable, however, to withstand the Russian assault, which pierced the screen long before the crossing of the river was completed. An immense number of prisoners, said to have been 30,000, fell into the Russian hands, and there was terrible loss of life as the

Russian artillery came up and shelled the bridges over which the Austrians were pressing in solid masses. Besides those killed by shell fire, many are said to have been forced into the river and drowned.

Nor did the Austrians find any rest on the further side of the river. In theory, the forcing of the passage of the San by an army invading Austria should have been an almost impossible task. The Austrians had spent immense sums of money in the endeavour to make it so. The upper, or southern, part of its course was protected by the immensely strong position of Przemysl and by Jaroslau. Thence a light railway, built purely for strategic purposes, ran parallel and close to its left bank almost to its confluence with the Vistula. At various places, as the Austrians fell back, they destroyed the bridges behind them. Had they destroyed them all, the 1st Army would have had at least a few days' rest. But the Russians in their advance were too swift. By a brilliant stroke they rushed, captured and made good their hold on the bridge at Krzeszov, on the frontier a few miles west of Tarnograd. In the words of an official *communiqué* from Petrograd "the Russian soldiers leaped across the river on the very shoulders of the retreating enemy."

This victory on the San, with the crossing of

the river, stands out as one of the conspicuous achievements of the campaign. What the Austrian losses were, in addition to the 30,000 prisoners taken, there is no way of estimating, but they were very heavy. What was more important was that the barrier which the Austrians had hoped to interpose between themselves and their ruthless enemies had failed them. Except that they were now in touch with their railways and within reach of safety, at least for the moment, under the shelter of Cracow, there was no more respite for the Austrians within the "riverine triangle" formed by the Vistula and the San than there had been above it. Within that triangle the Russians seized a prodigious amount of war material, supplies, and booty of all kinds. With the dash on Krzeszow, moreover, the last of the Austrian armies of invasion had been driven off Russian soil in this quarter. There was no longer an enemy left in the Provinces of Vollynia or Podolia.

Nor was this all. Mention has been made above of the fact that Russian troops, based on Iwangorod, had intercepted German reinforcements on the left side of the Vistula as they hurried across Poland to the help of Austria.

From that side of the river Russian guns had also shelled Austrian transports retreating along the right bank. As the Russian right pressed on the retiring Austrians, it had been able to spare a considerable body of troops, which it had thrown across the Vistula at Josefow. These troops, reinforcing the Russian force already on that side of the river, had swept southward parallel to the advance of the main army on the right bank, brushing aside any enemy forces which they met, effectually preventing any help from reaching the Austrians from that quarter, and, finally, at the same time when their comrades on the right bank were delivering the final blow to the Austrians at the crossing of the San, they, on the opposite side of the Vistula, drove a strong Austrian force out of, and occupied, the important place of Sandomierz. Near Sandomierz the Russians are said to have encountered and defeated the German 2nd Landwehr Corps under General Woirsch. In and around the town they appear to have taken 3,000 prisoners and 10 guns.

This advance down the left bank of the Vistula, with the occupation of Sandomierz, is a final detail illustrating the comprehensiveness of the Russian strategy and the precision with



ADVANCE COSSACK PATROL.



VIEW FROM OBSERVATION STATION ABOVE HALICZ.

which their movements worked in unison. It will be well to stop for a moment in the narrative to survey the course of events during this fateful month.

It must be remembered that Russia, more or less incompletely prepared, found herself invaded over a wide front by armies operating in three different directions, and aggregating in the neighbourhood of one million men. Her soldiers immediately saw and seized upon the weak point in the enemy's plans. The farther two invading armies operating on divergent lines penetrate into an enemy's country the wider must they become separated, and the more difficult it be for them to co-operate or for either to act as a shield to the other's flanks. The Russians were content, then, to allow the northern 1st Austrian Army to press on, almost unresisted, to within artillery range of its first main objective—Lublin and the railway line to Iwangorod and Warsaw. They then struck, and struck with decisive force, at the weak place between the two armies in the neighbourhood of Tomaszow. To meet this thrust the Austrians were compelled to withdraw their reserve troops from the extreme left across the rear of the 1st Army. When they proved insufficient, a new army was hastily organized and thrown into the gap. It might have served its purpose if it had been pushed forward at first simultaneously with the other two armies, but such improvisations

rarely prosper when a campaign is already well advanced. The Russians had gathered strength, and, having once driven their wedge in at Tomaszow, they kept it there, and succeeded in widening it by the subsequent operations about Bilgoraj and the forcing back of the Austrian line above Rawa-Ruska. The 1st Austrian Army was thus left, at the extreme of its advance, suspended in the air.

Meanwhile, Brusiloff's finely conceived and admirably executed turning movement along the Dniester on the extreme south, culminating in the blow on Halicz, while Ruzsky, with his main force, battered at the Austrian front and left, penned in von Auffenberg's Army on a continually contracting front, and threw it back on its successive lines of defence in the Ztota Lipa, before Lemberg, and from Grodek to Rawa-Ruska. Hurlled from each of these in turn, with the Cossack cavalry ranging wide over Southern Galicia on their right, the Austrians had no choice but to fall back, guarding their rear as best they might, westward towards Cracow.

As soon as von Auffenberg's Army was definitely in difficulties, and occupied entirely with considerations of its own safety, the Russians could afford to give attention to Dankl's Army in the north. No help could now reach it, and it was already exhausted with futile efforts to break the rigid barrier which had been thrown across its path. The Russians

rightly massed their chief strength against this army's left, for if that wing was broken, the whole army, hemmed in on both sides, must fall back or submit to being surrounded. Driven from Opolie along the Vistula, pitilessly hammered along its whole front, threatened and harried on its right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnograd, we have seen how Dankl's Army was hustled down to and across the San, to find no rest on the further side.

Every chief movement on the Russian side was executed with the same certainty of touch, and the operations of all the armies synchronized to perfection. By September 23 Ewerts and Plehve had driven Dankl's Army back to the line of the Wisloka. Ruzsky had taken Jaroslau on September 21. Brusiloff was in Chyrow on September 24.

It had been on August 22 that Ruzsky had crossed the frontier and occupied Brody, while on the same day Brusiloff had also entered Galicia at Woloczysk. Beyond doubt the world has never seen a month of such gigantic fighting as had taken place since then. The end of the month saw all the Austrian Armies, beaten and broken, driven in from north, north-east, east, and south, all herded into the confined region west of Przemysl, like sheep driven from all corners of a field into one narrow pen, with only a single opening—the railway leading to Cracow. The whole scope of the campaign can be clearly followed on the map which is given on page 260. A map covering the



A COSSACK SCOUT REPORTING TO HIS COMMANDING OFFICER.

larger theatre, including Berlin and Vienna, has been published on page 220.

As early as September 17 a Russian official statement put the Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, at 250,000 killed and wounded, and 100,000 prisoners, with 400 guns, many colours, and a "vast quantity of stores." Again, we hear that the rifles captured num



BRIDGE OVER THE DNIESTER DESTROYED BY THE AUSTRIANS DURING THEIR RETREAT.



THE ARCHDUKE JOSEPH FERDINAND.

bered nearly half a million. What the total losses on the Austrian side were in the whole campaign there is no way of knowing. In all they probably put into the field, including the later reinforcements, both Austrian and German, about 1,100,000 to 1,200,000 men. It is difficult to believe that they lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, less than 500,000 of these. Official Russian estimates placed the enemy's total losses at from 35 to 50 per cent. of his total forces. The Russian losses were heavy at times, but it is believed that in the whole campaign they did not reach 50,000. And the Russians were now masters of all Eastern Galicia, in possession of Lemberg and Jaroslau, of Brody, Busk, Grodek, Tarnopol, Sambor, Brzézany, and many other towns of importance, with all the railway system operating between them. They controlled the Galician oil-fields, of great importance to the enemy at such a time, and all the agricultural output of the rich Galician plains. Russian cavalry was already feeling at the approach to the Carpathians, from the Dukla Pass to the Bukowina. Przemysl alone held out.

This war was an extraordinary solvent of the reputations of fortresses. In this campaign we have seen how naturally strong positions, with effective defensive works, like Grodek and Rawa-Ruska, held out gallantly for some time, and were then carried by assault. Lemberg

had been reputed to be strong. As a matter of fact, the defences of the city itself were insignificant, and when the army shielding it was broken, no attempt was made to hold it. But the fall of Jaroslau has never been explained. Jaroslau was reputed to be stronger than either Liége or Namur. It had been confidently expected to offer a prolonged and stubborn resistance. The whole defences of the San were very strong. They collapsed with hardly any defence, and Jaroslau itself only withstood attack for two days. When the Russians brought their heavier guns to bear on the fortifications, it seems that the garrison simply deserted their posts and fled, showing how demoralized the Austrian Armies had become under their successive catastrophes. Przemysl alone of the Austrian fortified places justified its reputation.

Besides its strength as a fortress, Przemysl was a beautiful town, a veritable garden city, set around with orchards and flower gardens. It had a stormy history reaching back into the mists of the tenth century. In the town and its environs in 1914 there was a civil population of about 50,000, chiefly Poles and Ruthenes, who lived together in great amity and with perfect religious toleration. In September of that year, when the victorious Russian advance swept all resistance before it, there was said, in official reports from Vienna, to be an army of 80,000 men based on Przemysl, under command of General Boveerig. He, with a large part of this army, seems to have moved to the line of the Wisloka to help Dankl's demoralized forces to make their stand on that stream. Probably many of von Auffenberg's troops, as they retreated, were used to form the garrison of the fortress, which was understood at the beginning of the investment to contain about 100,000 men, the defence being in the hands of General Kusmanek. Later, this garrison appears to have been increased.

We have already seen how the railway communication with Przemysl had been severed on the south and east by the Russian advance after the fall of Grodek and the occupation of Mocziska and Chyrow. The fall of Jaroslau and the occupation of Radymno, a town on the main Cracow railway, on the left bank of the San, some eight miles east of Jaroslau, and 15 miles north of Przemysl, completed the isolation of the fortress. The stream of flight and pursuit flowed past, lapping round Przemysl on all sides, leaving it an islet in the middle of a flood. So it stood, except for one

short interval, when the tide was forced back, and for a while Przemysl was again in communication with Cracow, throughout the following winter until spring, for more than half a year.

In those intoxicating days of September, 1914, the Russians took it for granted that the lonely stronghold must soon fall to them. The newspapers, not of Russia, but of all the Allies, told the world that its fate was sealed. But stores of all kinds had been poured into it, and all preparations made for a long resistance. It was announced that it had provisions enough to last until May, 1915, and in General Kusmanek it had a commander who had no inclination to surrender. The first investment was made complete by September 26 or 27, 1914. The Russians immediately called on the fortress to surrender. General Kusmanek replied that he would not even discuss surrender until all the powers of resistance had been exhausted. An effort was made to carry the place by storm, but it was a costly experiment, and the Russians gave up the attempt and settled down to a regular investment until such time as heavy siege guns could be brought up and the way prepared for an assault.

In the following month, as will be shown in a later chapter, the renewed Austro-German offensive on this front forced the Russians back to a point where, if the pressure on the fortress was not entirely removed, the western forts were disengaged, and there was unrestricted communication with Cracow. It is probable that at this time extra forces were thrown into the



RUSSIAN SHELTERS IN THE TRENCHES.

fortress. The Austro-German tide again receded towards the end of November, 1914, and from that time onwards the investment of the fortress was complete and more stringent than before. The besieging force was in command of General Ivanoff. The heavy siege guns, however, were not brought up for some time. They are said to have been ready at the beginning of the New Year, but determined attempts were then being made to relieve the fortress from the direction of the Carpathians,



PRZEMYSL.



GENERAL VON KUSMANEK,
In command of the fortress of Przemysl.

and it was decided to wait until the danger had passed, lest the guns and siege material, difficult of transport, should be captured. Real bombardment, then, did not begin until early in March, 1915.

During the progress of the siege the garrison made many gallant sorties, but without material results. Towards the middle of March the heights dominating the eastern sector of the position fell into Russian hands, and on

the night of the 13th the important positions at Mackiowice on the north were carried by an assault in the darkness. There followed a desperate sortie, led by General Kusmanek himself, at the head of the 23rd division of the Honvéd, which was beaten back with a loss of over 4,000 prisoners, and many killed and wounded, and the forts on the western side fell into Russian hands. This was the end; for it seems that the garrison and civil population alike were on the verge of starvation.

It was stated that the defenders in these last days deliberately used up all their ammunition by reckless firing. They destroyed their guns and had already eaten all the horses. A final but fruitless sortie had been made on March 20 in the direction of Oikovice. Early on the following morning loud explosions were heard from different parts of the fortress, where the Austrians were blowing up the works preparatory to surrender. At six o'clock that morning, March 21, 1915, the place was surrendered unconditionally. According to the official lists furnished to the victors by General Kusmanek, the garrison captured with the fortress included 9 Generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 subalterns and officials, and 117,000 rank and file. The town of Przemysl was not injured, all the damage being confined to the fortifications and the outskirts.



ARCHDUKE CHARLES FRANCIS JOSEPH (in the centre) VISITING THE
FORTRESS OF PRZEMYSL.



AUSTRIAN OFFICERS IN BESIEGED PRZEMYSL.

The event was celebrated by a grand *Te Deum* at the headquarters of the Russian Commander-in-chief, at which the Tsar and the Grand Duke Nicholas were present. The Second Class of the Order of St. George was conferred upon the Grand Duke, and the Third Class upon General Ivanoff. The tenacity with which the Russians had clung to the siege through all the fluctuating fortunes of the war during the long winter, though reports from German sources declared that it had cost them 70,000 men previous to the beginning of the bombardment, and the frequent and determined efforts made by the Austrians and Germans to relieve the fortress, showed how much importance was attached to its possession by both sides. Its fall seems to have come as a shock to Germany. A day or two before, the German Press had been loudly proclaiming its invincibility. In Russia the news was received with great rejoicing, and everywhere it was recognized that the capture of the fortress profoundly modified the whole situation.

This narrative of the fate of Przemyśl, however, takes us far ahead of the general course of events. The first Galician campaign may be said to have ended with the complete and disastrous failure of the Austrian invasion. Przemyśl was still holding out, but all Eastern

Galicia—Sanak, Sambor, Stryj, Stanislaw—was in the hands of the Russians. The Austrian field armies had all fallen behind the line of the Wisloka, where von Auffenberg had his base at Tarlow, with Dankl and the remnants of his broken army on his left. At this moment German aeroplanes were scattering proclamations along the East Prussian frontier which said :

Soldiers! On the Austrian frontier the Russian Army has been routed and is retreating. Many Russian soldiers have been left on the battlefield. In Poland there is sedition, and in Moscow and Odessa there is revolution which will speedily extend to the whole of Russia. In order to prevent you from surrendering, your authorities tell you that we torture Russian prisoners. Do not believe this calumny, for where would be found executioners to kill the hundred thousand army of Russian prisoners? Your prisoners are now peacefully living within our country, together with French, Belgians, and English. They are very content. It is not worth while to die for a lost cause. Live for your wives and children, your native land, and a new and happy Russia.

But in Vienna other tales were circulated. There it was stated that one Austrian General had been tried by court-martial and shot, and another had been removed from the command of a cavalry division which had been almost annihilated, and had shot himself.

The immediate importance of the Russian victories was, perhaps, at first overestimated. There was talk in the Press of the immediate

capture of Cracow and overleaping of the Carpathians, of the roads to Berlin and Vienna being now open, of the elimination of Austria as a serious factor in the war, and the probability of her concluding a separate peace.

None the less, the results of the campaign were of the utmost value. In itself it was on such a scale—not less than 2,500,000 fighting men being engaged in it from first to last—and its battles were so gigantic and accompanied with such terrible slaughter that the campaign, judged by any standards in history, ought to rank as one of the greatest of wars of all time. In comparison with the battles of Lemberg, Grodek, Rawa-Ruska, Tomaszow, and others, most of the famous battles of history were trifling things. And the Russian success was brilliant and overwhelming. If Austria was not, indeed, eliminated, she had received a staggering blow, and worse than the blow to Austria was the blow to the whole Austro-German theory of the war. It showed, as was being shown also on the East Prussian front, that the Russian military power was a real and terrible thing. It showed how complete the miscalculations as to Russia's unreadiness and unwieldiness had been. It showed the folly of all the German expectations of risings in Poland, or of any other form of dissension among the Russian peoples. It showed that, besides her fighting millions, Russia had generals of first-class strategic ability. It

showed that all hope of a speedy "smashing" of Russia with one hand was as illusory as the same hope had proved in regard to France on the western front. We have seen that Germany had already been giving some actual support in men, albeit a useless one, to the Austrian Armies in their difficulties. From now on, however, she became much more the predominant partner in the alliance than had heretofore been the case. It will be shown in another chapter how Germany assumed the direct control, not only of the joint operations, but of the individual Austrian and Hungarian forces, to the bitter humiliation of the pride of the Austro-Hungarian peoples.

Certain aspects of the campaign and the inferences therefrom deserve especial treatment, especially the light which it threw on the quality and characteristics of the Russian soldier. The history of the Russian Army, the story of its reorganization, and an account of its composition at the outbreak of the war have been given in detail in Chapters XXVIII. and XXIX. of this History. Accompanying those chapters will be found many illustrations, including portraits of Russian Generals, which it will be profitable to look at again in connexion with the narrative of the events with which we have just been dealing. Mention has also been made of the miscalculations which Germany and Austria made in regard to Russia's readiness for war. Their misunderstanding of the



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY.

The new field gun.



A STREET SCENE IN PRZEMYSL.

Russian soldier was no less remarkable : it was on a par with the view of Sir John French's "contemptible little army."

The outbreak of the war produced no more remarkable phenomenon in any country than the conversion, as it were overnight, of the entire Russian people into a nation of total abstainers. The day after war was declared, every vodka shop in the Empire was closed by Imperial Decree during the time of mobilization. Subsequently the prohibition was extended for the whole duration of the war. In Russia's cold climate the use of strong drinks by all classes of the people had generally been regarded as more or less a matter of necessity. In one day its use was stopped, and the whole population accepted the decision without complaint. It was only one manifestation of the extraordinary spirit of earnestness, almost of consecration, with which the Russian peoples entered upon the war.

The Russian peoples had been known to be possessed of immense patience and powers of endurance. In the mass they were inured to hard living and accustomed to scanty fare. They are fundamentally by temperament a pro-

foundly religious people. But the fashionable view of them throughout Germany and Austria, encouraged by many who must have known better, was that they were uncivilized barbarians, heavy-witted and incapable of discipline, and of ferocious and savage passion. The word Cossack, in particular, was a thing to frighten babies with. The contrast of all this with the actual behaviour of the Russian Armies in the field was absurd.

The abstention from liquor probably contributed not a little to the powers of endurance of the Russian troops. Certainly they were remarkable. Very seldom have soldiers had to endure harder and more continuous work than was called for from the soldiers of the Tsar in the course of those four terrible weeks. Eye-witnesses testified to the fortitude which they displayed under all conditions of the campaign and when wounded, and to the uncomplaining cheerfulness with which they confronted every task. On the day after a desperate engagement, in which it had lost a large proportion of its numbers, a regiment would be singing as it marched along the road. Nor up to the last did the troops lose their dash. Fresh men of

any army could not have attacked with more impetuosity than did Brusiloff's at Halicz after an advance of the most arduous description, Ruzsky's at Rawa-Ruska, or the men of the northern army at the crossing of the San.

The Cossacks, especially, enjoyed before the war a most evil reputation. It has been mentioned in a former chapter that, in the campaign in East Prussia, the testimony of German authorities was that in towns which they captured, the behaviour of the Cossacks was "exemplary and irreproachable." The evidence from Galicia is to the same effect. Those who know the Cossack will, indeed, know that he is, as a rule, if high-spirited, very childish and essentially good-natured. At Halicz, if ever, the fighting spirit of the Russians must surely have been aroused, and we have testimony from independent sources of what happened there. The Russian van which, after the Austrian defeat, pushed first through Halicz and across the river in pursuit of the enemy, was apparently composed of three divisions of Cossack cavalry. Here was an occasion, then, when one might have expected the worst, when, after a bloody action, the victorious troops swept through a defenceless country full of Jews, and offering every temptation to excesses. The valley itself is a garden

filled to overflowing with all the good things that a rich and fertile agricultural country affords. So far from its having been plundered or devastated after the Russian advance had passed on, the fields were full of shocks of grain, in every garden there were chickens and ducks and huge white geese, and fat swine wandered about the streets of the town. On the outskirts of the town every acre seemed to be the grazing ground of happy and contented cattle. In the town itself there was not a single destroyed house, while at the settlement around the railroad station only a few buildings, such as warehouses, had been demolished by the Russian artillery in the effort to keep the retiring enemy on the move.

Still more significant was an incident which occurred at the neighbouring town of Botzow. It has been told how the retiring Austrians attempted here to make a stand, and were shelled out by the Russian guns which pressed after them. The whole centre of the town was reduced to ruins, except three buildings. The two churches and the Town Hall, which had a church-like spire, and was evidently mistaken by the Russians for a third place of worship, stood alone undamaged among the wreckage. It was impossible to believe that this had been the result of chance. The Russian



BOHEMIAN DRAGOONS.



THE VICTORY OF LEMBERG—CELEBRATIONS IN PETROGRAD.

gunners had obviously endeavoured to spare the religious buildings, and to confine their fire to the streets and buildings of which the military necessity of the moment demanded the destruction. Similarly, in other towns which the Russians were compelled to shell, it was always the region of warehouses, depôts, station-buildings and the like which was attacked, while the humbler sections occupied by the poorer classes were spared.

It was, of course, not to the interest of the Russians to ill-use the people of Galicia. They came not to oppress or spoil, but as deliverers. At the beginning of the operations, when Russia first assumed a general offensive on August 17, the Grand Duke Nicholas had issued the following appeal to the Russian inhabitants of Galicia :

Brothers.—A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patience and self-annihilation the Russian people of Galicia languished for centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecutions could break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestuous torrent breaks the rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest the Russian people in its onrush towards unification. Let there be no longer a subjugated Russia. Let the country which forms the heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise the banner of united Russia, an indivisible land. May

the providence of God who has blessed the work of the great unifiers of the Russian lands be made manifest. May God aid His anointed, the Emperor Nicholas of All the Russias, to complete the work begun by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita.

Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet the Russian Army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room will be found for you in the bosom of our mother Russia without offending peaceable people of whatever nationality. Raise your sword against the enemy and your hearts towards God with a prayer for Russia and the Russian Tsar !

It is impossible that a conquering army can pass through a vanquished country without the perpetration of some individual excesses. But there can be no doubt that throughout the Galician campaign the behaviour of the Russian troops was extraordinarily good.

Nor did the Austrians make any attempt to emulate the examples of the doctrine of "frightfulness" given by their allies in Belgium. In Galicia, of course, they were in their own country. As they penetrated north into Russia, being in happy mood and meeting with little opposition, they seem to have done small wanton damage. On its retreat, however, Dankl's Army laid waste a large part of the province of Volhynia, ravaging the country and burning villages and farmsteads



AUSTRIAN MOTOR CYCLISTS.

as they passed. In a measure this was doubtless dictated by supposed military considerations, in the hope of delaying the enemy in his pursuit. When a soldiery, however, is started on the work of destruction in an enemy's country, it is inevitable that many things should be done which neither military exigency nor anything else can excuse. It can only have been,

also, a complete relaxation of discipline in the beaten and demoralized Austrian Armies which permitted the pillaging which went on in some of the larger towns, even in Galicia, as Sieniawa. As a whole, however, the campaign appears, on both sides, to have been conducted towards the civilian population with moderation and humanity.



CHAPTER LVIII.

THE PROBLEM OF EGYPT : A NEW REGIME.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION—DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT—FACTORS OF DISCONTENT—THE KHEDIVE AND THE EXTREME NATIONALISTS—GERMAN AND TURKISH INTRIGUES—REMEDIAL MEASURES, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY—MEASURES AGAINST ENEMY SUBJECTS AND SHIPPING—WAR WITH TURKEY—MARTIAL LAW IN EGYPT—BRITISH PROTECTORATE PROCLAIMED—ABBAS HILMI DEPOSED—SULTAN HUSSEIN OF EGYPT—CHARACTER AND ACCESSION—THE SUDAN—NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA TILL THE END OF 1914—THE ACTION AT BIR EN NUSS.

IT is in the pages of Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt" and Lord Milner's "England in Egypt" that the fascinating but complex history of the British occupation of Egypt can best be studied. To describe it and the events that led up to it in brief were an impossible task. It is, however, necessary to preface this account of recent events in Egypt by a short sketch of the principal features of the history of the country since 1882. Only thus is it possible to understand the relations between the British and Egyptian Governments which had a vital bearing on the developments in Egypt after the outbreak of the Great War.

Great Britain had been opposed to the construction of the Suez Canal, which opened a new and shorter route to India to the Mediterranean Powers. Its completion made the fate of Egypt largely dependent on the will of the leading Sea Power. In 1875 Lord Beaconsfield purchased 176,602 original founders' shares in the Suez Canal from the embarrassed Khedive, or Prince, of Egypt, Ismail Pasha. England thus acquired a definite stake in the country and was bound to intervene both in the management of the Canal and in the organization of Egyptian

finance. Ismail Pasha was deposed by his Suzerain, the Sultan of Turkey, in 1879. He left an empty Treasury and an insubordinate army behind him. Anarchy ensued under his successor Tewfik, culminating in a military mutiny, inspired partly by real grievances against foreign usurers and corrupt officials, partly by fanaticism, and largely by the native Egyptian officers' jealousy of their Turkish and Circassian superiors. Great Britain intervened on behalf of the Khedive and restored order at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882. Owing to the national dislike for the responsibilities which such action would have involved she did not proclaim a protectorate over Egypt. There were, indeed, several occasions on which her statesmen contemplated the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation, but after the failure of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations of 1886-1887 it was recognized that this could only be effected, if at all, after many years.

In spite of the jealousy of France, whose politicians had allowed themselves to be manœuvred into an attitude of hostility towards England by Germany, the hostility of reactionary elements and of the Khedive



[From a painting by the Hon. John Collier.

SIR HENRY MCMAHON,
High Commissioner for Egypt.

Abbas II., who succeeded his father Tewfik in 1892, the financial bondage in which Egypt was held by international jealousies, the abuse of the Capitulations, and the fact that none of the Great Powers had definitely recognized our special position and interests in Egypt, our influence increased and Egypt prospered more and more under the masterful hand of Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General at Cairo. In 1898 the Sudan, which had rebelled under a religious impostor in 1882 and had been for sixteen years a prey to bloodshed and anarchy, was reconquered by an Anglo-Egyptian Army under Lord (then Sir Herbert) Kitchener and placed under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. A French attempt to effect a lodgment on the Upper Nile failed. Six years later came the Anglo-French agreement of happy augury, by which France, in return for concessions in Morocco and elsewhere, recognized England's special interests in Egypt, while England undertook to make no change in the political status of the country. The other European Powers, except, of course, Turkey, some sooner, some later, recognized the occupation.

Henceforth, instead of France, more or less energetically supported by Russia, it was

Turkey, encouraged later by the German Empire, that challenged Great Britain's political predominance in Egypt. The Porte had not recognized the occupation, had protested against the declaration of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan, and had since 1887 maintained a "Special Mission" at Cairo, which was never recognized by the British authorities, who held that the Sultan's official representative in Egypt was the Khedive, but was, nevertheless, able at times to exert its influence unfavourably to us.

Egypt, it must be remembered, was a part of the Ottoman Empire. By the Firman of 1879 the Khedive possessed certain essential attributes of sovereignty, subject to the payment of a tribute of about £675,000. The Khedivate was hereditary in the House of Mohamed Ali according to the law of primogeniture. But the same Firman debarred the Khedive from the right of raising loans without the consent of the Sultan and of keeping up an army of over 18,000 men in time of peace, nor could he conclude any treaty beyond certain commercial conventions with any foreign Power. At the Sublime Porte Egypt was regarded as an autonomous Ottoman province ruled by an hereditary Governor-General appointed by the Sultan, though possessed of greater independence than other Ottoman "Valis."

In 1906 the Turks, who had taken care never to agree to the usual definition of the frontiers of Egypt, attempted to occupy certain points in the Sinai Peninsula, from which they only retired when the British Ambassador had presented an ultimatum to the Porte. The eastern frontier between Egypt and Turkey was then delimited, but the frontier convention between the two countries was never ratified by the Porte. In 1907 Lord Cromer retired, owing to ill-health, from the post of British Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General, which he had held with honour since 1883. He had found Egypt bankrupt; he left it solvent. He found the Egyptian fellaheen, as the peasantry are called, oppressed and poor; he left them prosperous and secured against the grosser forms of injustice. His name will be for ever linked with the history of the revival of Egyptian prosperity and civilization. His departure took place at a time when the excitement aroused by the frontier dispute with Turkey had not died down, and the Khedive and the Nationalists of the extreme party were violently hostile.

Before proceeding with this narrative it is necessary to say a few words concerning the relations between the British Government and the Khedive and his Ministers.

"I hardly need point out," wrote Lord Granville in 1884, "that in important questions where the administration and safety of Egypt are at stake, it is indispensable that Her Majesty's Government should, so long as the provisional occupation of the country by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, after full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, they may feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive should be followed. It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices." Since 1895 the relations between Ministers and their British advisers had grown steadily more cordial, but complete harmony between the British and Egyptian sides of the Administration had been frequently prevented by the action of the Khedive, who, though unwilling, after a couple of severe lessons, to place himself in open opposition to Great Britain, never ceased for long to intrigue against the British and to undermine the


authority of his own Ministers. Sir Eldon Gorst, succeeding Lord Cromer in 1907, doubtless with instructions to avoid friction and "incidents," attempted a policy of conciliation which did not meet with the success which it deserved. He nevertheless was able temporarily to detach the Khedive from the extremist Nationalist Party and to curb the license of the extremist Press. During his tenure of office the Christian Premier, Butros Pasha Ghali, was assassinated by an extremist student, who would seem to have been in touch with the Committee of Union and Progress. After the sadly premature death of Sir Eldon Gorst, Lord Kitchener was appointed in his stead. His prestige as a stern soldier and his knowledge of Egypt enabled him rapidly to calm the local agitation of which the murder of Butros Pasha had been a sign. The extremist Nationalists lost ground or fled to Turkey, but the Khedive and the Ottoman Special Mission continued their intrigues. Sedition was, however, scotched, though not killed, and Lord Kitchener by his lavish expenditure on improvements and by legislation on behalf of the fellaheen acquired great popularity.*

When war broke out in Europe Egypt was therefore quiet. The Moslem peasants, who

* A full account of Lord Kitchener's work in Egypt has been given in Chapter XIX., together with portraits of Lords Kitchener and Cromer and Sir R. Wingate.



THE OLD WORLD AND THE NEW.
Australian Imperial Force near the Sphinx and Pyramids.



SIR GEORGE REID ADDRESSING AUSTRALIAN

formed the enormous majority of the population, appreciated the benefits of the occupation, and had no knowledge of and less liking for Germans, while their memories of Turkish rule were unpleasant. But they lacked initiative, and were largely uneducated, so that whatever support they were disposed to give the British authorities in times of trouble was likely to be platonic. Among the better educated classes in the towns there was little love for the Khedive and little fanaticism against Europeans, though Syrian and Coptic Christians were generally disliked. On the other hand, the numerically small but vocal extremist party, which comprised not a few students of law and theology and some of the Turco-Egyptians, who formed a sort of aristocracy since the days of Mohamed Ali, was hostile and had become more reactionary in its tendencies since it had begun to look to Turkey for support rather than to France. The great majority of officials, merchants, and landowners supported the occupation, which was, of course, anathema to the much less numerous *entourage* of the Khedive. The excitability, credulity, and fickleness of the urban lower classes, failings which extended to many of the half-educated *intelligenza*, made them unreliable as supporters of any Government. The Arabic proverb, "The Egyptian has fears, but has no respect," is too often true of this element. Religion was the side on which this town population was most easily approached by

intriguers, and it is noteworthy that the connexion between Egypt and Turkey was popular among them and among some of the fellaheen for religious reasons. The Turkish Sultanate meant nothing to them, but to be, if only nominally, "under the protection of the Khalifate" flattered their *amour-propre* and was, so to speak, a sort of guarantee of religious orthodoxy.

On August 2 the Council of Ministers declared the notes of the National Bank of Egypt obligatory legal tender. On the same day it prohibited the exportation of foodstuffs. On August 3 the Egyptian Government, in view of the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and between Russia and Germany, issued instructions similar to those issued during the Russo-Japanese War, to its authorities on the Suez Canal and its ports of access and at other Egyptian ports. But within forty-eight hours the situation had entirely changed owing to the entry of Great Britain into the war. On August 5 the Council of Ministers met and arrived at an important "decision tending to ensure the defence of Egypt in the war between Germany and Great Britain." The preamble ran :

Considering that war has unhappily been declared between His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dependencies over Seas, Emperor of India, and the German Emperor; that the presence in Egypt of the Army of Occupation of His Britannic Majesty renders the country liable to attack by His Majesty's enemies; that in consequence of this state of affairs it is necessary that all measures be taken



TROOPS AT MENA CAMP.

to defend the country against the risk of such attack—all whom it concerns are therefore informed that at a meeting of the Council of Ministers held on August 5, 1914 under the presidency of H.E. the Regent, the following decisions were taken.

The first four articles of the Egyptian Government's decision forbade any person residing in or passing through Egypt (1) to make any contract or agreement whatever with the German Government or any of its agents; (2) to contribute to or participate in the issue of any loan to the German Government or make any loan thereto; (3) to conclude any policy or contract of insurance with or for the benefit of any person residing in or passing through the German Empire, or effect any payment on the basis of any existing policy or contract of insurance on account of any loss due to warlike acts by the forces of His Britannic Majesty or of his Allies; (4) to conclude any new contract or enter into any new commercial, financial or other obligation with or for the benefit of any person as defined in (3). Article 5 prohibited any Egyptian vessel from entering into or communicating with any German port. Article 6 forbade the export of arms and munitions of war, military equipment and vehicles, petrol, benzine, aircraft, coal-sacks, coal and briquettes. The next two articles forbade the export of any merchandize from any Egyptian to any German port and the transshipment in any Egyptian port of any merchandize for the above destination, and prohibited the departure from any Egyptian port of vessels which had not been specially

authorized to sail. Articles 9 to 11 dealt with contraband. By their terms any neutral vessel which was in itself contraband of war in accordance with the definition of contraband adopted by the British Government, or carried contraband or rendered any services contrary to neutrality "to the enemy," would be prevented from leaving Egyptian ports; any neutral vessel embarking contraband of war in any Egyptian port would be liable to capture, and any neutral vessel on which contraband had been embarked before the date of the Egyptian Government's decision must unload the contraband cargo, if still in an Egyptian port. Article 12 forbade the discharging in any Egyptian port of any article or merchandize taken on board in a German port subsequently to the Egyptian Government's decision. The next four articles are given in full:

Article 13.—The Naval and Military forces of His Britannic Majesty may exercise all the rights of war in Egyptian ports and in Egyptian territory, and war-vessels, merchant vessels or merchandize captured in Egyptian ports or territory may be brought before the judgment of a British Prize Court.

Article 14.—Under the strict observation of the preceding clauses any German vessel which was in an Egyptian port at the date of the opening of hostilities or which, having quitted its last port before that date, has entered or shall enter an Egyptian port without knowledge of the outbreak of war, will be authorized until sunset on August 14, 1914, to load or unload and to leave port on giving such written engagements as may be required by the British naval authorities in conformity with the dispositions of Chapter 3 of the Convention of 1907 relative to certain restrictions in the exercise of the right of capture in naval warfare.

Article 15.—German merchant vessels which have left



HELIOPOLIS CAMP.

their last port before the declaration of war, and which put in without knowledge of the declaration of war to an Egyptian port after sunset on August 14, 1914, and are authorized to enter port, may be required to leave immediately, or after the delay deemed necessary by the port authorities for the discharging of such part of their cargo as they may be required or specially authorized to effect, in each case giving in advance the written engagements referred to in the preceding article.

Article 16.—A ship liable to the operation of any of the preceding articles, having cargo on board which, according to the rules applied by the British Prize Courts, constitutes enemy cargo, or which the British naval or military authorities wish to requisition subject to compensation (moyennant compensation) for the needs of the war, shall not leave port till this cargo shall have been discharged.

Under Article 17 cable ships, ocean oil-tank vessels, ships of over 5,000 tons displacement and 14 knots speed, or merchantmen obviously constructed with a view to their use as ships of war were expressly deprived of any of the benefits referred to in Clauses 14 and 15.

Article 18 ran:—"All persons whom this concerns shall render the assistance which may be required of them to the naval and military forces of His Britannic Majesty." Article 19 extended the operation of the Government's decisions to companies, associations, etc., having a legal or *de facto* existence. Article 20 dealt as follows with the Canal ports:

As regards the ports of access to the Suez Canal, the present decision shall be applied with the following modifications:

(a) Merchant vessels which have traversed or wish to traverse the Canal, whatever their nationality or cargo, shall have full liberty to enter or leave the ports of access or to pass through the Canal without risk of capture or detention, provided that the passage of the Canal and departure from the port of access are effected normally and without unjustifiable delay.

(b) These ships may receive such provisions, including coal, as shall be reasonably necessary for the voyage on which they are bound.

(c) Merchandise of all sorts which has passed the Canal may be transhipped at the port of departure.

(d) Article 13 of the present decision shall be interpreted in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.

On August 13 the above decisions were extended to Austria-Hungary, then at war with Great Britain, the date of August 22, 1914, being substituted for that of August 14 in the application of Articles 14 and 15 to Austro-Hungarian merchant vessels.

These decisions had been prepared beforehand, in view of the possible outbreak of a European war, by Mr. W. E. Brunyate, C.M.G., Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Government, under the auspices of the Imperial Defence Committee. They could not be described as a declaration of neutrality. They formed, indeed, something resembling a Treaty of Alliance of local and limited application between Egypt and Great Britain and her Allies. Egypt, being in the military occupation of the British Forces, was exposed to attack by the enemies of those forces, and, therefore, took the necessary measures against such attack. Against the argument that Egypt as a vassal State of Turkey had no right to take any such steps the Egyptian Government could urge the plea of military justification, the more so as her action harmed no neutral State whatsoever.

Thanks to the Allies' command of the Mediterranean, Egypt had nothing to fear from naval raiders as soon as the Goeben and

Breslau had disappeared into the Dardanelles. But the attitude of Turkey now became provocative, while the Germans resident in the country, the supporters of the Khedive, and the pro-Turk party required watching. Had the war caused Egypt no economic distress, their efforts to excite popular feeling against the occupation need have aroused no uneasiness. Unfortunately Egypt suffered severely from the war. The country lived on its cotton crop. The larger landowners, some of whom had already been hard hit by the financial crisis of 1907, the consequence of over-speculation in land, the effects of which were still felt, were not as a rule thrifty. They were in the habit of obtaining annually large advances against the coming cotton crop from the banks, and of spending these advances lavishly. The great mass of small landowners, if thriftier, were still too fond of spending sums they could ill afford on marriage feasts and similar festivities. Many of them were more or less heavily in debt, while those who hoarded would only part with their money at the last extremity.

To the landowners in general the war was a heavy blow; all means of financing the cultivators to enable them to lift and pick the crop were checked, the banks being unable to make the usual advances on cotton, and the general

indebtedness of the native population consequently increased. The landowners had been looking forward to a big cotton crop and hoping to realize it at satisfactory prices. The crop, as a matter of fact, was, generally speaking, inferior in quality to the last, and the quantity was less than had been expected, owing to the ravages of the latest Egyptian insect pest, the "pink boll-worm." Owing to the absence of facilities for financing the cultivators, the ripe crop was often left unpicked for so long that the first, second, and third pickings were taken together, to the detriment of yield and quality. There were cases, too, in which the disheartened tenant farmers refused to pick, knowing that as soon as they had gathered in the crop it would be seized by the landlord for rent. In the early months of the war, therefore, the anxiety and depression of the peasantry were great.

Trade naturally suffered. At the beginning of the war there was a short spurt in certain branches owing to the sudden replenishment of stocks. Complete stagnation followed for some time. Native industries suffered the most, and unemployment increased. The Public Works Ministry was compelled from motives of economy to cease work on all its various projects, except where it was necessary im-



BRITISH SENTRIES ON DUTY AT THE CITADEL, CAIRO.
In the background is the Mosque of Mohamed Ali.



TROOPS AT RIFLE PRACTICE ON THE DESERT SANDS.

mediately to spend money to conserve work that had already been done.

The departure of a large number of European residents—French, German, and Austro-Hungarian—called out for military service, affected the shopkeeping class and domestic servants, as did the general reduction of private expenditure all round. The returns of imports and exports up to December 14 were eloquent of the economic loss sustained by the country :

Value of imports into Egypt from 1.8.13 to 31.10.13 ...	£E.7,338,000
Ditto from 1.8.14 to 31.10.14...	3,357,000
Value of exports from 1.8.13 to 31.10.13	7,106,000
Ditto from 1.8.14 to 31.10.14 ...	1,583,000

Previous crises had merely affected a section of the population—stockbrokers, speculators, and owners of certain urban or suburban properties for the most part. The present crisis affected all classes, and caused a very general *malaise*, more especially among the very poor. The risk that sedition-mongers would attempt to stir up trouble among the ignorant and needy had to be taken into account. Hostile intrigue from four different quarters—the Khedive and his supporters, the extremist Nationalists, German agents, and Turkish agitators—had never entirely ceased, and was the more to be feared now that economic conditions were unsatisfactory.

The Khedive was unpopular, but an Oriental ruler can generally rely on some support as

long as he is on the throne, and Abbas Hilmi, as the lawful sovereign of Egypt, had his followers and even his admirers. Lord Cromer's "Abbas II." contains an interesting sketch of his earlier struggles with the young ruler of Egypt, who, fresh from the narrow training of the Teresianum at Vienna, ignorant of Egyptian conditions, and impulsive, made a series of rash "frontal attacks" on the British Occupation, and was repulsed with considerable loss to his prestige. Thereafter the Khedive waged a war of intrigue against Great Britain in Egypt. He did much to create the extremist Nationalist party, which he financed from the proceeds of the sale of grades and decorations, often to eminently undeserving persons. His *entourage* was a stronghold of anti-British feeling. Officers and officials who had misconducted themselves and had been dismissed from Government employment often found an asylum in his service. Corrupt ex-officials of the Ministry of Finance were particularly eligible. For long he held the Wakfs (Pious Foundations) Administration in his hands, and added to his private fortune therefrom. His ambition was, as Lord Cromer has written, "to enrich himself by every possible means in his power." His principal interest and amusement was political and financial intrigue. Lord Cromer has compared him to the Virgilian Dares, "seditione potens"—mighty in sedition. To such of his Ministers who displeased him or

pleased the British he could on occasion show the maximum of discourtesy.



After Lord Cromer's retirement came a brief reconciliation between the occupation, in the person of Sir Eldon Gorst, and Abbas Hilmi. The Khedive did not, it was true, abandon his sale of decorations or his hunt for "Naboth's vineyards," but his intrigues against the occupation became temporarily less energetic. His friendship for the new British Agent was undoubtedly sincere, and his visit to Sir Eldon Gorst's death-bed should be remembered by Englishmen in his favour. It must also be admitted that, violent as his dislike for England was, he was invariably courteous to her representatives in Egypt.

Sir Eldon Gorst undoubtedly broke the alliance between the Khedive and the Nationalists of the extreme faction. This alliance was not renewed till 1913, when Abbas Hilmi, who had large estates in Turkey and regularly visited Constantinople, fearing for his interests, made terms with some of the extremists. Others remained hostile, and the Committee Government, with which he was frequently on bad terms, and against which he undoubtedly intrigued, supported them. On July 24, 1914, a half-insane Egyptian student fired at and wounded the Khedive, then on a visit to Constantinople, as he drove past the Sublime Porte. The ruler's injuries were not severe: the would-be assassin was shot, stabbed, and sabred with much promptitude by the Otto-

man escort, who, in their inopportune or prudent zeal, wounded several passers-by, and by dispatching the culprit rendered further police researches fruitless. The Committee Government was prodigal of kind attentions to the previously detested "Vali of Egypt." Ere Abbas Hilmi had fully recovered from his wounds, the Great War had broken out. He asked the British Government for help to return to Egypt. The request was most embarrassing. The Army of Occupation had not yet been reinforced, the population was already disturbed by the economic crisis, and the return of a ruler who had shown such capacity for intrigue and such skill in rendering the position of his Ministers impossible would have added to the difficulties. He was recommended to remain at Constantinople. The Austro-Hungarian and German Ambassadors promptly made full use of their opportunity and, thanks to their efforts, the Austrophile or Anglophobe sentiments of Abbas and the assumed friendliness of the Turkish Government were speedily able to reconcile him with the all-powerful Committee of Union and Progress. Within a month of the outbreak of war he was discussing the invasion of Egypt by the Turks with Ministers and Generals, while his agents at Cairo and Alexandria were spreading alarming reports concerning his intentions. The British Ambassador suggested that he should withdraw for a while to Italy. It was Abbas Hilmi's last chance. He refused to entertain the suggestion and thus signed his



BRITISH SOLDIERS DIGGING TRENCHES IN THE DESERT.



EGYPT AND THE NILE.

1. Great Pyramid of Gizeh. 2. A street in Cairo. 3. Birds-eye view of Cairo. 4. The Nile bridge, Cairo. 5. Assuan.

own political death-warrant. His alliance with the Turkish Government grew closer. The Egyptian police was constantly coming across the tracks of his agents. A few weeks after the outbreak of war with Turkey none who knew his history and that of his relations with the Committee were much astonished to hear that the Talaats and Envers, after flattering his vanity and informing the Moslem world that he would lead the "Holy Warriors" to Cairo, had suddenly turned upon their dupe, accused him of playing a double game, and sent him packing. It was left to the Egyptian Government, in deference to a request from Sir John Maxwell, to appoint a sequestrator of his private properties "in the interests both of His Highness and of His Highness's creditors."


The extremist Nationalist group, known as the "Hisb el Watani" (Patriotic Party), was in an evil plight when the Great War broke out. This party in its tendencies somewhat resembled the extreme wing of the Committee of Union and Progress, which its brightest ornaments eventually joined. There had been "Nationalism" enough in Egypt before it, largely owing to the great uncertainty that prevailed as to our intentions, but many so-called "Nationalists" were simply trimmers, who, seeing the Khedive and certain magnates hostile to the British—who might one day leave the country—thought it safer to follow the lead of Abdin. After the Fashoda incident, and still more after the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, many of these waverers rallied to the British Occupation. The extremist party owed its existence to Abbas II., who assisted its leader, Mustafa Kamil Pasha, and his group with subventions which enabled them to found a violent but well-edited journal, called *Al Lewa* (*The Standard*). Mustafa was a Turco-Egyptian demagogue, whose pleasant manners and French veneer found him some influential friends at Paris, while his genuine eloquence inflamed the enthusiasm of the student class. After a while he showed independent tendencies which greatly annoyed the Khedive, who cut off supplies, and, after making use of him against Lord Cromer, gave him the cold shoulder when Sir Eldon Gorst was British Agent. Whether Mustafa could have stood on his own feet after the Khedive had disowned him is not certain. He died rather suddenly in the winter of 1907-1908, and the examination of his affairs revealed a deplorable confusion, from which his journal and supporters never completely recovered. After



[Lekegian.]

SHEIKH SHAWISH.

his death the Francophile veneer of his party, which had already shown signs of scaling off, disappeared entirely, and it became frankly reactionary, Turcophile, and anti-European—save where Germany was concerned. Its leaders were Mohamed Bey Farid, a rather unimportant agitator, and Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish, a fiery Tunisian who had learnt English admirably when Assistant Professor of Arabic at Oxford, spoke well, and though known when a law student as "Ahmak ed Dawla" (the State Fool), appealed to the fanatical through his knowledge of the Koran and the Traditions. The murder of Butros Pasha Ghali, already referred to, by a student named Wardani was credited by popular report to the promptings of Shawish and his friends, but no proof of this was discovered, and the crime may equally well have been inspired by Wardani's friends among the revolutionaries of Constantinople, who had sent emissaries to Egypt in 1909. After Lord Kitchener's arrival in Egypt the relations between the extremists and the Khedive, who had a terror of assassination, were fitfully resumed, but neither trusted the other, and Abbas Hilmi was probably rather relieved when Shawish and Farid fled the country, to avoid trial on charges of abetting reason, and took refuge at Constantinople. With their less dangerous local successors he was on better terms, but the flight of Shawish took the sting out of the extremist group, which had never been really dangerous, except as a



TROOPS DISEMBARKING IN EGYPT.

weapon in the hands of the Khedive and of Turkish fishers in troubled waters. Shawish became a leading member of the Committee of Union and Progress and counsellor to Talaat and Enver. Another Egyptian Nationalist, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, was appointed to the Intelligence Department of the Turkish Foreign Office. The leaders left in Egypt indulged in a certain amount of pro-German and pro-Turkish talk in bars and cafés, but no single Egyptian was induced thereby to risk his skin in derailing a train or blowing up a bridge. The censorship checked any journalistic manifestations on their part, and when war broke out with Turkey some of them, who had been allowed to continue to edit their newspapers, requested to be allowed to go to Italy, and their request was granted.

A far more dangerous group, the "Servants of the Kaaba" (the Holy Stone at Mecca), was scarcely represented in Egypt before the war. Sheikh Shawish was one of its leading lights, but its chiefs were usually Indian, Afghan, and Turkish Moslems. Some of its emissaries, who were sent to Egypt to incite the Indian Moslem troops against their officers, were caught and expelled from the country. They were Afghans or Indians.

For several years before the outbreak of the Great War German diplomatists, as the French

Yellow Book related, had sought to make Egypt, as the intellectual centre of the Arab world, a base for their propaganda, which was directed against England, France, and to some extent Italy. By posing as the friends of Turkey they won to their side the pro-Turkish elements among the Arabs. By flattering the extremist Egyptian Nationalists they maintained friendly relations with the *Hish el Watani*, and their relations with the Ottoman High Commissariat and with the Khedive were friendly. Baron Max von Oppenheim, Councillor with Ministerial rank to the German Agency at Cairo from 1904 to 1909, an energetic but somewhat theatrical intriguer, showed much pro-Turkish activity in 1906, the year of the Akaba incident and of the Conference of Algceiras. In the same year a branch of the Deutsch-Orient Bank, the advanced guard of German political and financial penetration in the Near East, was founded at Cairo. Its methods included house-to-house touting, appeals to the nationalist sentiment against Coptic moneylenders and British "blood-suckers," the offer of credit on insufficient security, and the bait of heavy interest, amounting in some cases to 4 per cent., on deposits. Rival banks were loud in their denunciations of the unprofessional methods employed by the German and Austrian Jews who controlled and managed the Egyptian branch, but when the Germans burnt their fingers by losing unsecured advances to untrustworthy, if Germanophile, notables, anger gave way to mirth. The Deutsch-Orient Bank eventually brought its policy into line with that of other Egyptian banks, but had none the less temporarily to suspend payment after the outbreak of war, to the huge indignation of its Egyptian clientele.

More important than these politico-financial experiments were the intrigues carried on by members of the staff of the German Agency. Baron von Oppenheim, though he corresponded with the Kaiser over the indignant heads of his official chiefs, and was even invited to a "lunch intime" at Potsdam to which his then chief was not invited, was not a *persona grata* either with Herr Ruecker-Jenisch, who disliked subterranean politics, or with Count Bernstorff, who preferred more open warfare. He was, however, on good terms with Prince Hatzfeldt, who succeeded Bernstorff, and from 1908 onwards lost no chance of establishing close relations with Nationalist or Turkish

intriguers. After the Baron's departure the threads of German intrigue in Egypt were confided to Dr. Pruefer, a retiring little man, but a fine Arabic scholar, who had travelled much in Syria and visited the Egyptian extremist leaders and certain reputed Pan-Islamic agents in Oriental disguise. In 1911 the leaders of the *Hisb el Watani*, Sheikh Shawish and Mohamed Bey Farid, entered into an agreement with Prince Hatzfeldt whereby they pledged themselves to use all their influence with the Union and Progress leaders at Constantinople, to oppose any attempt to bring about a *rapprochement* between Great Britain and Turkey and to obtain Moslem support for the Deutsch-Orient Bank. In return they received "postal facilities"—*i.e.*, the use of the German official valise for the forwarding of compromising documents to Constantinople—and monetary subventions. When the extremists fell on evil days and Shawish and Farid had to fly to Constantinople, the German Acting Diplomatic Agent in Egypt, Baron Richthofen, had the effrontery to propose Dr. Pruefer as the German official candidate for the post of Director of the Khedivial Library, in which he would have had abundant oppor-

tunities of influencing Moslem students and divines. The scheme failed owing to the wariness of Hishmet Pasha, then Minister of Education, who refused to be "rushed," and the subsequent opposition of the British Agency. Meanwhile the German Agency maintained close and friendly relations with Abdin Palace and with the Ottoman High Commissariat, and attempted to open direct relations with the Sheikh es Semussi, while the German Embassy at Constantinople kept in touch with Shawish and other exiled extremists. Dr. Pruefer left Egypt early in 1914, and was next heard of in connexion with the Mors affair, which will be described later. He and his chiefs, together with certain German residents, had undoubtedly succeeded in infecting a limited number of Egyptians and Egypto-Turks with Germanophile ideas, but this was the limit of their success. More timid and more practical than the Turks, their Egyptian friends confined themselves, even when the German armies were near Paris, to harmless demonstrations of sympathy, which became more discreet as each fresh British reinforcement reached Egypt.

Abdul Hamid had organized Pan-Islamism



SUDANESE SOLDIERS.



AN EGYPTIAN DRINK.

for defensive purposes. Having given the wilder Moslem elements of his Empire a free hand to plunder, and at times massacre, non-Moslems, he sought to exalt the prestige of the Turkish Kaliphate among Moslems subject to non-Moslem rule or administration, so that pressure exercised by European States on behalf of Ottoman Christians might be met by counter-pressure applied by their Moslem subjects on behalf of an unjustly humiliated Kaliph. In Egypt, as Lord Cromer confessed in 1906, he met with some success: the sympathies of a large number of Egyptians were on the Turkish side during the Akaba dispute. After his fall the Committee of Union and Progress continued his Pan-Islamic policy, which in their hands gradually took an aggressive form, and though at first hampered in Egypt by the Khedive's change of front, the death of Mustafa Kamil, and the indignation aroused among Moslem Conservatives by the manner in which Abdul Hamid was deposed, its agents gradually regained ground. They were helped in this by the general sympathy for Turkey felt throughout the Near East when Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire and by the long-successful resistance of the Tureo-Arabs of Cyrenaica under Enver Bey and Aziz el Masri, while Ismail Hakki, the real head of the Ottoman High Commissariat at Cairo, was in close touch with the Nationalist extremists and lost no

chance of flattering wealthy Egyptians who were likely to subscribe to Turkish political or patriotic funds. When Sheikh Shawish and Mohamed Farid Bey left Egypt to avoid arrest, the former edited a subventioned journal within a few doors of the Porte. Egyptian students of extremist views had already had a friendly reception at Constantinople; Wardani, the murderer of Butros Pasha, had visited Constantinople in 1909 and had been photographed in the company of prominent members of the Committee. After the return of the Committee Government to power at Constantinople over the corpse of Nazim Pasha, Pan-Islamism of a most militant and aggressive description was openly preached by the Turkish Press and by members of the "Executive Committee," to which Sheikh Shawish and his imitator, Sheikh Salih et-Tunisi, Enver Pasha's Arabic tutor, belonged. Enver founded an "Arab bureau," which entered into close relations with Egyptian malcontents, and under the auspices of Ismail Hakki Alexandria and Cairo became centres of political espionage and pro-Turkish propaganda. The plot against Aziz el Masri, if due in the first instance to the jealousy of Enver Pasha, was worked up by Shawish, Sheikh Salih et-Tunisi, and certain Egyptian journalists and Beduins, though the better elements in the country were disgusted by the persecution of this brave Egyptian. Many of the Turkish Ulema and students of Al-Azhar worked in the interests of the Committee among the religious. Certain Beduin notables were also approached by Turkish agents, but it is an interesting fact that no attempt was made to win over the "fellaheen." The relations between the Ottoman Special Mission and Abdin grew closer, and in May and June, 1914, Ismail Hakki caused alms to be distributed in certain mosques in the name of "Es-Sultan illi gaih"—the Sultan who is coming—a performance which would suggest that some at least of the Turkish extremists were well aware that 1914 would be a year of tension, if not of war, and had determined to profit from any trouble that ensued in Egypt. Late in June Ismail Hakki left Egypt. The outbreak of war in August seemed to the adventurers of Constantinople and Salonika a heaven-sent opportunity for the carrying out of their Pan-Islamic schemes at the expense of the Triple Entente. To what lengths they were prepared to go long before the outbreak of war with Turkey was shown by the fact that Shukri Bey,

Acting Ottoman High Commissioner, received orders as soon as war broke out in Europe to prepare public opinion in Egypt for a Turkish invasion, and by the disclosures of the Mors trial. A German, Lieut. R. C. Mors, of the Egyptian police, was arrested in Alexandria on arriving from Constantinople in September. He had explosives and compromising papers in his possession. He confessed under examination that he had been introduced by Dr. Pruefer to Enver Pasha, who spoke of military operations in Egypt. He had a long conversation with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Ottoman General Staff, on September 6. This officer had planned a scheme for the creation of disturbances in Egypt by bands of malefactors under Turkish officers and for an attack on the Canal by Beduins. Enver afterwards discussed this subject with Mors, who was finally given explosives to hand over to Turkish agents or sympathizers in Egypt. He was condemned to death, but his sentence, owing, no doubt, to his interesting confession, was afterwards commuted.

Though more fitful, Turkish intrigue in Egypt was more formidable than that of the Germans, owing first to the religious ties that united Egypt and Turkey, and secondly to the quite undeserved prestige of the Turkish Army and Government in Egypt. This prestige was mainly due to the fact that the Turkish rulers of Egypt

had seldom lost an opportunity of beating, squeezing, or otherwise terrorizing the Egyptians, who had not yet got over their nervous respect for their former masters, and still felt flattered if they could marry Turkish wives. Nevertheless, it failed, as other intrigues failed, because the great mass of the Egyptians had no great economic grievances to complain of, and because the Turks, as usual, mistaking their own desires for realities, believed that persons who from time to time invoked curses on the infidel and blessings on the Sultan were ready to sacrifice themselves for the Talaats and Envers. Lord Cromer, in his book "Abbas II.," describes how an old Anglophile Sheikh replied to those who asked him why he put his name to a petition to the Sultan begging him to save the country from the "abhorred presence" of the English. "It is all empty words," he replied. "I often say to my camel or to my horse if in some trifling way he tries my patience, 'Curses on you. May Allah strike you dead, oh, son of a pig,' and if I thought it would really happen I should be silent; but I know that the beast will remain unharmed. So also I know that the English will stay here, whether I sign a petition or not. What does it matter, then? I please our Lord, the Khedive; the English remain all the same and look after my interests and every one is happy all round."

The economic measures taken by the Govern-



NEW ZEALANDERS AT ZEITOUN.



[Zolt.]

MOHAMED BEY FARID.

ment immediately after the outbreak of war in Europe may now be described. The bank-notes issued by the National Bank of Egypt were made compulsory legal tender; and the stock and share exchanges and the cotton and cotton seed future markets were closed. The latter markets were eventually re-opened on December 7. The Government also issued (in connexion with the payment of debts) various moratoria, the last of which disappeared on January 31, 1915, and appointed Commissions in each Governorate and Province to fix the maximum prices of articles of first necessity. The exportation of foodstuffs was forbidden. This prohibition was afterwards modified in the case of beans, maize, and millet, the export of limited quantities of which was allowed after October 28. These measures, though useful enough, failed to improve the situation of the landowners, and especially of the smaller owners, who saw the price of cotton falling steadily and fast. In late August a cotton Commission, composed of Mr. H. Higgs, C.B., Inspector-General to the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Dickson, Sub-Governor at the Alexandria Branch of the National Bank of Egypt, and Mr. Critchley, head of the Alexandria Branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, was appointed by the Ministry of Finance to take measures in England to meet the situation. Its members, who between them could claim an unrivalled knowledge of Egyptian economics and official

finance, held repeated consultations with expert authorities on currency, finance, banking, and cotton in London and Lancashire. They came to the following conclusions:

Owing to difficulties of finance and other considerations a fresh *trade* demand for cotton was improbable before December. Consumption, for obvious reasons, was likely to be less than usual, whereas the supply seemed much greater. There were classes of people interested in cotton who would be prepared to buy as a speculative investment, provided a minimum price were fixed. Banks would be prepared to finance such purchases subject to this condition. There were administrative difficulties in the way of making individual advances against cotton to landowners or to village units.

Taking these factors into account, the Commission recommended:

(1) That the Government should forthwith announce its intention to buy and hold—if necessary till October, 1915—the estimated surplus production of cotton, fixing minimum rates for the purchase of first and second pickings as high as prudence allowed, and giving preference to small cultivators. It was the Commission's opinion that the mere knowledge of this decision, coupled with (2), would stiffen prices and stimulate demand without involving Government in heavy purchases.

(2) That the acreage to be planted in cotton for next crop should be reduced by Decree to an amount roughly equivalent to the estimated carry forward from the season. (It appeared desirable to lose no time in artificially curtailing the price of a commodity which was likely to be sold at a loss and stimulate the production of foodstuffs which were likely to become increasingly remunerative.)

(3) That any Government purchases be financed by the issue of National Bank notes with the specific guarantee of the Egyptian Government.

(4) That a Commission should be appointed to authorise further issues of similar notes to exporters against approved forward sales.

(5) That similar notes be issued as required for sound business by approved Banks.

(6) That in order to avoid an excessive note issue all emergency currency was to pay a penalty based on Bank of England rate. With this safeguard it was anticipated that a comparatively small gold reserve would suffice to steady exchange.

These proposals were telegraphed towards the middle of September to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, which may or may not have discovered better expert advice in the interim, but in any case rejected some of them. On September 22 the Government decided to reduce the acreage under cotton to a million feddans (1,100,000 acres), and limit the area under cotton in each holding to 25 per cent. of that holding. This gave rise to complaints from the tenants who paid rent on the basis of the area under cotton. Finally, on October 30,

وزراء الجناح العالی الخدیوی



1 سعادة يوسف وهب باشا
ناظر المالية



2 عاطف رشدي باشا
رئيس مجلس الوزراء وناظر الداخلية



3 سعادة اسماعيل سري باشا
ناظر الأشغال



4 سعادة محمد محب باشا
ناظر الأوقاف



5 سعادة احمد حلمي باشا
ناظر المعارف



6 سعادة عدلي يمين باشا
ناظر الخارجية



7 سعادة عبد الخالق باشا سروات
ناظر القضاة



8 سعادة اسماعيل باشا صديقي
ناظر الزراعة

THE EGYPTIAN MINISTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. [Photographs by Zola

1. Yusuf Wahba Pasha, Finance. 2. Hussein Ruchdi Pasha, Premier and Minister of Interior. 3. Ismail Sirri Pasha, Public Works. 4. Mohamed Moheb Pasha, Wakfs (Pious Foundations). 5. Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, Education. 6. Adli Yeghen Pasha, Foreign Affairs. 7. Abdul Khalik Sarwat Pasha, Justice. 8. Ismail Sidki Pasha, Agriculture.



CAVALRY IN THE DESERT.

the Government modified its decree of September 22, and limited the proportion of any one holding under cotton to one-third instead of a quarter. Little had been done to prevent the breaking of the market, whether owing to the existence of the other claims on the attention of the British Treasury or not, it is uncertain.

At the beginning of October the Government issued the following *communiqué* :

The Egyptian Government will shortly issue Treasury bonds to the value of £E.8,000,000, £E.5,000,000 of which will be guaranteed by the British Government and the balance by the Egyptian Government's reserve. The bonds will be redeemable from a period of three to six months, the latter being the maximum date, but are renewable if necessary. They will be issued in London and Cairo, preference being given to which of the two places is the more favourable, but as far as possible the decision of the Council of Ministers to issue £E.5,000,000 in London and £E.3,000,000 in Cairo will be carried out. In no case will the unit of £E.8,000,000 be exceeded. The bonds issued in Cairo will be paid by the Government in National Bank notes, printed specially for the purpose; those issued in London will be paid in gold or in notes of the same value.

These arrangements having failed to assist the needy section of cultivators effectively, the Government at length fell in to some extent with the recommendation of the Cotton Commission, and commissioned four of the principal firms at Alexandria to buy the cotton belonging to the smallest cultivators as soon as possible at reasonable prices to a limit of £1,000,000, and at the same time made arrangements for the guaranteeing of certain advances against cotton by the National Bank of Egypt. These measures produced a good effect, and the amount of cotton which the Government

needed to purchase was small. The market improved immediately, but in the opinion of good judges earlier action would have saved the community very considerable losses and abated discontent more rapidly than did the somewhat tardy steps above referred to.

But if the Ministry of Finance did not, perhaps, quite rise to the situation during the period that followed the outbreak of war with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and preceded the rupture with Turkey, the Ministry of Interior did admirable work. Its handling of the problem presented by the presence of large numbers of enemy subjects in Egypt and the measures it took against Turkish and native suspects when Turkey had joined our enemies will be described later. It may be noted here that, with the exception of a law increasing the penalties for breaches of the peace committed by assemblies of more than four persons, no new legislation was required to meet the situation. The police did their work well, and both British and Egyptian Inspectors of Interior kept a vigilant eye on all possible agitators, while vagabonds were sent back whenever possible to their own provinces and bidden to stay there. The direction of the various administrative measures for the maintenance of order during the first three months of the war was in the hands of the Adviser to the Interior, Mr. (now Sir) R. Graham. After the proclamation of martial law the General Officer Commanding the Army of Occupation was ultimately responsible for public tran-

quillity, but the measures taken *ad hoc* were still carried out under the orders of the Adviser, who throughout this difficult period deserved right well of his country and of Egypt.

The military measures taken at the outset cannot be described in detail here. In August the garrison was reduced through the departure of units belonging to the Army of Occupation, but in September Indian troops, detached from the Indian Expeditionary Force, landed in Egypt and were marched through Cairo, where they made an excellent impression. The Sirhind Brigade remained for some time with other Indian units near the Suez Canal, where all the Indian forces in Egypt were eventually posted, and was finally sent to France, its place and that of other Indian regiments which left for Europe being taken by fresh forces from Hindustan, including Imperial Service troops. In September the East Lancashire Territorial Division and a brigade of Yeomanry arrived in Egypt. Once they had settled down, these troops trained on in admirable fashion, and though inferior in physique to the Australian troops, who arrived later, were superior to them in discipline, shooting and manœuvring power. Their relations with the native population were really admirable. At the end of November and the beginning of December the Australian and New Zealand

Expeditionary Force arrived. Both contained admirable military material, and the New Zealanders, it may be noted, gave much less trouble to the military police.

On the departure of General Sir J. Byng in September, Lieut.-General Sir John Maxwell was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Egypt. Sir John Maxwell, who at the outbreak of war was fifty-five years of age, joined the Army in 1879. He had spent the greater part of his military career in Egypt. He was with the Black Watch in the Egyptian War of 1882, and was present at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. He was a Staff Captain in the Hill Expedition of 1884-85, and then served as Aide-de-Camp to Major General Grenfell with the Egyptian Frontier Field Force. He was promoted Brevet Lieut.-Colonel for his services at Dongola in 1896, and commanded the second Egyptian Brigade at the Battle of Omdurman. In the South African War he commanded a Brigade, and was afterwards appointed Military Governor of Pretoria. In 1908 he was given the command of the forces in Egypt, and he held this appointment until two years before the Great War. His great popularity with the native population of all degrees and his remarkable knowledge of the country were valuable assets to the British



SUDANESE TRIBESMEN.

Occupation throughout this period, and when martial law was declared he imposed it with the minimum of necessary severity and with practically no interference whatever with the normal life of the country.

There were obvious difficulties in dealing with German and to some extent with Turkish propaganda as long as the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments were diplomatically represented in Egypt, and Herr von Pannwitz, Acting German Diplomatic Agent in the place of Prince Hatzfeldt's successor, Herr von Miquel, received a bi-weekly foreign office "bag" from Berlin by way of Constantinople and Beirut. At the end of August it was decided to expel those German and Austro-Hungarian subjects, including Diplomatic and Consular representatives, whose presence was considered undesirable. An intimation to this effect was therefore conveyed to Dr. von Pannwitz and Count Louis Szechenyi by General Sir J. Byng's aide-de-camp. The aggrieved diplomatists protested to the Egyptian Government, which returned no answer to their protest. Article 13 of its decision of August 5 dispensed it from that formality. On September 10 both left Alexandria for Italy by the s.s. Catania, and the American and Italian Diplomatic Agents took over the protection of their nationals in Egypt. Four German Consular officials were left under the charge of the American Agency and two Austro-Hungarian Consular officials under that of the Italian Agency. The German Government and that of the Dual Monarchy did their utmost to make capital out of this incident, more especially at Constantinople. But the measure was purely a military one, and absolutely defensible on military grounds. As long as a British army occupied Egypt the Commander of that army had the right in war time to take all necessary measures for the protection of the troops under his orders, including the expulsion of enemy subjects, whatever their rank, whose presence was inconvenient or dangerous. Till the end of August no steps had been taken either to register enemy subjects resident in Egypt or to prevent Austrian and German reservists from leaving the country. Many of them did so; those who were unable to make their way to Italy taking passages for Syrian ports. In September, first unmarried and later married enemy reservists were prevented from leaving the country, and on October 1, 1914, a proclamation was issued by the General Officer Commanding the Army of

Occupation calling on all German and Austro-Hungarian subjects to register themselves, failing which they would render themselves liable to arrest by the military authorities. The registration form showed age, profession, length of residence in Egypt, family, and liability for military service. It was only returned, in the case of male enemy residents, to persons over 48 years of age, for whom it served as a licence to reside and carry on business in Egypt. The authorities, having thus obtained a list of enemy subjects liable to service, sent all unmarried reservists to Alexandria, whence they were dispatched to Malta on November 1. With them were deported the crews of enemy ships taken as prizes and lying in Egyptian ports. The papers of the remaining German and Austro-Hungarian subjects of from 18 to 45 years of age were then examined, and all who could not furnish proof of their exemption from military service were dispatched to Malta with a number of married reservists and some more crews of prize ships on November 28. Between November 1 and December 17, 1,651 enemy subjects were thus deported. After the proclamation of the British Protectorate and the development of Turkish military preparations in Syria, it became necessary to take more sweeping measures towards German and Austro-Hungarian subjects, many of whom continued to indoctrinate ignorant Egyptians with a belief in the ultimate success of the Central Powers. Malta being now overcrowded with deportees, including many Turks, a concentration camp to hold about 150 persons was formed at Alexandria. There were sent to it: (a) Germans and Austro-Hungarians who wished to go there; (b) those who had no means of leaving the country or whose health would have suffered from a European winter; and (c) persons who for special reasons had not previously been deported. Early in 1915 all Germans, of whatever age, were requested to leave the country, and exceptions were only made in cases of age or infirmity, or where thoroughly satisfactory guarantees of good behaviour were forthcoming. No male German or Austro-Hungarian subjects were allowed to land in Egypt, and no women without permission of the General Officer Commanding.

These measures were strict, but they were by no means harshly applied. No Triestines, Dalmatians, Istrians, or Austro-Hungarian Slavs were deported unless there were particular reasons necessitating their expulsion.



EGYPT AND THE TURKISH EMPIRE.

No women were deported or sent to concentration camps, and it was only found necessary to request three to leave the country. In cases where the head of a family had been deported and the family had no means of getting to Europe the cost of the passage was borne by the Government. All petitions from Germans and Austrians were submitted to the General Officer Commanding, whose decision in their case was final. All denunciations of individuals were investigated by the Ministry of the Interior through the police, and the decision of the General Officer Commanding was taken on the result. Enemy subjects who were in the service of the Egyptian Government on the outbreak of war were required to sign a declaration in which they gave their name, rank, functions, and nationality, and declared that the present war would in no way affect the proper discharge of their duties as Egyptian officials, and that during the war they would do nothing to injure the arms or interests of Great Britain or her Allies. On November 25 Sir John Maxwell decided that no Austro-Hungarians or Germans could be allowed to remain in Government service, except such as could either obtain neutral or allied citizenship

or a certificate from a neutral or allied Consulate that they had taken all steps in their power to renounce their old and to acquire a new nationality. On December 3 all enemy subjects in Government service were dismissed, and the reinstatement of such as had been able to accept the above offer was begun. Those who were dismissed were treated as if their posts had been suppressed, and their rights to pensions and indemnities liquidated. Ten minor Government employees were deported with other enemy subjects, and one only sent to England on parole at his own request. Throughout Sir John Maxwell used the administrative machinery of the Egyptian Government up to the point where enemy subjects were handed over to the military authorities. That this machinery was in good hands was proved by the rarity of complaints, even on the part of those who suffered from its activity.

Meanwhile a number of enemy merchantmen, mostly under the German flag, had been lying in the Canal, and had in many cases refused to take advantage of the provisions of Article 20 of the Egyptian Government's decision of August 5, whereby they were permitted to pass through the Canal and quit its ports of



NATIVES BRING FOOD TO BRITISH SOLDIERS.



AUSTRALIAN CAMP AT THE PYRAMIDS.

access without danger of capture or detention (in Egyptian waters), provided that their passage of the Canal and departure from its ports of access were effected without undue delay.

The danger of a block in the Canal was thus greatly increased. In one or two instances attempts to sink ships in the Canal were only just foiled in time by the vigilance of the British and Egyptian authorities. The growing tension between Great Britain and Turkey made it necessary to remove this source of danger, and on October 14 the Egyptian Government, which had every reason to complain of the refusal of the captains of the vessels in question to respect its decision, took drastic measures against them. On that and succeeding days Egyptian troops arriving at the Canal ports boarded the ships in question, 22 in number, and occupied them with the object of preventing disturbances. Crews were then put on board which took the ships to sea, and at the three-mile limit handed them over to the British Naval authorities, who took them over. All reached Alexandria by October 20. Meanwhile the British Government issued a communication to neutrals and allied Powers which had been parties to the Suez Canal Convention. It pointed out that since the outbreak of war certain ships belonging to

enemy countries had been detained by the Egyptian Government, some on account of hostile acts, others through fear that such acts were contemplated by their captains, while other vessels had declined to leave the Suez Canal though furnished with passes, thus proving that they wished to use the Canal ports merely as ports of refuge. The British Government could not admit such an interpretation of the rights of free access and use of Canal ports. To admit it would imply its consent to the early blocking of the Canal. It was obvious, therefore, that the Egyptian Government was justified in removing enemy ships which had remained long enough in the Canal ports to show that they meant to stay there till the end of the war.

Three days after the arrival of the last of these ships at Alexandria the Supreme British Court sitting in Egypt gave notice that it had instituted actions in its capacity as a Prize Court against the owners and parties interested in the ships in question, "the said ships having been taken as prizes by H.M. Ships of War, and for the condemnation thereof."

Meanwhile the Turkish Government was pushing on its preparations for a campaign against Egypt. The Sublime Porte assured the British Ambassador at Constantinople that these measures were purely defensive and had



SIR MILNE CHEETHAM.

been taken only in consequence of the general mobilization of the Ottoman Army. But British Consular reports spoke not only of the mobilization of the Damascus Army Corps, but of the formation of reserve regiments in Syria, of the dispatch to Aleppo of troops belonging to the XIIth (Mosul) Army Corps, and of an active propaganda among the Arab tribes of the districts on the borders of the Sinai Peninsula. The officially inspired or controlled Arabic newspapers of Syria and Palestine were encouraged to publish violent articles against the Entente Powers. In September the entire Ottoman Press began to raise the Egyptian question, and to demand by what right the British military authorities whose occupation of Egypt the Porte had never recognized, had ordered the German and Austrian Agents to leave the country, though they received their *exequaturs* from the Porte. False accusations of a sort calculated to arouse Moslem fanaticism were also made, and wild and mythical tales of "massacres" of "harmless Moslems" spread abroad. At a later date parties of "fedais"—the political desperadoes and agitators whom the Committee of Union and Progress employed for political assassinations, the persecution of minorities, and the promotion of revolutionary movements in the Caucasus and the Balkans—began to drift into

Syria and incite the population against England. At Aleppo a local tailor was commissioned to make "a variety of Indian costumes and measurements" on designs supplied by German officers, it being the object of some of the "fedais" to enter Egypt in Indian disguise and stir up the population. Large quantities of arms were meantime being distributed among the Syrian Beduins with money subventions. Belz-ed-din Shakir, a prominent member of the Committee, had made an agreement on behalf of the Government in September with the Sheikh of the Howeytat tribe, and large bodies of Beduins were collected near Gaza. Finally, on October 26, the long-expected raid took place, and 2,000 armed Beduins crossed the Egyptian frontier and watered their camels at Magdaba wells, 20 miles within the Egyptian border. Before the Grand Vizier had received official news of this aggressive movement a Turkish destroyer flotilla had raided Odessa and sunk a Russian gunboat. On October 30 the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors asked for their passports, and on November 5 Great Britain was at war with Turkey.

The British authorities in Egypt were not caught unprepared. No sooner had the news of the attack on Odessa and the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Porte reached Cairo than a large number of suspected Turks, among whom were several officers, sent on enigmatic missions to Egypt, were arrested, together with certain Egyptians whose relations with the Ottoman Special Mission were suspect or who were notorious sedition-mongers. Sir John Maxwell's plan of campaign had been skilfully arranged. The British officials of the Ministry of Interior were promptly invested with what amounted to military powers to deal with sedition, under the command of Sir Ronald Graham, the Adviser to the Minister of Interior, who for the time being acted as Chief of Staff to the General Officer Commanding in all matters connected with the maintenance of order. Orders for deportation or imprisonment were signed by the Adviser until the situation was regularized by the proclamation of the British Protectorate. What amounted to a military dictatorship was thus inaugurated. On November 2 the following proclamations were issued:

By the General Officer Commanding His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Egypt.

Notice is hereby given that I have been directed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to assume military control of Egypt in order to secure its protection. The

country is therefore placed under Martial Law from this date.

I, John Grenfell Maxwell, Lieutenant-General, Commanding His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Egypt, entrusted with the application of Martial Law, hereby give notice as follows :

(1) The powers to be exercised under my authority by the Military Authorities are intended to supplement and not to supersede the Civil Administration, and all Civil officials in the service of the Egyptian Government are hereby required to continue the punctual discharge of their respective duties.

(2) Private citizens will best serve the common end by abstaining from all action of a nature to disturb the public peace, to stir up disaffection, or to aid the enemies of His Britannic Majesty and His Allies, and by conforming promptly and cheerfully to all orders given under my authority for the maintenance of public peace and good order ; and so long as they do so they will be subject to no interference from the Military Authorities.

(3) All requisitions of service or of property which may be necessitated by military exigencies will be the subject of full compensation, to be assessed, in default of agreement, by an independent authority.


By the second proclamation Sir John Maxwell reserved the right of interfering, if necessary, in the civil administration of the country. This right was not exercised. That this was so was due to the wise and patriotic conduct of the Ministry. Telegraphing on December 19. after the proclamation of the

British Protectorate, *The Times* Cairo Correspondent said :

On the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey the position became admittedly more difficult and delicate. Holding their mandate from the Khedive as the vassal of Turkey, Ministers must naturally have regarded certain measures which the situation demanded as inconsistent with that mandate, but they all realized that their first duty, overshadowing all other considerations, was to Egypt and the Egyptians. . . . But while the Ministry as a whole acquitted itself commendably, the lion's share of all the anxious and strenuous work has naturally fallen on the shoulders of its chief—Hussein Ruchdi Pasha—to whom the greatest credit is due. He had gone through the most trying period of office of any Egyptian Premier. The sudden assumption of control by the military authorities might well have been expected periodically to give rise to what many men in his position might have resented as encroachment on the civil prerogatives. But Ruchdi Pasha has shown remarkable adaptability and appreciation of the true requirements of the moment. At no time has there been friction, nor has one moment of anxiety been caused to the British authorities, who appreciate very highly his sincere and valuable co-operation, especially in the difficult circumstances of the past two months.

On November 7 Sir John Maxwell issued a proclamation announcing that a state of war existed as from November 5 between Great Britain and Turkey. The preamble was followed by these important passages :

Although from the outset of the war between His Majesty and the Emperors of Germany and Austria the-



AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS BUILDING A BRIDGE OVER A CANAL.



SOME MEN OF THE 9th MANCHESTER

Ottoman Government, under the influence of His Majesty's enemies, have repeatedly violated the rights secured to His Majesty by international law and by treaty, His Majesty's Government have scrupulously abstained from any retaliatory action until compelled thereto, not only by military preparations in Syria, which can only be directed against Egypt, but by the violation of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands, and by an open and unprovoked attack by the Ottoman Naval Forces, under German officers, upon the territories of one of His Majesty's Allies.

Great Britain is now fighting both to protect the rights and liberties of Egypt, which were originally won upon the battlefield by Mehemet Ali, and to secure to her the continuance of the peace and prosperity which she has enjoyed during the thirty years of the British Occupation.

Recognizing the respect and veneration with which the Sultan in his religious capacity is regarded by the Mohammedans of Egypt, Great Britain takes upon Herself the sole burden of the present war, without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein: but She expects and requires, in return, that the population shall refrain from any action of a nature to hamper Her military operation or to render aid to the enemy.

The dispositions of the Egyptian Government's decision of August 5 were applied by Sir John Maxwell to the Ottoman Empire, but no period of grace was granted to Turkish merchantmen in Egyptian ports. Egypt being an Ottoman vassal, it was impossible to take measures against Ottomans residing in the country. It was also unnecessary, since a large number of the non-Egyptian Ottomans were Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks who were supporters of the British Occupation, and not a few of the Turks were deadly enemies of the Committee of Union and Progress. The officers previously referred to were sent to Malta with certain Egyptians. Other suspects were ordered to leave the country, and requests to this effect were served on Prince Mohamed Ali,

brother of the Khedive, and one or two other members of the Khedivial family, who withdrew to Italy. The censorship of the Press was strengthened, as was the military censorship. The former was well managed at Cairo, less well at Alexandria. The military censorship grew more efficient as its organization improved. Active steps were taken, on the whole successfully, to prevent the importation and dissemination of seditious literature. The Ulema, by a proclamation calling on the Moslem Egyptians to abstain from political agitation and excitement, greatly assisted the Government and the British military authorities.

This regime was, of course, exceptional and, as far as some of its features were concerned, it was necessarily temporary. As long as Egypt was *de jure* a vassal State of Turkey if *de facto* a "veiled" British Protectorate, Ministers who held their mandate from a prince who was notoriously on the enemy's side, and whose sovereignty was an emanation of that exercised by the Sultan, Egypt's Suzerain could not well sign orders for the deportation of persons whose crime was their devotion to the Sovereign or the Suzerain. On the other hand, Advisers and Inspectors of Interior could not exercise exceptional powers over the heads of the Premier and his colleagues for long without injuring the prestige of the latter. And the British authorities in Egypt had nothing whatever to gain by injuring the prestige of their good friends. The situation had somehow to be regularized. Three questions had to be settled—that of the Sultan's suzerainty over



REGIMENT AT HELIOPOLIS CAMP.

Egypt, that of the Khedive, and arising out of the first two, that of the future government of the country. Turkish suzerainty was a ghost that had to be laid. It had always troubled some men's dreams in Egypt; of late it had seemed to trouble more. The Turks, by forcing war on the Allies and by massing troops in Syria for the invasion of Egypt, stood to lose their vassal province unless victorious. England had forborne to declare a protectorate after Tel-el-Kebir; she had disappointed Count Aehrenthal by declining to annex the country when he had torn up the Treaty of Berlin and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; she had made no use of the occasions offered when Abdul Hamid threatened the Sinai and when France declared a protectorate over Morocco. The present situation—Egypt practically at war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, yet the vassal of their ally, ruled by a Government whose mandate emanated from the Sultan, but which had undertaken to give every assistance to the British Army of Occupation in the struggle with the Sultan's allies—was too absurd to be prolonged. The Committee of Union and Progress had led Turkish suzerainty in the game for Egypt. It was for us to take the trick and declare Turkish suzerainty forfeit to the King of England.

The Khedive had shown little hesitation in joining the enemy. His past was not such that his defection could be excused as having been forced upon him. He had intrigued with Abdul Hamid against Egyptian interests, with the Committee against Arabs and with Arabs

against the Committee. He had encouraged wealthy Egyptians to aid the Senussi in his struggle against the Italians, and he had aided the Italians against the Senussi. He had intrigued with Turks, Arabs, and the Central Powers against the British Occupation. It was impossible that he should remain on the Khedivial throne. But no Egyptian machinery for his dethronement existed. The Grand Mufti, as the mandatory of the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Turkey, who had recently declared a Holy War (to which Egypt, by the way, paid small attention) against England and her Allies, could not issue a "fetwa" of deposition, nor could the Ministers depose their Sovereign. It was for the British Government to declare the Khedivial throne vacant by reason of the conduct of Abbas Hilmi, who had joined the King's enemies.

These two questions were easily settled. But the question of the future status of Egypt was more difficult. There were two alternatives—annexation or protectorate—for Egyptian independence was not desired by the majority of Egyptians, and could not have been maintained against even a second-rate European State without a close alliance with the dominant sea Power. There were arguments for annexation which seemed more cogent in London than in Cairo. The annexationists believed that the adoption of the more simple if more violent course would enable Great Britain to deal with the problem of the foreign jurisdictions in Egypt more effectively and expeditiously than would otherwise be possible.

Some took the view that the proclamation of a protectorate would merely lead in the end to fresh difficulties between the Egyptian and British sides of the administration. At Cairo, on the other hand, it was held by those best qualified to form an opinion that this less showy policy was the soundest. The intellectual elements among the Arab peoples whom the Turkish and Levantine Pan-Islamists had been striving to combine against us had been profoundly impressed by our unremitting efforts to prepare the Egyptians for self-government, and by our abstinence from all action calculated to repress the development of local institutions. Again, we had entered into the world's struggle on behalf of "small nationalities." True, a national feeling as distinct from the religious bond of Islam had not yet sunk deep into the minds of the masses in Egypt. But it existed, if less strongly than in most European States, among the more enlightened classes, and there were indications that it was gaining ground among them. Even among the masses there was a racial feeling or particularism which contained in itself the germs of nationalism and deserved respect, the more so when it was remembered that the Egyptian people had on the whole behaved very well during the period in which its hostility might have proved most embarrassing to us. Finally there were large vested interests bound up with the maintenance of the House of Mohamed Ali, the dynasty which had given Egypt its rulers since the early days of the

nineteenth century. It would have been folly to ignore, and ultimately dangerous to annoy, them. After hearing both sides the British Government supported the "men on the spot" and decided in favour of a protectorate.

It was necessary, too, to choose the Khedive's successor. Prince Hussein Kamil, uncle of the Khedive, the senior member of the reigning House and its worthiest representative, was the obvious choice. But the Prince, though willing to accept the offer of the Khedivial throne, was in no hurry. "I am not *'arriviste,'*" he said to the Special Correspondent of *The Times*, to whom he granted an interview just before his accession. "I had no need to be, for I 'arrived' 59 years ago." He felt strongly and naturally that if he was to appear before his people as England's nominee to the throne of his deposed nephew he must appear with something in his hands. Negotiations followed between him and the British Government's representative at Cairo, Mr. (now Sir) Milne Cheetham. The acting British Agent conducted these delicate negotiations in a manner that won the admiration of all who were conversant with the facts. He received useful assistance from the Oriental Secretary to the British Agency, Mr. R. Storrs. It was finally settled that Prince Hussein should ascend the throne with the title and style of Sultan, which had been borne by the independent Mameluke rulers of Egypt—the "Soldans of Egypt" of our crusading ancestors—and the Fatimides before them. His title in French



STATE ENTRY OF THE SULTAN INTO CAIRO—CROWDS AWAITING ARRIVAL.

was to be *Hautesse*, in Arabic "Azamat," to distinguish him from the Turkish Grandviziers and ex-Grandviziers and Sheiks-ul-Islam and the minor princes of the Khedivial family, who bore the title of "Altesse." The standard of the Khedivial House, three white crescents with their backs to the staff, each with a five-pointed white star between the horns on a red field, was adopted as the national flag of Egypt.

The British Government appointed a British High Commissioner in Egypt, and the name of "British Agency" gave place to that of "British Residency," as the title of our representative's official residence. For this important and responsible post the British Government selected Sir Henry McMahon, an ex-soldier, who had won high distinction as a political officer under the Indian Government, and was thoroughly acquainted with Oriental ways of thought. The views of the British Government as regards the new regime were set forth in the following communication, which was transmitted to Prince Hussein on its behalf by Mr. Milne Cheetham, and afterwards published:

YOUR HIGHNESS,

I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to bring to the notice of Your Highness the circumstances preceding the outbreak of war between His Britannic Majesty and the Sultan of Turkey and the changes which the war entails in the status of Egypt.

In the Ottoman Cabinet there were two parties. On the one side was a moderate party, mindful of the sympathy extended by Great Britain to every effort towards reform in Turkey, who recognized that in the war in which His Majesty was already engaged no Turkish interests were concerned and welcomed the assurance of His Majesty and His Allies that, neither in Egypt nor elsewhere would the war be used as a pretext for any action injurious to Ottoman interests. On the other side a band of unscrupulous military adventurers looked to find in a war of aggression, waged in concert with His Majesty's enemies, the means of retrieving the disasters, military, financial, and economic, into which they had already plunged their country. Hoping to the last that wiser counsels might prevail, His Majesty and His Allies, in spite of repeated violations of their rights, abstained from retaliatory action until compelled thereto by the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by armed bands and by unprovoked attacks on Russian open ports by the Turkish Naval forces under German officers.

His Majesty's Government are in possession of ample evidence that ever since the outbreak of war with Germany His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies.

From the facts above set out, it results that the rights over Egypt, whether of the Sultan or of the late Khedive, are forfeit to His Majesty.

His Majesty's Government have already, through the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces in Egypt, accepted exclusive responsibility for the defence of Egypt in the present war. It remains to lay down the form of the future government of the country, freed, as I have stated, from all rights of suzerainty or other rights heretofore claimed by the Ottoman Government.



[Lafayette

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR J. MAXWELL.

Of the rights thus accruing to His Majesty, no less than of those exercised in Egypt during the last thirty years of reform, His Majesty's Government regard themselves as trustees for the inhabitants of Egypt. And His Majesty's Government have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has incurred toward Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and by the government of the country under such Protectorate by a Prince of the Khedivial Family.

In these circumstances I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that, by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as the Prince of the Family of Mehemet Ali most worthy to occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of Sultan of Egypt: and, in inviting Your Highness to accept the responsibilities of Your high office, I am to give you the formal assurance that Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the territories under Your Highness against all aggression whencesoever coming; and His Majesty's Government authorize me to declare that after the establishment of the British Protectorate now announced all Egyptian subjects wherever they may be will be entitled to receive the protection of His Majesty's Government.

With the Ottoman suzerainty there will disappear the restrictions heretofore placed by the Ottoman firmans upon the numbers and organization of Your Highness's Army and upon the grant by Your Highness of honorific distinctions.

As regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between Your Highness's Government and the Representatives of Foreign Powers should henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's Representative in Cairo.

His Majesty's Government have repeatedly placed on record that the system of Treaties, known as the Capitulations, by which Your Highness's Government is bound are no longer in harmony with the development of the country: but, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the revision of those treaties may most conveniently be postponed until the end of the present war.

In the field of internal administration, I am to remind Your Highness that, in consonance with the traditions of British Policy, it has been the aim of His Majesty's Government, while working through and in the closest association with the constituted Egyptian Authorities, to secure individual liberty, to promote the spread of education, to further the development of the natural resources of the country, and, in such measure as the degree of enlightenment of public opinion may permit, to associate the governed in the task of government. Not only is it the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain faithful to such policy, but they are convinced that the clearer definition of Great Britain's position in the country will accelerate progress towards self-government.

The religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected, as are those of His Majesty's own subjects, whatever their creed. Nor need I affirm to Your Highness that, in declaring Egypt free from any duty of obedience to those who have usurped political power at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government are animated by no hostility towards the Khaliphate. The past history of Egypt shows, indeed, that the loyalty of Egyptian Mohammedans towards the Khaliphate is independent of any political bonds between Egypt and Constantinople.

The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take a deep interest and with which Your Highness will be specially concerned, and in carrying out such reforms as may be considered necessary Your Highness may count upon the sympathetic support of His Majesty's Government.

I am to add that His Majesty's Government rely with confidence upon the loyalty, the good sense, and self-restraint of Egyptian subjects to facilitate the task of the General Officer Commanding His Majesty's Forces, who is entrusted with the maintenance of internal order, and with the prevention of the rendering of aid to the enemy.

I avail myself of this opportunity to present to Your Highness the assurance of my highest respect.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

December 19, 1914.

On Saturday, December 19, the following proclamation was published at Cairo :

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that, in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the Protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate.


The Suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated, and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt, and protect its inhabitants and interests.

The Proclamation was at the same time published in all the provincial centres. Its reception there was on the whole good. Many of the fellahen were openly though undemonstratively pleased by what they believed to be a guarantee that their rights would be respected, that they would get their water without having to bribe the irrigation officials, and that the great landlords would not be permitted to oppress them. There were grumblers in the towns, especially in Tanta, always a centre of fanaticism from pre-Islamic days; some of the Beduin notables who had been won over by Turkish agents, or who resented the British

occupation, which prevented them from preying on the fellahen as their ancestors had been wont to do, talked treasonably and hinted at an impending Turkish invasion. But no demonstration was made against the Protectorate throughout all the provinces from Assuan to Behera. In Cairo and Alexandria there was more discontent, not only among the ignorant who had heard wondrous tales of the coming of "Effendina" at the head of the Turkish legions, but among the fairly numerous class of extreme Nationalists, students, lawyers, and the like, some of whom donned black ties as a sign of their mourning. But this was all; the majority of the population remained good-temperedly indifferent to all that was happening. "Rather more than 10 per cent. of the Egyptians are with you, rather less than 10 per cent. against you, and the remaining 80 per cent. do not really care as long as they and their religion are left alone," was the verdict of a shrewd Oriental observer, and as far as Cairo was concerned he was probably right, though the pro-British forces were stronger, and hostile elements weaker, in the provinces.

Thus terminated the reign of Abbas II. of Egypt. In Lord Cromer's words he had "preferred to throw in his lot with the enemies of Great Britain, being probably under the impression that he was joining the side which would be ultimately victorious in the war now being waged. In adopting this course he committed political suicide." Yet his general unpopularity with the best elements of modern Egypt and with the peasantry, the abuses which he encouraged, and the rather squalid domestic scandals in which he was latterly involved, would probably have rendered it impossible for him permanently to retain his position. Even those who disapproved of his deposition, on the ground that, as a Moslem Viceroy appointed by the Sultan he could only lawfully be deposed by the Sultan, seldom affected to admire his character or his methods.

The groups, largely composed of ignorant, or, at best, half-educated folk, who continued discreetly to espouse his cause were actuated by fear of his return at the head of the Turkish Armies, by fanaticism, or by self-interest. The host of palace officials and parasites of both sexes, spies, secret agents, and other creatures of the ex-ruler, and their relatives, who had mostly robbed their master and had been permitted by him to rob and blackmail others.



BRITISH TROOPS, IN EGYPT.

1. New Zealand men at work. 2. East Lancashire Territorials pontoon making. 3. Brigadier-General Briscoe, in command of the Cavalry Brigade, with the members of his staff. 4. Australians on the trams. 5. Cooks preparing dinner at the Australians' Camp. 6. New Zealanders at their Christmas Dinner.



WESTMINSTER DRAGOONS IN EGYPT.
No. 2. Troop, "C" Squadron.

were naturally most genuine in their professions of regret, for Sultan Hussein would have none of them, and dismissed every person who was in the Khedive's employ. With some of the *exalté* students, especially those of the Law School, ever a centre of political agitation, and the more reactionary Ulema and their disciples, they formed what might have developed into a sort of Egyptian "Legitimist" party. But for the present they were silent, because they feared. The Beduin notables, with few exceptions, had already descended with their usual shrewdness to the British side of the fence. As for the fellaheen, who had no cause whatever to love Abbas Hilmi, "itkassarit sinûnuh" (his teeth are broken) was their most frequent comment, when they read of the deposition of "Effendina." Many of the members of the Khedivial family who had suffered from their kinsman's avarice doubtless echoed the sentiments of the fellaheen in more polished language.

His successor, Sultan Hussein Kamil, was born in 1853. At the age of 14 he was sent to Paris to continue his education, and there was a guest at the court of Napoleon III. and the playfellow of the Prince Imperial. In 1869 he acted as Chamberlain to the Empress Eugenie at the magnificent opening of the Suez Canal, and returned to Egypt in 1870. He was appointed Inspector-General of the Delta in 1872, and later held several portfolios, showing exceptional energy during his tenure of the Ministry of Public Works, notably in the great flood year of 1874. On the abdica-

tion of Ismail Pasha in 1878, Prince Hussein retired to Naples with his father. His brother, Tewfik Pasha, was reputed to be jealous of him, and there is reason to believe that Ismail Pasha had at one time the intention of altering the order of succession and appointing Hussein as his successor. After his return, he for long played no political rôle, but was able to render considerable assistance in many ways to the British Occupation. The Khedivial Agricultural Society was founded by him in 1898, and rendered great service to the country. Keenly interested in agriculture, gardening, and technical and industrial education, he could spare time for much philanthropic activity, especially in his capacity as president of the Cairo First Aid Society. In 1909 he returned to political life and became president of the Legislative Council and General Assembly. He certainly did much to raise the tone of their debates, finally resigning in March, 1910, when these bodies, inspired by the Khedive and the extreme Nationalists, foolishly rejected the proposal for the extension of the Suez Canal Concession. Strongly Anglophile, and at the same time a patriotic Egyptian, with a thorough knowledge of, and liking for, the fellaheen, whom most Turco-Egyptians were inclined to despise, the new ruler of Egypt was the antithesis of his nephew. Honest, open-handed to a fault, proud, yet courteous to all, and gifted with remarkable personal charm, he inherited the best qualities of his father, to which he joined a very genuine desire for the betterment of the masses. A spare, lithe-built man of aristo-

cratic Albanian type, with a manner that combined dignity and charm, his presence was that of a ruler. In religion he was a devout and liberal Moslem, in ethics a gentleman.

The first official act of the Sultan was to address the following rescript to Hussein Ruchdi Pasha, who, with the other members of the Cabinet, had resigned as soon as the deposition of the Khedive, from whom all Ministers held their mandate, had been officially communicated to him:

MY DEAR RUCHDI PASHA,

Recent political events have brought about the establishment by Great Britain of her Protectorate over Egypt and the vacancy of the Khedivial Throne.

By the communication, of which We transmit you a copy [the reference is to the British Government's communication published on page 309], to be brought to the knowledge of the Egyptian people, the Government of His Britannic Majesty has appealed to Our devotion to Our country to the end that We may take the Khedivate of Egypt with the title of Sultan, while the Sultanate furthermore shall be hereditary in the family of Mohamed Ali following an order of succession to be determined.

After a life devoted to the service of the country, We might have aspired to repose: nevertheless We consider it Our duty, in the particularly delicate situation of Egypt which these events have created, to assume this heavy responsibility and, faithful to Our past, to continue to devote Our energies to the service of the Fatherland.

This We owe to Egypt and to Our glorious ancestor the Great Mohamed Ali, whose dynasty We desire to perpetuate. In Our solicitude for the interests of the country We shall ever seek to ensure the moral and material well-being of its inhabitants by the continuation of the programme of reforms which has already been commenced. The constant care of Our Government will therefore be the diffusion and the perfecting of education in all its stages, the good administration of justice, and its organization on lines more appropriate to the actual conditions of the country; it will devote

the most vigilant attention to questions connected with the tranquillity and security of the population, and will give a new impulse to the economic development of Egypt.

As regards representative institutions, Our aim will be to associate the governed more closely with the government of the country.

For the realization of this programme We have the assurance that We shall obtain the most sympathetic support from the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and We are convinced that the more precise definition of the situation of Great Britain in Egypt, by dissipating all causes of misunderstanding, will facilitate the collaboration towards a common end of all the political elements in the country.

For the task that awaits Us, We count on the loyal aid of all Our people.

Knowing your experience and high qualities, We appeal to your patriotism in demanding your aid in the accomplishment of this task. We therefore summon you to the Presidency of Our Council of Ministers and invite you to form the Cabinet and submit to Our high approval the names of the colleagues whom you think fit to propose to Us.

We pray the Almighty to bless Our efforts in this patriotic task.

HUSSEIN KAMIL.

Ruchdi Pasha's reply admirably summed up his attitude and that of his patriotic colleagues. After thanking His Highness for the honour conferred upon him, he continued:

Though formerly holding office in virtue of a mandate from the preceding Sovereign, I am above all an Egyptian, and I consider it my duty as an Egyptian to attempt under the auspices of Your Highness to serve my country, the higher interests of which have always guided me and have now proved superior to personal considerations.

The New Ministry was thus composed:

Hussein Ruchdi Pasha, Premier and Interior.

Adli Yeghen Pasha, Agriculture.

Ismail Sidki Pasha, Pious Foundations.

Ahmed Hilni Pasha, Education.



AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS BUILDING PONTOON.



[Dutrich.]

THE SULTAN OF EGYPT.

Ismail Sirri Pasha, Public Works.

Yusuf Wahba Pasha, Finance.

Abdul Khalik Sarwat Pasha, Justice.

The only member of the former Cabinet who did not resume office was Mohamed Moheb Pasha, the former Minister of Pious Foundations. This was accounted for by the abolition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the British Protectorate, and perhaps by the favour wherewith Abbas Hilmi was said to regard the ex-Minister, who had left Egypt for Italy.

On the day of his accession Sultan Hussein received the following telegram from King George :

On the occasion when Your Highness enters upon your high office I desire to convey to Your Highness the expression of my most sincere friendship and the assurance of my unfailing support in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt and in securing her future well-being and prosperity.

Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced that you will be able, with the cooperation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt and the wealth, liberty, and happiness of its people.

GEORGE R. AND I.

The Sultan telegraphed the following reply :

To His Majesty the King, London.

I present to Your Majesty the expression of my deepest gratitude for the feelings of friendship with which you see fit to honour me and for the assurance of your valuable support in safeguarding the integrity and independence of Egypt.

Conscious of the responsibilities I have just assumed, and resolved to devote myself, in entire cooperation with the Protectorate, to the progress and welfare of my people, I am happy to be able to count in this task on Your Majesty's protection and on the assistance of Your Government.

HUSSEIN KAMIL.

On December 20 the Sultan made his ceremonial entry into Abdin Palace. Not a single incident marred the order and dignity of the proceedings. The military and police arrangements were alike admirable, while the populace showed a good humour and obedience that rendered the task of the authorities an easy one.

At half-past nine o'clock the booming of the first of the twenty-one guns of a salute announced that the Sultan had left the Palace of Kamil-ed-Din. As the cannon sounded, the troops all along the line of the route presented arms—the smart Egyptian cadets outside the Kamil-ed-Din Palace, the long lines of the East Lancashire Territorials, who lined the route up the street past the Savoy Hotel, the tall New Zealanders along the Upper Kasr-en-Nil Road, and the Sharia Magh-raby to the Opera Square near the Continental Hotel, the hard-bitten Australians, who carried on the line into Abdin Square, where the Ceylon Planters' Corps, a trim contingent, were ranged between the Australians and the British and Egyptian Guards of Honour. The guns boomed slowly from the Citadel, and the



[Dutrich.]

THE EX-KHEDIVE OF EGYPT.

Egyptian and European onlookers crowded forward from windows and balconies as the head of the procession came into view.


First rode the Vice-Commandant of the Cairo Police, then a squadron of Yeomanry mounted on grey Arabs, next—a bright touch of colour amid the long lines of dust-coloured khaki and drill—came a squadron of Egyptian Lancers, their red fezes and red and green lance pennons contrasting with the blue and white of their tunics. Behind them rode the Cavalry of the Bodyguard in black and dark blue, and then, preceded and attended by syces in traditional garb, came the Sultan's State carriage drawn by four magnificent white horses, the scarlet and gold liveries of the coachmen showing brilliantly up against the white.

The Sultan, with the Prime Minister on his left, drove slowly past. His mien was dignified and resolute. The slight tilt with which he wears his high scarlet Egyptian fez gave his bearing just that little touch of *panache* that endears rulers to their people, otherwise he was soberly but perfectly dressed. As he gravely responded to the applause with which the people greeted him, looking full in the faces of the crowd, there was something in his aquiline features and aristocratic bearing that reminded one of the proud Skipetars, the Folk of the Eagle, of those Albanian hills whence came his great ancestor.

Egyptians, like other Orientals, cheer but little, but all along the route, swelling louder and louder above the strains of the Khedivial Anthem, sounded the clapping of thousands of hands. The streets were bright with flags, among which flashed most conspicuously of all the scarlet Khedivial Banner, with its three white crescents and three stars. The Ministers followed the State coach, then rode a fine squadron of yeomanry mounted on English horses. Next came, accompanied by kavasses in scarlet, the carriages of the Acting British High Commissioner, the Agency Staff, and last of all, Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell.

A great multitude of dignitaries and notables, mostly from the provinces, assembled in a great marquee in Abdin Square, cheered and applauded the Sultan as the procession moved up to the entrance to the Palace. As he entered its doors he turned and saluted his subjects. A moment later the sky, which had till then been overcast, brightened suddenly, and the sun which Ancient Egypt had worshipped shone out. Thus Sultan Hussein entered his palace with favourable omens.

A reception which lasted over six hours followed. During it the Egyptian troops, whose officers, Egyptian and British, had taken the oath to the new ruler, acclaimed Sultan Hussein. In the course of the reception His Highness addressed advice on agricultural and financial matters to the provincial dele-



THE SULTAN ARRIVING AT HIS RESIDENCE IN HELIOPOLIS.

gations, deprecated religious quarrels, and urged the notables of Gharbia province in particular to use their influence to put an end to the family feuds, which are the principal cause of crime in Egypt. He admonished the Beduin Sheikhs of Fayum, warning them that they must remember that they dwelt in a civilized country, and must, therefore, submit to ordered rule. Those who preferred lawless "desert" conditions of existence had best leave the country.

It was noted that Sir Milne Cheetham, the Acting High Commissioner, was accorded an enthusiastic reception by the crowd when arriving at and departing from Abdin.

At nightfall the whole of Cairo was brilliantly illuminated. Thus closed three of the most eventful days in the history of modern Egypt.

During this period the Sudan had been absolutely quiet, to the relief and perhaps to the surprise of the British Military authorities. This huge country of nearly a million square miles in extent, peopled largely by Moslems who had been conquered by Lord Kitchener only sixteen years before, and were among the bravest and most fanatical of African races, was jointly governed by Great Britain and Egypt with a comparatively small garrison which included few white troops. The religious fervour of large elements of the

population excused and explained the fear that the action of Turkey might stir up the tribes to rise. It was largely owing to the action of the Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Reginald Wingate, and of the many able officers under his control that the whole country was not only quiet but loyal, and that the entire population supported the British cause. Returning immediately after the outbreak of the Great War to Egypt, Sir Reginald, who was also the Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army, spent some time at Cairo, and after satisfying himself that the spirit of the Egyptian Army was good, went south to Khartum, where he held many informal meetings with the senior Egyptian officers and the chief local notables. After this he held a huge public reception at Omdurman, where he addressed the religious leaders of the people in Arabic, fully explaining the origin and causes of the war with Germany. The speech was loyally acclaimed, and from that moment there was no doubt of the feeling of the leaders of the Sudanese peoples. The Governor-General afterwards made a rapid tour of the Sudan, and held receptions at the chief towns of the Sudan, always with the same excellent results. It was made clear by him and his chief subordinates to the notables in private conversations that Turkey



THE SULTAN'S ENTRY—ABDIN SQUARE.

Yeomanry leading procession : Ceylon Infantry : Egyptian Guard of Honour on the right.



INDIANS WOUNDED AT SUEZ CANAL ARRIVING IN CAIRO.

was drifting towards war. When war broke out with the Porte the ground had been well prepared, and the people were not wholly taken by surprise. On November 7 fifty of the leading regimental officers, British and Egyptian, were summoned to the palace at Khartum, where the Governor-General addressed them, and, after briefly explaining what had happened, read a proclamation announcing that a state of war between Great Britain and Turkey existed as from that day, and calling on the inhabitants of the Sudan to render all the assistance that might be required of them to the British, Egyptian, and Sudanese forces. A similar procedure was adopted in all the principal garrison towns by the Governors or Commandants at the same moment. On the following day the principal religious Sheikhs and Ulema were assembled, when the Governor-General addressed them, informing them that he was about to call upon the Grand Mufti to read them an address from him, and expressing his confidence that as enlightened and patriotic men they would explain the truth and give good counsel to the people. The Grand Mufti then read an address in Arabic, in which, after recapitulating the benefits the British had wrought in the Sudan, he declared that this war had been unsought by Great Britain, but forced on her by the madness of "this syndicate of Jews, financiers, and low-born intriguers, like broken gamblers staking

their last coin, and in deference to the urgent demands of Germany and our enemies, who have gone to war with the one Power who by her actions and the sentiments of her people has ever been a true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems and to Islam."

Great Britain had no quarrel with Islam or its spiritual leaders. She would ever maintain and enforce on others the sanctity and inviolability of the Holy Places. They need not fear that the war would affect the situation of Islam in the world. Their fears were groundless, for the British Empire would not change the position of a single Moslem subject for the worse, or repudiate a single privilege granted to its Moslems.

The Ulema were most enthusiastic and publicly protested their loyalty. Prominent among them was Sherif Yusef El Hindi, a descendant of the Prophet, who had enormous influence in the Sudan, and the eldest son of the Mahdi, who vouched for the fidelity of all ex-Mahdists. The Ulema afterwards produced an admirable manifesto, signed by sixteen of their chiefs. The popular response was extraordinary. From all sides letters and telegrams promising support reached the Sirdar, and the Egyptian officers made similar representations. Generous gifts were made to the Prince of Wales's Fund. Nor did the attempts of Turkish agents to excite the people meet with the slightest success. A typical



[Lekegian.]

SLATIN PASHA.

example of their failures was the case of Elmaz Bey, Enver Pasha's aide-de-camp and creature, an ignorant black, who had formerly served in the Egyptian Coastguards, joined the Turks in Cyrenaica, and had done his utmost to perjure away the life of Aziz el Masri. Girt with a lengthy sabre and clad in Turkish uniform this witless blackamoor landed near Port Sudan in full view of the Coastguards, and repaired to some Arab tents, whence he made his way in disguise to the officers' quarters of an Egyptian battalion. He called on the officers to revolt. They promptly arrested him, and he was sentenced to death after trial by court-martial, his sentence being afterwards commuted in consequence of the disclosures he made.

The Sudan suffered one serious loss through the war. Sir Rudolph von Slatin, the Austrian officer, who had been for many years a Mahdist prisoner, and after his rescue by the Sirdar had done admirable service to England and Egypt in the country where he had been a captive, felt himself compelled to sever his connexion with the service. His motives in so doing were creditable to his patriotism as a good subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and were misunderstood by none of his old colleagues, least of all by his old friend the Sirdar.

Such was the history of the Sudan for the first seven months of the war. British officers

stationed there regarded the loyalty and calm of its tribes as "little short of miraculous," and the *Sudan Times* truly said that whatever loss or misery the war might have brought to the world, it had at least given the British a proof such as would never otherwise have come to light that their work in the Sudan had not been in vain.

On the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey the Allied warships in the Southern Levant and in the Red Sea received orders to observe hostile ports and to prevent any smuggling or filibustering expeditions that might be attempted, especially from the coast of Arabia. Details concerning the activity of these warships, mainly British, on the coast of Syria can be more profitably given when the Turkish campaign against Egypt can be fully described. In the Red Sea an Indian expedition on its way to Egypt pluckily effected the reduction of the Turkish fort at Sheikh Said on the mainland near Aden. A landing party covered by H.M.S. Duke of Edinburgh captured a considerable quantity of war material with a loss of three killed and a few wounded.

On November 5 H.M. cruiser *Minerva*, which had observed Akaba during the Anglo-Turkish dispute of 1906, appeared before the town and demanded the surrender of the fort. Though there were not more than seventy or eighty armed men in the place, mostly Arabs with a few gendarmes, the Turks refused, and the fort and Government buildings were consequently destroyed by the cruiser, assisted by the destroyers *Savage* and *Scourge*. A landing party exchanged some shots with the enemy in the Wadi Ithm, but suffered no casualties. After this a close watch was kept on Akaba till the end of the year. Shells were fired at parties of Turks who showed themselves near the beach, and on one occasion a landing party drove a small body out of a trench, suffering three and inflicting seven or eight casualties. The *Minerva* was once forced to shift her anchorage owing to the fire of a concealed field-gun, which dropped shells near her, and on another occasion had a man killed on board by snipers. Nothing of note, however, occurred till the year's end.

After the first invasion of Egyptian territory by Beduins on October 28, the remaining Anglo-Egyptian posts were withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula to the Canal. Fort Nakhl was evacuated, the cistern blown up, and certain buildings destroyed. Several rock wells

which might have been of service to an invading force were blown in with dynamite. The Egyptian officials were withdrawn from El Arish without incident and the majority of the nomad Arabs of the desert of Et-Tih repaired with their flocks and herds to the mountainous country south of the Akaba-Nakhl road. The first raiding party which had crossed the border seems to have returned after stealing a few camels, but in the second week of November a force of Terabin Beduins from south-west Palestine accompanied by a few Turkish and German officers occupied El Arish, and afterwards advanced towards Katia. Save for the exchange of a few shots between Beduin scouts and Egyptian Coastguard patrols no encounters took place till November 21. On that morning an Egyptian patrol composed of twenty Sudanese camelmén was surprised while encamped east of Bir-en-Nuss, and captured to a man. Captain Chope, of the Bikanir Camel Corps, and an Egyptian officer, Lieutenant Anis, with a patrol of twenty men of the Bikanir Camel Corps, pushing eastward to gain touch with the Coastguards, found their camp empty. An hour's ride further east

Captain Chope saw ahead of him a party of twenty men mounted on white camels, waving white flags. Thinking they were the missing Egyptians he let them approach. Within thirty yards the Beduins raised their rifles and were promptly shot down almost to a man by the Bikanirs, who similarly disposed of another party which attempted to attack. Captain Chope then advanced towards Katia, when suddenly 150 horsemen were observed trying to move round his right flank, while a like number tried to turn his left. He therefore fell back fighting, but was hard pressed by the mounted men, who kept up a hot fire from the saddle but durst not close with the plucky Bikanirs, who shot straight and fought the enemy off till they reached their supports. Only five of them were then unwounded, with Captain Chope, who had a narrow escape, having his water-bottle pierced and his sword hilt shivered by bullets, while his camel was wounded in the hump by a ball from a Martini. The Egyptian officer Lieutenant Anis and Subadar Abdu Khan were killed, with ten of the Bikanir men. Three of the latter came in wounded and two more wounded men were afterwards



AIN MÛSA WELL, SINAI, NEAR SUEZ.

The enemy's scouts reached this point.



A TURKISH HYDROPLANE.

picked up by a patrol. One of them had a narrow escape from the enemy, who slashed at him as he lay, wounding him severely but not fatally in the neck. Of the Beduins over fifty, including the brother of the Tarabin chief, Sheikh Sufi, were killed and many

wounded. Tactically the enemy had had the best of the skirmish, but the moral effect of the resistance of the gallant Indian soldiers was such that the raiders immediately fell back on Katia, and made no forward movement towards the Canal for nearly six weeks.



CHAPTER LIX.

THE GERMAN FAILURE IN POLAND.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN OBJECTIVE IN POLAND—THE POLISH QUESTION—GERMAN TEMPTATIONS AND APPEALS—POLISH SOLIDARITY—THE FIRST GERMAN ADVANCE—DANGER TO WARSAW—RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS AND GERMAN RETREAT—IWANGOROD—DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS—BATTLE OF KIELCE—AUSTRIAN ADVANCE IN GALICIA—CAUSES OF AUSTRO-GERMAN FAILURE—SECOND GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN POLAND—A SUCCESS AT KUTNO—CAPTURE OF LODZ—RUSSIAN MOVE ON CRACOW—FIGHTING IN THE CARPATHIANS—THE SITUATION AT THE END OF 1914.

IN Chapter LVII. we saw the conclusion, in the last days of September, 1914, of the first Galician campaign, when the Russians had not only successfully beaten off the Austrian offensive at all points, but had swept the enemy back over his own borders, and had almost driven him out of the whole Province of Galicia. From the north, down the Vistula and across the San, from the east by Rawa-Ruska, past Lemberg and Jaroslau, and along the right bank of the Dniester, the Russian armies under Ruzsky, Ivanoff, Brusiloff, and Dmitrieff had forced the Austrians from one position after another until, beaten and temporarily demoralized, having lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners not much less than half a million men, the armies of von Auffenberg, Dankl, and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were herded together in western Galicia, beyond the river Wisloka, and under the protection of the guns of Craeow. Przemysl still held out and was not to fall, under circumstances which have been described, until six months later. Meanwhile the victorious Russian cavalry was scouring the country to the southward up to the very foothills of the Carpathians and in places penetrating into the mountain passes themselves. In the later phases of these opera-

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tions some, at least, of the Austrian armies had been reinforced by a greater or lesser number of German divisions, which had been powerless to avert or materially mitigate the catastrophe. The first month of the war on this part of the eastern front had ended in the humiliation of Austria, while the Russians had shown a quickness of movement, a vigour both in strategy and in offensive and a fighting spirit which had surprised even their friends. In the last week of September the Russian advance, after tremendous and almost incredible exertions, had spent itself, its immediate objective achieved, in a momentary exhaustion and satiety of triumph. For a few days the tide stood at flood.

On September 27 began the first movement of an Austro-German counter-offensive.

It is not necessary to dwell again at any length on the contour and strategical importance of Poland, which have already been discussed. It will be sufficient to repeat that, thrust out like a wedge between the territories of the two empires, it was equally exposed to attack from the Germans on the north and from Austria on the south. On the other hand, so long as it remained Russian—especially as long as the great fortified positions of Warsaw,

Novo Georgievsk, Ivangorod and Lomza, with their connecting railway lines, remained in Russian hands—neither on the north nor on the south could any effective invasion of Russia be attempted without evident danger of attack from the rear. The first object aimed at, then, in the Austro-German plans had been the reduction of Poland—its isolation and lopping off from the main body of Russia. If the first operations on the north by the Germans from East Prussia and on the south by the Austrians from Galicia had succeeded, the allied armies would have made junction somewhere in the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok region, and, with all Poland in their hands, they would have had a continuous front on a straight line from the Baltic to the Carpathians as a base for further advances.

But these operations did not succeed. They failed in the north and failed disastrously in the south. With both her right and left hands Russia held her enemies at bay. The next move of the allies, then, inevitably took the form of a direct thrust in the centre at the heart of Poland. In their first operations the Central Powers had hoped that such a direct thrust would be unnecessary. It would have been much simpler and less costly if Poland could be caused to drop in their hands, like a branch falling from a tree, by cutting through its junction with the trunk from which it grew. And the German General Staff professed, at least, the belief that Poland would rejoice to be so severed, and Germans and Austrians alike proclaimed that the Polish people would seize the opportunity offered by the war to rise against Russia, and would welcome the invaders as the instruments of their salvation.

The alternative which confronted Poland was, indeed, a terrible and testing one. To hold true to Russia and resist invasion could only mean the desolation of the land. The country must be overrun by hostile armies and become one vast battlefield. If they had consulted their immediate material interests alone, the Poles must have thrown themselves into Germany's arms. It was, in fact, the same dilemma as Belgium had had to face in the west, and, like the Belgians, the Poles chose the nobler part.

How far either Germans or Austrians really believed in the probability of Polish friendship for their cause it is difficult to say. Evidence is very contradictory. It is certain that up to that time neither Germans nor Austrians had

been under much misapprehension as to the Polish dislike of themselves. As recently as two years before, when the Balkan War was in progress, Vienna had been unable to conceal its fears of a Polish rising. In the history of Poland hostility to the Prussian and the Teuton had been an infinitely greater factor than hostility to Russia. The former went back for over a thousand years. Compared with it the century-and-a-half-old fear of Russia was a modern thing. As has been noted in a former chapter, moreover, since the partition of the kingdom of Poland, the treatment of their section of the Polish people by the Germans had been infinitely more ruthless and brutal than anything that had been done by Russia. If of late years the world had heard more of the struggles of the Poles against Russia than against Germany, it was only because Germany had long crushed out the power to struggle. A wounded thing still fighting for its life makes more noise than one which has already been beaten to unconsciousness and is on the point of death.

It is impossible not to believe that well-informed people in Germany must have known that the Poles hated them more deeply than ever they had hated Russia, and with good reason. The German people, as a whole, however, habitually showed singular obtuseness and ignorance in all discussions of the Polish question. The masses had but hazy ideas on the subject, and they were extremely willing, when this war began, to believe what they wished to believe. As for those who knew better, for the Austro-German Governments and General Staffs, the friendship of the Poles was a stake worth making a bid for. If it was to be won it must obviously be the best policy to pretend that it was expected. Everything possible, then, was done to create an atmosphere favourable to a Polish *rapprochement*. Both Germany and Austria declared their confidence in the Polish goodwill towards themselves, and both were lavish of promises and proclamations explaining how they came against Russia as the deliverers of Poland. It was not by accident that the Bishopric of Posen, which the Prussian Government for many years had ostentatiously kept vacant, was filled by the appointment of a Polish Bishop immediately after the outbreak of the war.

A characteristic German proclamation, typical of several issued during the present invasion of Poland, was promulgated by General von



RUSSIAN RESERVIST LEAVING FOR THE FRONT.

Morgen, in command of the German First Army, which advanced on Warsaw :

Inhabitants of the Governments of Lomza and Warsaw ! The Russian Narew Army is annihilated. More than 100,000 men, with the commanding generals of the 13th and 15th Army Corps, are prisoners ; 300 guns are captured. The Russian army under General Rennenkampf is retreating in an easterly direction. The Austrian armies are victoriously advancing from Galicia. The French and British troops in France have met with disastrous defeat. Belgium is now under German administration.

I come to you with the advanced armies of other German armies and as your friend. Take up your arms ; expel the Russian barbarians, who enslaved you, from your beautiful country, which shall regain once more its

political and religious freedom. That is the will of my mighty and gracious Emperor. My troops have orders to treat you as friends. We will pay for what you sell us. I look to your chivalry to receive us hospitably as your allies.

(Signed) **LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VON MORGEN.**
In the Kingdom of Poland, September, 1914.

That the game was worth playing is shown by the fact that well-informed Russians were by no means unanimous in their confidence in Polish loyalty. German emissaries had, of course, been secretly at work in Poland, as elsewhere, long before the outbreak of the war. That their labours had not been altogether

fruitless is shown by the reference to "certain Polish organizations" in the following utterance of the chief organ of Polish political opinion soon after the commencement of hostilities:

Fellow-countrymen! A danger threatens us, greatest, perhaps, among the many calamities which war brings to a country: the misdirection of the Nation's mind and understanding.

Various instigations are pressing the Poles to go against their own instinct and the dictates of political reason in their attitude towards the armies now invading our Polish lands, armies ringing with German words of command, which even resound through Galician detachments lured into belief that Poland may be saved through alliance with the Germans. Various agitators on both the German and Austrian sides, having their own interests at stake, are seeking to make our people take active part in the terrific conflicts now to be fought out upon our soil.

To attain this end by throwing dust into our eyes, various manifestoes signed by the leaders of the armies

beyond the frontier, have promised the Poles extensive liberties and privileges at the close of the war. Certain Polish organizations, having lost, in the general excitement, their healthy sense of judgment, are doing likewise. Do not let yourselves be hoodwinked by these promises. They are lies. Neither of the invading armies has any intention of fighting for Poland's sake. Each is fighting in the interests of its own Empire, and to those Empires we are of no account. They only want, in a moment of necessity, to make the Poles passive instruments serving their own ends. Whoever tells you that Austria in alliance with Prussia intends to build up Poland once again is a blinded dreamer. The result of a victory for the Germans and Austrians would mean a new partitioning of Poland, a yet greater wreckage of our Nation. Grasp this, listen to no seducers. Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation.

During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the marching-ground of various armies, we shall see temporary victors assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps, in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the Nation's future, we entreat you, fellow-countrymen, to remain deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole future to incalculable perils.—From the *Gazeta Warszawska*, Aug. 15. 1914.

If this shows that Austro-German intrigue had not been all barren of result, it also shows even more clearly that the intelligence of the leaders of the Polish people was unclouded. There was here no ringing appeal in behalf of loyalty to Russia—that would have been difficult to make—but there spoke clearly the voice of the ages-long hatred of the Teuton which



NEW POLISH LEGION FIGHTING FOR THE TSAR.

The mascot of the Infantry of peasants. Cavalry of young noblemen drawn up for inspection.

made a popular rising in behalf of the invaders impossible.

On the following day the same journal and the newspapers of all the world published a Proclamation from the Russian Generalissimo which may fairly be ranked as one of the world's epoch-making documents. It was a promise of the reconstitution of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland under the suzerainty of the Tsar :

Poles! The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment.

A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in hope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russia.

The Russian Army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihilated which cut the Polish nation into parts! May that nation reunite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in faith, in language, in self-government.

One thing only Russia expects of you: equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you.

With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the sword has not rusted which, at Grünwald, struck down the enemy.

From the shores of the Pacific to the North Seas the Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and resurrection of nations!

(Signed) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GENERAL
ADJUTANT NICOLAS.

1 (14) August, 1914.

While the weight of Polish opinion was already strongly against giving any aid to the Austro-German forces, it was this Proclamation which definitely and immediately crystallized Polish sentiment in enthusiastic loyalty to Russia. The promise made by the Grand Duke Nicholas was afterwards confirmed by Imperial Edict. Long before that, however, the attitude of the Polish people had been irrevocably settled. On August 17 the leaders of the several political parties in Warsaw united in the following pronouncement :

The representatives of the undersigned political parties, assembled in Warsaw on the 16th August, 1914, welcome the Proclamation issued to the Poles by His Imperial Highness the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Forces as an act of the foremost historical importance, and implicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the promises uttered in that Proclamation will be formally fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers and forefathers will be realized, that Poland's flesh, torn asunder a century and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish.


The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice, offered upon the altar of her Resurrection.

The Democratic National Party.

The Polish Progressive Party.

The Realist Party.

The Polish Progressive Union.




EFFECT OF A GERMAN BOMB ON
THE RAILWAY TRACK.

An unexploded shell is seen in the foreground.

From that date, though the Germans continued their futile intrigues, there was never any doubt as to the position or sentiments of the Polish people. The invading Austro-German armies were the enemy; the Russian troops were friends.

It was only by degrees that the people of Poland were to learn the extent of the calamities which were to be visited upon their country; only by degrees did the German invading armies give up the hope that they were soon to possess and dwell in a hospitable and friendly Poland. In their first advance from the frontier they seem to have engaged in little wanton destructiveness. They regarded Poland as already their own country, and, as the invading troops expected to spend the winter there, it was not to their interest to lay it waste. There was, it is true, at least one conspicuous exception. As soon as the German troops crossed the frontier at Kalisch they seem to have set themselves to spread a reign of terror in the population. Buildings were burned, harmless citizens were executed, and the place was given up to plunder and rapine. The mayor of the town, one of its most respected citizens, was dragged from his bed in his night-



RETREATING GERMANS REBUILDING A BRIDGE NEAR KALISCH PREVIOUSLY DESTROYED BY THEMSELVES.

clothes and his old manservant was shot dead before him for trying to cover the half-naked body of his master with his own coat. The facts are, unhappily, too well established; and hardly any town in Belgium was as brutally and ruthlessly used as was the old city of Kalisch. No explanation of this outrage has ever been given; but that there was not much, if any, excuse in the form of provocation by the civil population seems apparent from the fact that the Germans afterwards declared, whether truthfully or not, that the officer responsible for it had been disgraced.

On the whole, however, the German advance into Poland seems to have been reasonably free from outrages on the civil population; and it is to be noted that, from now on, whatever credit or discredit attaches to the allies for the conduct of this campaign must be awarded to the Germans and not at all to the Austrians.

We have already seen that a certain "stiffening" of German troops had been introduced, without any material result, into the Austrian forces in the later stages of the Galician campaign. When the completeness of the Austrian failure in that campaign became apparent, Germany assumed control of all the military operations. General von Auffenberg came near to being relieved of his command,

being apparently held to blame for the failure to protect the flank of Dankl's army in its advance on Lublin. The commanders of at least five Austrian Army Corps—the 6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, and 17th—seem to have been removed,* and the Austrian military organization as a whole was treated as if in disgrace. Vienna became full of German Staff officers, and German officers assisted in the defence of Cracow. A system was adopted of linking German and Austrian divisions, and even brigades, together, and the supreme control of operations was vested in the German Headquarters Staff. It will be remembered that there is evidence that the plan of the Galician campaign had apparently been forced on Austria by her ally, and that the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Konrad von Hötzendorf, never cordially approved of it. There was now a widespread inclination in Austria to hold Germany responsible for the miscarriage of that plan. In Vienna and elsewhere there came to be much complaint of the arrogant behaviour of German officers towards Austrians, whether soldiers or civilians. Much jealousy

* The names of the new corps commanders, as announced from Vienna early in October, were: 6th Army Corps, General Arz; 7th, Griesler; 8th, Scheuchstnel; 11th, Julieic; 17th, Kritek.

was engendered and not a little hatred and bitterness, which grew as time went on. That the German commanders of joint forces, in cases of retreat, gave to the Austrian troops the thankless and dangerous task of screening the rear of the retiring German corps was sufficiently shown by the identity of the prisoners taken. Many independent observers in Russia declared also that when German and Austrian prisoners were confined together there seemed to be more hostility between them than either showed towards their Russian guards. In the newspaper reports of the day many stories were told to illustrate the growing lack of harmony between the two allies. It was even stated that Austria before the end of this Polish campaign opened overtures looking to the making of a separate peace, when Russia demanded terms which included :

- (1) The surrender of Galicia to Russia.
- (2) The surrender of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia and Montenegro.
- (3) Withdrawal from the alliance with Germany.
- (4) The reconstitution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into Federal States, one of which should be an autonomous Bohemia.

Austria was said to have considered these terms too humiliating. Without putting too much confidence in all the tales of Austro-German friction which gained currency in the literature of the time, it is certain that from the autumn of 1914 there ceased to be full sym-

pathy between the two allied peoples, though the exigencies of the situation compelled Austria to cling to her more powerful neighbour: and it is also evident that for the misunderstandings which arose the responsibility must be put, even more than on the Austrian defeats, on the arrogant behaviour of individual German officers.

The first German offensive movement, it has been said, began on September 27. From documents which later came to light it appears that General von Hindenburg had been put in chief command of the combined Austro-German forces on September 25. For how long the preparations for the coming advance had been maturing we do not know, but ever since the beginning of the Austrian retreat there had been reports of German troops being moved from the western to the eastern front and of the massing of large German forces about the Polish frontier from Thorn to Cracow. The advance was begun, apparently, simultaneously by four separate armies or groups of troops. The first, from Thorn, advanced along the left bank of the Vistula and the railway to and by Wloclawek. The second, from the neighbourhood of Kalisch, aimed at Lodz. The third, started from Breslau and proceeded *via* Czestochowa towards Piotrkow and Novo-Radomsk. The fourth, based on Cracow, moved north-eastward by



RUSSIAN OUTPOST FIRING FROM A BARN.

the left bank of the upper Vistula towards Kielce. This Fourth Army was largely composed of Austrian troops, with, it is believed, only two German army corps. The combined strength of the four armies probably amounted to about 1,500,000 men, of whom something over 1,000,000 were German. This is exclusive of the main Austrian forces, which were, of course, still in Galicia where they were rallying in the country west of the Wisloka.

The advance seems to have partially taken the Russians by surprise. It had rather been anticipated that the Germans would prefer to await attack behind the strongly entrenched frontier line from Thorn to Czestochowa. In the view of Russian military authorities the advance was a mistake, causing the battle to be joined on ground more favourable to the Russians. There appears also at first to have been some uncertainty as to the German objective: whether it was to be pushed home as an attack on Warsaw and an endeavour to conquer the whole of Poland, or whether it was merely a demonstration threatening the rear of the Russian armies in Galicia so as to compel them to retire. In any case, the Russians showed no haste to meet the new movement and the German advance was for a while almost unresisted. It was pushed with characteristic rapidity.


By October 3 the Austro-German (Fourth)

Army in the south was at Stobnica, a place seven or eight miles over the Polish frontier on the left side of the upper Vistula, about midway between Cracow and Sandomierz. By October 8, farther north, the Second Army had reached and occupied Lodz, and was issuing proclamations calling upon the people to rise and join in the task of "saving Poland." By the 11th of the month the First Army was at Sochaczew, and its right, or possibly a detached force from the Second Army, was in contact with the Russians at Skierniewice. Already Warsaw could hear the thunder of the enemy's guns.

While the northern forces were thus rapidly approaching Warsaw, the Austro-German Army had also travelled fast, in spite of torrential rains which were flooding the country, so that on October 13 fighting was going on at various points between Sandomierz and Iwangorod. On the following day (October 14) a German official statement from Berlin announced that "the whole of Poland with the exception of Warsaw is in our possession." Nor, if the statement had excepted also a small area round Iwangorod, would it have been an exaggeration. On October 15 the Germans were within ten miles of Warsaw and on the 16th they penetrated to within seven miles; and there was no adequate force in sight for the city's protection.



RUSSIANS ATTEND A RELIGIOUS SERVICE BEFORE GOING INTO BATTLE.



THE WARSAW FRONT.

Warsaw was very difficult of attack from the north. On that side approach to it was barred by the rivers Vistula and Narew and the strong line of fortified positions from Novo Georgievsk to Lomza. Beyond the last-named point ran the Bobr, with the fortress of Osowiec and a region of swamp and lake to and beyond Grodno. More particularly after the recent German repulse on the East Prussian front, then, Warsaw had little to fear from any enemy on the north. Apparently the Russians were slow to realize how serious was the present threat against it, with forces of such magnitude converging upon it from all parts of the west and south; though the actual force engaged in the immediate attack on Warsaw does not seem to have exceeded from five to seven army corps, only a small portion of which were first line troops.

There was much discussion at the time as to why General von Hindenburg sent so comparatively small a force for the direct assault on Warsaw. There is no doubt that the Ger-

mans intended and expected to take the place. All arrangements had been made for its occupation on about October 17 or 18. Its value to them as a base for future operations against Russia was obvious, and its capture at that time, just a week after the fall of Antwerp in the west, might be expected to have great moral effect. Yet the attack on the position was unaccountably half-hearted.

It was to be remembered, however, that the Germans were well aware that the Russian forces in Poland at that time were trivial. A few divisions of cavalry on that side of the Vistula were all that the Austro-German force had to deal with on its advance on Iwangorod. It was doubtful if two Russian army corps were available for the defence of Warsaw. There was no considerable force at Novo Georgievsk. Iwangorod was masked and its garrison sufficiently occupied by the Fourth (Austro-German) Army, and no help could come from that direction; and the Germans, still convinced of the dilatoriness of Russia, believed that it



HEAVY AUSTRIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

would be a long time before material Russian reinforcements could be assembled and sent to Warsaw, either from Brest-Litovsk or Bialystok and Grodno. In these circumstances, it may well have been thought that the half-dozen German corps under General Mackensen, which constituted the first army of invasion, were a sufficient force for the purpose, and as much as could be advantageously employed.

The 2nd and 3rd Armies had pushed into Poland alongside of the 1st Army. They were now held in reserve for use in a counter-stroke against whatever force the Russians might ultimately send for the relief of Warsaw. The nature of this intended counter-stroke, with the reasons why it was never delivered, was disclosed in the German official account of the operations published three months afterwards, and will be referred to later. Meanwhile, if the Germans underestimated the force which would be necessary to take Warsaw, the Russians on their side were extraordinarily slow in taking any steps for the city's protection.

The thunder of the enemy's guns was first heard in Warsaw on the night of October 10-11. From that time onwards the thunder drew gradually nearer, while hostile aeroplanes paid daily visits to the city, and something like panic soon began to spread.

The Russian authorities for a time issued proclamations of an encouraging nature, endeavouring to restore public confidence; but as each day the sound of the guns in-

creased, and there was apparently no sign that any effort was being made to send help from Russia, the discouragement became profound. The State Bank packed up its archives and departed in haste for Siedlice, where it alighted for a day or two only, and then, taking wing again, flew in one spasm of apprehension to Moscow. In the meantime the aeroplanes, which were a novelty to the people of Warsaw, caused great annoyance. The first one that flew over the city was an object of immense curiosity to the people, and they showered the city with bundles of pamphlets proclaiming that the Germans were coming to save the Polish race. The populace were exhorted to have no fear of the aeroplanes, as no damage would be done to the civil population, but only troops and buildings of military value would be destroyed. It is probable that this was actually believed by the Poles for as much as a day, but not longer. For the next flock of airmen that flew over evidently came from quite a different source of authority. Instead of scattering blandishments and words of encouragement about the "future of Poland" they commenced to drop bombs. It is hardly necessary to say that, as far as is known, not a single object of military value was injured, nor was any soldier wounded, though forty or more civilians were killed or hurt, and a small amount of private property was destroyed.

Accounts of the happenings of the next few days inside Warsaw are very confused. That

is probably inevitable in such circumstances. In Antwerp, in the days preceding its fall, wild and contradictory rumours were current; orders to evacuate the city were given and cancelled, and the greatest uncertainty prevailed. So it was in Warsaw. It seems that the decision to evacuate the city was actually taken on October 15 or 16, and trains were provided for the officials and others who wished to leave. Practically all the British colony and many others who did not care to fall into German hands departed in haste.

Outside the fortifications the few Russian troops were holding the enemy back as stubbornly as they could, though they were outnumbered by nearly three to one. Day and night the windows of Warsaw shook with the detonation of the guns, while from the roofs of the buildings the population could see the shells bursting to the west and south. Wounded were pouring back into the town, but still there seemed no sign or hope of relief; and for a day or two the Poles gave themselves up to the unhappy conviction that in spite of their loyalty they had been abandoned. On Sunday, October 17, the Germans were literally at the edge of Warsaw, and great shells from their 6-inch field howitzers were exploding just beyond the

town limits. Opposed to the advance in this direction was part of a division of one of Russia's magnificent Siberian corps, and it is this heroic band that Warsaw has to thank for its remaining in Russian hands.

It seems to be well established that there was a period of seven hours when the Germans might have entered Warsaw unopposed. The Siberians had been fighting all day and were cut almost to pieces. Their artillery was said to have withdrawn, and they themselves were in retreat, offering scarcely any semblance of a rearguard action. Individuals departing on the train were told that the Germans were actually entering the town and that resistance had been abandoned. In from the Radom road streamed the shattered fragments of regiments, and, according to the generally accepted version, there were four hours or more when there was not in this direction a single gun or effective unit to oppose a German advance. For some incomprehensible reason the enemy at just this critical moment ceased their attack.

It is difficult to know exactly what took place during that lull of the German fighting. Someone seems to have whipped the retreating fragments again into shape, and mustered a few batteries and thrown them back on the Radom



AUSTRIAN PRISONERS.



AUSTRAINS SURRENDERING TO A CHARGE OF ORENBURG COSSACKS.

road, so that when the Germans, after those fateful hours, again resumed their attack they found themselves still opposed as before. The most reasonable hypothesis of the German failure to seize their opportunity seems to be that just at the moment when the Russians were giving up hope the Germans also decided that they were in too little strength to carry the position. Short as it was, the delay was fatal to them. The next day there came to Warsaw some weak reinforcements and orders to hold on. For another day the still unequal contest was continued, when the Russians suffered terribly. Then came news that swept through Warsaw from street to street and from house to house with such rapidity that everyone seemed to know it simultaneously. The population poured into the streets in an uproar of rejoicings and excitement. "Warsaw," it was announced, "was to be held at any cost. The Grand Duke had said it. Reinforcements were actually on the way." And almost on the echo of the first announcement came the tidings that reinforcements were coming as fast as steam could bring them.

The first corps to come by the railway was one of those grand units from Siberia, and the first regiment to detrain is said to have been the 91st Siberian. It is told how the soldiers actually leapt from their box ears into their company formation and without a moment's delay swung out over the Vistula bridge through the main street of Warsaw and on by the Jerusalem road to the front. This regiment had already so distinguished itself in the Galician campaign that a sword of honour had been presented to its commanding officer, Colonel Letchinsky. It had been conspicuous in the fighting before Lublin and in the fierce counter-attacks which drove the Austrians back into Galicia. Arriving there, it had taken an effective part in the eight days battle at Rawa-Ruska and had then been in the van of the advance against Jaroslau and beyond. It was still on active service when the orders came that Warsaw must be relieved. It was loaded into railway vans, and, as we have seen, was the first regiment to arrive at Warsaw in the moment of the city's crisis. People who saw its entrance into Warsaw and its march through the main street and out on to a new campaign (in which he it said that it fought for eighteen consecutive days and was then decorated by the Grand Duke with the Order of St. George), spoke of the scene

on its arrival as an extraordinary one. With its brass band blaring, it poured through the town. The men unshaven, dirty, haggard, and war-stained from their campaign in Galicia, marched through the main street with the swinging strides of veterans. All Warsaw seemed almost to go wild. Women and children wept. It is said that the flower stores were stripped and every sort of blossom was thrown among the troops, while men and women alike ran beside the soldiers tossing them cigarettes, fruit, bits of bread, and anything and everything that a population frenzied with delight could offer to the men who had come to their rescue. Men who witnessed it said that they could never have believed that they would live to see the Poles give such a welcome to soldiers of the Tsar. It seemed as if, in that historic hour, a century of bitterness had all but been obliterated.

Behind this first regiment came another and another and another; and then guns and ammunition caissons. Behind them were more regiments, more guns, more cavalry, and still again more divisions and more corps, until at last there seemed to be no end to the hordes of troops that Russia was pouring in. From the first day of their arrival Warsaw was safe. By October 21 the Germans were in retreat.

In speaking of the reinforcements which Russia sent to relieve Warsaw a Russian writer says: "The march of the Russian armies down the right bank of the Vistula over roads of which English readers can have no conception, and where no automobile transport could travel in terrible weather across swollen tributaries, was an exploit worthy of an honourable place in the history of the Great War." What the precise strength of these armies was is unknown, but the same writer says that in one day "four columns, each 250,000 strong, crossed the Vistula over sixteen pontoon bridges," and deployed upon the left bank to advance upon the Germans. Before the Germans definitely fell back there was desperate fighting, especially about Blonie, but a strong Russian force, pushing down the Vistula, swung round the enemy's left and occupied Sochaczew, making a hurried withdrawal of the whole German force necessary. This movement was led by the Siberians. Among the German troops which suffered most heavily are mentioned the 20th Army Corps and the 17th and Reserve Corps, which bore the brunt of the struggle about Blonie.

A curious but seemingly well authenticated detail of these operations before Warsaw is that the King of Saxony was present with his suite, one of the equerries having been taken prisoner by the Russians. Inspired German newspapers had for some time been dropping hints of an act of great political importance which was to take place as soon as Warsaw was in German hands. It is believed that this act was to be the resuscitation of a Saxon dynasty in Poland. To have all preparations ready for so dramatic a stroke would have been entirely in accordance with the German procedure throughout the war, and it may well have been calculated that this would be the best retort to the promise made by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and confirmed by the Tsar, of the establishment of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland under Russian suzerainty.*

* The claims of the Saxon Royal House to the Throne of Poland, strictly speaking, are inadmissible, as the Electors of Saxony were Kings of Poland only while the Republic was an elective monarchy, and the wearing of the Polish Crown conferred no sort of hereditary right on the children of the King. Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, "The Strong Man of Sin," remarkable as the father of Marshal Saxe and an innumerable progeny, was King of Poland as Augustus II. from 1697 to 1706, when he abdicated, only to be re-elected in 1709. He died in 1733 and his son was elected as Augustus III. (1733-63). When Napoleon erected the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 he gave the Throne to Frederick Augustus I., King of Saxony and grandson of Augustus III., who was deposed from it in 1813 and lost it definitely by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. The present King of

While Warsaw had been going through such critical times, fierce fighting had also been in progress on the left bank of the Vistula opposite Iwangorod, where the Austro-German Army under General Dankl had arrived without meeting any more serious resistance than minor actions at Kielce and Radom, which had hardly delayed its advance.

Iwangorod lay on the eastern or right bank of the Vistula about sixty miles to the south-east of Warsaw, and was credited with being a fortress of the first class. In the present operations it does not appear that its safety was ever seriously menaced. The Austro-German force sent against it apparently consisted of seven army corps, two of which were German, with some additional units. Whatever its size or composition, it was not strong enough to take Iwangorod. If the Germans expected that it would prove strong enough, it was but another example of their over-confidence in themselves and their under-estimation of their enemy. Arriving opposite the fortress, on the west side of the river, without, as has been said, encountering any very serious opposition on the way, the allied force opened a bombardment with heavy guns on October 16. On the following days

Saxony, Frederick Augustus III., is great-grand-nephew of the only Grand Duke of Warsaw, and five generations removed from the last elective Saxon King of Poland.



CONVEYING RUSSIAN WOUNDED TO HOSPITAL.



RUSSIANS ADVANCING THROUGH THE WOODS WITH FIXED BAYONETS.

they made several attempts to force a crossing of the river on pontoons, but without any success. The point from which their main attack was directed was at and around the little village of Kozienice, a little north of, or lower down the river from, Iwangorod itself.

Kozienice was about three miles from the Vistula, standing on the last elevated ground before the country dips almost to the level of the stream. The intervening area between the high ground and the river was under the best conditions low and marshy, and was commanded by the road that ran along the ridge. The Germans and Austrians had made this ridge into an effective line of defence, though there are evidences that it was done rather as a formal precaution than out of actual fear of a Russian attack. On the night of October 20, however, a detachment of one of the Caucasian divisions crossed the river from the Russian side and seems to have gained a foothold on the west bank before its approach was taken seriously. After reaching the shore, the Russians still had some two miles of swampy country to cover before they could get at their enemy on the ridge. We are told that while in the swamp the Russians came under the batteries of the enemy, which were able from their elevation to sweep the low country with almost direct fire; but the Caucasians, wading in mire up to their armpits, worked their way up, regard-

less of their losses, through the morass and took the enemy on his exposed right flank. It is probable that this flank was not very strong. The nature of the ground between the position and the river was so obviously bad for infantry that attack from this direction may well have been thought improbable. Once on solid ground, the Caucasians, not the most docile of the Russian troops, seem to have advanced against the exposed Austrian flank with such ardour and impetuosity that it crumbled at the first assault.

Under cover of this initial advantage the Russians brought up more troops, until the whole Austrian right was forced back from the road which it had been holding into a strip of wood that lay directly west of the road. The retirement of this flank involved the centre, and finally the left, which, it is believed, was the position held by the German contingent. In any event, the whole of the allied line was dislodged from its position on the road paralleling the Vistula and hustled unceremoniously into the edge of the forest. The army which had hoped to capture Iwangorod could not even prevent its supposedly inefficient enemy from crossing the river and attacking over a country involving the greatest military disadvantages, and turning it neck and crop out of a well-located and strong defensive position. The Austrians and Germans were



LANDSTURM PATROL.

well equipped with artillery, and after the engagement there were to be counted forty-two gun positions within a mile of Koziénice. Owing to the difficulties of the ground the Russians were unable to give their infantry any material support from artillery, and the performance of the Russian troops under the circumstances was one of the most remarkable exploits of the campaign.

As has been said, the country directly west of the Koziénice-Iwangorod road was heavily wooded. For perhaps ten miles east and west and thirty or forty miles north and south there extended a forest which was almost a jungle. Several excellent roads leading toward Radom pierced this belt. Otherwise it was difficult to travel through the forest even on foot, so dense was the second growth, the fallen timber, and underbrush. It was, then, into this belt, which Nature seemed to have devised especially for their protection, that the enemy was forced. Then followed an episode which was buried in Russian official dispatches in a brief mention of "satisfactory progress made against the enemy by our troops in the fighting around Iwangorod." As a matter of fact, here in this woodland for nine days was fought what must by all accounts

have been one of the most terrible actions that ever took place.

The problem presented to the Russians was a simple one. Into the woods had gone the enemy. The woods extended east and west for perhaps ten miles. The enemy must be driven out. It was perfectly clear that if enough Russians went into the eastern side of the woods and kept on going, eventually the enemy, or what was left of him, would emerge from the western side into the open country. So dense were the woods even on the outskirts that shrapnel was of little value. In the first place, it was almost impossible to locate the line of the enemy, and the lack of roads and thickness of the woods made anything like free movement of guns impracticable. So, in single heartedness of purpose, the Russian infantry went at their task of driving the enemy back by main strength; and with a stubbornness that challenges admiration the Austrians and Germans went back only almost inch by inch, every yard won having to be purchased dearly by the Russians.

After two days the whole fight had become what might be called an informal one. Regiments and battalions might keep more or less in touch one with the other, but the man in the ranks had no idea of what was going on elsewhere than immediately in front of him. He knew, perhaps, that a company of the enemy had made a little fort of their own, and for a day or two the only thing in his mind was to take that one spot of resistance. With each day the fighting became more scattered and more general; and with each day the lines of the enemy gave back slowly toward the west. Day after day saw fresh Russian battalions, regiments, even brigades and divisions, led into their side of the wood, to disappear and to all intents and purposes be lost sight of for a week. The losses on both sides were appalling; but the Russians could fill their gaps overnight, while the enemy probably could not fill his at all. At the end of a week, then, the Austrians and Germans were almost through the wood, with only a mile or two between them and the stretch of open country which they must traverse in their retreat, and the indications in the forest afterwards showed that the fear of that belt of unprotected country must have been present to the whole retreating army; for the last narrow stretch of woodland was a continuous maze of trenches and small forts thrown up by a few soldiers;



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

and the desperation with which each one was fought over was proved by the almost innumerable graves and wooden crosses which studded the whole region.

At last came the final stand, and then the retirement of the enemy across the bit of open ground. For nine days the sullen field artillery of the Russians had been baying ineffectually or else waiting quietly with muzzled guns in the reserve until their hour should come. When the open country was reached it was their turn, and the spectacle on that open field must have been one never to be forgotten. Some weeks after the action acre after acre was still strewn with exploded shells, cases, bloody bandages, dead horses, and broken equipment; and between and among all were the dreadful fragments of humanity too small to have been picked up for burial: a hand, a foot, fragments of bone, a bit of skull, a leg sticking out of a boot, and all the other ghastly relics which show where human beings have been exposed to the rain of shrapnel and shell fire. The woods were still filled with unburied dead, lying about in every conceivable nook or corner where a desperate man could take refuge from the guns or defend himself from a hand-to-hand attack with the bayonet. Already the Russians had buried 16,000 of their own and the enemy's dead. Still there were

thousands left in the woods. It is safe to put down the killed alone in this action, from the crossing of the river until this open spot near the village of Augustow, at 20,000, and the total casualties cannot have been, in that single small area, less than 100,000. It should be added that while, in this war, it had already become the fashion, both in Germany and among the Allied Powers, to decry the valour of the Austrian soldiers, there can be no doubt that here, as at Grodek and Rawa-Ruska, they fought, however ineffectually, with great gallantry.

On October 23 a Russian official announcement said that the enemy was in full retreat from before Iwangorod, to the fortifications of which "no essential damage" had been done by his gun-fire. It was on October 21 that the Germans had begun to fall back from Warsaw. By October 22 the tide had already receded so far from the city, and the Russians were pressing the pursuit with such ardour, that the chief fighting on that day was on the Bzura beyond Sochaczew and in the neighbourhood of Lowicz. On the 24th Dankl's army had been forced back to Radom. On the 25th the Russian official *communiqué* spoke of the battle as raging along a front from Radom to Skierniewice, and on the 28th, at one end of that line, Radom, and at the other end, Lodz, had been reoccupied by the Russians.



DEAD AUSTRIANS AFTER THE BATTLE OF KIELCE.



THE AUSTRIAN HEIR APPARENT IN POLAND.

According to a Russian writer, extraordinary scenes had been witnessed in Lodz during the German occupation. From the first days there had been a great influx into that democratic and industrial town of Princes of the German Confederation and German aristocrats. At the Hotels Bristol and Savoy stayed many Germans of high rank, including the Grand Duke of Saxe-Meiningen. These gentlemen, covered with decorations, devoted themselves to every kind of enjoyment. In the hotels which they honoured champagne flowed, music played, and dancers exported from Germany gladdened the eyes of the princes. Not improbably they had assembled there to be on hand to give *éclat* to the accession of the King of Saxony to the Polish throne. Just before the German withdrawal from Lodz the princes and counts attached to the German Staff went hunting in the Liusnierski forests, which are renowned as game preserves. It was a fine sight—the cavalcade galloping through the woods, the sun reflected from many glittering helmets. Two days afterwards, however, the scene changed. The German Army had broken against the living wall of the Russian soldiers. The hunters became the hunted, on whose trail a merciless chase was organized.

The chief lines of German retreat were along the main railway from Warsaw by Piotrkow and Novo-Radomsk to Czestochowa, along the line of the light railway from Lodz to Kalisch, and north-westerly from Lowicz towards Thorn. The Austro-German forces fell back on the route by which

they had come, by Kielce to Olkusz and the shelter of Craeow. All the retiring armies did their best, by destroying bridges, wrecking railways, and ploughing up roads behind them to delay pursuit. The German official accounts of the operations, published three months later, declared that these measures were so successful that the Russian advance was rendered very slow and the allied forces had abundant time to retire in good order. This was only partially true of the main German forces and very far from true of the southern Austro-German army. The Russian force which pushed the German armies back was in command of General Ruzsky, who had already shown in the Galician campaign how thoroughly he understood the art of making things uncomfortable for a beaten army and how rapidly his men could push a pursuit over any kind of country, however lacking in roads or railways.

The fighting about Skierniewice and Lowiez was of a serious character, the Germans attempting to make a stand in a carefully prepared position which the Russians carried with the bayonet. Around Rawa the Russians took 400 German prisoners and buried over 400 German dead. There was stern fighting along the Pilitsa, both north and south of the river. At the end of October the Russians were "advancing victoriously along the whole front." In the first week of November the main German retreat had fallen back beyond the frontier, not even making a stand at Kalisch or Czestochowa. On November 9 the Russian cavalry crossed the frontier and



RUSSIAN TRANSPORT IN POLAND.

raided German territory at Plesehen, just north of Kalisch, and General Joffre and Lord Kitchener sent glowing telegrams of congratulation to the Grand Duke Nicholas.

If the main German armies in their retirement, however, were thus harried, they did not suffer nearly so heavily as did the Austro-German force on its retreat from Iwangorod. To the Austrian troops, indeed, as not infrequently, had been entrusted the most dangerous part of the allied operations, and, characteristically, it was, as we shall see, on their failure that the Germans subsequently put the responsibility for the collapse of the whole campaign. There is no doubt that in this retirement from Iwangorod such German troops as there were in the combined army went on ahead (by not less on the average, it is said, than one day's march), and left to the Austrians the whole work of protecting their retreat and fighting rearguard actions. The Austrians fully understood what was being done, and it is said that in the course of the retreat many thousands of Austrian soldiers surrendered on the slightest pretext, giving as their reason afterwards their discouragement and disgust with their treatment by their German allies. The Poles in the Austrian ranks especially began to lay down their arms and give themselves up whenever they could do so with safety.

Mention has already been made of the fighting about Radom and the occupation of that place by the Russians. The struggle seems to have gone on for some four days in the Radom forests, but the occupation of the town itself, on October 27-28, was effected without serious resistance. From Radom to Kielce there ran an excellent road, which for much of its distance was an elevated causeway built above low-lying and often marshy ground, while other portions ran between heavily wooded forest land. The Austrians in retreat did everything that could be done to make this highway impassable. The road was ploughed up, bridges were burned or blown down, and culverts exploded, leaving great ditches across the road. In many places to go round these obstacles would have meant traversing the soft meadow lands by the roadside, the sinking of transport, and miring of guns. Along the wooded portions it was equally difficult to leave the road without felling hundreds of the big trees that pressed in close to the highway. The result was that the Russians were materially delayed during the following days in their advance. Though the infantry could press on, guns and transport had to wait for repairs to be accomplished. The Russian engineers, however, were on the heels of the first regiments of the advance, and they worked desperately in extemporizing bridges and corduroying

roads through the marsh lands that flanked the highway. The delay served to give the Austrians a chance to throw up hurried works in the vicinity of Kielce, where an action was fought on November 3 which in any other war would be chronicled as a battle of importance.

The Austrian line was spread out here on a length of, perhaps, seventy kilometres from the west of Kielce to near Sandomierz, on the Vistula. The centre of the Austrian line was in a village perhaps ten miles east of Kielce itself, and in the centre of the village was a walled-in graveyard, the whole of which had been flanked with gun positions and protected with wing trenches and hurriedly erected barbed wire entanglements. It seems that the Austrians and their German advisers (who, however, had pushed on to the south the afternoon before the action) considered the position sufficiently strong to delay the enemy for three or four days. But the Russian army, with the famous Caucasian corps in the van, came on with irresistible momentum. We are told that the main column, its transport keeping pace with it, was moving at the rate of fifteen or sixteen miles a day, in spite of all obstacles, while flanking regiments thrown out to east and west were covering sometimes as many as

twenty-five miles in the twenty-four hours. After their gruelling experience in crossing the Vistula and the week-long hand-to-hand struggle in the woods, the Caucasians were thoroughly aroused and in no mood to be checked by any rearguard. Just as the Austrians were putting the finishing touches to their field works the Caucasians, covered by a screen of Cossack cavalry, swept in upon their front and deployed against their centre.

This was towards the evening of November 3. The enemy, it appears, anticipated an engagement commencing on the following morning with the characteristic artillery action, to be followed later in the day, or perhaps not until the next day, with an infantry attack, which the Austrians would be fully prepared to receive. But they were not in the least prepared for what was to come. The Caucasians, after just enough rest to give them time to have something to eat, without even waiting for the complete development of their artillery support, attacked the Austrian centre with the bayonet.

The strongest position of the whole line of defence was the graveyard with the little white church in the middle. Before the Austrians were fully alive to what was going



POLISH COTTAGERS RAKING OVER THE RUINS OF THEIR HOMES.



OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE OF KIELCE.
Russian Cossacks attacking the Saxon Jaeger and Austrian troops.

G. S. m. d.

on the Caucasians were pouring over the wall, overrunning barbed wire and wing trenches, with an impetuosity which crumbled the Austrian centre as the incoming tide dissolves a castle on the seashore. The little graveyard where for centuries the dead of the village had slept beneath the shadow of overhanging trees, was transformed into a shambles. The only outlet was a single gate, and the Russian soldiers took this in their rush, effectually closing the compound within. Here in the darkness men fought hand to hand, stumbling over graves and wakening the echoes with rifle shots and shoutings and with the groans and moans of the dying. It is no fiction to speak of the ground here as being soaked with blood. A Special Correspondent of *The Times*, who visited the spot soon after the action, found great clots of coagulated blood, "like bits of raw liver," lying everywhere. The surrounded Austrians, taken by surprise, had fought with desperation and stubbornness, but as the hundreds of dead crumpled up under the trees and among the tombstones too well indicated, they were no match for the Caucasians when it came to hand-to-hand fighting with cold steel and clubbed muskets. When morning came, the Austrian centre had disappeared and the whole line of the army left to screen the German retirement was in retreat. At one o'clock of the same day the Russians poured into Kielce, horse, foot, and artillery, while on the flanks their infantry were sucking up the stragglers among the enemy, and, on the extreme left, entering Sandomierz, which had to be taken by storm against a triple line of defences.

The Austrians are believed to have lost here heavily in dead and wounded, while more than 12,000 prisoners and fifty guns, with numerous machine guns, fell into the Russian hands. After the fight the victors made no stop at Kielce but pushed right on. Kielce, which had been blue with Austrians at ten in the morning of November 4, was grey with Russians at two in the afternoon. The artillery that had been in action the night before, as well as that which had not had time to come up on the preceding evening, now came pouring through the town; the guns, dirty and blistered from the contact with enemy's shrapnel in many previous engagements, came clanking and jingling over the rough stones of the streets, the tired but still eager soldiers eating their rations on limber and in saddle as they pushed

forward to the front. By four in the afternoon the Russian advance was again pressing the Austrian rear and the hungry guns were once more at work. With the Germans well out of the way of the Russians moving leisurely with their transport and artillery, the Austrians evidently had no intention of further sacrificing themselves unnecessarily, but made what speed they could, losing now and again small contingents, on their way to the Polish border and the protection of Cracow.

It is now necessary to turn to the events which had been happening since the investment of Przemysl, in Galicia, for which a Russian Governor had been appointed in the person of Count Bobrinsky, under whom the civil administration of the newly acquired territory was soon working without apparent friction. The new governor divided Galicia into three provinces—Lemberg, Tarnopol, and Bukowina—the first of which was destined to be part of the new Kingdom of Poland.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the German invasion of Poland, the Austrian armies in western Galicia also began to show a tendency to take the offensive. It was like the slow turning of a tide or the resurgence of the water in a well fed by some subterranean spring. In a dispatch from the Russian Great General Staff the Austrian troops on the advance were described as "a mass, operating in different directions," and feeling its way "very cautiously." This mass seems to have been under the command of von Auffenberg and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand with General Böhm-Ermolli in command of the cavalry. To what extent it was composed of the remnants of the original armies of von Auffenberg and the Archduke, and how much of reinforcements and German "stiffening," we do not know. In any case, moving on a narrow front for its size and with exceeding slowness, it constituted a formidable force, and before it the Russians, while their cavalry continually fenced with and harried the front and sides of the mass, fell back in the first week of October behind the line of the San. There they stood. We have seen in a former chapter that it was only by an extraordinary feat of arms that the Russians had succeeded in crossing the San, in the reverse direction, on the heels of the flying enemy. They had no intention now of allowing the enemy to force a recrossing against them.

This retirement partially relieved Przemysl, the western forts of which were disengaged about October 10 (or at the same time as Warsaw first heard the German guns), and had free communication with their friends and with Cracow. The Russians, however, still pressed upon Przemysl on the eastern side. Though their main forces were east of the San, the cavalry continued to make raids and reconnaissances on the west of the river. Continuous rains had reduced the roads to a deplorable condition, but we heard of sharp cavalry engagements on the left, or west, side of the San on October 13, and fairly heavy fighting to the south and south-west of Przemysl on October 16. On the 18th the Austrians made a determined effort to cross the San, but were repulsed. The effort was renewed on the following days, seemingly with gallantry but without any success, and it was said that the river bore numbers of Austrian corpses down to Sandomierz and Iwangorod. During these days, also, the fighting on the south-west of Przemysl, between Sanok and Sambor, increased in intensity, and here the Russians on October 20 claimed to have taken large numbers of prisoners through a dashing flanking movement by troops under General Dmitrieff.

Of all these affairs we have only very fragmentary information, but it is evident that

much of the fighting was of a desperate character, though the country was almost waterlogged and half-flooded. About October 21 or 22 (at the moment when the Germans were beginning to fall back from Warsaw) the Austrian attack seems to have lost its momentum. Russian official statements began to speak of "our advance" in the neighbourhood of Przemysl, and fierce fighting raged around Jaroslau, while farther south an Austrian division seems to have been almost annihilated in the neighbourhood of Sambor on October 28. On the last days of the month there was much confused fighting, in which the initiative was plainly passing into Russian hands. In the first days of November the Russians definitely took the offensive on the San, and, having beaten off every attempt of the enemy to pass the river, themselves began to force a crossing. By November 4 they had established themselves at various points on the west side of the river, and on November 6 the news of a complete victory there was celebrated by a *Te Deum* at the Russian General Headquarters at which the Tsar was present.

So ended in failure at every point the first Austro-German invasion of Poland. When the completeness of the failure became apparent, the Germans spoke of the whole operation as



AUSTRIAN AMMUNITION BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE FRONT.



THE KAISER (marked with a cross) RECEIVING THE ACCLAMATIONS OF HIS SOLDIERS DURING A VISIT TO THE POLISH FRONT.

merely a "reconnaissance" If it was a reconnaissance, it was the most costly and most ill-advised reconnaissance recorded in history. But reconnaissances are not made with over a million and a half of men, nor are they pushed to the point of such fighting as took place at Iwangorod.


Later, after two months of reconsideration, the official German account of the operations, published on January 17, 1915, put forward a new theory, which it is not much easier to accept.

According to this theory, as German troops could now be spared from East Prussia, it was decided to use them in helping Austria. With this object an Austrian Army, with a German contingent attached, started from Cracow on September 28 (the date is approximately correct) up the left side of the upper Vistula towards Sandomierz. Nothing is said of the simultaneous advance of the other German armies. It was merely a flanking movement against the Russian troops in Galicia to relieve the pressure on the Austrians on and beyond the San. At this time there were only some

six Russian cavalry divisions in Poland west of the Vistula.

Unfortunately, according to the German view, the Austrians failed to take advantage of the new situation. They were unable to cross the San, although the Austro-German invading army had pushed on with great *élan* towards Iwangorod. The Austrians having failed to push the Russians back, the enemy was enabled to throw great masses of men across the Vistula at Sandomierz and Josefow, which threatened to encircle the allied right to the east of Opatow. At the same time great Russian forces advanced from Iwangorod. Only then was it that the dash on Warsaw was undertaken, in order to distract the enemy and withdraw some of his strength from falling on the Austro-German Army. The difficulty of this part of the story is that the Germans were already close to Warsaw ten days before the Austro-German troubles began.

The Russian force advancing on Warsaw outnumbered the 1st German Army by at least four to one. So German reinforcements were hurried up (which is the first that we hear of the



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIA.

2nd German Army), and a counter-offensive was begun by crossing the Pilitsa with a view to falling on the flank of the Russians by Warsaw. This would undoubtedly have succeeded, but once more the scapegoat Austrians failed to do their part. They allowed themselves to be driven back from Iwangorod, by Radom and Kielce, whereby the German right became so exposed that there was nothing for it, in view of the great numerical superiority of the enemy, but for the whole line to fall back beyond the frontier; a movement which the German armies accomplished with their usual steadiness, and with a thorough destruction of all the roads and railways as they went.

This summary of the German official version is chiefly interesting for its ungenerous and almost brutally contemptuous tone towards the Austrians. As a serious story of the operations it can only be made tenable by a complete ignoring of dates and an overturning of most of the main facts of the campaign.

It has, however, been already suggested that one point which emerges from this story is probably true, namely, that while the 4th Austro-German Army was sent towards Iwangorod to prevent any Russian force from crossing the Vistula on the reaches from Iwangorod to the San, the 1st Army was sent on alone to Warsaw, the other armies being held in reserve for that counter-offensive by way of the Pilitsa which was to fall on the flank of the Russians when they came to Warsaw's relief. Unfortunately, when the Russians came, they came in such force and with such dash as to sweep 1st Army, 4th Army and Reserve Armies together in one common ruin. What would have happened if von Hindenburg had, in the first instance, sent a stronger force to strike at Warsaw, or if Mackensen, with such force as he had, had not failed to grasp the opportunity of seizing the place when it was at his mercy, it is not easy to say. Perhaps it could not have been held against the strength which Russia pushed up to its relief. At least, however, the whole story of this Polish campaign would have been a different one, and this initial German failure would have been less inglorious than it was.

It was, of course, unthinkable that the Germans should sit still under the rebuff which they had received. The Russians had treated them, including some of their best troops, as unceremoniously as they had previously treated



GERMAN MACHINE GUN SECTION.

the Austrians. The natural, indeed inevitable, reply must be a vigorous and immediate counter-offensive.

Long before the German invading armies had been beaten back to their frontier, it became known that still larger forces were being massed from Thorn and Breslau. There had been reports before, after the Russian successes in Galicia, of the hurrying of German troops from the western to the eastern front. Similar reports now were indubitably true. It was asserted in Petrograd that the enemy now had no fewer than 3,000,000 men facing the Polish frontier ready for a new advance. By November 10 the Russians had not only driven the enemy out of Poland, but between Kalisch and Thorn detachments of General Ruzsky's armies penetrated 20 miles into German territory. At the same date other Russian troops of General Ivanoff's forces were within 20 miles of Cracow. On November 14 it was announced from Petrograd that a German counter-offensive had been "noticed" from Thorn in the direction of Wloclawek.

That the estimate of 3,000,000 Austro-German troops on the Polish frontier was an exaggeration we may well believe. In the operations recently described there had apparently been engaged some 22 or 23 Army Corps,



RUSSIAN PRIEST BLESSING MEN IN THE TRENCHES.

with various additions. Among these were some first line troops, but not many. Most of these had been employed in the last efforts to gain a definite success on the Western front. Of the 22 Army Corps probably not more than 5 were active German Army Corps. With these appear to have been 8 Reserve Corps, the remaining 10 being Landwehr and Landsturm formations.

There also seems to have been a certain mingling of Austro-Hungarian troops with the German armies. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian forces proper, under command of Duke Albert of Wurtemberg, seem to have been divided into three armies of some three corps each, with additional units. The Austrian troops, however, had suffered so severely that the formation of most of their units was now most irregular. The combined effective Austro-German strength on this frontier probably amounted to about 2,000,000 men.

Against these the Russian armies, already great, were being constantly reinforced. It was supposed that early in November the total Russian forces from Warsaw to the Carpathians amounted to some 35 army corps, of which 15 were opposed to the Austrians in Galicia and

the rest confronted the Germans along the Polish frontier. Of these Russian troops in Poland (excluding those in Galicia) much the greater number seem to have been concentrated on the southern part of the line, towards Cracow. In this direction were combined both those troops which had driven the Austro-German army from Iwangorod by Kielec to Olknoz and Cracow, and also the main army which had followed the bulk of the Germans retreating along the line of the railway from Skierniewice to Czestochowa. The sparsity of railways in Poland, and the absence of any line parallel to the frontier on that side, made the transfer of large numbers of Russian troops from one part of the line to another—from south to north, or *vice versa*—difficult. The Germans, on the other hand, had at their service a most complete railway system, by which their mobility was enormously increased. This fact, enabling the Germans to mass troops easily at one point or another much more quickly than their enemy, was sufficient to neutralize a very considerable total numerical superiority on the part of the Russians.

Taking advantage of this fact, as the chief Russian strength was on the left, or southern,

part of the line, whence it could only be laboriously transferred, the Germans threw the weight of their attack on the comparatively weak Russian right.

In speaking of this as the Russian "right," it has to be always borne in mind that, logically and in essence, the war in this eastern theatre extended over one continuous battle front, 700 or 800 miles long, from the Baltic to the Carpathians. In that huge line the Thorn-Vistula region was not much above the Russian centre. But for purposes of narration it is necessary to divide this great field into sections and to treat the operations in East Prussia, in Poland, and in Galicia respectively, as separate campaigns, though they were in truth interdependent, a thrust in one quarter when parried being replied to by a counter-thrust in another.

At the present moment it was in the southern area that, after the last futile attempt on Warsaw, the peril of Russian invasion of German territory looked most imminent. Here on what is generally called the Czestochowa-Cracow line, and beyond in Galicia, the chief Russian troops were massed. And the shadow of these troops almost overhung the rich industrial districts of Silesia. At the same time, so long as Przemysl held out and Cracow stood firm, serious Russian advance on this line by the valley of the Oder was obviously difficult. From Cracow north to Czestochowa, again, the German defensive position was very strong. Rough, broken ground lent itself to defence, and,

as a Russian official *communiqué* frankly remarked, in the four months since the beginning of the war the Germans had been able to "fortify it in extraordinary strength." The danger to Silesia, then, was less immediate than at first sight it might have looked. None the less, it had, if possible, to be removed. But against the great Russian strength in this quarter it was obviously better that the Germans should confine themselves here more or less to defensive action behind their formidable defences and deliver their blow against the more vulnerable part of the Russian line further north. A success there would just as surely compel withdrawal on the Czestochowa-Cracow line as if it had actually been achieved on that line.

It was, it will be remembered, then, from Thorn towards Wloclawek that the first German offensive had been "noticed" on November 14. This offensive was pushed with great violence along the left side of the Vistula and by the railway line towards Kutno and Lowicz. On this immediate front the Russians do not appear to have had more than three army corps, and the German advance soon assumed the character of another and more determined thrust at Warsaw. This was obviously sound strategy. The capture of Warsaw itself, after the recent failure, would have been a triumph of the first magnitude, while, at the least, it was calculated, a serious threat to it would, as we have seen, compel the



THE ROLL CALL.

withdrawal for its defence of a large part of the Russian forces in the south, with a resultant relieving of the pressure on Cracow.

The comparatively small Russian strength in this region between the Vistula and the Warta, west of the Bzura, could offer no effective resistance to such weight as the Germans threw upon it. So rapid was the German advance that by November 16 it had already, from its base from Thorn to Wreschen, reached a line from Plock to Leczica on the upper Bzura, some 50 miles inside the frontier, and about half way to Warsaw. Under von Hindenburg, the force was divided into two armies—the left or northern one being commanded by General von Morgen, the right by General von Mackensen. On November 15–16 the Russians, in spite of their inferiority in numbers, had ventured a delaying action against von Morgen in the neighbourhood of Kutno. They were, of course, driven back, and General von Hindenburg announced the

result as a great victory, claiming to have taken 28,000 Russian prisoners. The news was received with enthusiasm in Berlin, and von Hindenburg was rewarded by being made a Field-Marshal.

On the following day Mackensen's right successfully engaged a Russian force between Dubie and Leczica, driving it north-westward along the Bzura towards Lowicz. Pressing on the left flank of this force in its retirement, the Germans opened a gap in the Russian lines, into which they drove a wedge between Strykow and Zgierz. If they could make the penetration of the Russian line at this point effective, and could pour troops through it in any strength, the Germans believed that they had the game—and Warsaw—in their hands. According to the German official report, issued in January, 1915, it "now looked as if what had been originally undertaken merely as a counter-offensive movement to relieve the strain on Cracow, might be converted into a great success." New troops were therefore, it is declared, hurried up from Breslau. It is, however, as frequently, only possible to accept this version of the events with certain modifications.

It is true that at this moment the Germans were flushed with enthusiasm and full of the highest hopes. Disappointment at the earlier Russian successes had been intense, and the relief at what looked like von Hindenburg's triumph was so great that Berlin, decorated and wild with joy, was already speaking in exaggerated terms of the defeat of the whole Russian armies. But the present movement had no more been undertaken as a mere indefinite counter-offensive for the purpose of threatening the Russian left on the south, than the earlier attempt on Warsaw had been a "reconnaissance." Its very formidable character had been apparent from the beginning. The victory of Kutno was no such great matter as the Germans claimed, and much happened, which is slurred over in the German report, between it and the penetration of the Russian line.

After the affair at Kutno the Russians fell back upon the line of the Bzura. The Bzura itself is a small stream, but its banks are bordered for a large part of its length with wide marshes, which form a most formidable obstacle to an advancing army. Against this obstacle the German progress, hitherto so rapid, was definitely held up. Time to bring



RUSSIAN NATIONAL DANCE.



AN AUSTRIAN ENCAMPMENT IN THE CARPATHIANS.

up reinforcements to this part of their line was of the greatest importance to the Russians. On November 18 fighting was in progress around Lodz; on the 20th. between Lowicz and Skiermiewice. On the 23rd the Russians claimed something of a success in the neighbourhood of Strykow, and from that date to the end of the month the Germans gained no advantage. The Russian armies here had by this time been heavily reinforced, not by weakening the armies in the south, but by bringing up new troops from the east. According to German versions, considerable forces were also thrown across the Vistula from the right bank between Novo Georgievsk and Plock. At all events, after covering the first 50 miles of his advance in three days, in the following fortnight von Hindenburg beat in vain against the Russian line along the Bzura and to and beyond Lodz.

During all this fortnight fighting was of the most stubborn and desperate character. The Russian official announcements recorded the fact from day to day. On November 26 there was "some advantage to our troops." On November 27 the action "continues to develop favourably." On other days there was "no change" or "nothing important to report." What was, however, of the utmost importance

was that the Germans were not progressing. On the last day of the month the fighting was still "extremely stubborn." The triumphant German predictions following on the incident of the penetration of the Russian line between Strykow and Zgierz were by no means being fulfilled. It is necessary to explain what had happened at that point.

The German troops which operated at Strykow and Zgierz seem to have come from two directions. One body had forced the crossing of the Bzura marshes at Piontek; another appears to have crossed the Bzura, beyond the limit of the marshes, east of Leczica. At all events the German official statement spoke of their armies advancing "on both sides" of that place. Between Zgierz and Strykow two army corps with some extra units—probably 100,000 men in all—forced their way north-east of Lodz as far as Brzeziny. If the penetrating force had been in such definitely superior strength as to be able to crumple back the enemy's line to the northward, the coup might have been of almost decisive importance. But Russian reinforcements were by this time arriving, coming by the railway from Warsaw, and by the time the thrusting corps had reached Brzeziny the



ENTRANCE TO AN AUSTRIAN
ENCAMPMENT.

Russian line had been so strengthened that it was able to close in on their rear. Later German troops, hurrying after the advance force, had their hands full in warding off Russian attacks from both sides, and it looked for two or three days as if the two isolated corps would be compelled to surrender or be annihilated. As a matter of fact, the Russian line behind them was not held in equal strength at all points, and they, or their shattered remnants, were able to force their way back.

These two corps seem to have had terrible experiences in their endeavours to find a way of retreat. Roughly handled around Brzeziny, the force seems to have been broken up and fragments were described as roaming the frozen and desolated land "like a pack of hungry wolves." The greater part of those which escaped appear to have made their way northward by Bielawy and Sobota, between which places they were attacked by a Russian force and again severely mauled. Ultimately, of about 100,000 men, something like 40,000 seem to have got back. Among them was the remnant of a regiment of the Prussian Guards. Besides the killed and wounded the Russians took many prisoners. It is known that 5,000 were taken one day and 6,000 on the next. A few days later Warsaw was full of German

prisoners, and apparently the two corps lost almost all their guns. The news of the catastrophe, even in the modified form in which it was permitted to the public to know of it, brought great depression in Berlin, where a complete and brilliant victory by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had been confidently anticipated. In importance, as in the numbers lost, it much outweighed the German success at Kutno. Both, however, were only incidents of the struggle on this front which went on unceasingly and on a gigantic scale, and the issue of which was by the end of November definitely turning in favour of Russia.

While these things had been going on in the region from the Vistula to Lodz, fighting had also been in progress farther south. In support of the armies advancing on Warsaw, other German armies had pushed forward along the railway from Kalisch by Sieradz towards Lask and from Wielun towards Piotrkow; and the month of December opened with an extraordinarily confused situation along the whole front. It was well described at the time as being less like one continuous action than "a series of more or less simultaneously proceeding independent battles," in which fortune veered from side to side. Retreats at one point were counter-balanced by advances at another, and at many places, in the course of isolated combats, troops from either side pushed far ahead of their general line and were fighting in the rear of the enemy on either side of them. It is believed that during this period the German armies were reinforced by more corps transferred from the Western front.

It would be useless to unravel and follow up each thread in all the tangled skein. The incident which stood out most conspicuously from the turmoil in the early part of December was the occupation by the Germans on the 6th of the month of Lodz, of which they had not had possession since their hunting had been interrupted there in October. Lodz was a town of considerable commercial importance, the "Manchester of Poland." Since the beginning of the nineteenth century it had sprung from a village of a couple of hundred inhabitants to a manufacturing and commercial centre with a population of nearly half a million. Occupied and reoccupied as it had been since the beginning of the war, with battles raging around it for weeks together, Lodz had suffered terribly and become only a shadow of its usual busy self. Much the larger part of the population had fled



THE WAR IN POLAND.

1. Russian prisoners being marched through Lodz. 2. A wrecked village. 3. Sacks of flour burned by the Germans before their flight—two Russian soldiers on the left. 4. German field post office at Lodz. 5. A destroyed frontier station.



AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN OUTPOSTS.

to Warsaw, and those who remained had suffered serious privations, food being almost unobtainable.

The Germans celebrated the capture of Lodz as a great triumph, and claimed that they had taken a large number of prisoners and war booty. The Russians asserted that its evacuation had only been a strategic move to enable them to take up a shorter and more advantageous line and categorically declared that they "did not lose a single man" in the operation. It was even asserted that for fifteen hours the Germans shelled empty trenches from which the enemy had retired on

the preceding day. The truth undoubtedly is that the Russians would not have given the place up, if only for its moral effect, unless they had been obliged to do so. Its surrender was a reverse, and the Germans were justified in claiming the acquisition of it as a success of some importance. At the same time, it had become very embarrassing to the Russian campaign. Its defence occupied a large number of troops and it constituted a costly salient in a line which was a good deal stronger after it had been abandoned. There is, moreover, little doubt, from the narratives of individual Russian officers engaged in the operation, that

the Russian official statement as to the deliberate nature of the retirement, the reluctance of the Germans to advance, and the freedom from casualties was substantially accurate.

But the Germans needed whatever comfort could be drawn from the incident. It was known that they had promised themselves to spend their Christmas in Warsaw; but it was plain by now that the attempt to reach Warsaw had failed. Nor had they succeeded in compelling the Russians to withdraw any material portion of the armies which threatened Cracow, either in Southern Poland or in Galicia. If von Hindenburg's offensive had attained any object it may have been the prevention of an invasion of Silesia. But it is questionable whether that could not have been as effectively prevented, at less expense in German lives and with heavier loss to the enemy, by awaiting attack along the frontier. The course of the campaign had clearly shown how rapidly the German advance lost its momentum as it drew farther into Poland and farther away from its railways. On the other hand, every mile that the enemy advanced eastward made the Russian problems of reinforcement and supply less difficult.

About the middle of December the German attacks appreciably decreased in violence. Much stubborn fighting still went on, as on the 15th and 16th of the month, about Sochaczew. A few days later some bodies of German troops succeeded in crossing the Bzura, but were

beaten back or wiped out. About the 22nd and 23rd there was heavy fighting about Piotrkow, and also near Bolinow, between Lowiez and Skierniewice. But this was ground which the Germans had reached a month earlier, without being able to get any farther. Early in December the Germans attempted a diversion by a wide flanking movement from East Prussia, directed against Warsaw from the north, which, however, though a part of this general conflict, belongs geographically to the narrative of events in that region. It was, though dashingy pushed, not made with any great strength, and was easily met and beaten back by the Russians.

The last week of the year saw little of any importance in this region. Between December 20 and 25 the Russian line, as a whole, fell back a little, not so much under pressure as for the purpose of taking up a better position on a straighter front. Both sides were then content to dig and entrench themselves along a line which ran from the Vistula along the Bzura and Rawka to Tomaszow. Thence southward confused fighting continued along the Pilitsa to the neighbourhood of Novo-Radomsk, and thence along the Nida, where in the last days of the year the Russians claimed some minor successes with the capture of considerable numbers of prisoners.

Once more we must pick up the thread of



RUSSIAN AMBULANCE AND TRANSPORT IN POLAND.



RUSSIAN PRISONERS TAKEN IN EAST PRUSSIA.

events in the Galician theatre, where we saw how the Russians, at the beginning of November, after successfully resisting all efforts of the Austrians to force a crossing of the San, had themselves broken across the river and driven the enemy westward. In this final battle on the San it was claimed that they took 12,000 Austrian prisoners with 120 officers. The Austrians seem to have fallen back in great disorder, and contemporary reports declared that they were lacking in both food and ammunition, and that they suffered serious ravages from cholera. Once more the tide swept past Przemysl, which, again, and finally, as it was to prove, became completely invested. By November 13 the Russian advance cavalry, following on the heels of the enemy, was within thirteen miles of Cracow, which was now practically invested on two sides. It was on this and the following days, it will be remembered, that the German offensive had begun to make itself felt from Thorn. We have seen, however, that the Russians did not withdraw any of their strength from their southern front to oppose the German advance. The pressure on Cracow, instead of loosening, increased. By the beginning of December Russian troops were within eight miles of Cracow, and on the 4th of the month it was

announced that they had occupied Wieliczka, and were within three and a half miles of the outer fortifications. On the same day Russian cavalry was reported, on the other side of the Carpathians, to be raiding Hungarian territory as far as Bartfeld, 20 miles over the border.

In this advance towards Cracow, although the Austrians were more or less completely demoralised, the Russians had formidable defensive positions to carry besides the successive rivers to cross. All the operations seem to have been performed with impetuous gallantry. The resistance naturally increased as the fighting swept westward. Bochnia, strongly fortified, had to be carried by assault, and the Russians claim to have taken 2,000 prisoners with ten guns and many machine guns. The Raba river had to be crossed by a ford in the face of the enemy's fire, through ice-floes and bitterly cold water up to the neck. At Wieliczka trenches and barbed wire entanglements were rushed with the bayonet when the temperature was below zero. At the end of such experiences, the Russian General Staff was able to say that "the *moral* of our troops, seasoned by forty-five days of almost continuous fighting, is, according to the reports of army commanders, of the highest order."

At this moment the safety of Cracow seemed seriously threatened.

Throughout the war, both in the East and West, the characteristics of German strategy had been the resourcefulness and vigour of its counter-attacks; even if that resourcefulness itself was of a somewhat stereotyped character. A rebuff in one quarter was immediately countered by an attack, as swift as possible, in another, generally delivered at the remotest point on one or other flank at which it could be delivered without becoming ineffective as a retort. Von Hindenburg proved himself so adept at this particular manœuvre that he gave it an individual character, stamped with his particular genius. To relieve the pressure on Cracow and Silesia we have seen how he struck at once for Warsaw along the very banks of the Vistula, and when that attack began to spend itself he had even tried to swing round from farther north and reach Warsaw from East Prussia. So now, when the danger to Cracow grew imminent, he struck again, not on that immediate front but far to the southward along and round the Carpathians.

For two months and more the Russians had, except for the one Austrian advance to the San, been practically in control of Galicia up to the mountains. After the failure of the

Austrians on the San it was announced in Petrograd, on November 18, that Russian troops were "attacking Austrian rearguards" at the mouths of both the Dukla and Uszok Passes. By the 25th they seemed to have forced the Lupkow Pass, along the railway line from Sanok, and to have occupied Mezo-Laborcz on the Hungarian side, taking 3,500 Austrian prisoners, three railway trains and some machine guns. On the last day of November it was announced that more prisoners had been made "in the Carpathians," that the Bukovina was cleared of Austrians and Czernowitz reoccupied. On December 1, after ten days' fierce fighting, the Russians claim to have carried by assault a very strong position along the crest of the mountains by Konieczuka, a point just south of Gorlice, between the Dukla and Tarnow passes. Altogether the number of Austrian prisoners taken in the last half of November was now said to amount to over 50,000, with more than 600 officers.

Fighting continued through the first week of December all along the Carpathians, but the Russians now found that their opponents at many points here were no longer Austrian but German. Advices from Petrograd to London said that "the Austrian armies around Cracow



A POLISH VILLAGE SET ON FIRE BY THE GERMANS.



RUSSIANS WITH HAND GRENADES.

have ceased to exist as an independent force . . . they are all mixed up with Germans." A force, largely German, appeared on the River Dunajec near Novo-Sandee, and at various points farther east German troops began appearing north of the Carpathians. A new German offensive on this extreme left flank had begun.

On December 14 the Russian General Staff announced in its characteristically unperturbed way that it had "discovered the enemy trying to assume the offensive." On the 16th it was said that Austro-German columns were "pouring over the Dukla into Galicia." It is believed that at this time three new German army corps had been sent to the eastern front (making nine new corps since the beginning of these operations), while three Austrian corps had been withdrawn from Serbia. The new armies pouring into Galicia by the mountain passes were estimated at 170,000 men. The movement was quite ineffective. It compelled the Russian raiding parties which had invaded Hungary to retire into Galicia, and to that extent it allayed the panic which was beginning to be felt in Budapest and Vienna. The extreme southern end of the Russian line below Cracow was pushed back from advanced positions west of the Raba to and across the Dunajec. But the Russians never regarded the diversion in this quarter seriously, and the Austro-German advance was easily checked and


held. On December 23 General Sukhonlinoff, the Russian Minister for War, announced that it had been "stopped absolutely."

As a matter of fact, so long as Przemysl held out and Cracow stood firm, it is improbable that the Russians could have entertained the idea of invading Hungary in any force. To push an army any distance across the mountains as the situation then was would have been almost tantamount to giving it as a hostage to the enemy. The Russian position in Western Galicia and in Poland would have to be much more assured before real invasion could be undertaken without great risk. And before that time came there was to be a long winter with terrible and prolonged fighting in the deep snows and bitter cold of the mountains. That will be dealt with in its appropriate place hereafter.

The end of the year saw the war five months old. The result of the struggle during those five months had been sufficiently favourable to the Allied cause in the east; much more favourable than, at the beginning, had appeared probable. Germany, held on a rigid front in France and Belgium, had been unable, as she had expected, to turn her whole strength to the



AUSTRIANS BRINGING A SHELL TO THE GUN POSITION.




AUSTRIANS ADJUSTING A HEAVY SIEGE HOWITZER.

eastern front. Against such offensive as Germany had attempted in East Prussia and against the advance of Austria in the south, Russia had shown herself much less unready in massing her first armies than had been expected. Those armies had proved themselves a match for Germans and Austrians alike. The high quality of Russian strategy and the gallantry of the Russian soldier had been demonstrated beyond dispute. For five months fighting such as the world had never seen had raged over a front of over 700 miles, from the Baltic to the frontiers of Rumania. During that period not less than 6,000,000 men had been engaged on the two sides. At the end Russia was stronger than ever, Germany had suffered reverses at least as heavy as any which she had inflicted on the enemy, and the military power of Austria was broken and discredited. Losses on both sides had been heavy, but the combined losses of Germany and Austria were certainly heavier than those which Russia had suffered; and Russia was much better able to stand losses than either of her opponents. At the end of the year it was announced that the prisoners in Russia included 131,737 Germans, with 1,140

officers, and 221,447 Austrians and 3,186 officers, or a total of 4,326 officers and 353,184 men.


The saddest feature of all the operations in this last part of 1914 upon this front was the devastation wrought in Poland. It is a subject which will be dealt with more fully hereafter. We have seen that the Polish people, when they chose the path of loyalty, must have known that they would pay a terrible price. For five months now the contending armies had swept backwards and forwards over the land. Almost the whole of Poland had become one vast battlefield. Farms, villages, and towns had been almost obliterated; provinces had been laid utterly waste. In their first advance the German armies had behaved with restraint. On their retreat they do not seem to have committed the unspeakable outrages that they had perpetrated in Belgium, at least in such numbers. But they had systematically ruined the land, not only by the destruction of railways, roads, buildings, and bridges to delay the advance of the pursuing Russians, but by the most exhaustive plundering and carrying away of all discoverable supplies of food and clothing, and everything



AUSTRIAN ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING A TRESTLE BRIDGE.

else for which they could find a use, or which could give any comfort to the enemy. The condition to which such of the population as remained in the devastated region was reduced was, as winter came on, pitiable beyond description. The world at the time heard less of the

sufferings of Poland than of those of Belgium, and Poland had not the same ready hands reached out to succour her. Nowhere did Belgium suffer starvation and frozen misery on the scale on which they stalked through Poland that winter.



CHAPTER LX.

SECOND AND THIRD AUSTRIAN INVASIONS OF SERBIA: FALL AND RECAPTURE OF BELGRADE.

SERBIAN STRATEGY AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE JADAR—CAUSES OF DELAY—INVASION OF SYRMIA—MISTAKES AND MISFORTUNES—SERBS RETIRE—THE SECOND AUSTRIAN INVASION—PUTNIK'S STRATEGY—AUSTRIAN FAILURE—THE THIRD AUSTRIAN INVASION—INITIAL SUCCESS—CAPTURE OF VALIEVO—SERBIAN DEPRESSION—FALL OF BELGRADE—THE GREAT SERBIAN RALLY—BATTLE OF SUVOBOR—RECAPTURE OF BELGRADE—ROUT OF THE AUSTRIANS—AUSTRIAN ATROCITIES IN SERBIA—THEIR BOMBARDMENT OF THE SERBIAN CAPITAL.

THE failure of the Serbian Staff to order an immediate pursuit of the routed Austro-Hungarian Army after the battle of the Jadar was the subject of much adverse comment in some quarters. That the enemy was a beaten rabble when he crossed the frontier rivers is beyond doubt, and the obvious course would have been for the Serbs to follow up their victory and run the fugitives to earth. It must be conceded, however, that General Putnik and his advisers were fully alive to the importance of driving home their advantage to the hilt, and that very weighty reasons intervened to persuade them to call off their troops. No part of the army had been awaiting the attack in the district in which the battle of the Jadar was fought. The troops which bore the brunt of the fighting had, on the contrary, been obliged to undertake a series of forced marches before they made contact with the enemy, and, once on the scene, they entered into a fierce and prolonged combat with a determined and well-equipped foe. The Serbs were, therefore, more or less physically tired before the invaders had been chased back into Austrian territory.

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Further, the divisions which had been held in reserve and which came into action towards the end of the battle were even more fatigued, for they had been marched about from one sector to another as the fortunes of battle dictated, and finally entered the arena after their powers of resistance had already undergone a certain strain. This fact taken alone, however, would have provided no adequate excuse for the subsequent Serbian inactivity. The Austrians were no less fatigued than they were, and, for the rest, a few days' repose would have served to reinvigorate the men. There were other and more potent reasons, originating in that Serbian unreadiness for war to which concrete reference has already been made, which had a serious and decisive bearing upon the situation. Among these the shortage of rifles was not the least important. The Jadar battle had, of course, been fought and won despite this deficiency; but an incursion into enemy territory would possibly have necessitated the employment of all the reserve forces in the firing line, and it was precisely these reinforcements which had hitherto remained unarmed in the rear. The third and



SERBIAN OFFICERS EXAMINING A STAFF MAP.

most weighty reason lay in the absence of the material necessary to effect a crossing of the rivers.

The Drina is no ordinary water-way. Rising in the tors of the Bosnian hills and periodically fed by important tributaries, it rushes northwards to its junction with the Save. Ever swift, often torrential, it has washed out a bed of imposing width, and by a constant cutting of new courses has created a series of deltas. The local facilities for the construction of pontoon bridges consisted of boats, barges, and the crude pontoons of the curious water-mills which are a feature of this territory. At different stages of the war both armies dismantled these latter installations, flung the mills and wheels into the water, and commandeered the pontoons for the purposes of bridge-building. In the period under discussion, however, the Austrians had had the advantage of first choice. Profiting by their unopposed advance, they had seized and utilized every suitable floating structure, and despite the precipitate nature of their retreat, they had, fortunately for them, succeeded in massing the boats on their own shore. The Serbs, it is true, possessed military pontoon trains, but with the exception of those captured

from the Turks at Koumanovo in 1912, they were composed of inferior wooden constructions and were not only inefficient, but insufficient to make up the number of bridges which offensive operations in Bosnia would have necessitated. Finally, it was ever-incumbent upon the Serbians to bear in mind the fact that from the very commencement of hostilities they had put every available man into the field; they had no reserves, and they were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with a foe whose resources at that time were almost boundless.

As a matter of actual fact, the army was not sufficiently strong to undertake the defence of any longer line than that provided by the frontiers of its own country, and as events fell out it was demonstrated that the wisdom of General Putnik in wishing to keep his men in Serbia was abundantly justified.

During the twelve days which followed the battle of the Jadar a comparative calm prevailed over the entire front. At least one of the Austrian Army Corps (the 4th Corps of three divisions) was known to have withdrawn; the others had been sadly battered, and all available evidence combined to suggest that the Hapsburg Government had, as their


amusing post-Jadar *communiqué* suggested, adjourned a renewal of their offensive to a more favourable occasion. In the meantime, Russian operations in Galicia had progressed with almost unhopèd-for rapidity and success, and a great Austrian Army had been routed at Lemberg. At this time a general tendency to underrate the military resources of Austria-Hungary had developed, and the Serbs, having eaten of the sweets of victory, were eager to prosecute the combat on foreign soil. They were greatly encouraged in this ambition by at least one of their powerful Allies. All these considerations played their respective parts in persuading General Putnik to undertake a penetration into Syrmia—an expedition which in reality was intended to be but the first and necessary phase of a general invasion of Bosnia.

While the strengthening of General Potiorek's forces in Bosnia by driving down troops from the north was rendered exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, by reason of the sparsity of railways, the network of communications in Syrmia permitted the speedy concentration of considerable numbers of the enemy on the Serbian frontier lying between the Drina river and Belgrade. General Putnik's first


object was, therefore, to protect the western half of his northern border by seizing the territory lying between the Save and the Danube, and establishing himself in strength on the dominating mountain range of Frushkagora. By this manœuvre he would have prevented the reinforcement of the Austrian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina and could have proceeded with his offensive in those Serbian provinces in comparative security. The idea was rendered the more attractive by the known fact that the enemy's forces in Syrmia were by no means strong, and consisted only of the 29th Division of the 9th Army Corps, the 38th and 68th Infantry Regiments of the Common Army, the 21st Jaeger Battalion, the 12th, 13th, 27th, and 28th Landsturm regiments and 6 to 8 *bataillons de marche*.*

The task of invading Syrmia was entrusted to the 1st Army, composed, for the purpose, of two divisions, and the Independent Cavalry Division. On the left wing support was to be rendered by a division in Matchva, while a detachment known as the "Detachment of Belgrade" was to cooperate on the right.

* *Bataillons de marche* were made up of the remains of other regiments and recruits.



A SERBIAN SIEGE GUN IN ACTION BEHIND BELGRADE.



THE PRINCE REGENT ALEXANDER OF SERBIA
Observing the effect of Artillery Fire on Austrian Forts opposite Belgrade.

One Second Ban division was moved up to Obrenovatz, and the rest of the Serbian forces remained on their old positions on the Drina.

For the development of the strategy a sector of the Save was chosen lying almost midway between Matchva and Belgrade, where the river makes a loop-like incursion into Serbia, known as the Kupinski Kut. For all military purposes both banks of the Save were here in possession of the Serbs, for the whole of this peculiar isthmus was controlled by artillery stationed on Serbian soil, while the island of Podgorichka-Ada on the west and that opposite Skela on the east formed additional bases from which invasion could be effected with ease and in practical security.

The decision which had been taken by Headquarters was kept secret from all save the Divisional Staffs, and it was not until they arrived near the river during the night of September 5 to 6 that the Field Officers were aware that an offensive against Austria had in reality been undertaken. The marches to the centres of concentration were, moreover, carried out during the night, for it was necessary to screen the movements of the troops from the eyes of enemy aeroplanes, which unceasingly swept up and down the river in reconnaissance. At 1 a.m. on September 6 the divisions com-

menced the passage of the river at their allotted stations in barges. Once the advance guards were safely across, pontoon trains were brought up and thrown across at Novoselo, while at the islands the bridges were made up of pontoons belonging to the riverside water mills to which reference has already been made.

The curious detour made by the Save had offered the Serbs an ideal crossing-place, and, strangely enough, an old watercourse of the same river provided them with a natural bridge-head almost opposite the "Kut." At this point there exists a small wood, almost circular in shape, surrounded by what is now a moat. At the north-west of the moat lies the town of Obrez, and the formation of the whole section suggests its having been designed by Nature for offensive operations such as those under discussion. Once the Serbian divisions were safely across the river, they undertook the task of clearing the woodland within the moat and fortifying it as a bridge-head. The opposition encountered was not strong—a matter of two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery—and a vigorous shelling of the forest speedily drove most of the defenders towards Obrez. The left of the Serbian 1st Army then steadily worked round on the town itself, and, after not more than a score of shells had been

'dropped into it, the Austrians scattered in a north-westerly and north-easterly direction. The Cavalry Division subsequently arrived on the scene, and the two units then proceeded to fortify the moat and to throw a bridge over it. The Serbian right, working towards the east and north-east, had a rough fight with a hostile regiment and two batteries, but succeeded in capturing the villages of Kupinovo and Progar.

While the chief offensive had thus gone well for Serbian arms, a supporting action on the extreme left at Mitrovitza ended in bitter disaster. The division there engaged was to occupy and thoroughly fortify Mitrovitza and with it a strong bridge-head, after which it was to bear on the enemy's flank and generally seek to relieve the pressure on the army acting in Syrmia. The place chosen for the passage of the river in this sector was a Customs Station at Jasenova Grada, between Mitrovitza and Jarak. The troops commenced their march from Glustzi at midnight on September 5, and in the early morning of the next day the head of the column arrived on the river and immediately reconnoitred a suitable emplacement for a pontoon bridge. Towards 5 a.m. a spirited artillery and rifle fire was opened with a view to preparing the terrain for a crossing, it being understood that in the event of a successful issue two

regiments would deploy to the left and right respectively and subsequently entrench on the line from Mangjeloskabara-Shashinshi, with the object of countering any enemy movement from Jarak.

The dispatch of the troops in barges commenced at 7 a.m., and was received by a heavy volley from the Austrian shore. In the first boat 5 men were killed and 3 wounded; the second was riddled with bullets and speedily sank. Orders were given to the artillery to open fire on the enemy's trenches with explosive shell; the passage by barges continued, and many of the men, chafing at the slowness of the movement, threw themselves into the river and commenced to swim across. At 7.40 a.m. three barge loads had reached the enemy's



VOIVODE (FIELD MARSHAL) PUTNIK,
Chief of the Serbian General Staff.

(Photographed specially for "The Times History" after the battle of Suvobor.)

Inset: COLONEL GIVKO PAVLOVITCH, Sub-Chief of the Serbian General Staff.



["The Times" Photograph]

THE TRANSPORT OF SERBIAN WOUNDED.

shore, and while awaiting reinforcements three score of the men stormed the Austrian trenches, inflicting comparatively heavy casualties in killed and wounded, and taking 20 prisoners. Thenceforward events moved quickly, and once the troops were across they engaged in combat with the Austrians at Jarak and Shashinshi while the engineers threw a pontoon bridge across the river.

The forward movement of the Serbian forces seems now to have been prosecuted

with some lack of foresight, for, although the bridge was not yet in position, the troops were pushed on until, at 5 p.m., one of the regiments was outside Shashinshi with both its flanks exposed to hostile attack. At this juncture what might have been foreseen happened, and the Austrians, having received important reinforcements at Mitrovitza and Jarak, delivered a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the regiment. That a considerable body of the Serbs were able to extricate themselves from their hopeless position and get back to the river reflects the greatest credit upon the men. They reached the Save after two hours of stubborn fighting, carrying with them a mass of wounded, to find the bridge near completion, the pontoons being already in position and all but the last 20 yards of the 400 yards span planked. A critical situation now speedily developed for the Serbs. On the one side was a regiment with half its effectives out of action and the other half subjected to a murderous fire from an enemy in overwhelming force; on the other a battalion of reserves seeking to cross to the support of their comrades. Between the two lay the still unfinished pontoon bridge. The better to ensure the arrival of reinforcements before the wounded could rush the passage, it was decided to send the pioneers immediately in advance of the reserves, and by this means assure to them the first crossing; but before this intention could be put into practice the wounded flung themselves into the empty pontoons, which, still insecurely fixed, parted their moorings and drifted with their cargo of bleeding warriors down the stream. Moreover, the boats were old and leaking, and




["The Times" Photograph.]

THE MILITARY ATTACHÉS
ATTACHED TO THE SERBIAN STAFF.
Colonel Fournier (France), Lieut.-Colonel Harrison
(Great Britain), Colonel Atamonoff (Russia).

the more heavily laden of them speedily sank. As the last hope of the gallant band floated away, they stood with their backs to the watery wall facing their foe like a hunted stag, their curses mingling with the shouts of desperation from the thwarted reinforcements and with the cries of the drowning and the wounded, until they rose above the din of musketry and machine gun fire. The Serbians, however, were game to the end; cut off alike from supplies and ammunition, they fought to the last cartridge, and then surrendered. All that was saved of the 13th Regiment was the flag, rescued by the Colonel himself, and handed to the regimental doctor, who swam the river with it shortly after midnight.

Fortunately, the imprudence which led this regiment to disaster did not characterize the movements of the main expedition. The line was advanced cautiously, preceded always by a strong advance guard of cavalry, and it was only after the successful occupation of Progar, Ashanja, and Obrez that the old bridge-head round the moat was discarded and a new and more extended ring of earthworks constructed around the villages already named, with its western corner at Podgoritchka-Ada. Thus the three Serbian bases were thoroughly protected by a semicircular field-fortress radiating from Kupinovo.

Having in this manner assured his communications, General Boyovitch advanced the Cavalry Division in fanlike formation to the



[*"The Times"* Photograph.

VOIVODE (FIELD MARSHAL) MISHITCH,
Commander of the Serbian 1st Army.


north and west, the norsemen being closely followed by one division on the right—on the left the other division took a north-easterly direction. By the evening of September 7 mounted patrols had arrived on the line Karlovchitch-Subotishtie-Grabovtsi, and had unmasked the enemy holding a front Detch-Mihaljevtsi-Bresach-Platichevo.

The following day the patrols in the north and west sectors arrived at Mihaljevtsi-Sabotishtie-Bresach-Nikintzi, but the forward move-



[*"The Times"* Photograph.

SERBIAN WOMEN CARRYING WOUNDED FROM THE FIRING LINE.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE EXPEDITION IN SYRMIA.

ment of the Infantry was arrested at Voichin-Marich Salas-Vitojevchi. This perhaps unnecessary discretion was in part occasioned by the knowledge that the Austrians were in force at Detch and Surchin, and it was, therefore, considered inadvisable to send the left too far ahead until this opposition had been overcome.

On September 9 the Serbian right proceeded to attack Detch and Surchin. The former village was captured after a short though determined resistance, but the Austrians succeeded in holding Surchin, and the advance was thereby checked at Bechmen. The following day the offensive was renewed against two enemy regiments well entrenched at Surchin, and the village was taken by assault after heavy fighting. This task accomplished, the Serbians turned north and captured Dobranovtsi with little difficulty, and the troops stationed around Belgrade, taking up their rôle of cooperation, crossed the river and advanced to Semlin.

On September 11 General Boyovitch commenced a huge sweeping movement over the whole front, with the object of driving all the enemy units westward on to the Frushkagora mountain—a strategy which would have left him in undisputed possession of the plain. The two divisions, together with the Indepen-

dent Cavalry, would then have been free to advance against Frushkagora itself, when, that stronghold once taken, they would have established a mastery of Syrmia—a territory of which, it is well to note, the inhabitants were almost exclusively of Serbian race.

September 11 saw the Serbs extended on a line Hrtkovtsi-Budjanovtsi-Subotishte-Mihaljevtsi-Voika-Pazovanova, with the Austrians entrenched on Jarak-Dobrintsi-Popintsi-Golobintsi-Pazova Stara. The next morning their left occupied Pechintsi, and advanced northward to the Romer Canal, where they were met by heavy fire, and forced to dig themselves in. Farther west, however, a brilliant little engagement, in which bombs and bayonets were freely used, resulted in the capture of the town of Jarak.

At this critical moment in the history of the expedition the Austrians commenced their second invasion across the Drina in great force, and the Serbian Staff found it necessary to abandon the advance in Syrmia and recall the divisions there engaged to the defence of the homeland. The retirement, effected behind a screen thrown out by the Cavalry, was executed in perfect order, and so obstinate was the resistance offered by the rearguards that the entire expedition was safely back across the

Save before the Austrians realized that their territory had been evacuated.

While in Syrmia the Serbs had been the object of enthusiastic demonstrations of welcome by the population, and their departure was the signal for a corresponding degree of depression. For these testimonies of affection the Syrmians paid dearly upon the return of the Austro-Hungarian Army. In the case of one village the punishment which a Hungarian regiment desired to inflict so greatly incensed a regiment of Croats that a pitched battle ensued, in which rifles, maxims, and even cannon were employed by both sides, heavy casualties resulting.

While the possibility of a new Austrian offensive had been foreseen, the strength of the hostile forces engaged came as a surprise to the Serbian leaders. As a matter of fact, General Potiorek had been able to draw upon sufficient reserves to reform his decimated army corps, and was thus enabled once again to undertake an advance against Valievo and the second Austrian invasion of Serbia commenced.

From August 25 to September 7 the Austrian Balkan Army had been grouped as follows :

A Combined Corps:—Klenak-Jarak-Bosut.

The 8th Corps:—Bosut-Bijeljina.

The 13th Corps:—Janja-Kosluk.

The 15th Corps:—Kosluk-Zvornik.

The 16th Corps (less 3-4 battalions) Zvornik-Liubovia.

The 3-4 battalions of the 16th Corps, together with 6-10 battalions of Landsturm and recruits, were before the Montenegrins, and one and a half divisions held the front Zemlin-Weiskirchen.

For purposes of explanation, it will be well to divide the theatre of operations into two sectors, of which the town of Loznitza may be considered the dividing line. The Austrian attack developed in force on September 7, when an assault in force was carried out on the whole frontier from Liubovia to Jarak. In the northern sector fighting of a very severe and sanguinary nature took place, and though the enemy succeeded in forcing the line at many points, they were almost invariably driven back across the rivers. In the north-eastern corner of Matchva, however, they succeeded in obtaining a foothold on a triangular strip of swamp bounded by Ravnje-Tolich-Jarak. They were checked on the line Ravnje-Tolich, where both sides dug themselves in, and there

then ensued a period of trench fighting distinguished by little save a woeful loss of human life, and a continuous and, from the Serbian point of view, disastrous expenditure of ammunition.

The practical failure of the Austrian effort to the north of Loznitza was very largely due to the fact that the Serbs had there concentrated a force strong enough to cope with the invaders. The sector which had been weakened in order to provide sufficient troops for the expedition in Syrmia was that lying to the south. There the Serbs were numerically feeble. They were under the impression that the exceedingly mountainous nature of the terrain was in itself sufficient guarantee against a strong attack from that direction, and even when the new penetration commenced at Liubovia they failed to attach any serious importance to it.

But the Austrians thought otherwise. Although their first attempt to cross on September 8 was frustrated, they came on again in augmented numbers, and very speedily caused a general Serbian retirement to the line of hills Guchevo-Boranja-Jagodnia-Sokolska planina-Proslop-Rozani, where our Allies dug



“CROWDED OUT.”

A wounded and fever-stricken Serbian soldier for whom there was no room in the hospitals.

themselves in and awaited a renewed attack.

It is worthy of note that up to this time the paramount importance of certain summits of the Guchevo-Boranja-Jagodnia ranges does not appear to have been adequately appreciated by either side. The heights of Guchevo—to take a particular instance—absolutely control the Jadar plain as far eastwards as Jarabitzé, and, at a later date, thousands of lives were sacrificed in a struggle for predominance there. Yet the Austrians failed to fortify the position in effecting their first invasion; the Serbians ignored it after their victory, and it was only when the second invasion had been checked that the Austrians established themselves there

in force, with the result that, until their retirement some six weeks later, the Serbs kept nearly an entire division engaged in a continuous and sanguinary effort to drive them from it.

Meantime, the fight in what may best be referred to as the Krupani theatre raged with ever-increasing intensity. The Serbians succeeded in holding the crest of Kostañnik—a position of great strategical importance—but farther south they were steadily driven back by superior enemy forces and, by September 11, the Austrians held all the land west and south of the line Shanatz (835)-Sokolska planina-Petska.

At this critical period one of the divisions which had been operating in Syrmia arrived on the scene, and the combined troops were at once ordered to undertake an immediate offensive against the Sokolska planina, all the summits of which (Ravno brdo-Kuline-706-Yasenovatz-Melatina-Yasharev breg-Petkovo brdo-Goritza) were then in hostile occupation.

The mountainous and thickly-wooded nature of the country rendered military action exceedingly difficult, and progress was at first very slow. Little by little, however, the Serbian



[“The Times” Photographs.]

A SERBIAN REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS DURING BATTLE.

Inset: GENERAL YOURASHITCH STÜRME, Commander of the Serbian 3rd Army.

advanced parties, adopting much the same tactics all along the line, crept steadily up in open formation under a heavy rifle and artillery fire, and then, throwing up temporary cover, they awaited the arrival of the main forces.

Once these came up, the order to charge was given, and a rush made for the positions. The effect upon the Austrians was original, if not entirely unsuspected, for they had previously advanced before a stubborn but retreating adversary. Now, while many turned and fled, despite the fact that their own artillery was turned against them, the rest stood fast. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting then ensued, but the Serbs were not to be denied, and they succeeded in securing possession of all the heights. They found the Austrian trenches choked with dead and wounded, the survivors having taken hurried flight in the direction of the Drina. So complete was the defeat that the Serbs were soon able to arrive on the line Shanatz-Melenkov Kamen-Brankovatz-Obednik - Velesh - Karachitza - Tchermanovitza Gai Brdjanska Glavitza, with cavalry patrols extending to the Drina at Liubovia.

The attention of both armies now centred around the commanding position of Matchko Kamen (literally "the cat's leg"), a position

which, by reason of the terrific struggles which followed for its possession—it was taken and retaken no fewer than eight times—and the appalling losses there occasioned, will figure large in Serbian military history.


The sole aim of General Putnik's subsequent strategy was to drive the invader out of Serbian territory. With the forces at his disposal he was unable to play for any startling "coup," and he accordingly planned a wide sweeping movement in order to push the Austrians northward on to the hills, thus rendering their military position precarious, and force them over the border. The general idea was, therefore, to storm Matchko Kamen, and subsequently



[*The Times*] Photographs.

THE OFFICERS OF THE 1st BRIGADE OF THE SERBIAN INDEPENDENT
CAVALRY DIVISION.

Inset: VOIVODE (FIELD MARSHAL) STEPANOVITCH, Commander of the Serbian 2nd Army.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE SECOND AUSTRIAN INVASION OF SERBIA.

advance and occupy a line of crests—Kriva Jela-Tsrni vrh Debelo Osoye-Ugivalishte-Charochichi-Polyana-Osmanovo brdo. This manœuvre, as will be observed on reference to the accompanying map, would have completed the chain of heights which commence with Guchevo on the north, and would have given the Serbs a frontier which they could have held with a minimum expenditure of men and ammunition.

Before this programme could be carried to its conclusion, however, both sides were worn out by the struggle on Matchko Kamen and other points of vantage. The Austrians not only showed no inclination to renew the offensive over such difficult ground, but were doubtless disconcerted by the progress of the Uzitsha Army, which had penetrated a considerable distance into Bosnia. The Serbs, for their part, were equally content to settle down and safeguard the terrain which they had gained, for, if the operations under discussion lacked the incident and display which

characterized the first and third invasions, they were in many respects the most desperate and sanguinary of the whole campaign. The losses incurred by both sides were, in comparison with the forces engaged, truly enormous, and a conservative estimate of the Serbian casualties in killed, wounded, and prisoners put them at well over 30,000 men *hors de combat*.

Following the repulse of the second invasion of Serbia by the Austro-Hungarian Army there set in a stage of siege warfare, closely resembling in its principal aspects the periods of fighting, at times uneventful and at times desperate, which filled in the intervals between the great battles in eastern and western Europe. Both sides dug themselves in on positions which they persistently fortified and rendered increasingly impervious to attack, and constructed line upon line of trenches from which a maze of communications led up to the actual front.

Throughout the whole of the period between the second and third invasions, the

Austrians persistently endeavoured to break their way through in one or other of the sectors of the line dividing the two forces. They had, as will be remembered, retained possession of only two small triangular tracts of Serbian territory. To the north of Matchva they held a tract of marshy plain—Ravnje-Tolich-Jarak—while farther south their conquest had been limited to a section of sparsely populated mountain land roughly encompassed within a line—Smrdan-Taminovich-Zvornik. On the credit side the Serbs could point to the fact that their Uzitsha Army had advanced into Bosnia as far as Vlasenitza. It would appear that the Austrian command had decided that in view of the fierce resistance which the Serbs had offered in the Krupani theatre little success could attend a renewal of offensive operations in that direction, and they accordingly strongly entrenched themselves, and settled down to hold what they already possessed. Farther north, however, they had at length come to appreciate the immense strategical importance of the Guchevo mountains. At the close of the operations which are referred to as the second invasion, these mountains remained in the joint possession of the two armies, and there accordingly set in a perpetual and sanguinary struggle for supremacy. At some points the rival forces were separated only by a few yards of hilltop, while at others nearly a mile of neutral ground lay between the trenches. All the arts of siege warfare were

employed by one side or the other in the constant combats, which took place, but the Serbian engineers were not slow to demonstrate their superior initiative, as was evidenced just before the Serbian retreat, when they successfully mined over 100 yards of Austrian trench and blew 250 of its defenders high into the air. This was part of a last attempt to conquer the crests, and it was a tragic commentary upon the paucity of ammunition from which the Serbs suffered that the whole manœuvre resulted in no definite advantage for no other reason than that the Serbian commander had been obliged to fix definitely the number of rounds which could be fired from his cannon, and to cease the offensive when the apportioned quantity had been exhausted.

Although the Serbians repeatedly demonstrated their superiority over the enemy, they were always held in check by the Austrian siege guns, which controlled the mountain from the security of the left bank of the Drina river, and though the valleys of Guchevo were red with the blood of thousands of victims of both armies, the close of the operations found the two forces in the same position as they had occupied during the second invasion.

A little farther north along the Drina frontier the Austrians had a footing in Serbian territory at Kuriachista, but were otherwise confined to the left bank until the triangular tract which represented their conquest of Matchva in the north-east was reached.



SERBIAN SOLDIER LYING AMIDST THE WRECKAGE OF TRANSPORT CONVOY.



A YOUTHFUL SNIPER.

While they kept up a continuous bombardment of the Serbian lines between Kuriachista and Parashnitza and Ratcha, it was along the line from Parashnitza to Shabatz that they subsequently directed their chief attempt to progress southwards. In adopting these tactics they were doubtless occupied by two great considerations, the first of which was that over this line very potent assistance could be rendered them from river monitors, and the second was that the Serbian territory which they held was very low-lying, with the result that their trenches speedily became waterlogged and untenable. Experience had, moreover, taught them that, despite the result of the battle of the Jadar, the Serbians were more vulnerable over level ground, and they rightly assumed that they would find it less difficult to register progress across the plains of Matchva than over the broken and mountainous territory farther south.

In view of the preponderance in numbers and weight of metal which the Austrians possessed, and their own acknowledged shortage of gun ammunition, it is questionable whether the Serbian Staff would not have been well advised had they decided completely to abandon Shabatz and the Matchva plain and retire at once to the foothills of the Tzer

Mountains and the watershed of the Dobrava river. That they did not do so was due to the massacres committed and the devastation caused by the Austrians during the first invasion. This outburst of barbarism came as a complete surprise to all sections of the Serbian people. They had been reared in no ultra-squeamish school. Yet in 1914 even officers left their families in frontier towns without undue concern, basing their misplaced optimism on a belief that they were, on this occasion, warring against a civilized monarchy whose consideration for non-combatants would be second only to their valour upon the battlefield. How terribly they erred will be shown later.

A concentration on what may be designated the strategical frontier would, moreover, have delivered up the rich and fertile Matchva district to the mercy of Austrian marauders, and General Putnik, therefore, yielded to sentimental and political influence and deployed his divisions in a manner which, as subsequent developments were so soon to demonstrate, was tactically unsound.

Shortly before their withdrawal from Matchva the Serbians gained a success by the sinking of one of the largest of the Austrian river monitors. Five of these craft had been annoying and hampering their military operations throughout the campaign. Night after night they perambulated the Save, disclosing the Serb positions with their searchlights, and pounding shrapnel into distant trenches and pompoms into those on the water's edge. Serbian shell only glanced off their heavily armoured and rounded hulls, and previous attempts to mine the river had proved aggravatingly inefficient. But on the night of October 22 one of a pair of monitors which had been promenading the river with impunity struck a mine, and sank before she could be steered to the Austrian shore.

After nearly six weeks of stubborn resistance to the Austrian attempts to break across the Drina, and following a series of bloody struggles for supremacy on Guchevo, the Serbs were at length faced with the necessity of retreat. Various causes contributed to this enforced decision to withdraw from the frontiers. With the coming of winter the trenches along the river side and on the waterlogged plain of Matchva became almost untenable; the Austrian attacks increased in intensity; the preponderance in numbers and weight of

metal possessed by the enemy grew almost daily; the Serbian stocks of gun ammunition fell lower and lower; and the men showed evidence of mental and physical fatigue due to their constant vigil in the trenches. The Serbian soldiers were subjected to all the drawbacks of trench warfare at its worst but without the respite which it had been found possible to accord on other frontiers. So extended was the Serbian line in proportion to the strength of the army that the troops had, perforce, to remain day and night without relief and often without repose in the sector of muddy earthworks which had been allotted to them. The nerve-racking strain thus imposed became almost insupportable. The special correspondent of *The Times* reported that he had seen several soldiers who had gone mad under the weight of it, and that these were but examples of the nervous tension from which the rest of the army was suffering.

When, therefore, the dictates of military strategy were allowed to supersede political considerations, and the order was given to retire the troops in Matchva to the foothills of the Tzer mountains and the summits on the right bank of the Dobrava river, the retreat acted upon an enfeebled nervous system, and the moral of the army gave way.

The withdrawal had been too long delayed, with the consequence that the command of the Tzer mountains was lost, and a retirement from Guchevo, and, in fact, along the whole line became necessary. Thus encouraged, the Austrians swarmed over the frontier from Shabatz to Liubovia. The Serbians fought a series of rearguard actions, but their enemy, converging upon Valievo in overwhelming force, speedily rendered that stronghold untenable, and the headquarters staff precipitately evacuated it on November 11 and drew back on Kragujevatz.


Valievo was a town of considerable strategical importance. The centre of a series of routes which led to it from Shabatz and the Drina river and from it to Obrenovatz, Belgrade, and Kragujevatz, it was also the railhead of a light railway which joins up with the European line at Mladenovatz and of another which finds its northern terminus at Obrenovatz. Its capture was, therefore, the first stage in the progress towards Kragujevatz, Nish, and Constantinople, but, in view of the ease with which it had been taken, the jubilations which followed at Vienna were hardly justified, and

the high decoration conferred on the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, General Potiorek, was at least premature. Even the ill-fated "punitive" expedition of August and the expensive second invasion in September had apparently failed to convince the Austrians of the seriousness of the task which they had undertaken, and they appear also to have failed to realize both the difficulties which lay before them in the way of a veteran army fighting for its very existence in its own lair, and the enormous obstacles presented by the question of transport over the switchback highways of levelled mud which serve for roads in central Serbia. The score of cannon which the Serbs were compelled to leave behind for this latter reason were hailed as evidence of hardly fought and dearly-won battles; the outposts which were captured and the fainthearted who surrendered were accepted as signs of a complete demoralization which had not yet set in.

If, however, the Austrian success served only to depress and not to demoralize the Serbs, it had a most timely effect upon their own soldiers. In the case of this army so lacking in homogeneity, so devoid of all national patriotism, and bound together only by the chains of discipline, victory was a great essential.



PRINCE PAUL OF SERBIA and
SIR THOMAS LIPTON AT BELGRADE.



SERBIAN ARTILLERY ENTRAINING FOR THE FRONT.

To those of its members who had but little interest in the cause for which they were fighting, it supplied an inspiration which had previously been non-existent.

The Serbs, as we have already suggested, regarded their enforced retreat as unfortunate, but it was by no means considered to be serious. They had not yet been driven back on to the line where they had originally intended to hold the Austrians. During the days which intervened between the completion of the concentration and the first Austrian invasion of August 12, what are referred to as the Kolubara and Lyg positions were strongly entrenched, and, before the actual capitulation of Valievo, the General Staff had decided that no serious attempt would be made to stay the progress of the enemy until he reached that line of fortifications.

In itself the Kolubara river presented no formidable obstacle to an advancing army. It is neither very wide nor very deep, but its approaches are sometimes devoid of cover, and on other occasions are commanded by formidable mountain heights, with the result that in the hands of a determined defence it should prove difficult to negotiate. A little south-west of Lazarevatz the line of defence left the Kolubara, followed the course of the Lyg river,

and entered country of an exceedingly rugged nature. From the source of the Lyg the Serbs had fortified the Jeljak and Maljen ranges which control various routes converging on Kragujevatz, and, proceeding in a south-westerly direction, they threw up earthworks on the Bukovi, Varda, Jelova, Bukovic, Miloshevatz and Leska-Gore ranges, which barred an advance towards the Western Morava valley.

It was upon these positions, therefore, that the Serbs elected that the great battle should be fought out. At Obrenovatz they had a strong brigade known as the "Detachment of Obrenovatz." Farther south, at Konatiche on the Kolubara river, the Independent Cavalry Division formed a liaison with the 2nd Army, which held Volujak-Lazarevatz-Cooka and the contours of the ridge to the left. The 3rd Army occupied the right bank of the Lyg river from Barzilovitz to Ivanovchi. The 1st Army took up a strong line—Gukoshi-Mednik-Batchinova-Ruda, and south-west along the Jeljak ridge to Maljen. Finally, the "Army of Uzitsha" was withdrawn from a meritorious penetration into Bosnia in order to protect the base of Uzitsha and the valley of the Western Morava by entrenching itself strongly from a point south-west of Yasenovatz through Vk. Prishedo along the Jelova crests,


following which it stretched across the road and joined the tors of the Leska-Gora to Shanatz. The whole line was naturally formidable, an excellent field of view was everywhere obtainable, and sufficient time had been available for its adequate fortification. Even admitting a shortage of gun ammunition, therefore, the confidence of the Serbian Staff appeared to be justified by the circumstances, although it might with reason have been suggested that General Putnik was endeavouring to hold a very extended front with the comparatively small forces at his disposal.

The Austrians displayed no undue haste in their advance. Despite the feeble opposition offered by the Serbian rearguards which had been left behind to protect the retirement, it took them nearly six weeks to arrive on the ground selected by their adversary, and it may be assumed that during that time they were able to adapt themselves to the conditions of warfare dictated by the peculiarities of the country over which they were operating. Mid-November had arrived before they got into touch with the main body of the Serbian Army. They had almost divested Bosnia of its garrisons and had brought up an additional corps from the Italian frontier, so that they went into action with five Army Corps (roughly

250 battalions of infantry, in addition to cavalry, artillery and corps troops).

Information that ammunition was *en route* now exerted a cheering influence upon the Serbian Staff; but the men, unaccustomed to retreat, were further disheartened by half a million of refugees who blocked the roads as they fled in terror before the oncoming Austrian hosts and recounted exaggerated stories of the enemy's preponderance to their comrades-in-arms. The sight of the streams of refugees as they filled every nook and corner of the towns or stood with their oxen and wagons, knowing not whether to turn to the left or right, spread panic among the civilian population, and the inhabitants of Lazarevatz, Milanovatz, Kragujevatz and other of the more populous centres deserted their homes and added their thousands to the flotsam of Nish.

The Austrian general attack on the Serbian positions commenced on the morning of November 15. It developed principally against the 2nd Army south of Lazarevatz and the Uzitsha Army in the direction of Kosjerichi, but during five days the offensive was successfully repulsed, and the defenders were able not only to inflict considerable loss upon their enemy, but to capture a fair number of prisoners. The intention to seize Lazarevatz and push on



ONE OF THE TWO FRENCH 14cm. NAVAL GUNS DESTROYED BY THE AUSTRIANS AT BELGRADE.

[“The Times” Photograph]

along the Valievo-Mladenovatz railway was meritorious in that it would have both cut off the main Serbian Army from the forces around Belgrade and permitted an easy outflanking movement against Kragujevatz. For the Serbs it was a very necessary stronghold on which to pivot their operations north and south, and it was probably for that reason that its defence was confided to Voivode Stepanovitch and the divisions whose efforts had counted for most in the great victory on the Jadar river.

In order to render the account of the subsequent operations more intelligible to the reader, it will be advisable to divide the theatre of war into two sectors, and to treat the operations against Kragujevatz and Belgrade as separate and distinct actions, although, as a matter of actual fact, each exerted a considerable influence upon the other. For purposes of reference to the advance against Kragujevatz the 2nd Army at Lazarevatz may be considered the right wing of the Serbian line, the 3rd Army its right centre, the 1st Army its centre, and the Uzitsha Army its left.

On November 20 a strong enemy force advanced and occupied Milovatz in close touch with the right flank of the 1st Army, while a further column made contact with its centre at Ruda and seized the important summit of Strazhara. The next day this manœuvre developed into a determined onslaught on the Serb positions. The men held their ground for some time with undaunted courage, but towards evening the resistance in the centre broke down, and the army was beaten back with heavy losses in men and guns on to the line Babina Glava-Rajac. On the right, two attacks on the Lazarevatz positions were successfully beaten off. The 3rd Army (Barzilovitza-Ivanovchi) held its ground, and sanguinary fighting between the Uzitsha Army and the Austrian 16th Corps closed without advantage to either side.



SERBIAN INFANTRY MARCHING INTO ACTION.

[*The Times*] Photographs.

Inset: PRIVATE LEACH, one of a small group of British volunteers serving with the Serbian Army.



SERBIAN ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH.

The disastrous retirement of the 1st Army from the excellent positions which it had held on the Ruda-Mednik-Gukoshi line sent a wave of depression over the Serbian ranks. The men lost heart, and the high commands became discouraged, because they well knew that the demoralization could only be stayed by the timely arrival of ammunition, and they feared that the situation, so far from manifesting any improvement, might steadily worsen until even renewed activity by the artillery might prove ineffective. Fortunately, however, the Austrians did not immediately follow up their success, but rested on the central sector while the mountain brigades of their 16th Corps came in from Vishegrad-Rogatitza and Bajina Bashta, and delivered an indecisive attack on the Serbian extreme left on the line Varda-Vk. Prishedo - Gjakov - Bukovik - Miloshevatz-Gruda.

On November 24 the battle developed on the whole front, with such success to the invaders that two days later they had stormed and taken the heights of Cooka (thus involving the retirement of the 2nd Army to the line Glavitza-Stubitza-Smyrdlykovatz) and had driven the Uzitsha Army back on to the Goinjagora mountains at the head of the Western Morava valley.

Simultaneously with their general offensive the Austrian Staff now inaugurated a determined effort to outflank the Serbian extreme left. To this end they deployed their mountain brigades to excellent purpose, and though the Serbs, despite all the disabilities from which they were suffering, fought gallantly and well, they were compelled to retreat, step by step,




"The Times" Photograph

A SERBIAN 3rd BAN SOLDIER
GUARDING A BRIDGE.


until, on November 28, the Uzitsha Army took up a strongly prepared line on Kita-Kablar-Markovitza, all paramount heights of great strategical importance.

In the rest of the southern sector many efforts were made to retrieve the situation; but, though the counter-attacks were often successful,* the defenders were unable to maintain any advantage, and, outnumbered and outweighed, and with an ever-weakening "moral," they ceded ridge after ridge until the dominating Suvobor mountains fell to their elated enemy.

* A counter attack on Salinatz on November 27, for example, resulted in the capture of the position with 7 officers and 1,580 men prisoners.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE THIRD



AUSTRIAN INVASION OF SERBIA.

In the northern sector (Obrenovatz-Lazarevatz) a succession of hardly fought combats took place on the Kolubara river. The Serbs, while in a great numerical inferiority, fought with great stubbornness, and though an enemy division penetrated to Progon on November 24, it was subsequently rounded up and driven back with heavy loss by the Independent Cavalry Division.

The chief danger, however, lay in the south. In that theatre the Austrians had scored an undoubted success, for they had not only driven the Serbs back upon their defences before Kragujevatz, but, what was perhaps equally important, had succeeded in extending the front until it stretched from Tchatchak to Belgrade—a distance of nearly seventy miles from point to point.

On November 28 the Serbs held the line :

2nd Army. — Vechani - Medvedjak - Progo-roochi-Vagan-Summits 428 to 262.

3rd Army. — Kalanjevchi - 498 - across Tru-deljska river - 700 Gotrovitza - Kelja.

1st Army. — Silopaj - Nukuchani - Vrnchani-Lochevchi-Galich.

Uzitsha Army. — Kita-Kablar-Markovitza.

The disposition of the Austrian forces was as follows :

In the direction of the Western Morava valley :

Four mountain brigades of the 16th Corps.

On the road Valievo-Gn. Milanovatz :

The rest of the 16th and the entire 15th Corps.

Against Lazarevatz :

The 13th Corps.

The 8th and a Combined Corps were moving eastward against the line Mladenovatz-Belgrade.

The Serbian nation was at this time fully conscious of the fact that its very existence was in jeopardy. The well-equipped armies of the mighty neighbour who sought nothing less than its annihilation had penetrated far into the land, and to all appearance would soon complete the destruction of the weary defending force. On the eastern frontier bands of irregulars were destroying the only route by which the needed ammunition could arrive, and there was fear of the military occupation of Serbia's Macedonian territory. Rumania still held aloof, Italy gave no sign of prompt intervention, and Greece, ready to help, was kept back by fear of Bulgaria. It seemed impossible that succour could arrive, and the Serbs, losing faith in themselves, lost hope. Yet, save among a section of the civilian population, there was no panic. They faced the new situation calmly and stoically. They were a little nation fighting a great Empire; they were worn out by this and previous wars and short of everything, and, perhaps more tragic than all, ammunition that had been hoped for from richer Allies had been delayed too long. Thus they felt that even if complete defeat followed, it would be no disgrace.

Despite the apparent hopelessness of it all, there remained deep down in the heart of the



THE LETTER HOME.

[“The Times” Photograph.]



A BATTLEFIELD FUNERAL.

["The Times" Photograph.]

Serbian leaders a conviction that the decisive battle had still to be won. Through the darkness of defeat there had shone occasional gleams of victory. Day after day Colonel Pavlovitch,* the brilliant Director of Military Operations on the General Staff, had analyzed the statements of the captured Austrians, and from these, coupled with the slowness of the enemy advance, he deduced that serious difficulties of transport were being encountered, and that the demoralization in the ranks of General Potiorek's army was no less marked than in his own. Further, supplies of gun ammunition had at last commenced to arrive.

Thus the Serbs set about the organization of one last, bold bid for victory in the shape of

* Colonel Givko Pavlovitch was born in 1871. The son of a Serbian farm labourer, he early developed a passion for the army, but by reason of the poverty of his parents he was unable to attach himself to his chosen career until, by his extraordinary ability, he won a series of scholarships. After a period of study in the Military Academy at Belgrade, he finished his instruction at Berlin, and was then admitted to the Serbian General Staff. He soon rose to the position of Professor of Tactics at the Serbian Military School, and when war was declared with Turkey, was the obvious choice for the position of Director of Military Operations. He visited London in the spring of 1913 as military expert attached to the Serbian Delegation, and later proceeded to Scutari, where he was in charge of the joint Serbo-Montenegrin attack against that town. During the Bulgarian War of 1913 Colonel Pavlovitch was the principal collaborator of General Putnik, and the same rôle was allocated to him in the war against Austria. Physically, he possesses the well-developed physique of the average Serbian, but in personal appearance somewhat resembles the Japanese type. He has tremendous powers of resistance, and rarely loses his innate optimism.

a vigorous counter-offensive. The first and obvious necessity was to shorten the enormous front over which the armies had previously been extended. This manoeuvre involved the withdrawal of the detachment of Obrenovatz and the Cavalry Division from the right bank of the Kolubara, and the evacuation of Belgrade (night of November 29-30). A redistribution of the Serbian forces then followed, the troops from the Kolubara occupying the heights about Sibnitza and the Detachment of Belgrade being placed astride the Belgrade-Nish railway on the summits of Varoonitza (east) and Kosmaï (west). The other armies were grouped on the line already indicated, measures having been taken to reinforce the centre.

It had also become self-evident that a change in the high command of the 1st Army had become necessary. This unit, though composed of divisions with a record of distinguished service behind them, had led the retreat, and thus precipitated the general withdrawal. It had lost Suvobor, and, if success was ever to crown this new offensive, it was considered that that range must first be recaptured. General Putnik, therefore, decided to deprive the Staff of the services of General Mishitch, his trusted lieutenant through all the three wars, and to place him at the head of the 1st Army.

Mishitch was a typical Serbian officer. The son of a peasant, he had risen by sheer



"The Times" Photograph

A FRONTIER GUARD OF 3rd BAN TROOPS ON THE RIVER SAVE.

capacity to the front rank of Serbian military leaders. A man of simple and unobtrusive tastes, with the fair hair and blue eyes of the pure-blooded Southern Slav, and a disposition which bordered on self-effacement, he possessed a natural genius for command. The subsequent recapture of Suvobor was very largely due to his superb generalship and inspiration, and it was fitting that he emerged from the combat a Field-Marshal of King Peter's Army.

The men, if disheartened by the continued withdrawal, had nevertheless in some measure recovered from the nerve-racking strain in the trenches, and they were now called upon by Royal Proclamation to make one great sacrifice for their country's sake. The aged King Peter rose from a bed of suffering and joined his subjects in the firing line. The sale of liquor was prohibited. Finally, as has already been stated, artillery ammunition had at last arrived, and guns that had long been silent were again to belch forth that encouragement which the thunder of cannon alone can give.

The strategy of General Potiorek had now become apparent. Using the mountain range of Suvobor as a pivot, he strengthened his wings, and attempted to swing round on the north by Mladenovatz and south down the Western Morava valley. Had this scheme been successfully executed, the enemy would have been able to round up the mass of the

Serbian Army together with Kragujevatz and its arsenal, after which the capture of Nish (the temporary capital) would have followed as a matter of course, and the campaign in Serbia would have been at an end.

It was under such conditions, and before the invaders had been able to develop their great outflanking movement, that the order for the counter-attack was given on December 2, and the advance at once began over the whole front. There can be little doubt that, after the somewhat feeble resistance which they had previously encountered, the brisk offensive took the Austrians completely by surprise. The Serbians pulled themselves together in a manner which finds few parallels in history. Mishitch led his 1st Army against Suvobor, where, advancing with wonderful *élan*, during three days of combat, they stormed and captured the enemy pivot and threw the Austrian right and centre (the 15th Corps and 8 brigades of the 16th Corps) into headlong flight along the road to Valievo. Commencing with this dramatic success, the Serbian Armies—the demoralized hordes of a few days before—advanced with remarkable rapidity, and did not cease the pursuit until they had driven the armed hosts of the Hapsburgs back across the Save and Drina.

Up to December 1 the Austrians had slowly advanced towards the Serbian positions, sure

that victory now lay within their grasp. In fact, so great and deeply founded was the confidence of the enemy Staff that the end was within sight that the most primitive requirements of the troops went unsupplied. Demands for boots and equipment and even for food were met by an assurance that two or three days would see the end of the campaign, and that the inconvenience must be supported until that time.

Thus when the 1st Army commenced its advance the Austrians were caught leisurely trundling along the roads—not on open country, but in valleys and dales commanded from the heights above—and by the time they could recover from the shock and extend their ranks, the Serbs had inflicted enormous losses on them and thrown the survivors into a state of semi-panic. On that day alone General Mishitch captured 12 officers, 1,500 men, 5 mountain howitzers and 4 machine guns, and advanced his army to the line Kostuniche-Teochin-Grn. Branetichi-Vranovicha. The Uzitsha Army was heavily attacked on its positions on both sides of the western Morava, but repulsed the enemy and took 95 prisoners. The 3rd Army advanced more slowly towards Lipet, taking 3 officers, 500 men, and 2 machine guns. The 2nd Army met with considerable opposition, but after desperate fighting registered good progress and captured a considerable number of prisoners.

In the northern sector the Austrians had detached an important force for their triumphal entry to Belgrade, and reconnoitring parties, probably a flank-guard of observation, were observed in the direction of Slatina-Sopot-Popovitch.

The signal successes of the first day's offensive, coming, as they did, hard upon weeks of discouraging bulletins, were hailed with enthusiasm by the Serbs. Yet their jubilation was quiet and restrained. They recognized that their enemy had been taken in more or less degree by surprise, and they did not lose sight of the fact that he remained in possession of mountain positions of great natural strength, from many of which he would have to be driven at the point of the bayonet. But the soldiers had recovered their moral, and pressing onward with renewed courage, they swept the Hapsburg armies before them with ever-increasing rapidity. Tor after tor was stormed and taken, and headquarters had scarce announced one victory ere news was received of another. By December 5 the 1st Army had reconquered the dominating height (802) of the Suvobor range and the summit of Rajatz. The 3rd Army had overcome a vigorous resistance and advanced to Vrlaja during the day, and as the result of a night attack the Austrians abandoned Lipet with 2,000 prisoners. The 2nd Army had pushed steadily on to Kremenitza and Barosnevatz. The Uzitsha Army



THE EVENING MEAL OF THE 3rd BAN.

[*"The Times"* Photograph.]



SERBIAN SIEGE GUN IN ACTION.

continued to wage an unequal fight with the right wing of the 16th Corps, but nevertheless succeeded in holding its own. Thus encouraged, it, too, took the offensive with a night attack, and the following morning saw the enemy in full retreat towards Zelenibreg.

There was now little doubt that the third invasion of Serbia would prove a greater débâcle than the first. The three Army Corps on the Austrian centre and right had been completely broken, and were retreating in disordered flight towards Valievo and Rogatitza, ceding thousands of prisoners and abandoning enormous quantities of impedimenta of war. On December 7 the Uzitsha Army reached Pozega, the 1st Army quickly overcame the last enemy resistance on the summit of Maljen, and took the line Maljen-Ruda-Donia-Toplitza. The 3rd Army pushed on with great vigour and reached Milovatz-Bochnyanovitch-Dudovitza, making a great haul of guns and prisoners.

Only the 2nd Army failed to make headway, for the Austrian command, doubtless regarding the situation on Suvobor as irretrievably lost, attempted to create a diversion on the north. The 8th and Combined Corps had, in effect, held their ground more stubbornly than those opposed to the Serbian 1st and 3rd

Armies, and they not only succeeded in checking the 2nd Army, but somewhat audaciously opened an attack on the position held by the "Detachment of Belgrade" at Kosmai and Varoonitza. The Serbs had, however, no occasion for discontent with this day's operations, for their booty included 29 officers, 6,472 men, 27 field guns, 1 mountain gun, 15 gun carriages, 56 wagons of artillery ammunition, and between 500 and 600 transport wagons. They had also decided the issue in the south, and the 13th, 15th, and 16th Austrian Army Corps were flying—a disordered rabble—before the armies of General Stürm (3rd Army) and General Mishitch.

On December 8 the Uzitsha Army met with considerable opposition before the town of that name, but the Serbian soldiers were not to be denied, and the remnants of the famous 16th Austrian Corps turned tail and fled for the frontier. The 1st Army, continuing its triumphal progress, recaptured Valievo. The 3rd Army likewise reached the Kolubara (at its junction with the Lyg), and, deploying one division eastward, threatened the right flank of the Austrians on Cooka, and permitted the 2nd Army to carry the position. By this success the Serbians drove in a wedge and completely cut off the three

fugitive corps in the south from the two which were still manifesting some measure of martial activity in the north.

The operations towards the west and north-west now resolved themselves into a race for the frontier. There was little fighting, for the fugitive Austrians sought only to put a safe distance between themselves and their pursuers, and jettisoned enormous quantities of war material, which littered the routes to Banjabashta, Rogatitza, Loznitza, and Shabatz.

From this stage military interest centred in the operations against Belgrade. On December 8 and 9 the "Detachment of Belgrade" had been hard pressed on the line Kosmai-Varoonitza; but the completeness of the Austrian *débâcle* in other theatres enabled General Putnik to rearrange his troops. He therefore dispatched the left wing of the 3rd Army against Obrenovatz, attached the remainder of the 3rd Army and the Cavalry Division to the 2nd Army, and placed this combined force, together with the "Detachment of Belgrade," under the supreme command of Voivode Stepanovitch, the hero of the first battle on the Tzer Mountains.

Voivode Stepanovitch was typical of the peasant stock from which he sprang. Short, fat, and stumpy, he was distinguished by a round, chubby head, a well-lined ruddy face,

and smiling blue eyes which radiated kindness. Towards his officers he maintained a severe and uncompromising attitude; he was intolerant of incapacity or idiosyncrasy, and his morose temperament and preference for his own society rendered him at times a most difficult chief. Yet towards his soldiers his demeanour was entirely different. It is no exaggeration to say that he loved them as children, made their comfort and well-being his first consideration, and became, in consequence, the idol of the rank and file. In the piping times of peace Stepanovitch devoted much time to quiet reflection. Each day he sauntered from his Belgrade home to the most remote park of the capital, and, seating himself in a lonely spot, was wont to study visions in the azure space. If any interloper arrived on the scene the General would glare at him with undisguised annoyance, and move off into solitude. So accustomed had the Belgradians become to this habit of one of their most famous military leaders, that a seat in the park was known and respected as the Voivode's own. The General carried the same dislike of intrusion into war, and oft-times declined conversation with his Staff for hours on end, the better to preserve an uninterrupted flow of thought. Yet he was a great General. The castles which he



[The Times' Photograph].

AUSTRIAN PRISONERS EN ROUTE TO VALIEVO.



SERBIAN PEASANT WOMAN MINISTERING TO WOUNDED SOLDIER.

built were strategical plans which had a habit of maturing to the discomfort of his enemy, and although an exclusively home-grown product, he was able to point to a distinguished military record.

When, on December 10, Voivode Stepanovitch took up the command of the movement towards Belgrade the 3rd Army was pressing onwards towards Obrenovatz; the cavalry division held the left bank of the river Beljanitza; the 2nd Army were on the line Volujak-Sibnitza-Nemenikuchir; "The Detachment of Belgrade" maintained the positions on Kosmai-Varoonitza, and the detachment from Semendria had come up and occupied Pudarchi. The troops thus occupied a semi-circular front practically stretching from the Save to the Danube rivers.

The Austrian main positions stretched from Obrenovatz up the right bank of the Kolubara to Konatitche, and then across to Grocka through Boran-Boshdarevatz-Vlashko-Lipa-Krajkovo-bara.

A general advance was ordered for December 11, and, particular importance being attached to the control of the railway, the centre pushed rapidly ahead, and after overcoming a desperate resistance stormed and captured the summit of Vlashko the same evening, thereby securing control of the rail-head at Ralia, the virtual terminus of the line, since a tunnel a few kilometres north had been blown up by the Serbs after their evacuation of Belgrade. The next day the left wing of the 3rd Army reached Obrenovatz and its right occupied a line Konatitche-Borak-Boshdare-

vatz. The 2nd Army occupied the summits 418 and 287, and the Belgrade force advanced to a front Koviona-Lipa-Krajkovo-bara.

Thus, with disconcerting swiftness, the Austrians were being pushed up into the triangular sector of Serbian soil which has its apex at Belgrade. They contested the ground inch by inch, and, despite the catastrophe which had befallen them farther south, they manifested a grim determination to retain possession of the capital. Although the enemy had been driven in rout from all the territory lying between the Save and the Drina by December 13, with such desperation did he cling to Belgrade that he delivered repeated counter-attacks upon the positions of Koviona and Krajkovo-bara before he finally retired north in a dense column of panic. The victorious Serbs followed up the retreat with great vigour and pressed along the banks of the Topchiderska river on the left and up the main road on the right. The Austrians now attempted to block the advance by heavy rearguard forces entrenched on the several strong positions which distinguish that part of the country. The hills commanding the road north of Ralia, for example, are strategic points of immense military importance, but the Serbs pushed ahead with ever-increasing energy, so that on the morning of December 14 they approached the line Ekmekluk-Dedigne-Banovobrdo, the southern defences of Belgrade. Upon these hills the Austrians had thrown up extensive earthworks consisting of well-executed entrenchments and numerous gun emplacements, and it was evident that they had calculated there to make a determined stand. Their troops were, however, now in a demoralized condition, and though the combats which ensued were of a very sanguinary nature, nightfall found the Serbs in possession of the heights.

In the meantime the Cavalry Division had been engaged in a meritorious attempt to work along the banks of the Save and cut off the Austrian retreat. They were faced, however, by the flat, marshy plain of Makesh, where the fire from hostile guns on Topchider and two monitors in the river effectually barred their progress.

The invaders commenced the repassage of the Save on the morning of December 14. Throughout the day, as the news became more and more serious, the movement increased in intensity, and during the night developed

into a hurried scamper across the river. Next day at dawn the Serbians got their guns on one of the surrounding hills, shelled and broke the pontoon bridge, and rendered further escape impossible. A detachment of cavalry then descended from Torlak, and while it was engaged in street fighting with a party of Hungarians who refused to surrender, King Peter drove into his capital, and proceeded to the cathedral to render thanks for the success of Serbian arms.

The Special Correspondent of *The Times*, writing after his return to Kragujevatz, thus described his impressions of the great battle :

The road to Suvobor follows a pleasant enough valley, now winding and twisting round cliff or crag, now striding some half-dry waterway over a crude bridge, and again bisecting a little village that seems all church and coffee shop. Then, as we left the low foothills and were pushed up the ever-rising slopes of the range, we topped a domineering ledge and entered the battlefield.

Here was the aftermath of war. Deep-dug trenches, fields spitted with gaping holes bored by falling shells that had shot the earth up fountain-like, broken rifles, bits of clothing, knapsacks, and still unburied corpses. Ploughed land and stubble that had been flattened by thousands of warring feet as the tide of victory ebbed and flowed; well-worked Serbian earthworks in the rear and then little mounds thrown up by the advancing infantry as they crept onwards to the enemy. Then the signs of the final rush that sent the Austrians headlong towards Valievo.

It had been no sudden flight, this retreat from Suvobor.

Rather had the wave of disaster risen in a *crescendo* from a small beginning until it reached the dimensions of *débâcle*. At first there had been time and to spare, for the early prizes consisted of mountain howitzers placed in almost inaccessible positions and limbers from which the guns had been lifted at no little pain and carefully buried. We saw them there, neatly interred on the mountain-side in graves surmounted, like those of fallen warriors, with a wooden cross, the better to conceal their hiding.

Farther along were heavy siege guns left by the roadside, their breechblocks removed and every accessory easily transportable carried off. Thus early the retreat was difficult to understand. The Austrians had held well-entrenched positions of undoubted military value. Line after line of rising crests, each commanding the other, all with an excellent field of fire over the country before them, had been held and well fortified. The approaches were always of the most arduous. Yet, more and more impetuously as the battle progressed these strongholds had been successively abandoned, until, shortly after the Lyg and the little village of Gukoshi were left behind, the real, live, panic-stricken rout commenced.

One might as well seek to paint the lily as try to describe the scene. Take the tableau near Gorni Toplitza, where the road winds round a commanding promontory which overhangs the valley. Right on the edge of the cliff, protected by a copse of prune trees, the Austrians had placed a battery of field guns, while in the road were placed a score of ammunition wagons, from whence the guns were served by crude little two-wheeled carts. Deploying on the flank of this position, the Serbian gunners had covered it with a terrible enfilading fire, and men, horses, carts, wagons, lay in a mangled heap upon the ground. There were dead horses in the shafts of the carts with dead men's hands still clutching the bridles—all shot down by a veritable torrent of shell. Some few had tried to escape, and as they ran



AUSTRIAN PRISONERS CARRYING SERBIAN WOUNDED.



SERBIAN SOLDIERS COMPLETING TRENCHES AND PUTTING WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AROUND THE FORTS OF BELGRADE.

they jettisoned caps, cartridges, and haversacks, only to meet death themselves ere they could reach the shelter of a neighbouring ravine. It was a pathetic, moving picture of bewildered flight.

Thereafter the Austrians had but one thought—to get outside the range of Serbian guns. Everything was cast off. Cannon were left perfect and uninjured; maxims abandoned in the trenches; accoutrements of every description fairly littered the road. Some ammunition wagons were left fully charged: from others the live shell had been pitched out upon the roadway to lighten the load until, with the increasing pressure of the pursuit, the vehicles themselves had been left behind. Jumbled up with this mass of artillery were countless transport wagons and innumerable field ovens. Horses, fallen by the roadside, were left to die if injured, shot if they had but succumbed to fatigue.

Wounded warriors were abandoned to their fate; dead soldiers uncountable left to add a touch of blue-grey colour to the mass of dark-green carriages. There were rifles by the thousand, dropped by their flying owners. Most were whole, others splintered by shot or broken in some of the fierce hand-to-hand fighting that preceded the rout. Ammunition littered the route like the coloured tissues of a paper-chase; sometimes in batches where they had been tipped out of the wagons, and again sprinkled over the earth as the fugitives had emptied their belts to ease the burden by a few ounces.

Thus for mile upon mile. At every few yards some discarded trophy; in every ditch gun or rifle ammunition; and towards the end the gunners had cut the traces of their teams and fled onwards with the horses. There were few dead to be seen now, for the Austrians no longer stayed to fight. Nothing seemingly mattered save to put a distance between themselves and the pursuing Serbians.

Before Valievo itself the garrison holding the town had prepared the defence. The approach by the main road had been entrenched and guns were in position. But the Serbs were inconsiderate. They went along the road, it is true; but their main force deployed round the hills and the Austrians were taken as completely by surprise as if they had never heard of their coming. While the fugitives hurried through the town towards Loznitza and Shabatz, a rearguard of Hungarians on the

hills to the north-west put up an indifferent fight before they, too, fled in disorder. The last of them were caught by the Serbian artillery, and on the rising ground I saw nigh a hundred lying stretched out on the road, shot down as they ran. A few—severely wounded—sat nursing their sores amid their dead comrades, tended only by a little Serbian lad who fetched water to soothe their raging thirst.

All along this highway of tragedy we had jostled two streams of hapless sufferers. Going in our own direction were streams of refugees, their oxen, in divers stages of life and death, yoked up to every conceivable manner of springless wagon piled high with the few odds and ends of furniture and bedding which they had snatched up when they fled before the Austrian advance. Atop the bundles lay starving and sick children, wan with want and exposure; by the side of the conveyances, urging the emaciated cattle along with weird cries and curses walked sore-footed and weary women-folk returning to the devastated remains of what were once their homes.

Crossing us came a continuous procession of Austrian prisoners. Now and again there would be a thousand or more marching along in charge of a couple of Serbians. They were men of every age, and of every race which that hotch-potch of nationalities called Austria-Hungary can provide—recruits, common Army, the Landwehr and the Landsturm; Austrians, Hungarians, Musulmans, Serbs, Czechs, Moravians, Slovanes, Rumanians, Russians, &c. A sorry enough crowd, and of them all I liked best the Bosnian Musulmans.

In between the convoys straggled men who had fallen out by the way. Weary, pain-stricken souls, these, who groaned and panted as they staggered along by the aid of a supporting stick hewn from the roadside trees. Many of them, footsore, had slung their boots across their shoulders and walked with feet enwrapped in rags of sack-cloth. And ever and anon we passed some blue-grey soldier stretched out by the way, awaiting death, alone and unbefriended.

For almost two months until November 11, when I had to flee with the Headquarters Staff, Valievo had been the centre of my wanderings, and it was pleasant to retread its cobbled streets. The town had, however, a strange and deserted appearance. Crowds of Austrians and but a handful of Serbs gave it the air of still being

under enemy occupation. Save for one barracks and two houses burned, the place was outwardly intact, and the few inhabitants who had remained had not been molested. But never were external impressions more misleading, for every unoccupied house had been pillaged from floor to ceiling. Room after room had been ransacked, everything of value pilfered, and pictures of the Serbian royal family defaced.

What surprised one most, however, was the state of indescribable filth which these people left behind them and in which they had obviously lived. The bedrooms which had been occupied by officers and men alike were positively pestilential. Worse, indeed, were the hospitals. Three thousand Austrian wounded had been left in the charge of 13 doctors with ambulance staffs, and yet the men were lying anywhere and anyhow on handfuls of hay, suffering and dying in a condition of appalling filth. It cannot be suggested that Austrian doctors knew no better; but this experience, taken with the many other evidences of indifference to the well-being of the troops which I have observed of late, forces me to the conclusion that, in the eyes of his superiors, the Austrian soldier ceases to be worthy of consideration the moment he is indefinitely put out of action. He is just "cannon-fodder," as the Prussian has it.

From Valievo I hastened onwards towards Belgrade and 48 hours later, reached the outskirts of the capital. The previous day (December 14) had seen fighting of a very determined character. Driven back on to a ring of commanding hills, of which Torlak may be taken as the centre, the Austrians had there put up their last defence. These positions were captured the same evening, not, however, without heavy sacrifice. The Commandant of the Serbian force which attacked this sector stated that his men alone had buried 1,800 dead Austrians, and he described the fighting as the stiffest of the campaign.

When we arrived in the rear of the Army on the 15th the Serbian gunners were firing through a cloud of fog and rain against the pontoon bridge over the Save, and on a hostile rearguard without the city. The opposition was soon overcome, and a detachment of cavalry rode in, closely followed by King Peter. The Serbian Monarch is an old campaigner, and the fact that street fighting was still going on had no more effect on his enthusiasm than the inclemency of the weather. He stayed to trample under foot a Hungarian flag freshly hauled down from the Palace, and then attended a hastily arranged *Te Deum* at the Cathedral.

Ninety minutes later the Crown Prince Alexander,

accompanied by his brother, Prince George, a strong cavalry escort, and the British Military Attaché, approached Belgrade. They were met on the outskirts by a crowd of poor women and children who, with few exceptions, were the only inhabitants who had remained. These joyous souls, themselves dependent upon a pittance from the municipality which had ceased with the evacuation, brought their all. They had quickly collected masses of chrysanthemums, and with these they bombarded and decorated the incoming heroes until they pranced over a veritable pathway of flowers. The maidens brought the embroidered scarves and sashes which they had worked in preparation for marriage, and these they hung about the cavaliers till the men looked like so many *garçons d'honneur* at a Serbian village wedding. Huge tricolor streamers now hung from the mansions; little bits of dirty flags from the cottages. There was a touch of heartfelt simplicity about this welcome from deserted Belgrade that, to the looker-on, was most impressive.

The Austrian occupation of Belgrade had lasted but for fourteen days, and even in the retrospect had something of the unfinished about it. The invaders had evidently settled down for a prolonged stay. Under the guidance of their late military attaché in Serbia, they established themselves in the best available buildings, commenced to repair the roads which they had themselves ripped open by shell fire, and set up a pretence of city administration. On the Torlak hills solid earthworks protected by barbed wire entanglements had been constructed, and concrete foundations were ready for the big guns. Yet they had scarcely had time to decide what they would do with Belgrade before the Serbian hosts swooped down and drove them helter-skelter back across the Save. Thus the good and evil which was the city's lot depended largely upon individual benevolence or malice. Two currents—the one respect for civilians and the



DRAWING WATER FOR THE TROOPS.

other the product of Prussian example—ran side by side. The buildings occupied by one military authority remained cleanly and intact, even King Peter's photograph being left undamaged; in others filth was everywhere, furniture destroyed, and the Royal image shot and slashed to ribbons. Entire sections of the town escaped pillage; other quarters were pitilessly looted from end to end. While the Cathedral and various other churches were not seriously damaged, the General Post Office was completely wrecked; all the furniture in the Parliament House was destroyed and broken, and the Royal Palace was officially stripped from floor to ceiling, and the contents carted off into Hungary in furniture vans brought specially from Semlin for the purpose.

The troops of the Dual Monarchy made their unopposed entry into the capital with flags flying and bands playing. There was much merry making, much feasting and drinking. The Hungarian banner floated from the Palace, and twelve peasants were hanged in the centre of the town. The news of the "conquest" was flashed to Vienna and Berlin, where it was the occasion of great and enthusiastic rejoicings.

Yet, even at this epoch, when easy victory

over the Serbians seemed beyond doubt, the Austrian authorities manifested that same indifference for the welfare of their soldiery which had been so painfully apparent at Valievo. Their medical service was hopelessly disorganised. With the army of occupation came 800 wounded from other theatres. They had spent many days on the road, racked with pain and unattended, and on arrival at Belgrade, they were unloaded upon the small American Red Cross unit already burdened with a charge of 1,200 maimed Serbians. Day by day further batches of dirty, neglected Austrian warriors, their sufferings augmented by hunger and inattention, were deposited in the American Hospital, until it sheltered nearly 3,000 patients. Although the Staff strove heroically to cope with the avalanche which had thus suddenly descended upon them, they received no assistance from the Austrian doctors, who were manifestly incompetent or unwilling either to instal hospitals of their own or to assist the overwrought little band of American surgeons and nurses. Up in the town the Staffs were banquetting and celebrating their "victory" in a debauch of wine; down in the hospital the wounded starved until Dr. Ryan—the energetic head of the



A FIELD HOSPITAL NEAR THE BATTLEFIELD.



EFFECT OF SHELL FIRE ON SOME SHOPS IN BELGRADE.

mission—took a brougham and forcibly commandeered 400 loaves from a military bakery.

When the evacuation commenced, the Austrians took not their own people, but the wounded Serbians, whom they transported into Hungary to swell the numbers of their prisoners of war. Several hundred natives of Belgrade—the exact number will probably never be established—were led captive into Austria-Hungary. A few of these were males, and included a boy of nine years of age and an old man, deaf and dumb; the rest were women and girls.

It was on the morning of December 14, that the real preparation for departure commenced. A Staff officer visited Dr. Ryan, and requested him to take charge of the Austrian wounded who must needs be abandoned, and thenceforth there went a procession of wagons across the Save and along the road to Semlin. As the day wore on, and the news from Torlak became more and more serious, the movement developed into a wild rush for the other shore, and the pontoons were choked with transport. Cannon, it is stated on very good authority, were unlimbered and thrown into the river, and troops fought among themselves for precedence.

All through the night the panic-stricken retreat continued, until, on the early morning

of the 15th, the Serbian gunners shot away three of the pontoons. At that time the stream of fugitives stretched from the bridge away down the road towards Obrenovatz. In the streets of Belgrade the Austrians left five cannon, eight ammunition wagons, 1,000 horses, and 440 transport wagons—many of the latter filled with loot from the city. Some 150 junior officers and 10,000 men likewise found their retreat thus suddenly cut off, but among them there were few officers of high rank. The army chiefs were among the first to leave. In the officers' mess lay the evening meal of the 14th—the soup half consumed, the wine half drunk.

Thus ignominiously ended the third Austrian invasion of Serbia. Of the army of 300,000 men who crossed the Drina and Save rivers, certainly not more than 200,000 returned. In the last 13 days of combat the Serbs captured 41,538 prisoners (including 323 officers), and an enormous booty, including 133 cannon, 71 machine guns, 29 gun carriages, 386 ammunition wagons, 45 portable ovens, 3,350 transport wagons, 2,243 horses and 1,078 oxen. The Austrian killed and wounded numbered not less than 60,000.

Though there were successes more vast, it is doubtful whether any had a more important



ALBANIAN RECRUITS AT MEAL TIME.

bearing upon the progress of the great war. Koumanovo, Monastir and the Jadar did much to establish the martial prestige of Serbia ; but the victory of Suvobor constitutes one of the finest deeds in military history, and is unique in its example of the manner in which an army, ill-equipped and without reserves, was able, notwithstanding the absence of material and the fatigue of unceasing work in the trenches, and with almost certain defeat staring it in the face, to rise up and snatch a brilliant and decisive victory out of a menacing and dangerous situation.

The presence of the King in the firing line, the strategy of the Staff, the arrival of the gun ammunition, and the leadership of Mishitch, all contributed to the glorious result of this great battle ; but the pride of place must be accorded to the gallant Serbian peasant soldiers who, worn out by years of warfare, suffering from hardships unheard of in other armies, and demoralized by weeks of unaccustomed retreat, rose up with renewed courage at their country's call, and, with unsurpassed vigour and *élan*, drove the well-armed and disciplined armies of the Hapsburgs beyond their frontiers in utter rout.

THE AUSTRIAN ATROCITIES.

The Austrian "Strafexpedition" of August, 1914, resulted in ignominious failure ; the first invasion of Serbia ended in the headlong flight of the Imperial and Royal soldiers ; but the Serbian nation was, nevertheless, punished in a manner so cruel and savage as scarce finds a parallel in the bloodstained pages of Balkan history. The calamity was not, of course, so vast as that which overtook Belgium :

but in proportion to the population it was infinitely greater. The Austrian armies "out-Prussianized the Prussians" in their treatment of the peaceable peasant population of the country they had invaded.

Even the trumpery excuse that troops had been fired on from private houses was in this case absent, for the villages were denuded of firearms, and all males, save those too young or too old, or those suffering from some physical incapacity, were with the colours. Yet the Austrians, beaten on the battlefield, avenged themselves by the slaughter of defenceless women and children.

In the course of the description of the battle of the Jadar, reference was made to the recapture of the position of Marianovitchewis, when an Austrian officer and 500 men were taken prisoners. The officer in question was a Major Baltzarek—a Moravian by nationality. He was afforded every courtesy, and, as befitted his rank, sent to Valievo under escort of a Serbian officer. Shortly after his departure the Serbs discovered near the position seventeen persons—old men, women, and children—who had been bound together and massacred. Peasants declared that the outrage had been committed at the order of Baltzarek ; one of the victims—an old man who had had the veins of his wrists severed—was still alive and supported the accusation.

A telephone message sped along the wires which follow the road ; the murderer was recalled, and, now bound and under a guard of soldiers with fixed bayonets, brought back and confronted with the results of his ghastly deed. Then, whining for mercy for himself and pity for his wife and family in Moravia, he was conducted to Valievo to stand his trial by court-martial. Before the door of the tribunal, his cords were unloosed, and, darting a hand from pocket to mouth, he swallowed a tablet of poison, tottered, and fell at the feet of his warders.

The truth of the massacre at Marianovitchewis, like others perpetrated in the same locality, was attested by a commission which included Dr. A. van Tienhoven, of The Hague.

A factor which served to augment the sufferings of the populations was the advice given to the inhabitants to go quietly about their affairs when the Austrians entered. This war, they were told, differed from the two preceding campaigns in that it was being waged with a civilized European Power, and non-combatants

had, therefore, nothing to fear. Yet there is no doubt that many crimes were at least condoned by Austrian officers. Even the order issued by the "Imperial and Royal Commandment" having regard to the "Instructions for the conduct of the troops towards the population in Serbia," was a direct incentive to massacre:

"You are engaged in war," read this instructive document, a copy of which was found on the body of a wounded officer, "in a hostile country inhabited by a population possessed of a fanatical hatred towards us; in a country where cowardly assassination, as the catastrophe of Sarajevo showed, is held to be permissible even by the upper classes, and where it is glorified as an act of heroism.

"For such a population any disposition towards humanity or kindness would be entirely misplaced; it would even be fraught with danger, for such sentiments, which may occasionally be exercised in time of war, would here constitute a continual menace to the security of our troops.

"I therefore order that during the military operations everyone shall be treated with the greatest suspicion and harshness.

"In the first place, I will not allow persons armed, but wearing no uniform, to be taken prisoners; they must be executed without exception.*

"In any case (in passing through a hostile village) hostages—priests, schoolmasters and rich men—must be

* The true import of this paragraph will be realized when it is remembered that, as the Austrians well knew, the Serbians had not received their new uniforms. At least one-third of their Army was obliged to take the field in ordinary peasants' dress.

taken and kept until the last house has been passed, and they must be all killed if a single shot is fired at the troops.

"Any person encountered outside an inhabited place, and, above all, in forests, must be considered only as a member of an irregular band who has hidden his arms somewhere."

It will be remembered that the mountain range of Tzer practically divided the two chief theatres in which the battle of the Jadar was fought. In the northern sector the Austrians retreated westward and northward, and it is significant that between the Dobrava and the Drina rivers there stretched a chain of villages. viz.:—Grushitch, Tsulkovitch, Des-sitch, Belareka, Chokeshina, Leshnitsa and Prnjavor, in which the fugitives left their bloody mark.

While every hamlet through which they passed had its story of murder, pillage, and outrage to tell, while every roadside displayed its advertisement of Austrian savagery, the first outstanding example was presented by the village of Grushitch. There all the houses were looted, the mayor and twenty other of the inhabitants—mostly young women, youths, and children—were put to death, and many of the aged males carried off into captivity.

The neighbouring village of Tsulkovitch through which the Hapsburg soldiers retired



SERBIAN SOLDIERS RESTING.



IN THE TRENCHES.

after their first defeat on Belikamen, was the subject of special attention. As the advance guard of the Serbians left a village where they had discovered a group of three men and two old women lying with their throats cut, they entered a neighbouring ravine which offered the desolating spectacle of an indiscriminate mass of twenty-five boys aged 12 to 16 years, and two old women of over 60, all riddled with bullets and mutilated by bayonet thrusts. In the village itself, one terrifying picture after another met their sickened gaze.

From the neighbouring village of Dessitch, lying a few miles to the south-west, the entire population had fled, leaving the deserted cottages to the care of five women, four old men, and five infants—all slaughtered before the "Swaba" left.

The Austrians thoroughly looted Chokeshina, a little hamlet consisting of but a sprinkling of houses. At Leshnitza, on August 19, they shot fifty peasants before the eyes of an assembly of women and children of the locality, with the object of terrorizing the population. The town was pitilessly sacked; all objects which could be carted off were taken, and the rest, such as stores of grain, were soaked with petroleum and fired. Before the retreat a further massacre was ordered, and over one hundred of its victims were buried

in a trench dug in front of the railway station. Nearly fifty persons were led off into captivity.

Prnjavor was another of those towns which the Austrians, for some unexplained reason, singled out for special treatment. They reduced half of it to a smoking shambles. Immediately upon the entry of the Imperial and Royal soldiery, many of the male inhabitants were seized and shot in the café of Milan Milutinovitch, and all stores were confiscated. The houses were perquisitioned, and everything of value removed, particular affection being shown for the bridal robes of young women. A reign of terror for the unfortunate inhabitants accompanied the occupation. The destruction of the town followed the reception of the order to retreat. In many cases the owners of the habitations were driven inside their property before fire was applied, and thus perished in the flames, and it was no uncommon thing to discover among the débris the charred bodies of young mothers clutching their infants to their breasts.

At Shabatz the Austrians allowed their savagery full and unbridled demonstration. Immediately after their entry a patrol arrived before the house of a rich resident, with a written document, and demanded the delivery of six valuable horses which occupied his stables. Later on they burned down his house.

Animals, stores of fodder, and such like were commandeered in a formal, if irregular manner. Houses were occupied in accordance with the laws of warfare, and the inhabitants were assured by proclamation of their personal safety.

Presently the official control was relaxed; soldiers commenced to steal objects of minor value but military utility. Then came a raid upon provisions in any shape or form, to be crowned, prior to evacuation, by the general looting of the town. Not a house or a shop escaped this pillage. Every habitation was ransacked from floor to ceiling, and everything of value was carted off across the Save. Shops were turned inside out and their contents thrown into the streets; banks and offices wrecked and safes prized open and the contents rifled. In fact, the appearance of the whole place suggested that an army of expert burglars had descended upon it, worked their will for some time, only to be disturbed with the job still unfinished. Drawers and cupboards had been hurriedly sacked, and their contents scattered about in the hunt for valuables, and so they were left, standing open amid the litter of the rooms, no time having been available even to close them. A strange, cruel air of devastation permeated the streets where mer-

chandize, gramophones, broken furniture, and safes lay jumbled up with wine and spirit barrels, whose contents had been let run to waste along the cobbled gutters.

Incessant shell fire wrecked all the public buildings and hundreds of houses and shops, and what the guns failed to accomplish Austrian soldiers completed by fire. The fine old church (which served as a stable during the occupation) was pitilessly bombarded, and stood the centre of a scene of destruction resembling nothing so much as the effect of some tremendous earthquake. The prefecture was riddled by shot and shell, and the same description applied to countless habitations in all directions—of the extensive artillery barracks but the four walls were left standing.

In the region of the Jadar valley similar, if less extensive, massacre marked the Austrian retreat.

At Puscarevatz, Maïdan, and Draghintsé, pillage, outrage, and murder were freely indulged in. Many women were outraged. In the villages of Cohuritze, Tsikoti, Dvornitsa, Moikovitch, Chlivoir, Stave, Bastavi, and Breziak, a total of 49 men and 34 women were left massacred and mutilated.

There was, fortunately, little repetition of this ghastly savagery during the retreat which



RUINS IN BELGRADE.
View from the Royal Palace windows.



SERBIAN SOLDIER OF THE 3rd BAN.

followed the third Austrian invasion. So terrible had been the disillusionment of the Serbians after the battle of the Jadar that when the enemy came again the people flung a little bedding into their oxen wagons and fled in terror. Those who had no conveyance walked. Throughout the great Serbian retreat the roads leading from the front were blocked with a constant stream of fugitives who, hungry and rain-sodden, struggled along the muddy roads in the bitter cold in their search for sanctuary.

Thus originated the problem of the Serbian refugees. In normal times there is no poverty in Serbia—the distribution of wealth is very equal, and all have sufficient for their meagre requirements. But now they lost all. More than half a million people were reduced to beggary, and the towns became choked with applicants for food and lodging. Even more disastrous was the fever which the Austrians left behind them after “Suvobor.” Its germs infected the devastated homesteads, to which many of the refugees returned, and, more powerful than the Hapsburg soldiers, it decimated the ranks of the Serbian Army.

The better to preserve an approximate chronological order in the story of the Austro-Serbian Campaign, it will be advantageous to take, as an epoch in the military history of Belgrade, that period which began at 1 a.m. on July 29, 1914, when a detachment of irregulars beat off a river steamer and two troop-laden barges which attempted to approach the Serbian shore, and ended at 9.27 a.m. on December 15 of the same year with the entry of King Peter at the head of his victorious army. During these momentous four and a half months Belgrade and its inhabitants tasted of all the varied experiences of modern warfare. The thunder of cannon and the screaming of shells first startled and then coldly interested them; attacks and counter-attacks on riverside islands degenerated from an excitement to a commonplace; ruined edifices, wrecked houses, and slaughtered civilians became an unmarked portion of their everyday life. In quick succession they passed through the varied emotions occasioned by the evacuation of Serbian troops and the entry of unopposed Austrians with flaunting banners and blaring bands; they saw their women and children taken as hostages, and their citizens hanged, their houses looted and their homes despoiled, and then, to the music of booming guns and crackling rifles, they watched the hostile rabble fight its way back across the Save, until, in delirious joy, they went without the city walls and cheered the Serbian victors of the greatest battle in Balkan history.

For the greater part of the period under discussion Austrian cannon on land and river poured shell, shrapnel, and incendiary bombs into an undefended town with intent to destroy the evidences of State, civilization, and culture which had there been erected during the hundred odd years of Serbian independence.

Both Belgrade and its environs were devoid of permanent defensive works, and no effort was, in fact, made to protect the capital. Those military precautions which were undertaken were directed against any attempted passage of the rivers Save or Danube, and, for this reason also, the island of Tsiganlia to the west of the railway bridge, continued to enjoy a considerable measure of importance. With the exception of the troops engaged in the occasional expeditions against Bezanja and those stationed sometimes in and sometimes against Tsiganlia, the infantry played little part in the work of defence, but a frequent use was made of artillery. Surrounded as he was by a series of dominating heights of great strategic value, General Djivkovitch had a plethora of excellent gun positions at his disposal, and he moved his batteries from one to the other as the exigencies of the ever-changing situation required. Banovo brdo, to the south-west, and Topchider and Dedigne to the south, were, however, outstanding summits upon which cannon were more or less permanently installed, and it was from these points that an almost continuous artillery duel was fought with the Austrian gunners on Bezanja.

The bombardment of Belgrade will rank as one of those inexcusable acts of vandalism which disgraced the European war. It was unprovoked, served no military purpose whatsoever, and could have had for its object only the wanton destruction of private and State property. During the period under discussion over 700 buildings were struck by bombs, shell, or shrapnel, and of these but sixty were the property of the State. Nothing was sacred. The old, unarmed fortress, with its memories of the Turkish occupation; the University, where centred Serbian culture; the riverside factories, which represented her industrial progress; the museum, which housed priceless relics of Rome and Macedon; even foreign legations, hospitals, and pharmacies—all suffered in the lust for revenge. The cigarette factory belonging to the State monopoly was wrecked by shell and fired by grenades; tobacco and machinery to the value of £320,000 were destroyed in the flames. The foundries, bakeries, and all the factories along the Serbian shore of the river were razed to the ground. The King's Palace bore little evidence of external injury, but Austrian howitzers dropped shell through the roof until little remained of the once



SERBIAN SOLDIER OF THE 1st BAN.

gorgeous interior. The University was riddled until the building, with its classrooms, laboratories, libraries, and workshops, was entirely demolished. Even the cellars were destroyed by great shells, which broke down the walls and pierced their way into the very bowels of the earth and there exploded. In an ineffective attempt to destroy the State and other banks, one street running up from the water's edge was ripped open from edge to edge.

Nowhere were the terrible effects of modern artillery more visible than in the streets



SERBIAN INFANTRY HAULING ARTILLERY. ["The Times" Photograph]

themselves. Missiles pierced the wood paving and its concrete foundations by a small hole, pressed their way underground for some distance and then exploded, throwing particles of the roadway far and wide, and exposing an immense hole often measuring 15 feet in diameter by 12 feet in depth.

Though the greater part of Belgrade's population fled the city with the Government, there remained many too poor, or, for divers reasons, unable to move. It was inevitable, therefore, that a certain loss of life should have been caused. Most of the victims were quietly sitting in their own homes when a shell fell and buried their dead or maimed bodies in the débris of the shattered walls. More intrepid spirits were in the streets when an unawaited shot laid them low. Yet others were foully murdered, for Austrian sharpshooters were placed in positions covering certain exposed streets, whence they wantonly fired on passing civilians. In all, some thirty non-combatants were killed and 150 wounded. The losses among the military were confined to a few gendarmes on police duty.

The installation of two French 14 cm. naval guns at the beginning of November

put an end to the activities of the Austrian monitors which had previously been able to steam into the river and shell the city with impunity. The Frenchmen sent their first message into Hungary on November 8. The damage inflicted so impressed the monitors that they feared to venture again within range. Moreover, spies, with whom there is every reason to believe Belgrade was still infested, had doubtless advised the Austrians that the mining of the river had been scientifically carried out. Preparations for offensive operations were, therefore, afoot when the sudden and unwelcome order was received to abandon the city and retire southward with all the material that could be saved. The French saw themselves obliged to sacrifice their cannon, but, in the early morning, they fired off their stock of 240 rounds of ammunition and in little more than half an hour deposited some twelve tons of mélinite on the enemy forts at Bezania, with such terrifying effect that the garrison fled 12 miles into the interior. Thus it came to pass that the two strongholds, having snarled at one another across the dividing waters of the Save for nearly five months, were both evacuated at the same time.



CHAPTER LXI.

THE AUTUMN AND WINTER CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN FRANCE.

THE EASTERN FRONT—BEFORE AND AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE—ARGONNE—WOEVRE—LORRAINE—VOSGES—UPPER ALSACE—DISTRIBUTION OF ARMIES—THE FRENCH MISTAKES IN ALSACE—THE GERMAN ADVANCE TOWARDS VERDUN—SITUATION AT END OF AUGUST—THE LINE OF FORTRESSES—FALL OF MANONVILLER—THE DEFENCE OF NANCY AND TOUL—HEROES OF LORRAINE—GERMAN ATROCITIES—THE FIGHT FOR NANCY—GERMAN FAILURE AND RETREAT—THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE AND THE VERDUN OBJECTIVE—CAMP DES ROMAINS DESTROYED—THE ST. MIHIEL WEDGE—FAILURE TO REACH VERDUN—THE TURN OF THE TIDE—THE ARGONNE FIGHTING—THE WINTER CAMPAIGN—CAMPAIGN IN ALSACE—POSITION AT END OF FEBRUARY, 1915.

ON the eastern frontier of France the war during the opening months followed in one respect the same course as it did farther north. Up to the date of the battle of the Marne there was a period of more or less important skirmishes and battles in the open field, all along the line from Verdun to the Swiss frontier. By the end of that time, or soon after the passage of the Aisne, both sides had strongly entrenched themselves in the positions which they had won or to which they had been driven back, and from the beginning of October onwards there was hardly any change in the ground occupied by the opposing armies. For the time being the spectacular battles of the old style, with the huge loss of life which they entailed, had come to an end. Along a front of more than 200 miles (from Verdun to Pforterhausen) French and Germans faced one another from the shelter of two almost continuous lines of trenches, often not more than forty or fifty yards or even less apart. The day of the sapper and miner had come, backed up by artillery bombardments from positions well in the rear, which prepared the way for short charges and counter-charges

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by the infantry. The cavalry were dismounted and were armed with rifles and spades instead of swords and lances. In the language of Rugby football, the struggle had settled down into a tight scrummage in mid-field. Until it broke up, neither side was likely to score any goals.

The first of these two periods, while the relative strength and fighting qualities of the opponents were still unknown, was incomparably the more interesting. There were more important ups and downs in it, first one side and then the other seeming to hold the advantage, and it was always full of dramatic possibilities. Unlike the operations farther north, where the allied forces retreated or advanced as a compact whole, in obedience to one concerted plan or necessity of action, the fighting in the Argonne, the Woevre, Lorraine, the Vosges, and Upper Alsace was split up into several sub-sections, more or less closely corresponding with these territorial divisions. In each of them almost anything might have happened.

There was first, between Reims and Verdun, what a special correspondent of *The Times* called the *guerre des apaches* between the Third French



AFTER A FRENCH VICTORY IN ALSACE.
 • German prisoners being brought into Belfort.

Army under General Sarrail and the force commanded by the Crown Prince, which was to have been the connecting link between the armies which entered France by way of Belgium and those which advanced by the legitimate avenue of attack between the Duchy of Luxemburg and the Vosges. In the Woevre, between the Meuse and the Moselle, the chief issue was the repulse of the efforts of the Army of Metz to join the Crown Prince in investing Verdun, which resulted in the peculiar bulge in the German line at St. Mihiel. East of the Woevre the triangle between Pont-à-Mousson, Nancy, and Cirey, at the head of the Vosges, was the theatre of the second great German objective, the capture of the unfortified capital of French Lorraine. Below Cirey, along the west side of the Vosges as far as Epinal, the fighting was partly connected with the attack on Nancy, and partly with the French advance into Alsace through the passes of the Vosges and the Trouée of Belfort: and lastly, this French offensive in Alsace was itself a flanking movement intended to support the quickly abandoned advance of our allies into the annexed province of Lorraine.

Broadly speaking, each of these separate movements formed part of the general scheme of operations by which the Germans tried to attack and the French succeeded in

protecting the great frontier fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Toul, and Verdun. The offensive tactics of the French failed badly in Lorraine and were only moderately successful in Alsace. But the balance was in their favour. The capture or at any rate the masking of the fortresses was essential to the triumph of the German plan of campaign. Except the fall of Paris, there was no object that they were at the beginning so bent on or so confident of attaining. After six months of persistent effort they were further from it than they were at the end of the first week. That in itself was a victory of the first magnitude for the arms of our allies. It was mainly due to the heroic stand made in front of Nancy by the Army of General de Castelnau, supported by General Dubail and the First Army, during the last days of August and the beginning of September. No chapter in the history of the first part of the war was more glorious for the French, and none more vital. If Nancy had fallen, Toul and Verdun would almost certainly have followed suit, and the battle of the Marne would have been fought in vain, perhaps might never have been fought at all. No doubt it was the issue of that battle which was the final cause of the retirement of the Germans in Lorraine. But that does not in the least detract from the splendour and the value of the defence of Nancy by the famous

Vingtième Corps, and the other gallant army Corps of the Armies of the East.*

The achievement was all the more meritorious because the prelude to it was the serious defeat

*For various reasons it is difficult to give the composition of the different armies with absolute accuracy, but the following analysis of the troops on which they were based may be of some assistance in following the operations in Eastern France from the beginning of the war. The Belfort Command, from which was drawn the army that operated in Alsace, consisted of the garrison of the fortress under General Therenet, and the VIIth Army Corps (General Bonneau). The garrison troops were: infantry, the 35th and 42nd Regiments (14th Division), and 171st and 172nd (Independent Division); cavalry, 11th Dragoons; garrison artillery, 9th Regiment; field artillery, 47th Regiment. The VIIth Army Corps: infantry, 23rd, 35th, 42nd, 133rd (14th Division), 44th, 60th, and 152nd (13th Division); the 5th and 15th Chasseurs-à-pied; the 11th and 18th Dragoons, the 4th, 11th, 14th Chasseurs-à-cheval, the 12th Hussars; the 8th and 9th Garrison Artillery, and the 4th, 5th, 47th, and 62nd Field Artillery. Their business was to guard the Trouée of Belfort, and conduct the offensive in Alsace. The First Army (General Dabail) was based on Epinal, and its original sphere extended along the Vosges as far as Lunéville. It was made up of the Epinal garrison and Field Army (170th Infantry, 1st, 3rd, 10th, 17th, 20th, 21st and 31st Chasseurs-à-pied, the 11th Engineers, and the 6th Colonial Artillery); and the XXIst Army Corps: infantry, 21st, 109th, 112th (13th Division), and 149th and 158th (43rd Division), and the 12th, 59th, 61st Field Artillery. The men composing this army came from

at Morhange, between Metz and Saarburg. That unfortunate calamity was the outcome of what was to many minds the great surprise and even the great mistake of the beginning of

Lyon, Epinal, St. Dié, Raon l'Étape, and other places in the foothills of the Vosges; they fought mostly in their own country, and also helped to defend Nancy.

The Second Army, General de Castelnau's, about 200,000 men strong at first, guarded the frontier line between Metz and the Vosges, especially Nancy and Toul. It consisted of the Toul garrison, the IXth, XXth, XVth and XVIth Army Corps, and the 59th, 68th, and another Division of reserve. In the Toul garrison were the 167th, 168th, and 169th Regiments of infantry, the 2nd and 4th Chasseurs-à-pied, the 10th and 20th Engineers, and the 4th and 6th Garrison Artillery. The two divisions of the XXth or Lorraine Army Corps, commanded by General Foch, were the 39th (the 146th, 153rd, 156th and 160th infantry regiments) and the 11th (the 26th, 69th, 37th and 79th). To this last Division, the special Nancy contingent, known as the Division de Fer, were added the 5th Hussars, the 8th Field Artillery, and the 20th Engineers and 4th Garrison Artillery stationed at Toul; and the other troops of the Army Corps were the 8th, 12th and 31st Dragoons, the 17th and 18th Chasseurs-à-cheval, the 39th and 60th Field Artillery, and the 20th Legion of Gendarmerie. The IXth Army Corps was commanded by General Dubois. Its infantry, drawn from the Tours district, were the 32nd, 66th, 77th and 135th (18th Division), and the 68th, 90th, 125th, and 114th (17th Division). For cavalry it had the 5th and 8th Cuirassiers, the 25th Dragoons, the 7th Hussars, and the picked squadron of Saumur: the 20th, 32nd, and 49th Field Artillery, and



THE FRENCH IN ALSACE.

A railway station at Burnauf, near Mülhausen, occupied by the French after a severe engagement.



AFTER THE BATTLE.

The Place de Baccarat and a corner of Gerbéviller.

the war. For some reason a large number of strategists, professional as well as amateur, had formed the opinion that the only wise course

the 6th Regiment of Engineers. The XVIth Army Corps (General Taverna) recruited from the Pyrenees, Careauonne, Montpellier and Lozère, contained the 96th, 81st, 142nd, 122nd, 15th, 143rd, 53rd, and 80th Regiments, of the 31st and 32nd Divisions, the 19th Dragoons, 1st Hussars, and 2nd Engineers, and the 3rd, 9th, and 56th Regiments of Field Artillery. A special tribute is due to the airmen attached to General de Castelnau's army, who were stationed at Toul and Nancy. Apart from their business of watching and pursuing the enemy aeroplanes, which were constantly dropping bombs on Nancy, they did splendid reconnaissance work over the enemy's lines and military centres, such as Metz and Strassburg. They were always ready to take great risks; and unfortunately one of the most valuable of them, the Senator Reymond, met his death while flying too low over the Germans during an engagement. There was a three hours' fight for the possession of his body, which was won by the French. When they picked him up he was still alive. He had pretended to be dead in order to deceive the enemy and was thus able, before he actually did die a few hours afterwards, to give to the General the information which he had collected as the result of his too daring flight.

The XVth Army Corps (General Espinasse) was also a frontier force, recruited from Nice, Grasse, Mentone, Marseilles, Toulon, and other places on the Mediterranean coast. The regiments composing it were the 3rd, 111th, 114th and 141st (29th Division), the 40th, 55th, 58th

for the French was to await the enemy's attack in their own country. General Joffre thought otherwise. When there was no longer any

and 61st (30th Division), the 163rd and 173rd (Independent Division), the 22nd Colonial Infantry and 3rd Colonial Artillery, the 6th, 7th, 23rd, 24th and 27th Chasseurs Alpins, the 6th and 11th Hussars, the 7th Engineers, the 7th and 10th Garrison Artillery, the 19th, 38th, and 55th Field Artillery, and two Legions of Gendarmerie.

The Third Army (General Sarrail), consisting of the VIth and VIIIth Army Corps, was based on Verdun; the garrison and Field Army of which was made up of the 164th, 165th, and 166th Infantry, the 8th, 16th, 19th, 25th, 26th and 29th Chasseurs-à-pied. In the VIth Army Corps there were three infantry Divisions, the 12th (the 91st, 132nd, 147th and 148th), the 42nd (the 94th, 106th, 151st, and 162nd), and the 40th (the 150th, 161st, 154th and 155th) together with the 3rd, 6th, and 9th Cuirassiers, the 4th, 16th, 21st, 22nd, 28th, and 30th Dragoons, the 5th, 10th, 12th, and 15th Chasseurs-à-cheval, and the 2nd and 4th Hussars. These men belonged to the district between Châlons and Commercy.

The VIIIth Army Corps (General de Castelli) drew its forces from the centre of France, and contained two infantry Divisions, the 15th (the 10th, 27th, 29th, and 56th Regiments), and the 16th (the 13th, 85th, 95th, and 134th Regiments), the 17th and 26th Dragoons, the 8th, 14th, and 16th Chasseurs-à-cheval, the 7th Engineers, the 1st, 37th, and 48th Field Artillery, and the 8th Legion of Gendarmerie.



AFTER THE STORMING OF STEINBACH.

French troops standing in front of houses destroyed by the heavy shells of the Germans. On the right is a post that divides France and Germany.

doubt as to the violation of Belgian territory by the Germans he ordered a special Alsace Army, built up round the regular frontier force of the Belfort district, to occupy Mülhausen, the commercial capital of Alsace, to cut the Rhine bridges at Huningue and below it, and to flank the attack of the first and second armies which were to advance into German Lorraine. The sequel was tersely described in a French summary of events published on March 22 :

In Alsace this operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at once relieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse (Mülhausen), lost it, and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had therefore to be recommenced afresh, and this was done from August 14 under a new command *

Mulhouse was taken (for the second time) on the 19th after a brilliant fight at Dornach. Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held the approaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy had undergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells and forage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on our left prevented us from carrying our successes farther, for our troops in Alsace were needed elsewhere. On August 28 the Alsace Army was broken up, only a small part remaining to hold the regions of Thann and the Vosges.

That is a clear and accurate statement of what happened. The second occupation of Mülhausen was brought to an end by a voluntary

* General Pau.

retirement, and not by pressure from the Germans. But the first force, which marched unopposed into the town on August 8, consisted of only one Division, and was not strong enough for the task it had been set to accomplish. On the following day it fell into a trap which ought to have been foreseen. It was badly defeated between Mülhausen and the Hartz forest by an army much stronger than itself, reinforced by troops which were brought south from Colmar, and was lucky in being able to fall back on Belfort without having its retreat cut off. Little, therefore, was apparently gained by the invasion of Alsace, except the excellent moral effect produced throughout France by the feeling that part, at all events, of the ravished provinces was once more occupied by the soldiers of the Republic. That, however, was a very real gain, upon which General Joffre had doubtless counted. But he had also a simple military aim in view, which had escaped the attention of most of his critics. It was given as follows in the summary of events quoted above :

The purpose of the operations in Alsace—namely, to retain a large part of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations—it was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly by holding before



THE FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE.

A notable scene in a small Alsatian town, the inhabitants of which have never faltered in their allegiance to France.

it the German Army Corps operating to the south of Metz. This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we had reached the region of Saarburg, and that of the Etangs; we held Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Château-Salins. On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in the strong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy's artillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and finally in the default of certain units.

On the 22nd, in spite of the splendid behaviour of several of our Army Corps, and notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to the Grand Couronné, while on the 23rd and 24th the Germans concentrated reinforcements—three Army Corps at least—in the region of Lunéville, and forced us to retire to the south.

Little need be added to this account beyond the main facts that the defaulting units belonged




A FRENCH COLONIAL.
An Algerian Infantryman.

to the Fifteenth Army Corps (which, however, did excellent work later on both in Lorraine and the Argonne) and that the leading French troops had got too far in advance of their artillery. This last was an unfortunate mistake, as was also the choice of an Army Corps recruited in the south to form the vanguard, since the troops composing it could not be expected to have the same racial interest in the reconquest of the province as the troops native to Lorraine. The whole movement appears to have been executed in too light-hearted a spirit. It began with a series of facile victories by which

the invading army was lured on till it suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of overwhelmingly superior forces. The slaughter was terrible and the retreat that followed was at first a rout, till the flying troops were rallied and steadied by the 20th Army Corps and the other regiments in reserve, though they, too, were obliged to fall back almost as far as Nancy, fighting a strong rearguard action as they retired. For the time being the triumph of the Germans was complete. The effort to recover the lost province had ended in a dismal and costly failure, and there were grave fears for the safety of Nancy and, what was more important, of Toul. Only one advantage had been gained. The offensive, although it had not succeeded, had, as General Joffre expected, necessitated the presence in Alsace and Lorraine of a very considerable German force. It remained to be seen whether the armies of General de Castelnau and General Dubail were strong enough to resist it.

Up to this date (the beginning of the fourth week in August) the fighting on the rest of the frontier was not of great importance. In the hope of avoiding hostilities the French for some days before war broke out withdrew their troops a few miles from the border. The Germans not only did not follow their example but precipitated the conflict by sending small bodies of patrols into French territory in three or four different places (Longlaville, Cirey, and Pétit-Croix) before war was declared. Consequently when it did begin they were first in the field.

To begin with, they distinctly scored by this typical example of German "preparedness." While the French were marching eastwards in front of Belfort, Epinal, and Toul, the vanguards of armies from Strassburg and Metz, under General von Strantz and the Crown Prince of Bavaria, advanced in the opposite direction into France. On August 5, 6, and 8, to the south of the army which was penetrating into German Lorraine, they bombarded and occupied Cirey, Badonviller, and Baccarat, three small towns close to the frontier, and to the north of it the guns of St. Blaize, one of the forts of Metz, shelled Pagny-sur-Moselle and Pont-à-Mousson. Still farther north a more important demonstration was made by the Army of Metz, which quickly occupied Briey, Conflans, Mangiennes, Damvillers, and Spincourt, and so got within about 15 miles of Verdun. Above this district, on August 22, the Crown Prince's Army, which had crossed the frontier close to the



THE FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER.

Inset: The German attack on Nancy.

Luxemburg border near Longwy (which did not however fall till the 27th), flung back a French offensive from the Meuse in this region and pushed the French before it across the Meuse at Dun, 23 miles north of Verdun, and, making a detour to the north-west of the fortress, continued to press them back till finally it took up its position facing eastwards between Bar le Due and the Ardenne forest, and having the army of General Sarrail opposite to it along the left bank of the Meuse. Further west the army of the Duke of Wurtemberg, working southwards on the Crown Prince's right, had also routed the French advancing from the Meuse into the Ardennes and had crossed the Meuse lower down near Mézières, and following a course parallel to his had advanced almost in step with him till it was deployed along a line facing

south between his right wing and Epernay. During these operations the French gained certain minor successes (as at Dinant, where the Duke of Wurtemberg's army corps were momentarily repulsed on August 15), but the net result was that they were steadily and surely driven back.

Generally speaking, therefore, at the end of August and the beginning of September, the French prospects on the right wing of the Allies' line were no brighter than they were in front of Paris. The special Alsace army had retired on Belfort, and had taken the place of part of the First Army about as far north as Gérardmer, below St. Dié. The First Army, under General Dubail, after occupying the crests of the Vosges had been obliged, as a consequence of the defeat at Morhange, to fall back in front of Epinal, and in the foothills of the Vosges and the valley of the Mortagne as far as Baccarat was fighting hard to keep the pursuing Germans at bay. General de Castelnau with the Second Army (the sphere of which after the violation of Belgium had been extended westwards from the Moselle to Verdun), was holding the Grand Couronné east and north of Nancy against several army corps from Strassburg and Saarburg under General von Strantz. At the same time it was facing the garrison army from Metz between



A FRENCH SOLDIER'S FUNERAL.

An impressive funeral service over two Garibaldian heroes.

Inset: Infantryman in his dug-out.



LIFE IN THE FRENCH TRENCHES.

French officer making observations from a first-line trench.

Inset: Receiving a message by telephone.



Pont-à-Mousson and Commercy (where it had the support of the Toul garrison), and from Commercy northwards along the valley of the Meuse past St. Mihiel till its left rested on the garrison defences of Verdun. The line was then continued by the Verdun garrison force facing outwards to the east, north, and west of the fortress round to the south-west, where it joined the third army under General Sarrail (now back to back with the left wing of the Second Army on the other side of the Meuse), which with the Fourth Army under General Langle de Cary was hard pressed by the forces of the Crown Prince and the Duke of Wurtemberg. On the whole of their front, therefore, except behind the lower part of the Vosges, the position of our allies was extremely critical, especially at the places where they had been driven back—to the south-east, east, and north of Nancy, and between Verdun and Reims. The way in which little by little they pressed the enemy back till it was they and not the French who were acting on the defensive was a splendid example of unflinching courage and determination. The opening disasters and faults of generalship, instead of unnerving the French, steadied them

and filled them with fresh spirit. From the moment when the armies felt that they were in touch with each other, and standing shoulder to shoulder in one unbroken line, with their backs against the wall, they began slowly to make ground instead of yielding it.

This wall was no imaginary figure of speech. It was the forty-mile line of fortresses planted along the Meuse from Verdun to Toul. For the plans of General Joffre and the safety of France it had to be held. It could only be held if the whole of the front on the Allies' right wing stood firm. Looked at as a series of straight lines, that front was at this time like the side view of a Windsor chair, of which the line Verdun to Toul was the back, Toul to Nomény the seat, and Nomény to St. Dié the front leg, with Epinal at the foot of the back leg. Actually it



GENERAL MAUNOURY,

The saviour of Paris. He led the Sixth French Army out of the French capital in taxi-cabs and motor omnibuses, and turned von Kluck's flank on the Ourcq.

did not quite follow these lines, but extended from Verdun to just above Commercy (a few miles short of Toul and west of the Verdun-Toul line), and from there to Pont-à-Mousson and Nomény, whence it curved slightly inwards between Nancy and Lunéville before reaching St. Dié.

In front of this position there was the solitary fort of Manonviller, ten miles to the east of Lunéville, of which great things were expected by the Germans as well as the French. These expectations were not realized. On August 28 its garrison of 900 men surrendered after a two days' bombardment, probably carried out by two Austrian 305 guns stationed at Avricourt on the frontier. Many stories were told of its fall; the most clearly established facts appear to be that the fort was totally demolished, that its own guns were never fired, that the garrison only lost four or five killed and wounded, and that the telephone communication with Toul was found to have been cut off at the beginning of the bombardment—a combination of circumstances which present a not very satisfactory contrast with the story of the defences of Fort Troyon and Longwy.


Although Manonviller did not fall till six days after the occupation of Lunéville, when the main German armies were already several miles further west, it played practically no part in delaying the advance of the enemy.

The real bulwark of Nancy consisted in the field armies of de Castelnau and Dubail. The troops composing them were some of the finest in France. Both by training and tradition they were the frontier force of the Republic. In time of peace they held the post of honour along the vulnerable border-line between Metz and the Vosges, always ready for war, as their ancestors had been for generation after generation. Many of the best generals of France had served their novitiate in these famous army corps, and ever since 1870 officers and men, nearly all of them children of the soil, were bound together at first by the desire for *la revanche*, and later, when that died out, by the feeling that when the threatened German invasion came the task and the glory of repelling it would be theirs. The people and army corps of Lorraine were therefore something apart; they occupied much the same position in relation to the rest of the army as the British frontier force in India to our own Regular Army. Now they were to be put to the test. On them depended the fate not only of Nancy and of Toul, but in all probability of the whole of the Verdun-Toul line of fortresses. The Germans were already making desperate efforts to approach and if possible burst through their line, but for the time being it was Nancy,



GENERAL BELIN,

One of General Joffre's principal executive officers.



DINNER TIME.

French officer testing soup prepared for the men under his command.

Inset : Taking food to the trenches.



or rather the entrenched positions in front of it, which took up most of their energy. It was perhaps fortunate for the French that it was a field army and not a fortress with which their enemy had to deal at this particular point. This was the conclusion arrived at on the spot by the special correspondent of *The Times* on the French eastern frontier :

When Bismarck interfered in 1874 to prevent the construction of fortifications round the town by threatening to renew the war of 1870 he was, without knowing it, working against the interest of his country rather than for it. If Nancy had been encircled by a ring of stereotyped forts it is almost a certainty that the French would have fallen back on the protection of their guns, and that the town would have been taken long ago. It is because Nancy did not, because it could not, put its trust in forts that the German advance has been checked (and will perhaps be checkmated) at this one point only on the whole line.

Further south the enemy have crossed the difficult barrier of the Vosges mountains, and by the Col de Sainte Marie, the Col du Bonhomme and the Col du Donon and other passes have penetrated some little distance into France. To the north the whole of the rest of their line has swung across Belgium and France to Compiègne and then part of the way back again, like a bar (though never a straight nor a rigid bar),

hinged to a fixed point. And the immovable pivot which three months' constant sapping on three sides has not been able to undermine is the open and unprotected town of Nancy. That is one of the wonders and one of the chief lessons of the war.

Before, however, the wonder was finally accomplished there was for the French a period of heroic fighting and acute suspense to go through. The quiet and confident way in which the people of Lorraine faced the anxiety was another of the war's marvels. Their town was attacked (and the nearest phase of the attack was kept up for three weeks) from

four directions at once. Yet they never lost heart, and even when its streets and barracks were thronged with wretched refugees, and its hospitals with wounded from the burnt and ruined villages and blood-drenched battle-fields only a few miles off, the life of the place went on with very little change. The inhabitants of the town, like the army in front of it, felt that they stood at the outposts of the State and that they owed a duty to France. They had at their head two exceptional men, who were able to work together with perfect unanimity. Monsieur Léon Mirman (once a *chasseur-à-pied* and "soldat-député" for Reims) had resigned his position as Directeur de l'Assistance Publique at Paris in order to take up at Nancy the anxious and sometimes dangerous office of Prefect of Meurthe et Moselle. Monsieur Simon, whose appointment as Mayor also dated from the beginning of the war, was unanimously chosen by his municipal colleagues as the fittest man for

the post in the unexampled emergency. It was largely due to the personal example of these two men and the official and emergency staffs which they gathered round them that the population kept its head and its *bonne humeur* all through the difficult and trying days when the enemy stood at its gates. At night, as at Verdun, Commercy, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, very few people were to be seen abroad in the darkened streets. But by day, except for the convoys of prisoners, of wounded, and of *ravitaillement*, the constant going and coming of long columns of troops, and the never-ceasing sound of the guns, there was little to show that technically the town was in a state of siege. Everyone had his or her work to do (Madame Mirman, like her husband, was untiring in the organization of relief for the refugees and the wounded), everyone did it willingly and even cheerfully, and everyone refused to despair of the Republic.

Meanwhile the attack was in full swing. It came, after the retreat from Morhange, by Pont-à-Mousson to the north, Château-Salins to the north-east, Cirey to the east, and St. Dié to the south-east. The routes chosen by the Germans were naturally the easiest for reaching their objective. From St. Dié along the wide valleys of the Meurthe and its tributary the Mortagne; from Cirey past Lunéville down another Meurthe tributary, the Vezouse; from Château-Salins by the main road across the frontier between the forests of Champenoux and St. Paul; and from Metz southwards past Pont-à-Mousson up the channel of the Moselle



A STREET IN VITREMONT BURNT BY THE GERMANS.

Monsieur Léon Mirman, Prefet of the Meurthe and Moselle Department (inset). On the right of picture M. Mirman is talking to a homeless villager.



LOOKING FOR THE ENEMY.
Chasseurs scouting along a road.

and the Meurthe, the ways into Nancy are straightforward and the ground for the most part flat and unbroken. But, besides the villages and towns by which they pass (most of which were used by the French in delaying the advance of the Bavarian troops), there is, at irregular intervals between them, a ring-fence of wooded heights, proudly known as the Grand Couronné of Nancy, which served as the main line of the defence. To the north these hills rise to a height of about 1,000 feet on each side of the Meurthe and encircle Nancy from the south, along the side away from the frontier, round to a point a little east of north. Through the remaining segment of the circle of which the town is the centre, towards the frontier on the east and south-east, a wide plain rises gently to the horizon five miles away, with more hills and forests springing out of it. The most important of these landmarks are the Plateau of Amanee, six miles north-east of the town, with the forests of Champenoux and St. Paul just beyond it, north and south of the Château-Salins road, and secondly, more to the east, in the direction of Lunéville and Cirey, the forests of Vitrimont and Parroy.

At the beginning of August, as we have seen, the opposing forces were making several forward movements in opposite directions, each in

front of one of the rival fortresses of Verdun and Metz, Toul and Saarburg, Epinal and Strassburg, the garrison armies of which, before the war began, were waiting like kennelled watchdogs, ready once they were let loose to fly at one another's throats. By the fourth week of the month, except in Alsace, all these cross-currents were setting in the same direction, converging steadily on Lunéville and Nancy (which is only ten miles from the frontier), as the French fell back before the pursuing Germans. Once the retreat had begun in the north the result was felt all along the line. In the centre the Germans reoccupied Cirey and Badonviller, from which they had fallen back earlier in the month, and occupied Blamont, between Cirey and Lunéville. Lower down their second army took possession of St. Dié, Raon l'Etape, and other small towns between Epinal and the Vosges, and General Dubail with the First French Army gradually retired westwards, which had the effect of straightening the French line. There was some very severe fighting at the Col du Chipotte (where the losses on both sides were exceedingly heavy) and other places in the spurs of the Vosges at the end of August and the beginning of September, in which the French behaved with great gallantry and were not content with acting on the defensive. But the general result was that

the Germans, though they could never get as far west as Epinal, at first always held the upper hand.

Farther north, as the French fell back from Saarburg and Morhange, they rallied first at a position marked by the river Meurthe to the south of Lunéville and the Marne canal and the boundary river, the Seille, above it, and then farther west along a front that began in the valley of the Mortagne and extended in the same line in the direction of Champenoux. Beyond that line, which practically coincides with the Grand Couronné of Nancy, the Germans



FRENCH COLONIAL.
An officer taking observations.

never advanced. The position was well chosen. Beginning in the north at Mount Toulon, it was based first on the heights of Mont St. Jean, La Rochette, and Amance (the rock on which the attack broke), then protected by the forests of Champenoux, St. Paul, and Crévic, and finally by the forest of Vitrimont, and a short stretch of the Mortagne. The most important of the towns which stood between it and the frontier was Lunéville, which the Germans entered without resistance on August 22, and held till September 12. It was deliberately and wisely sacrificed by the French


in order to gain the advantage of the stronger position behind it. The first two army corps engaged in the invasion of Lorraine started from Strassburg and, entering France by the upper passes of the Vosges and between Cirey and Baccarat, advanced along the three river valleys on Lunéville and the group of villages surrounding it. All of these villages suffered severely from the shells of both sides and the still more destructive incendiarism of the Germans, especially Gerbéviller and Badonviller, in each of which the French put up a stiff fight. Badonviller, three times occupied by the enemy, was the scene of nearly continuous fighting for the first month of the war. The second arrival of the Germans on August 23 was described as follows by one of the special correspondents of *The Times* :

At 8 in the morning the French hurriedly evacuated Badonviller and took up a position at Pexonnes, about two miles to the rear, and the Germans, after a desultory bombardment, which went on all day, marched in at 6 in the evening. For the next few hours there was furious fighting in and around the town between the Chasseurs Alpins and the Chasseurs d'Afrique on the one side and on the other the Bavarians, the Landwehr, the 162nd Regiment of Strassburg, and the regiment of the notorious Lieutenant Von Forstner (since reported killed), the 99th of Zabern. The Germans, as soon as they entered the town, began ordering the terrified inhabitants to come out of the cellars in which they had taken refuge, when suddenly they were interrupted by a furious counter-attack of the Chasseurs, and driven out of the town at the point of the bayonet. Once more the natives shut themselves up in the cellars and listened panic-stricken to the noise and confusion of the struggle overhead. One comfort they had in their alarm. All the time, above the din of the fighting, they heard the stirring notes of the French bugles sounding the charge, and all the time the voices of the French soldiers singing, as they charged, the famous Sidi-'Brahim bugle march :

Pan! Pan! L'Arbi!
Les Chacals sont par ici!
Mais plus haut c'est les Turcos!

Little by little, as the Germans retreated, the sounds died away in the distance, and then suddenly began again as the Chasseurs, still chanting the Sidi-'Brahim, marched back through the town and retired to their position at Pexonnes. Then once more the Germans, and at last the silence of the night.

The church . . . was the part of the town that suffered most from the bombardment. Dome and roof have both been entirely shot away; shattered fragments of the pillars in front of the church and the shapeless remains of the four walls are all that is left. Except for one thing—a statue of Joan of Arc, with one arm broken off short at the shoulder, standing erect and serene on its pedestal, surrounded by the piles of stone and mortar and timber and glass that litter the floor of the roofless nave. . . . In the rest of the town comparatively little damage has been done by the shells. And there is this curious fact to note, that the bombardment which did the mischief took place while the town was actually occupied by German troops. They were simply ordered to keep out of the range of the fire, which meant away from the neighbourhood of the church. These troops—they were Bavarians—completed the work of destruction



"LA TRICOTEUSE," THE HEAVY FRENCH 120 MM. GUN.
A powerful gun of the French Heavy Artillery concealed from the enemy's observation.



SEEKING A FALLEN COMRADE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

A French soldier searching for a friend after an attack on a German trench.

by burning the quarter of the town nearest to the German frontier, some 30 houses in all, besides pillaging many others. They also shot 12 of the inhabitants, including Madame Benoit, the wife of the heroic mayor, another woman and the child she was holding in her arms, and an old man of 78, who was sitting peacefully by his window.

But it was at Gerbéviller, a small town about five miles south of Lunéville, that the systematic German policy of terrorising the population by shooting civilians and burning their houses reached its height. According to the account given by the same correspondent, less than ten houses out of more than 460 remained habitable after the Germans were finally driven from the town. On the day on which they first attacked it it was defended with splendid courage by a body of 60 or 70 Chasseurs against a force of three or four thousand. When they were at length forced to retire, a few of their number who got separated from the rest hid till nightfall in a cellar, and, as they were making their escape, shot a sentry who had been posted at the lower end of the town. By this time the place was full of German troops. Roused to fury by the heroic resistance which had kept them so long at bay, and assuming, without any justification, that the sentry had been killed by a non-combatant, they set to work to wreak their vengeance on the unfortunate town, of which they left practically nothing standing except a melancholy desolation of blackened and tottering walls. The authors of the outrage were eventually driven out by the French artillery. But it was not the two bombardments suffered by the town that did the mischief. It was caused by deliberate incendiarism, carried out by petrol, and at least two different kinds of firelighters, which the soldiers had ready in their haversacks. One by one the

churches and houses were set on fire and burned, in many cases burying in their ruins the charred bodies of the inhabitants in hiding in the cellars. Nor were these the only victims of the insensate lust for blood of the German soldiery. The French Government have in their possession a photograph taken by a responsible official of nine white-headed old men, whose dead bodies were found after the German withdrawal, lying in a field close to the town. Their hands were bound together, their trousers had been unbuttoned, and were clinging round their knees, either as a cruel insult, or else—the irony of it—to prevent them from running away, and they had been shot down in cold blood. The wretched inhabitants, when they were able to come back to gaze sadly at the crumbling heaps of stone that had once been their homes, said that many more of their acquaintances and relations had been “judicially murdered” in the same way. The one bright spot in the story of the nightmare of barbarism was the fine courage of Sœur Julie, the brave *religieuse* who, with other sisters of her order, stuck to her post through all the horrors of the double bombardment and the incendiary fires, and nursed the wounded of both sides. She richly deserved the decoration of the cross of the Legion of Honour which she received from the hand of the President of the Republic.

As for the Germans, almost everywhere that they went in this part of France at Nomény, at Baccarat, at Réméréville, and scores of other towns and villages in Lorraine, the Vosges and the Woëvre, endless stories were told by responsible level-headed eye-witnesses, not only of indiscriminate house-burnings (the evidence of which remained for all the world to see), but of women and

children, shot like rabbits at their windows or in the streets, for the mere pleasure of killing, of horrible rapes, and of disgusting bestialities. There were, of course, many men and many officers who had no hand in these atrocious acts. In some cases their occupation of conquered villages and towns was free from the stain of them; in others the stories told were no doubt untrue or exaggerated. In Lunéville, for instance, though they wantonly burnt down about forty houses in one of the suburbs, shot some of the inhabitants (more probably from nervousness than brutality), and helped themselves freely to their belongings, the record of their three weeks' stay, during part of which they were being hotly bombarded by the French, was not for them a particularly black one. It is true that the fact that the town got off comparatively lightly was chiefly due to the firm and courageous and dignified conduct of M. Minier, the *sous-préfet*, M. Keller, the mayor, and M. Méquillet, the deputy of the town, who, sometimes at the risk of their own lives, boldly stood up to the German military authorities, and at the same time kept a hold over their fellow citizens. But to rank the Germans' treatment of Lunéville as one of their minor misdoings is enough in itself to expose the gravity of the case against them. After making all reasonable allowances, far more than enough evidence remains to convict the Bavarian and Prussian troops which in-

vaded the east of France of callous cruelties and acts of degraded grossness which, except in rare instances, ought to have been unheard of in the national army of a modern civilized State. The names of Gerbéviller and Noinény were blots that could not soon nor easily be wiped out from the escutcheon of German "Kultur." In Eastern France no less than in Belgium, the campaign proved to demonstration the poisonous influence of the German teaching that in war might must be right. It had resulted in a general lowering of the ethical and moral standard of the German people and army—even as compared with 1870—and by suppressing the finer impulses of human nature had brought to the surface its more cruel and brutal instincts.

The great final fight for the possession of Nancy was now definitely staged. The two first invading armies had made good as far as Lunéville. The Third, and main army, which also consisted of Bavarians, with more and heavier guns, and some Prussian cavalry in the shape of Uhlans and the White Cuirassiers of the Guard, marched from Château-Salins and engaged in a violent series of conflicts with the French in and about a group of villages round the forest of Champenoux. At the same time part of the Army of Metz, which began by marching westwards towards Verdun, wheeled round facing south, between the Meuse and the Moselle, with its left resting on Pont-à-Mousson, and joined in the attack on the Lorraine capital.



AFTER A BATTLE.

Dead German soldiers left on the battlefield after a French charge.

The German plans had so far succeeded that they were now nearly in a position to advance from two directions at once on the plateau of Amance, the hill on which General de Castelnau had concentrated the bulk of his artillery. Before they could cooperate in this attempt with the armies coming from Saarburg and Strassburg, the Northern or Metz Army, after occupying Nomény on August 20, had to take the village of Ste. Geneviève, about ten miles north-west of Amance, where a moderately strong French force under General Foch had been posted. They started from Pont-à-Mousson on August 22 full of enthusiasm with confident cries of "Ste. Geneviève to-night: to-morrow Nancy!" Three miles up the river they left the main road at Loisy to climb the hill to Ste. Geneviève, and found themselves confronted by the wire entangle-


ments which the French had erected about three-quarters of a mile in front of and to the left of their trenches. This obliged them to make the attack from their own left front, and they decided to prepare the way with field guns and some heavier artillery, which, in the course of the next 75 hours, poured into Ste. Geneviève over 4,000 shells. The French had only one regiment of infantry in the village (about 3,000 men against 12,000), but they were well sheltered in their trenches, and only lost three killed and some 20 wounded in the course of the bombardment. The batteries in support were so well hidden that the enemy's aeroplanes failed to locate them, and they allowed the Germans to waste their ammunition without firing a shot in return. They knew that the position was critical and that the safety of Nancy in all probability depended on their success. The brilliant fight that followed was described as follows by the special correspondent of *The Times*:

On the evening of the 24th the German commander, deceived by their silence and imagining that the infantry force had been crushed by the bombardment, gave the order to attack, and his formidable little army, still covered by the fire of its artillery, advanced on Ste. Geneviève in massed columns. Then at last, when they had come to a convenient range, the 75's opened on their



WINE CASKS AS A BARRICADE.

Scene in the streets of Nomény, Eastern France. Inset: French troops in the trenches.



THE DEUTSCHES THOR, METZ,
Known to the French of the City as La Porte des Allemands.

closely-formed ranks. Most of the work fell on one particular battery from Toul, as the others were so placed that they could not fire effectively without endangering their own infantry. For three hours they pounded the Germans, cutting them up badly, and then, when he had fired his last shell, the captain of the battery ordered his men to fix bayonets and join the infantry (the 314th Regiment) in a last effort to check the assault, to which the Germans at once advanced, crouching low as they came on up the slope.


The order had been given to the infantry to let them get within 300 yards. When they reached that distance the French officers shouted at the top of their voices the command which, of all others, the Germans dislike, "En avant à la baïonnette." But the infantry had also been warned that, on hearing this word of command, instead of charging they were to stay in the trenches and fire a succession of volleys. It was a neat idea, and it came off. Hearing the order and the bugle sounding the charge, the German front ranks quickly rose from their crouching position and hurriedly fixed bayonets to repel the attack. The first volley caught them just as they reached the wire entanglements in front of the trenches, and mowed them down in hundreds. They fell in such dense masses that the men who came on from behind climbed over their bodies and the first row of entanglements at the same time. But they could get no farther. The French Lebols wiped them out, and the only result of their fine courage—for they came on to the assault four separate times—was that they left 4,000 dead in front of those murderous trenches. Then, almost at nightfall, they gave up the attempt, and fell back on Atton, the village in front of Pont-à-Mousson, through which they had passed so cheerfully three days before with their cries of "Nancy domain." For the moment their demoralization was complete. In the darkness some of them lost their way, and stumbling on the wire entanglements in front of Loisy fell into the river and were drowned. The survivors, when they reached Atton, christened Sto. Geneviève "The Hole of Death."

The attack on Amanee and Nancy from the east was a more protracted affair, but it was

equally unsuccessful. At first the struggle was most severe along the French right, on the Nancy side of Lunéville (which is 15 miles from the Lorraine capital), round Haraucourt, Rosières, and Dombasle, the last of which places was occupied by the Germans on August 22, though they were quickly driven out and retired on the heights and woods of Crévic. Next day there was the same sort of give-and-take fighting along the low hills north of the Dombasle-Lunéville road, and at Léomont, Crévic and Vitrimont, where thousands of German dead were left in the forest. On the 25th, between Courbesseau and Drouville, a strong German position was attacked by five French infantry regiments. Owing, however, to insufficient support by their artillery, they suffered severely. One regiment lost 65 per cent. of its men killed and wounded, and for the time being the attack failed. But the spirit of the whole army remained excellent. During that long drawn out fortnight of fierce charge and counter-charge, in the fields and forests, and the streets of the ruined and smoking villages, the fighting was so continuous that sometimes even to pick up the dead and wounded was impossible. There were places, too, where the Germans, hidden in the woods, persistently fired on any of the wounded who moved a limb and anyone who went to their rescue even after the engagements had stopped. Some of them lay and suffered, without food



420
 MAP ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHTING



or drink, for as much as five days. But even they, or those of them who survived the ordeal, only asked to be cured of their wounds that they might go out and fight again. They had but one thought—to defend Lorraine and avenge its sufferings.

Further north along the line a series of violent engagements at Réméréville, Erbéviller, and other places round the forests of Champenoux and St. Paul, culminated in a sustained attack on the plateau of Amance. The bombardment lasted for more than a week, night and day. Before it began, on August 30 and 31, there was a trying period of suspense for the men who were working the guns on



AERIAL WARFARE.

Machine that winds up the rope of the French captive balloon.

the top of the plateau. They were surrounded by a thick fog. They had a feeling that the enemy were near, but could see nothing. All that they could do was to work at the entrenchments which they had been constructing since their arrival from Toul and to shell the roads likely to be used by the enemy.

Meanwhile, as they suspected, the Germans were placing their heavy guns in position. When the fog had cleared away German airmen flew over the plateau at a great height, and once they had made out the position of the French artillery their gunners had little rest. Four batteries opened fire upon them, and the shells fell thick and fast, with a deafening din. At one time the fire was so severe that the drivers and most of the men serving the guns were ordered to retire to the village behind the

hill. But here as well they were quickly detected by the enemy war planes and captive balloons, and followed by a rain of shells which sent the villagers scuttling to their cellars or flying over the fields. After a time the French artillery men made a dash for the plateau through a storm of flame and iron and reached the trenches near the guns, which were well concealed and had not been touched. Their wounded they were obliged to take into the trenches with them. The fire was so hot that it was out of the question to show even a hand. Then at last it began to show signs of slackening, and the battery commanders and gun layers, who had been waiting for this moment in the little wood on the plateau, were able to get back to their pieces, which were soon once more in full action.

Up to September 8 the battle was fought with increasing violence all along the 25 miles of the French front, which at its nearest point was within about six miles of Nancy. To break through that line had become for the Germans a matter of urgent importance. West of Verdun their armies were being steadily pushed back beyond the Marne. In front of Amance one of their divisions had been heavily defeated on the 7th in the forest of Champenoux. On the 8th they braced themselves for a final effort under the eye of the Kaiser, who in spite of the gravity of the situation on the Marne, had journeyed to the eastern front to give to his armies there the encouragement of his presence and authority. If he had been able, as he probably expected, to enter Nancy in triumph at the head of his victorious troops, the moral effect both in France and in Germany would have been immense. But before that was possible the heights of Amance must be stormed. When the order for the assault was given the Germans came out of the woods a mile away, and headed by their fifes and drums, as if they were on parade, advanced solemnly and pompously to the attack of the French infantry positions halfway up the east side of the hill. The French guns were silent. There was nothing to show whether they had been put out of action or were only biding their time. Except the music of the bands there was not a sound, for the infantry also reserved their fire till the enemy were within 200 yards. Then suddenly, with loud shouts of "Vive la France," they sprang from the trenches and charged with fixed bayonets. The two lines met with a violent shock, and the German ranks broke.


As they fled to the shelter of the forest the 75's came into action, and firing at short range, mowed them down rank by rank. But the Kaiser was there to inspire them. The work that he had given them to do was still undone, and they fought on with wonderful courage and tenacity. Six times they advanced to the attack, and six times they were driven back again to the woods. At some places at the foot of that deadly hill the bodies were piled up five or six feet high, and when the survivors took shelter behind the heaps of dead and wounded the 75's still raked them through and through, smothering dead and living in a horrible mire of flesh and blood, while the 155's, firing over the heads of the front ranks, finished off the work farther back in the forest. The German losses were enormous. Thousands of their dead were left lying on the plain, and in the evening they asked and were granted a four hours' truce to bury them. It was believed by the French that they took advantage of the opportunity to place in position near the village of Cercenil the heavy guns which shelled Nancy on the night of September 9. They might have saved themselves the trouble.

The bombardment, which should have been the dramatic finale of the assault on the town, was instead a rather feeble anti-climax. It began at about half-past eleven, when most of the inhabitants were in bed. A violent storm was raging, and at first the sound

of the bursting shells was mistaken for claps of thunder, till everyone was roused by the crash of falling masonry and the roar of the French guns replying to the attack, which they completely silenced in about an hour's time. About 70 shells were fired, killing and wounding a few civilians and damaging a certain number of houses. As a military manœuvre the bombardment was purposeless and futile, and was so quickly over that it scarcely had the effect of alarming the population, though some of the more timid retired the next day to towns further removed from the enemy and the frontier. But they were the exception. The great majority showed the same confidence in the armies of General de Castelnau and General Dubail as their Prefect, whose response to the bombardment was to send for his young son and daughters to come and live with him and Madame Mirman at Nancy. The watchwords of the whole town were courage and duty. A good example of the prevailing spirit was given by one of the very few Englishmen who were in Nancy at the time. He had under his charge an important municipal *usine*, containing several big boilers, which, if they had been burst by a shell, would have caused widespread damage. His first thought when the firing began was to empty them, and though his works and the streets leading to them were exactly in the line where the shells were falling, he started off at once from his hotel, went down to the works, and did what was necessary



FRENCH BALLOON AT VALMY.
Taking observations above the famous old mill.



THE RETREAT OF THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY IN THE ARGONNE.
The French Infantry are rapidly approaching the retreating German battery.

to make the boilers harmless. That was typical of the way in which almost everyone behaved, not only at the time of the bombardment, but during and after the formidable and prolonged efforts of the enemy to invest the town. At the Prefecture, the Mairie, and the Chamber of Commerce, in the temporary and permanent hospitals (where the regular staffs were supplemented by devoted bands of nurses and some of the foremost civilian doctors of France), in all the various organizations which busied themselves with the care of the refugees and the poorer inhabitants, there was everywhere the same activity and the same undismayed resolution and devotion to duty. The local newspapers, in spite of the galling and sometimes absurd restrictions under which they were placed, always maintained a high standard of patriotic loyalty to the one supreme cause and of unswerving faith in its sure and certain triumph. Lorraine, like France, had become a united whole. The common danger and the common effort had put an end to the dislike and distrust between Church and State and all the other differences of French political and public life. The armies of the Eastern frontier, which shared and were fortified by this new-born spirit of unanimity, had their minds and their hands free for their own special business. The victory on the Marne put the finishing touch to the work that they had done and the fight that they had so gallantly fought before Nancy. The bombardment of the town was the Germans' parting shot. On September 10 they evacuated Pont-à-Mousson, and on the 12th Lunéville, Baecarat, Raon-l'Étape, and St. Dié; there was a general advance along the whole French front, and though the enemy still held a bare footing on the edge of Lorraine and in the department of the Vosges the effective occupation of the two provinces was at an end. The attack on the Epinal-Verdun line by way of Nancy had completely failed. The Kaiser and his men had looked at the promised land and turned their backs on it.

From this time onwards the weight of the attack was shifted from the southern to the northern half of the barrier line of fortresses—between Toul and Verdun—and Verdun took the place of Nancy as the main German objective. The army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria occupied a front extending to the north-west from the frontier opposite Lunéville, past Thiaucourt to Consenvoye on the Meuse ten or twelve miles north of Verdun, where its

right rested on the left of the Crown Prince's army. Its left wing as far as Thiaucourt was kept busy in preventing the French from advancing on Saarburg and Metz; its centre and right began about this time a serious forward movement across the plain of the Woëvre to the wooded heights of the Meuse. It had two objects in view: to break through the line of fortresses, and then to cross the river and join hands with the right wing of the Crown Prince's army so as to encircle Verdun.

The fortress of Toul is almost exactly half way between Epinal and Verdun, 40 miles from each. In the lower stretch of country, the Tronée de Charmes, there are no forts, and the failure of the Germans to break through in this region and so approach Toul from the south is the strongest possible testimony to the generalship of Dubail and the magnificent resistance of the Chasseurs-à-pied and 75's of the First Army. Between Toul and Verdun the French position was far stronger. East of the Meuse the wooded Hauts de Meuse slope gradually down to the river, broken at intervals by a series of deep and precipitous ravines, guarded by forts, ancient and modern. On the north the district is bounded by the Verdun-Metz railway, below which is the plain of the Woëvre, and on the south by the quick-flowing Rupt de Mad, which runs from Commercy on the Meuse north-east past Thiaucourt to Arnaville, where it falls into the Moselle a few miles south of Metz. All along the Meuse, on both sides of the stream, there is a chain of forts. South of the Rupt de Mad, between Commercy and the Moselle, the forts of Liouville, Gironville, Jouy, Lucey, Bruley and St. Michel point their guns to the east and north, towards the German frontier. Lower down, on the right bank of the river, the guns of the Camp des Romains, a little south of St. Mihiel, and of Forts Troyon and Genicourt to the north of the town, are trained on the river, ready to dispute its passage, and still further north are the southern defences of Verdun, facing up the channel of the stream, on the further or left bank of which the Fort des Paroches, between Troyon and St. Mihiel, faces to the east. This was the formidable position which the Germans had to attack in earnest, as a *riposte* to the battle of the Marne and their repulse in front of Nancy.

They had already, from September 8 to 13, hotly bombarded Troyon (which the Crown Prince had also made a rather feeble attempt




WAITING FOR THE ENEMY.

French troops have a quiet half-hour in the trenches on the banks of a French river.

to bombard from the other side of the river). The defence of the fort was one of the most gallant feats of the 1914 campaign. In the first three hours of the bombardment the German 150's dropped shells into it at the rate of one a minute, firing from positions in the ravines which the French artillerymen were unable to reach, and a number of French 120's and 90's were destroyed by an explosion caused by a "Grosse Marmite" (a 210 shell) which burst in a store of melinite. On the other side of the river the enemy were retreating on the Marne, but no one could come to the help of Troyon. Telephone messages from Verdun told the Commandant that on his resistance depended the success of the big movement to the west, and that he must at all costs hold out. At the same time the Commandant of the fort at Paroches telephoned that his guns could not reach the positions of the Germans who were bombarding Troyon. There was, therefore, nothing left for its garrison but to fight on as best it could while the fort gradually crumbled to pieces round them. On the 9th two German officers and a bugler arrived and three times called upon it to surrender. The Commandant proudly refused. "Never," he said; "the fort has been trusted to me by France, and I would sooner blow it up," and finally told

them to decamp, as he had had enough of their company, though he wished them *au revoir*—at Metz. Then the Germans brought heavier guns to bear on the place, 280's and 305's, and during the night their infantry advanced and cut the wire entanglements in front of the fort. Their charge was, however, checked by the French mitrailleuses, and further German onslaughts in dense masses on the 10th and 11th were repulsed with great slaughter by the garrison, aided by a battery of 75's and the 2nd Cavalry Division from Toul. The same fate befell a final German charge on the 13th, and they were at last compelled to give up the attack on the fort, in front of which they lost from seven to ten thousand men, and to retire on the frontier.

On September 20 they reoccupied Thiaucourt (often confounded, even in the official reports, with Triaucourt, in the Argonne) and once more advanced on the line of fortresses and began a fresh bombardment of Troyon, Les Paroches, and the Camp des Romains, from a front extending north and south in front of them, between Tresauvaux and Heudicourt, a distance of about 12 miles. In the course of the next few days, as the result of flank attacks on the Metz army by the garrison of Toul from the south and the garrison of Verdun from the north, coupled with a



FRENCH ARTILLERY IN NORTHERN FRANCE.

Firing a heavy gun at a German position. The report from these guns is so terrific that some of the gunners have to protect their ears. Many have been rendered completely deaf.

determined advance of the Germans in the centre, the dispositions of their troops were altered till they took the double alignment that came to be known as the St. Mihiel pocket or wedge, from which there was to be no material change for a period of many weeks. The effect of the change was that the German front was pushed forwards from the Thiaucourt-Fresnes line (the 17 mile base of the triangle of which St. Mihiel is the apex) so as to occupy the two sides of the triangle, St. Mihiel-Fresnes and St. Mihiel-Thiaucourt, each 14 miles long.

This advance was not due to any defeat of the French in the Woëvre. It simply meant that the Germans marched forwards as far as they could, till they were brought up short by the fire of the forts along the line of the Meuse and the line of the Second French Army, almost at right angles to it, which extended from the Meuse north of Commercy to the frontier north-east of Nancy. Their position then was that they still had to reckon with Troyon, the Camp des Romains, and the other forts before they could hope to cross the Meuse, and that they also had to guard their left flank from the army of General de Castelnau to the south. Their double front was not therefore a matter of their own choosing. It was imposed upon them by the disposition

of the French lines of defence, which was in part due to the fact that before the war began the Germans had trespassed on the neutral zone established and respected by the French. At the same time the loss of St. Mihiel was obviously not a part of the French programme. It appears to have been due to a miscalculation on their part. They were said, rightly or wrongly, to have come to the conclusion that the enemy, discouraged by the heavy losses they had suffered, had given up the idea of crossing the Meuse. At all events, it was thought safe to move a number of battalions away from the river to reinforce the troops on the Moselle and to the east of it where there were signs of an impending German advance. Intelligence of what had happened was quickly carried to the enemy, and while the French right was engaged beyond Champonoux and its left was pushing back the main body of the 14th German Army Corps on the Rupt de Mad, the movement was made which resulted in the occupation of St. Mihiel. The right wing of the Army of Metz executed a bold flank march up the left or north bank of the Mad, and the advance guard on arriving at St. Mihiel found that it was empty of French troops. Practically without opposition they had penetrated into the heart of the barrier



SŒUR JULIE AND MONSIEUR
DOMINIQUE BONNARD.


Sœur Julie received the Cross of the Legion of Honour for her courage and devotion to duty.

of fortresses, midway between Verdun and Toul.

The next thing was to cross the Meuse. On the evening of September 25 the main body of their army reached the right bank, to the north of the town. To resist them there was on the other side of the river a single battalion of Territorials, but no artillery. The French troops managed, however, to delay their advance as long as daylight lasted, and during the night, though they were in a minority of one to ten, with rifle-fire only they prevented the German engineers from making a pontoon-bridge. Early on the morning of the 26th the position suddenly changed. The enemy placed some heavy guns on the right bank, and after that further resistance was useless. The French artillerymen in the Camp des Romains were unable, owing to the intervening heights, to bring an effective fire to bear on the troops crossing the river, the Territorials were obliged to fall back, carrying their wounded with them, and by midday the Germans were across the

Meuse, marching in the direction of the valley of the Aire. At last it must have seemed to them that the moment had come when their dreams of encircling Verdun were on the point of being realized. The French, however, were fully alive to the gravity of the situation, and two forces were hurrying to dispute the enemy's advance. From the north General Sarrail, who was pushing the Crown Prince's Army before him towards the Argonne, was able to detach a body of cavalry to hold them in check. But the main work fell on the shoulders of the 20th Army Corps who had hastily been ordered back from Champenoux when the news of St. Mihiel was received. Fresh from their engagement in Lorraine they marched through the night of the 25th and the morning and afternoon of the next day, and at 5 o'clock in the evening their advance guard of cavalry which had crossed the Meuse at Lérrouville, just above Commercy, got into touch with the enemy some miles to the north in the valley of the Aire. The dragoons attacked at once with mitrailleuses, and so gave time, first for the artillery and then for the infantry to come up to their support. Three times the Germans made violent attempts to dislodge them from the heights of the Aire, but all three, after furious fighting, were repulsed, and during the night, after suffering severe losses, the enemy were obliged to fall back on the Meuse.

The bold attempt of the Metz Army to come to the help of the Crown Prince had failed. All that they could do was to entrench themselves at St. Mihiel (still keeping their footing in the part of the town on the left bank of the river) and from there continue their bombardment of the French forts. The Camp des Romains (the nearest of them, and, for their purpose, the most important) they completely destroyed, the garrison being compelled to surrender after a most gallant resistance. This, or rather the new fort which they constructed close to it, since nothing was left of the old, made their position in St. Mihiel secure, and for the next few months all the attempts of the French to dislodge them were unsuccessful. But the strategic advantage that they gained by their continued occupation of the point at the end of the St. Mihiel wedge was always doubtful. It enabled them to keep under (but not to take) Troyon, Les Paroches, and the rest of the lesser Meuse forts, and to bombard open towns and villages like Sampigny and Lérrouville. But it also, as was said in *The Times*,



ARTILLERY DUEL IN THE ARGONNE.

Cleverly concealed French batteries replying to the German guns, which directed a searching shrapnel fire.



GERMAN MOUNTS IN HIDDEN STABLES IN THE ARGONNE.

Each horse has a tent to protect it from the cold; the tent is covered with branches to hide it from the enemy.

kept a large part of their force in a position of considerable danger; all through the winter the trenches forming the legs of the compasses of which St. Mihiel was the pivot, were gradually closing in on them and imperilling their chances of retreat in case it was forced upon them.

On the west side of the Meuse the other effort to invest Verdun had proved equally unsuccessful. At first things went well for the Crown Prince's army, though it was said that his Imperial father was seriously annoyed at his prolonged failure to reduce the fort of Longwy and by the great number of lives that were sacrificed before it fell. Still, fall it did, on August 27, after a siege of 24 days, in spite of the splendid defence of its commander, Colonel Darche, and its garrison of only one battalion, and from then till September 7 the Crown Prince and his army shared in the general triumphant advance of the German centre and right. He had under him the XVI., XVIII., and XXI. Army Corps, on his right the Duke of Wurtemberg, commanding the IV., XI. and XIII. Corps, in front of him General Sarrail and the VI. and VIII. French Corps. On the day after the fall of Longwy these two German armies, the 4th and 5th, crossed the Meuse at Mézères, Sedan, and Stenay, 50, 40, and 25 miles nearly due north of Verdun, the armies of Langle de Cary and Sarrail retiring before them. On the same day, the 28th, the Crown Prince reached Dun, five

miles higher up the Meuse, on September 1 Clermont in the Argonne, 14 miles west of Verdun, and on the 3rd Ste. Ménéhould, a little further west, on the opposite edge of the forest of the Argonne, halfway between Verdun and Châlons, with the Duke of Wurtemberg's army always on his right, between Ste. Ménéhould and Reims. Two days later, after what was known as the battle of Reims, the French fell back still further, but on September 6 the retreat from the Meuse to the Marne had almost reached its furthest limit. The Crown Prince's army was now occupying a front of about 20 miles, from a point south-west of Verdun and quite close to it as far as Révigny, just short of Bar-le-Duc, facing almost due east, with Sarrail between him and the Meuse, and on his right the German 4th army extended westwards past Vitry-le-François on the Marne, facing rather more to the south. The loop round Verdun and on both sides of the Verdun-Toul line was now nearly completed; the only opening in it was the 30-mile stretch to the south, between Bar-le-Duc and Toul.

But here, too, just as on September 26, in the valley of the Aire, after the Germans crossed the Meuse at St. Mihiel, the cup was snatched from their lips at the last moment. The retreat of the French was over. The time for the advance had come, and while Troyon was being bombarded on the east bank of the Meuse they began to drive the enemy northwards towards the Aisne in two divisions, one each side of

Bar-le-Due. To the west of the town they pursued them hotly past the forest of the Three Fountains and Révigny, across the Ornain to the forest of Belnoue; to the east they forced them to abandon the line of the Saulx, which they had strongly entrenched, and followed them up past Vavineourt, and then on to the forest of Argonne, where the whole German line split in two, like a torrent dashed against a huge rock in mid-stream, and flowed on right and left, leaving the plateau high and dry in the centre. From this time onwards there was constant fighting in and round the forest—an arduous campaign of fierce combats in which the French showed extraordinary patience and pertinacity, and the enemy an equally dogged spirit of resistance. The local conditions are difficult in the extreme. The forest is a narrow rocky plateau, about 30 miles long by 8 wide, in the angle between the Aisne and its tributary the Aire. Its shelving slopes are covered with dense masses of oak, beech, and hornbeam, and a very thick undergrowth, broken only by occasional glades and sides and hardly any roads. It runs nearly due north and south, and as a rule is highest on its east side, from which a number of small burns, running at the bottom of deep-cut ravines with

precipitous sides sometimes 150 feet high, drop down into the Aire. The road and railway between Ste. Ménéhould and Clermont, which lie opposite to each other on its left and right borders, about on a level with Verdun, divide the forest into two nearly equal parts. Five or six miles north of this road is another, between Vienne-la-Ville (just below Vienne-la-



IN THE ARGONNE DISTRICT.

A French outpost in the woods around Bagatelle. Inset: In a German trench. The wire netting seen above is used as a protection against hand-grenades.



A STRUGGLE FOR A FEW YARDS IN THE ARGONNE.
This trench, which was fought for again and again, was retained by the French after desperate encounters.

Château) and Varennes, in a part of the forest known as the Bois de la Grurie, and two miles above this again a rough track, too small for wheeled traffic, which runs left to right from Servon to Montblainville. One or two other places that were constantly referred to in the official accounts of the Argonne operations from September to February are, on the Vienne-Varennes road, La Harazée, the Four de Paris, and la Barriade, and, between Servon and Montblainville, the Pavillon of Bagatelle—tiny little hamlets, gamekeepers' cottages, and roofless sheds, but none the less important landmarks in the intricate story of the fighting in the forest.

On September 15 the Germans were on opposite sides of the forest, at Vienne-la-Ville and Varennes, nine miles apart. The French threw themselves into the interior between these two positions with the object of preventing communication between them and eventually of enveloping one or the other, and entrenched the space between the two roads, a rectangle of about nine miles by three, the right side of which, from Bagatelle, past a little hovel called St. Hubert and Fontaine Madame to Barriade, faced the east section of the German Army at Varennes, while the left faced the enemy along the line Binarville-Servon-Vienne. In this tiny theatre of war, in spite of constant encounters of the fiercest description, the relative positions remained practically unchanged from the end of September all through the winter months. On the west side of the rectangle, where they had to deal as well with the French troops posted at Melzicourt, at the junction of the Aisne and the Tombe, the Germans were never able to encroach on the forest. Their chief efforts were all made on the other side, from their position between Varennes and Montblainville. As the result of a series of determined attacks between October 3 and October 20 the XVI. Army Corps, forming part of the Crown Prince's army, succeeded at last in forcing their way at this point into the Bois de la Grurie between the two roads. On the 12th they took Bagatelle and on the 15th St. Hubert and the Barriade. From here they advanced along the lower or Varennes-Vienne road to within a quarter of a mile of the Four de Paris, and extending their left front, occupied the Bois Bolante and Bois de la Chalade, just south of the road.

Then came the French *riposte*. From October 21, all through November, they fought their

way steadily back, with infinite determination and great gallantry, through these four or five miles of bloodstained forest, till on the 29th, after six weeks of charge and counter-charge, they once more reached Bagatelle and occupied the same front as in the middle of September, except that the enemy still had a footing at Barriade. During December, January, and February fighting of this kind went on day after day with hardly a break, and still with no modification of the rectangle of forest held by the French. But though they could claim nothing tangible in the way of an advance since September 15 they had gained here, as on the whole of the rest of the front, one enormous advantage. They still had to turn the enemy out of their two positions—especially that between Varennes and Montblainville—but on the whole, as compared with the first weeks of the war, it was they and not the Germans who were the attacking party.

The moral as well as military importance of this *bouleversement* of the original conditions was immense. It was won by heroic perseverance on the part of all the troops engaged, including the gallant Garibaldian contingent, which fought for a long time in this district. Much of the fighting consisted of attacks and counter-attacks on trenches extraordinarily close to one another, especially in the Bois Bolante, where they were often only from ten yards to the length of a cricket-pitch apart. These attacks were generally preceded by the explosion of mines, to the making of which the clayey soil—though an added difficulty in the way of infantry charges—was admirably adapted. In the retreat before the battle of the Marne, no less than at the critical moment when they stood with their backs to the Meuse before they in turn became the pursuers, the army of General Sarrail showed all the traditional qualities of the French soldier. But the finest, as it was the most anxious and trying, work that they did during the first six months of the war was the trench-to-trench struggle in those few square miles of deep ravines and trackless thickets, the short furious bursts and rushes and the patient sapping and mining of the blind-man's-buff fighting in the Forest of the Argonne.

To the west of the Argonne and the Third Army there were at the time of the retreat to the Marne three other French armies between General Sarrail and the British Expeditionary

Force, those of General Langle de Cary, General Foch and General Franchet d'Espérey. Unlike the first three armies they had no concern with the line of frontier fortresses. They were defending the heart of France, the huge open rolling plain of Champagne, in the district north of Châlons and east of Reims. There is one obvious difference between it and the country farther east which had a direct bearing on the course of the war. The big rivers, the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne, run from west to east, instead of from south to north like the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Mortagne. In the plains through which they flow there are no steep bluffs and deep-cut ravines, and no forests, but numbers of little fir woods, of geometric regularity, with wide, bare spaces between them. The soil is dry and chalky, and the work of digging trenches correspondingly easy. The villages on the watercourses in the hollows of the wide, shallow valleys can be seen from great distances, and for the same reason the movements of troops are both difficult and costly.

The distance due north from Châlons on the Marne to Rethel on the Aisne is about 30 miles; Reims lies halfway between them, a little to the west of the direct line from river to river. On September 6 the Duke of Wurtemberg and General von Hausen, commanding respectively the IVth, XIth, and XIIIth Army Corps and the XIIth, XIXth and the Guard, occupied a front of 50 miles extending from Révigny, past Vitry-le-François and the Camp de Mailly, which is about 20 miles south of Châlons, to the plateau of Sézanne. On the next two days the French in front of them retreated still farther south, but on September 9 General Foch, reinforced by the Xth Army Corps (part of the army of General Franchet d'Espérey) repulsed an attack of General von Hausen and the Prussian Guard, pushing them back on Vitry-le-François. On the 11th there was a general advance all along the line, and three days later the French had driven General von Hausen and the Duke of Wurtemberg back more than 30 miles across the plain to a position north of Reims (which they re-occupied on the 14th) and to Souain. This village, which lies just above the Camp de Châlons, about midway between Reims and the German position at Vienne in the Forest of the Argonne, became from that time the centre of most of the fighting in the Champagne district. Between it and the Forest of the Argonne the railway from

Vouzières to Ste. Ménéhould runs up the valley of the Aisne, skirting the west edge of the forest. At the north end of the forest, in the narrow passage which separates it from the Forest of Boule, a branch line from this railway follows the channel of the Aire southwards along the east side of the Argonne to the other German position at Montblainville. The possession of this passage, which is called the Gap of Grand-Pré, was therefore of great strategical importance, and became the chief French objective in this direction, so as to force the enemy away from the Forest of the Argonne. On September 19 they repelled a strong German attack on their centre and succeeded in taking Souain, but after that the position remained stationary all through October and November, the French line extending from Souain and the neighbouring village of Perthe les Hurlus, past Ville-sur-Tourbe to join, on the other side of the forest. General Sarrail's front reaching as far as Charny and Eix, a few miles north and north-east of Verdun. From December onwards there was almost daily fighting round Souain, Perthe-les-Hurlus, Tahure, Beauséjour and Le Mesnil, all within a few miles of each other. Great slaughter and little progress (though what there was was in favour of the French and towards the north) was the story of the fighting here through December, January and February, in which months the Germans alone lost 10,000 men. The severity of the struggle was a clear proof of the importance of the position in the eyes of both of the combatants. The Germans probably felt that a French advance here, if it reached the Gap of Grand-Pré, would so seriously threaten their lines of communication that it might prove the beginning of that piercing of their line which, since the battle of the Aisne and the beginning of the war of trenches, had necessarily become the chief object of the Allies—and the chief fear of the enemy.

For the conditions of the war had by now completely changed. Not only in the north of Champagne and in the Argonne, but east of Verdun, between the Meuse and the Moselle, in the valley of the Moselle towards Metz, and all along the frontier to the Vosges, the first force of the characteristic Germanic invasion had spent itself. Everywhere the Germans were besieged, and their efforts to advance became more like the sorties of a beleaguered garrison than the impetuous onrushes of an army of attack. Even in the Woevre and the

St. Mihiel wedge, in spite of their apparently threatening position, it was their lines much more than Verdun that were in a state of siege. Verdun, indeed, in spite of numerous German statements to the contrary, had not been besieged at all. General Sarrail, believing strongly in the maxim, "ville assiégée, ville prise," had seen to that, by extending its fortifications many miles in advance of the original zone. But though the day of the old-fashioned rampart had gone, the value as well as the power of artillery had enormously increased, and the guns on both sides played a prominent part in the autumn and winter operations. A good idea of the way in which they were employed, and of the ordinary life of the infantry when not actually in the trenches was given in an article written by the Paris correspondent of *The Times*, in which he described a visit to Verdun in December :

Verdun, he wrote, summarizes a development in the art of siege operations. It is a walled, battlemented city, with moat, drawbridges, and portcullis, protected by an outer ring of forts, which were modern a few months ago. Now every height and every valley in the country for 20 miles around has been so laboured at that there are fields ploughed by trenches and hillsides so closely dotted with short poles supporting barbed wire that they recall

the vineyards of Champagne when the vines have been cut in the autumn.

In the valleys through which we passed on our way to a vantage point in the Meuse heights from which to survey an artillery duel in progress we gained more clearly than in the plains of Flanders some idea of the way in which war is a test of national efficiency, and the completeness with which an army is self-contained. Regiments were at work making new roads and remaking old where they were worn by the constant stream of food and ammunition convoys, of artillery on the march, of rushing motor-cars, and of ponderously moving heavy guns. In the woods other regiments were felling trees, clearing the fire-zone of some hidden battery. Others were weaving twigs into baskets which, filled with earth, will strengthen the scattered defences. In the hills others, again, were cutting the trunks of young trees into stakes for barbed wire entanglements, preparing planks for the roofing of trenches, or for the manufacture of hospital beds, or for the construction of the marvellous winter dwellings which the handy soldier of Franco is building for himself in these exposed regions.

Gazing from the observation station the eye was caught here and there by clusters of men busy as bees. White ribbon-like roads were speckled with slowly-moving dots of motor convoys, of the ever gay-hearted French artilleryman going or returning from his position in the battery emplacements, constructed with marvellous skill by French engineers in the exposed hillsides around Verdun.

By giving free rein to the initiative and constructive abilities of the private in the French artillery, the whole of this section of the front is dotted with charming artillery "garden cities," made by the men themselves without any supervision from their officers. A huge scoop is taken out of the wooded, sandy hillside and the village nestles right into the heart of the hill. About



FRENCH GUNNERS AT WORK.

The famous 75 mm. gun in action in the Argonne Forest.

it is a fir-crowned crest over which the guns fire at point "46" on "X" hill some miles away. Below it stretches a valley flaked with the blue smoke of the soldier-woodmen's fires. Over the distant range of hills floats a captive balloon. Here and there is a glint of sun upon the wings of a speeding aeroplane. The battery itself contributes nothing to the general view. Its four guns, each in its little stall of turf, are covered with branches of spruce. The cottages of the men are built of straw or covered with the branches of trees and are lost in the general countryside. When we approached the "village" the men tumbled out of the porches and lined up for inspection by the General. They seemed at first sight to be the only sign of war in the whole valley. It was perfectly preposterous to think that at any moment a distant thud and a strange whistling sound would either send everybody scuttling to splinter-proof shelters or to the removal of the spruce branches in front of the battery and the dispatch of several tons of steel and explosives towards the distant, unseen, and mysterious point "46" far away on the other side of the hill. An artillery duel is a curious affair.

Climbing higher up the hillside—indeed quite to the very crest of the range—we had a wider view of the battlefield of the Meuse, which stretches, taking the German line, from Vauquois, through the Bois de Montfaucon to the north-east, through Flabas to Azannes, then south to Ornes to the east of Étain, then south-west to Maizeray, then south-west to Les Épargés, thence almost in a straight line through Amorville to St. Mihiel. From the point upon which we were standing, facing north-east, a ragged white line in the plain marked the German trenches. Behind it, across the wood of Montfaucon, set like a piece of jade in the silver of innumerable lakes and streams, rose the pointed spire of Montfaucon, its outline blurred by a cloud of smoke hanging over the village. The sound of guns firing upon Montfaucon was muffled by the cushion of the intervening hill and forest. Never was there such a pleasantly peaceful afternoon.

Suddenly, with a soaring roar over the woods in the foreground, four shells from the battery near which we stood sped out towards the hidden Germans. It all seemed very aimless until General Sarrail, pointing overhead, explained this sudden activity. An aeroplane working with this battery had transmitted by wireless



IN THE CHAMPAGNE DISTRICT.
French soldiers searching for Germans in a
village farmhouse.

the result of its reconnaissance. Little specks of light, such as splinter the darkness of the night on an overhead electric trolley, showed bright even against the daylight sky as battery after battery came into action. All seemed as if anxious to join in the conversation—bass, alto and tenor made their voices heard—and down in the plain along the tree-lined road the men in the trenches stopped their game of dominoes and prepared to add an asthmatic soprano of musketry to the general chorus.

Day and night this apparently aimless artillery duel fills the hills with the sound of the banging of big gongs. Day and night French cavalry patrol the two neutral zones, the no-man's land left between Étain and Haute-Cour, between Herméville and Wareq, watching for any sign of advance by the enemy through these two inviting corridors, stumbling every now and again upon a German patrol engaged upon the same mission, and adding their weekly quota to the list of killed and wounded.

It is the men in the trenches who are giving Verdun her elbow room. It is the artillery which renders their existence possible.

It was the same story all along the line. The men in the trenches gave Verdun and Toul and Epinal and Belfort elbow room, and the artillery made their existence possible. As the result of their combined operations the Germans were everywhere pressed slowly back, or at least prevented from advancing, through the five months from October to February. Between Verdun and the Vosges this pressure on the enemy's lines was most severe at certain points of particular strategic value. Thus in the Woevre, though it was kept up without intermission on both sides of the St. Mihiel wedge, it was most vigorous in the neighbourhood of Étain, on the line between Fresnes and St. Mihiel, and on the southern side of the wedge at the forest of Apremont and the Bois de Mort-Mare, a little south of Thiaucourt. The reasons for this were two-fold. It was never the French policy to clear the enemy out of the Woevre by hammering at the point of the wedge. The strength of the fort in the Camp des Romains, close to St. Mihiel, made its western extremity almost impregnable, except at the cost of very heavy losses. Their main idea, therefore, was to compel the Germans to evacuate St. Mihiel and the Camp des Romains by bringing lateral pressure to bear at the other end of the two sides, so as to press them together like the legs of a pair of compasses. At the same time they wished to get at the strategic railway by which the enemy brought their supplies to St. Mihiel through the Trouée de Spada. The fighting was therefore most severe at the points which best lent themselves to the prosecution of these two objects, both of which were intended to compel the retreat of the Germans from the point of the wedge. North of Nancy there was in the same way a



BARBED WIRE DEFENCES IN FRANCE.

French sentry in his dugout behind entanglements on a main road. Inset: Bringing in the wounded in the Argonne.

of innocent non-combatants, and had pillaged and burnt the villages and towns in which they lived, and they had driven back the French army which tried to invade Lorraine. But at the end of February they were almost as far from their original goal as they were before the war began, and much further from it than at the end of August.

ALSACE AND THE VOSGES.

prolonged succession of infantry and artillery engagements all through the winter, near Pont-à-Mousson, in the Bois le Prêtre. Very slowly, foot by foot and trench by trench, and not without splendid courage and many costly rebuffs, the French fought their way through the wood, and therefore along the valley of the Moselle, towards Metz. Measured in miles, or even yards, the advantage gained, at great expense, was trifling. But it prepared the way for a possible advance on the fortress in that direction, and at the same time pressed the enemy back towards the frontier, in the same way as the less well known operations lower down in the forest of Pasroy, and in front of Badonviller. As the Germans were actually at first, and technically afterwards, the attacking force, they could hardly look upon the general result of the winter campaign on this part of the line as satisfactory. They had killed or deported as hostages a large number

In Alsace and the Vosges they fared still worse, since here the French had still a strong footing, though their positions were not as far advanced as they were at the beginning of the war, when at one time they penetrated within ten miles of the Rhine. For this partial retirement there were two reasons. It was due, in the first part of the campaign, to mistakes of generalship which followed on the brilliant opening. After the first occupation of Mülhausen, the French retreated because they were obliged to by a defeat on the spot. They fell back from Mülhausen the second time because of the reverses suffered further north, at Morhange and elsewhere, as the result of which General Joffre decided to reduce the size of the army in Alsace, so as to concentrate stronger forces at the points where the need for the time being was greatest. In subsequent operations during the course of the winter on practically every occasion when the French withdrew nearer to their own frontier, they did so in order to avoid useless loss of life in holding

positions not so strong or so strategically important as others further back.

From a military point of view the campaign in Alsace up to the end of February was not of great importance. There was plenty of hard fighting in the Vosges and the long narrow plateau, twenty miles across, between them and the Rhine, but neither side made use of such large bodies of troops as were employed along the rest of the front. The moral effect, however, of the continued French occupation of part of the annexed province was considerable in both countries. The French were elated and the Germans proportionately depressed by the partial undoing of one of the visible results of the war of 1870. In Alsace itself the behaviour of the Germans greatly increased the dislike with which they were already regarded by a large part of the inhabitants. In the big towns, from the beginning of the war, they systematically kept them in a state of complete ignorance of everything that did not tell in their favour. In Mülhausen, for instance, and also in Metz and Strassburg, the news of the battle of the Marne and of every other success of the Allies was carefully concealed, and on the other hand the extent of German triumphs was greatly exaggerated. Spies and informers made life intolerable for all who were suspected of pro-French sympathies, and even the speaking of French was automatically suspended, as it was certain to lead to denunciation. No one dared to risk it. When the German troops came back to Mülhausen after the first occupation, they proceeded to round up two or three hundred of the male inhabitants who were foreigners, including a large number of French Alsatians, and imprisoned them for varying periods in the interior of Germany. There were people of all classes and ages among them, rich manufacturers and poor artisans, old and young, and all were treated with the same callous inhumanity (their only crime being that they were not Germans); except that the handful of English, whatever their station, were bullied and browbeaten more than the rest and set to do the most degrading tasks. On the evening of their arrest, before they were taken away from Mülhausen, the whole body of the prisoners were suddenly ordered to form themselves into ranks, and the first rank were then placed against a wall opposite to a few files of soldiers who went through the motions of loading and presenting their rifles. The unfortunate men naturally concluded that their


last hour had come, when suddenly the officer who was presiding over the heartless ceremony stepped forward and explained brutally that now they knew what would happen to them if they showed any signs of insubordination. In all the shameful story of the callous cruelty of the Germans during the war it would be difficult to find a more glaring example of the way in which the lust of conquest had blinded a part of the nation to the most elementary principles of right and wrong.

After the second retreat from Mülhausen the army of Alsace, very much weakened by the removal of some of its units to different parts of the frontier, proceeded to entrench itself in front of Belfort along a line of about 25 miles, starting from Thann at the foot of the Vosges, and passing between Dannemarie and Altkirch to Moos, near the junction of the French, German and Swiss frontiers. Supported by the garrison of Belfort they held this line all through the autumn, in spite of many determined efforts to dislodge them, besides making it the base for constant reconnaissances in force, which sometimes advanced 20 miles into the enemy's country. During the winter, when the rain-soaked ground began to make manœuvres of this kind almost impossible, in order to avoid wintering in the open country and because of the floods which threatened to cut them off from their base of supply, they fell back a little nearer to Belfort, on the railway between Dannemarie and Pfetterhausen, in the valley of the Largue. The enemy, who commanded the railway north of Pfirt by Altkirch to Mülhausen, and from there to Cernay, did not suffer from the same difficulties of transport, and were able to occupy the various positions as they were evacuated by the French, but only after they had retired of their own accord. Not one of them was taken by assault, and through most of December there was hardly any fighting in Haute Alsace beyond trifling skirmishes and affairs between the outposts. But about Christmas snow began to fall, and as soon as the frost had made marching more possible the French resumed the offensive. They had in the meantime received reinforcements, consisting partly of Alpine troops who were used to manœuvring in the snow, and they succeeded quickly in gaining several important strategic positions near Steinbach and Altkirch, from which they were able to threaten Mülhausen from two directions at once. To this the Germans replied by bringing

down fresh troops from the north of France and strengthening their artillery, which up to that time had been rather weak. From now onwards the campaign in Haute Alsace settled down for the most part into the stubborn snail's pace warfare of the trenches. But every now and then there were exceptions. Between December 27 and January 8 there was fierce fighting for the possession of the point 425 near Cernay, and the Germans finally succeeded by a characteristic attack in column, in establishing themselves on the side of the hill. Another position in the same district, a short distance farther to the north, a few miles above Thann, which became the centre of a prolonged struggle, was the hill of Hartmannsweilerkopf, 2,868 feet above the level of the sea. At the end of December the Germans held the east slope and the French the west. In the first days of the new year the French captured the summit, and established on it a post of about one company in strength. A German detachment of two battalions was ordered to dislodge them. Approaching the hill from the east, they attacked two bodies of French troops, first at Hirzenstein, to the south of their objective, and then in the depression between Hartmannsweilerkopf and Molkenreim, another

steep mountain a mile or two to the west of it, a dangerous but clever movement which was rewarded with success. The small detachment of Alpine troops on the top of Hartmannsweilerkopf was thus completely cut off from its base, but for several days from their strongly entrenched position kept up a gallant fight against the much stronger force of the enemy. At last about 40 of the chasseurs, mounted on skis, determined to make a sortie and try to join the main body. The order was given to fix bayonets, and, headed by two officers, with loud cries of "Vive la France," the little body of heroes glissaded down over the frozen snow right into the middle of the enemy. At the end of a few minutes of fierce hand to hand fighting not a single Frenchman was left alive. The rest of the company at the top of the hill fought on bravely till two-thirds of their number and all of their ammunition was gone, and then were finally overcome. For the time being Hartmannsweilerkopf was lost to the French, but they still held the almost impregnable mountain of Molkenrein, the chief peak of the district, 3,375 feet high, close to it, and effectually barring the entrance to the middle and upper parts of the valley.

From the end of January onwards both sides




CHASSEURS ALPINS NEGOTIATING A MOUNTAIN STREAM

made several attacks in various parts of Alsace without gaining any material advantage. Cernay, Mülhausen, and the Rhine-Rhone canal were the chief objectives of the French; the most vigorous fighting was round Altkirch, between Aspach and Heidweiler, to the north of the town, and in the forest of Hirzbach, just south of it. The affair at Aspach was particularly violent, and in the end the French, as the result of a brilliant bayonet charge, succeeded in establishing themselves well in front of their original position. Generally speaking, the fighting in the rest of Alsace up to the end of February consisted chiefly of a violent series of artillery duels, though even these were conducted with great difficulty owing to the flooded state of the country. Both sides were waiting for the spring to come, and there was little change in the relative positions of the two armies. But the net result was in favour of the French. They held not only the crests of the Vosges, but the valleys running down through them to the plain of the Rhine, and at the lower ends of the valleys they continued to resist successfully the efforts of the Germans to force a way up them into France. South of the range they had estab-

lished a strong line across the entrance to the Trouée of Belfort, and by advancing towards Mülhausen and Altkirch had practically shut them out from any hope they might have had of making a direct attack on the famous fortress. Before the coming of spring, therefore, it seemed likely that Belfort (which was further protected by many miles of newly constructed entrenchments) would remain, as in 1870, unsubdued and even unattacked.

But that was the one solitary point in which there was any resemblance at all between the state of affairs in 1870 and at the beginning of 1915. Everything else was different, and the whole of the change was strongly in favour of France and her allies. The Germans had come once again, but they had not conquered. The France that they found this time was a united France, headed by a united Government, and defended by a united army—an army purged of its incompetent officers, burning with indignation at the wanton attack that had been made upon the freedom of France and of Europe, and unflinching in its resolve to fight and to go on fighting, no matter how great the cost, till all fears of another such attack were at an end.



Facsimile of official *visé* of the Mayor of Badonviller, Monsieur Benoit, on the passport of the "Times" special correspondent in the East of France. Badonviller was three times occupied by the Germans, who took away all the official stamps of the town except the one pictured above, which is that of the "Tueries," a local slaughter-house. The wife of the Mayor (whose signature forms part of the *visé*) was shot by the Germans in the street before his eyes.

CHAPTER LXII.

THE BATTLE OF YPRES (FIRST PHASE).

THE OPENING MOVES OF THE BATTLE OF YPRES—THE FRENCH ADVANCE TO ROULERS, AND THE BRITISH ON MENIN AND LILLE—DUKE OF WURTEMBERG HEAVILY REINFORCED—VICTORY OF THE GERMANS AT ROULERS—ARRIVAL OF SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND I. CORPS—SITUATION ON OCTOBER 19—THE FIELD OF BATTLE—STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION—ATTEMPT OF SIR DOUGLAS HAIG TO BREAK THE GERMAN CENTRE NORTH OF THE LYS—THE ALLIES OBLIGED TO FIGHT A DEFENSIVE BATTLE—LE GHEIR LOST—GENERAL HUNTER-WESTON RETAKES IT ON THE 21ST—THE BATTLE OF OCTOBER 22; RETIREMENT OF SIR HORACE SMITH-DORRIEN TO THE LINE GIVENCHY-NEUVE CHAPELLE-FAUQUISSART; CAVALRY CORPS REINFORCED BY INDIAN INFANTRY; THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN DANGER; THE LINE OF THE I. CORPS BROKEN NEAR PILKEM—BATTLE OF OCTOBER 23; THE BRITISH DRIVE BACK THE GERMANS AND SAVE THE DAY—ARRIVAL OF FRENCH 9TH CORPS.

WHILE, as related in Chapter LIV., the Duke of Wurtemberg from October 16 to 23 was struggling in face of the Belgian Army and Ronarc'h's Marines to cross the Yser, a battle of the most desperate nature was proceeding from Dixinude to Armentières and from Armentières to La Bassée. It arose out of the efforts of the Allies to take the initiative against the Germans.

The plan of campaign adopted by Joffre and French was to fight a defensive battle with the left wing of their armies on the Yser and to attack with their centre in front of Ypres and with their right south of the Lys. On the 17th, when the Germans were shelling the Belgians in the villages east of the Yser, the cavalry of De Mitry cleared the Forest of Houthulst of the Germans; the 3rd British Cavalry Division extended its left to Westroosebeke and its right to Droogenbroodhoek. The next day (the 18th) Ronarc'h reoccupied Essen, the mounted African troops threatened Bovekerke and the woods of Couckelaere,

De Mitry's cavalry entered Cortemarek and Roulers, the 7th British Infantry Division marched on Menin, and our Cavalry Corps pressed down the north bank of the Lys to assist in capturing the bridge-heads over the river.

The III. Corps, north of the Lys, on the 17th had occupied Le Gheir at the eastern edge of the Bois de Ploogsteert opposite Pont Rouge, and its centre and right wing extended over the Lys towards Radinghem on the ridge between the Lys and the La Bassée-Lille Canal.* Though the enemy had been heavily reinforced, on the 18th Pulteney captured Radinghem, Ennetières, Capinghem, at which last-mentioned village the British troops were between Forts Englos and Carnot, the two works guarding Lille from an attack on the west. The left of the III. Corps was astride the Lys, 400 yards south of Frelinghien, its right in touch with Conneau's Cavalry Corps. Beyond Conneau's Cavalry the II.

* The Corps of the British Expeditionary Force are numbered in Roman figures.



ON GUARD.

A British sentry on the walls of a ruined
château.

Corps had on the 17th taken Aubers on the ridge and Herlies to its south, and the next day it gallantly repulsed several severe counter-attacks. If the ridge could be held, the Germans might be driven from Lille and La Bassée.

So far the only misadventure in the battle had been the repulse of the 7th Infantry Division, which had been unable to take Menin. Mr. Underwood, an interpreter to the Staff of the 21st Infantry Brigade, describes some of the fighting of that Division on the 18th. The 21st Brigade before dawn had marched to Becelaere and moved on Terhand:

The troops marched out of Gheluvelt at 4.30 a.m., and arrived at Becelaere 7.30 a.m. The 22nd R.F.A. opened fire on our left, and the battle began. This was the baptism of fire for most of our brigade, and they stuck it well. At 8.30 a.m. the whole line advanced to Terhand. At 11 a.m. our first casualties were reported: 1 officer killed and 2 wounded in the Bedfordshires, and 20 men wounded. We took up our quarters at five o'clock in a farmhouse 200 yards in rear of Terhand windmill. A battery of our guns was posted there, and opened fire on the enemy. The farmer, his wife, two daughters, and one son, with two refugee women and three children from Ghent, were also there. The battery had hardly opened fire when the enemy replied, and soon the shells were whirring right over the farmhouse, much to the discomfiture of the inmates. By six o'clock our guns had silenced the enemy's batteries, and we were once more at peace; but the shells had done a good deal of damage to Terhand village. We did not undress that night, as we expected a night attack. This, however did not mature.


The explanation of the Allied offensive north of the Lys is a simple one. For their operations against the Allied line north of the Lys the Germans were bound to keep hold of the Menin-Roulers-Thourout-Ostend highway, because from it proceeded westwards all the roads by which they could approach the Allied line between Ypres and the sea. Moreover, a little to the east of it ran the Lille-Menin-Thourout-Ostend railway, joined at Roulers, Lichtervelde, and Thourout by lines connecting with Liège and thence with the strategic railways of Germany. Joffre's object was to cut the Menin-Ostend road and railroad.

On the morning of the 19th, though Menin had not been taken by the 7th Infantry Division, Roulers was in the possession of the French, and French cavalry was menacing from Cortemarck both Lichtervelde and Thourout, and the African horsemen near Couckelaere were advancing north-east of the latter town. Other troops were coming up; the I. Corps (Sir Douglas Haig's) was detraining between St. Omer and Hazebrouck, and marching on

Ypres; the Lahore Division of the Indian Army was assembling behind the II. Corps. The British monitors and destroyers, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hood, had made their unexpected appearance off the coast, and were protecting the left wing of the Belgians along the Yser.

On their side the Germans had been heavily reinforced. For example, three Reserve Corps (Nos. 26, 27, and 28) had reached Courtrai from Germany. Each company in them was composed of 100 Volunteers—some of whom had had about six or seven weeks' training—100 Reservists (Landwehr Reserve), aged from thirty-one to thirty-six, and 40 Landwehr-Ersatz Reserve between thirty-six and thirty-nine years of age. The officers and equipment (many soldiers had obsolete rifles) might be of inferior quality but the men were full of enthusiasm. An inhabitant of Courtrai, on whom three officers—respectively an evangelical clergyman, a doctor of classical philology, and a commercial traveller—were quartered, relates that, in answer to his question whether they “expected to meet the British,” one of his “guests,” who two days later was wounded, replied: “Oh, yes, we’ve come to see them run; that’s all their long legs are good for. We shall be in Calais before the end of the week.” On the 19th (Monday), as the men were about to march to the field of battle, their officers announced to them an encouraging piece of news: “Boys,” they said, “you’ll be glad to hear that Paris fell into our hands last night.” The soldiers, some of whom danced for joy, sang the “Wacht am Rhein,” and a song specially composed for the entry of the Germans into Paris. One of them, who had been already in the fighting line, however, observed: “Unfortunately, this is the fourth time we have had the fall of Paris announced to us!” The soldiers were given half-an-hour’s leave to drink to the triumph of the Fatherland, and under the influence of stimulants such sceptical utterances fell on unappreciative ears.

Reinforced on their centre and wings the Germans on the 19th took the offensive. Issuing from Ostend and exposing themselves to the fire of the British flotilla, they assaulted Lombartzyde, the Belgian advanced post in front of Nieuport. Their attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. On the right bank of the Yser between Nieuport and Dixmude they fell upon the Belgians in Keyem and Beerst. Keyem held out, but Beerst was taken and



THE PERISCOPE.

Seeing without being seen.

then recaptured by the French Marines and part of the Belgian 5th Division from Dixmude. Eventually the Allies were compelled to retire from this point and also from Keyem, as the Germans had captured Roulers, and thus were able to threaten the right flank of the Allied Army on the Yser. They had forced back the French cavalry demonstrating towards the Roulers-Thourout-Ostend road, and they had advanced along the high road which branches off from it three miles north of Roulers to Hooglede. On the hill of Hooglede, German artillery had been posted, and, covered by it, the German infantry descended to attack Roulers.

From the Bruges-Courtrai road other columns

Menin and establish himself on the Roulers-Menin road. To cover the advance of the 7th Infantry Division on Menin, Byng's Cavalry Division (the 3rd), placed on its left, had pushed eastwards from the line Westroosebeke-Moorslede. By 10 a.m. the 7th Cavalry



BELGIAN REFUGEES LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY.

Top picture: Crowds at Ghent outside the Town Hall waiting to obtain passports to permit them to travel to England. Centre: Arrival of refugees at the Gare du Nord, Paris. Bottom picture: Waiting on the Quayside at Ostend.

of the Germans had marched on that town, which was shelled from Ardoye and from Iseghem. By nightfall Roulers was once more held by the enemy and its defenders had withdrawn to Oostnieuwkerke. The African Cavalry on the extreme left were even brought back behind the Ypres-Yser canal.

While the battle of Roulers was proceeding, another attempt was being made by Sir Henry Rawlinson with the IV. Corps to capture

Brigade was in touch with considerable bodies of the enemy and had to fall back. North of Moorslede "K" Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery, which had been attached to the brigade, came into action and afforded it great assistance. From Moorslede and Droogenbroodhoek the 6th Brigade, aided by "C" Battery and protected by the 7th Brigade, had pushed ahead to St. Pieter and thence had crossed the Roulers-Menin road, and after a brisk action occupied Ledeghem on the Roulers-Menin railroad and Rollegheemcappelle. In the meantime the 7th Infantry Brigade from the edge of the belt of woods which to



THE BELGIANS IN THE TRENCHES.

The famous 7th Regiment of the Line.

the south and east of Ypres stretches from the end of the Mont-des-Cats ridge to Zonnebeke had been heavily engaged with the enemy, who at Menin and Wervieq had crossed to the north bank of the Lys. The Division made some little progress, and, with the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Ledeghem and Rollegheemcappelle, there was a prospect that Menin and Wervieq might be taken.

But the German victory at Roulers, combined with the movement of the enemy from Courtrai on Ledeghem, obliged Sir Henry Rawlinson to suspend the advance of Capper's Division. The 7th Cavalry Brigade had had to be withdrawn to the high ground east of Moorslede, on which village the 6th Cavalry Brigade, pursued by considerable forces from Courtrai, was being gradually brought back from Ledeghem and Rollegheemcappelle. Covered by the 7th Cavalry Brigade, it retired through Moorslede, and at nightfall it was in billets in and round Poelcappelle, south of the Forest of Houthulst, on the Hoogledede-Westroosebeke - Ypres highway. The 7th Cavalry Brigade, under a heavy shell fire, effected its retreat to Zonnebeke, south of Poelcappelle on the Roulers-Ypres railroad, and French cavalry occupied Passehendaele between Zonnebeke and Westroosebeke. The 7th Infantry Brigade by sunset was in its old position from Zandvoorde through Kruiseik to Gheluveld, and to the north of that village; its left was prolonged by the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and, beyond Zonnebeke, by the French as far as Westroosebeke.

Thus the Germans on the 19th had recovered most of the Roulers-Dixmude road and all the Menin-Roulers-Thourout-Ostend road and railroad; they were threatening the route from

Westroosebeke to Wervieq. The northern end of it round Westroosebeke was held by the French, but lower down towards Wervieq, which was in the hands of the Germans, parties of the enemy had crossed to the western side of the road.

It was under such critical circumstances that Sir John French on the night of the 19th met Sir Douglas Haig. As, after Sir John, Sir Douglas was perhaps the most important British officer who took part in the battle of Ypres, it may not here be out of place to supply the reader with a brief biography of the soldier whose name will always be associated with that of the I. Corps.

Three years the junior of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien—the other of Sir John French's principal lieutenants at the battles of Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne, the Aisne and Ypres—Sir Douglas Haig was born on June 29, 1861. He was the youngest son of John Haig, J.P., of Cameronbridge, Fife. He was educated at Clifton College and at Brasenose College, Oxford. In 1885 he was gazetted to the 7th Hussars, and was Adjutant of that regiment from 1888 to 1892, and obtained his captaincy in 1891. During this time he showed that he was not only a studious soldier but a dashing polo player. From April 28, 1894, to March 31, 1895, he was A.D.C. to the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and then passed through the Staff College.

His first active service was with Lord Kitchener in the River War of 1898. He was present at the battles of the Atbara and Omdurman, and was mentioned in dispatches. At the outbreak of the South African War Major Haig was sent to Natal, and served under Sir John French at the actions of Elands-

laagte, Rietfontein and Lombard's Kop. He was on the Staff of Sir John French during the operations round Colesberg at the beginning of 1900, and accompanied him on his celebrated ride to Kimberley. Later he took part in the battles of Paardeberg, Poplar Grove, Dreifontein. He was present at the actions of Karee Siding, Vet River and Zand River, at the takings of Johannesburg and Pretoria, at the battle of Diamond Hill, and in the advance to Middelburg and Komati Poort. When Kritzinger invaded Cape Colony in December, 1900, Lord Kitchener gave Haig the command of four columns sent in pursuit of the Boer leader. Haig next joined in the abortive efforts to capture De Wet, who had followed Kritzinger and Hertzog into the Colony. When De Wet and Hertzog returned to the Orange



PAY-DAY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
German Infantry being paid in notes.

Free State, Haig was stationed in the southern district, from which he was again transferred—in April, 1901—to Cape Colony. During May he was hunting Kritzinger. On July 16, 1901, he became Lieutenant-Colonel of the 17th Lancers. During the remainder of the war he assisted French in clearing Cape Colony.

Haig left South Africa with a greatly enhanced reputation, and, now a Colonel, he was appointed by Lord Kitchener Inspector-General of Cavalry in India (1903-6). Promoted a Major-General in 1904, he returned to England in 1906 to take up the post of Director of Military Training at the War Office. In 1907 he became Director of Staff Duties, and in 1909 Chief of the Staff in India. Three years later he was given the

command of the Aldershot District, which formed practically the I. Army Corps.

In August, 1914, Haig, a Lieutenant-General, proceeded to France at the head of the I. Corps. He brilliantly commanded the right wing at the battle of Mons and during the subsequent retreat, and at the battles of the Marne and Aisne highly distinguished himself.

To what point in the battlefield was the I. Corps to be directed?

The bold offensive taken by French and General d'Urbal had failed. The Germans at Keyem and Beerst were on the banks of the Yser. Its waters are carried from Dixmude to Nieuport in a channel raised some twenty-five feet or so above the fields to the west, easy for the Germans to hold if they were in possession of it and difficult for the Allies to retake. To the west of the banks of the canal there were only the low embankment of the Dixmude-Nieuport railway and a number of dykes and ditches to impede the enemy's advance to Furnes. If this point were gained, Nieuport and Dixmude would become untenable, and the left of the Allies round Ypres could be attacked by the Germans in flank.

Between Dixmude and Ypres the position was also precarious. Part of the Dixmude-Roulers road had been lost, and, south of it, the Forest of Houthulst was being reoccupied by the enemy.

From Dixmude to Bixschoote the Allied line ran along the Yser Canal to the old and dismantled Fort de Knoeke, then along the Yperlee Canal towards Ypres. At Bixschoote the Allied line struck east and roughly formed two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was Westroosebeke, eight miles or so north-east of Ypres. The base of the triangle might be said to be formed by the Yperlee Canal, by the city of Ypres, and by the Ypres-Comines Canal as far as Houthem. A glance at the map on pages 460-1 will show the reader that an enemy debouching from the Forest of Houthulst could attack the Bixschoote-Langemark-Poeleappelle-Westroosebeke side of this triangle, which was about 7 miles in length.

The third side of the triangle was ten miles long. The Allies, as related, held the main road from Westroosebeke through Passchendaele to the neighbourhood of Zonnebeke. From Zonnebeke their line stretched round the woods to Gheluvelt on the Menin-Ypres road; thence it proceeded over the fields

to Kruseik; from which point it bent westwards to Zandvoorde, and from Zandvoorde it descended to Houthem on the Comines-Ypres Canal. Behind the line Zonnebeke-Houthem the country, which is of a rolling nature, was in parts thickly wooded. North of Zonnebeke the space in the triangle was fairly open, though near the apex there were clumps of trees. East of the line Zonnebeke-Westroosebeke, towards Roulers, there were more woods.

Keeping in mind the distance to which modern guns can throw shells, it is obvious that if the Germans arranged their artillery in a crescent from the north of Langemarck round Westroosebeke to the east of Zonnebeke, the position of the Allies in the area Zonnebeke-Westroosebeke-Langemarck would become very perilous. The distance between Zonnebeke and Langemarck, which villages are connected by a cross-road, is only four miles, and towards the apex of the triangle, between Poelcappelle and Passchendaele, the trenches of the defenders facing north and east respectively, would be scarcely three miles apart.

Thus on the north and the north-east the position of the Allies was a bad one, but on the east the belt of woods which extends south of Zonnebeke to Gheluveld and thence to Hollebeke on the canal and thereafter to the eastern spurs of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats, opposed a substantial barrier to an enemy moving on Ypres from the north bank of the Lys between Courtrai and Warneton. Most of the trees, on the 19th October, were still intact and standing. In the tops of some of them sharpshooters or even machine guns could be ensconced, and the branches here and there to some extent protected the troops from shrapnel. The trunks of the trees stopped or diminished

the velocity of rifle bullets and the foliage screened men and guns from hostile air-craft.

On the eastern side of the Comines-Ypres Canal the main approaches to Ypres through the woods which, be it noted, were not continuous, were—beginning from the canal—the road from Wervicq on the Lys by Zandvoorde-Klein Zillebeke, and Zillebeke, that from Menin through Gheluveld and Hooge, and one from Courtrai through Ledeghem-Dadizeele-Terhand-Becelaere to Gheluveld and thence to Hooge. From the north the woods could be turned by the road from Roulers by Moorslede and Zonnebeke to Ypres.

In making their calculations, Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig had to take into account that the Germans, who held all the crossings of the Lys from Frelinghien, three miles north-east of Armentières, to Comines, as well as those from Comines to Ghent, might attack Ypres from the south.

The gap between Zandvoorde through the woods to the eleven-mile-long ridge—in places two miles wide and some hundreds of feet high—of the Mont-des-Cats, which from Godevaersvelde to Wytschaete and Messines crosses the plain and divides the Poperinghe-Ypres road from the Lys, was filled by the two Divisions of the British Cavalry Corps. These troops, the number of which could not much have exceeded 4,000 horses, were now being used principally as infantry. Crossing the Lys at Warneton and at Comines the Germans could advance on Ypres either through Hollebeke or by the main road which leads from Warneton to St. Eloi. The country south of the line Messines-Hollebeke was sparsely wooded. A cross road connected St. Eloi with Vlamertinghe between Poperinghe and Ypres,



AN OLD METHOD REVIVED.

British troops throwing hand-grenades from the trenches.



BELGIAN PRISONERS DIGGING
TRENCHES, GUARDED BY
GERMAN SOLDIERS.

Inset : German observation post on top of a
haystack.

and if St. Eloi, two miles south of Ypres, were captured, not only could that city, which lies in a hollow, be assaulted, but all the communications of the Allies through Ypres south of the Ypres-Poperinghe high road might be cut and the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats attacked from the north.

The ridge was of cardinal importance to the Allies. If it were occupied, Ypres, Vlamerhinghe and Poperinghe must be abandoned, and the line of the Ypres-Dixmude-Nieuport Canal could not be maintained. From the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats the German artillery would sweep the plain on both sides, and, descending from the ridge, the German infantry would be at Godewaersvelde on the Hazebrouck-Poperinghe-Ypres railroad and at Bailleul on the Hazebrouck-Armentières railway. These two lines were, with the Dunkirk-Furnes-Dixmude railroad, the sole railways going eastward from the line Dunkirk-Hazebrouck-Merville. The ridge of the Mont-des-

Cats was thus the key to the Allied position north of the Lys.

At its eastern end, as already mentioned, nestled on high ground the village of Wytschaete and, south of it, the village of Messines. Below Messines and flowing from the west along the base of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats was the little river Douve. Beyond it rose Hill 63, a knoll on a low ridge which separated the Douve from the Lys. On the other side of this ridge and divided by the Ypres - St. Eloi - Wytschaete - Messines - Ploegsteert-Armentières chaussée was the Ploegsteert wood, called by the British troops "Plug Street," a straggling patch of woodland some 3,000 yards long by 1,500 wide. The ground under the trees was a treacherous bog, the roads scarcely passable on account of mud.

The right flank of the Cavalry Corps rested on the north-eastern end of the wood, a detachment holding the hamlet of St. Yves. Along the eastern and the south-eastern edges of the Bois de Ploegsteert were entrenched units of the left wing of the III. Corps. Le Gheir, which is at the south-eastern corner of the wood, was occupied by the British. The remainder of the III. Corps north of the Lys was disposed between Le Gheir and the bank of the river 400 yards south of Frelinghien.



BELGIAN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

After a fortnight's fighting the Belgians have been relieved and are going back for a rest.

Inset: A message by telephone.



From the western outskirts of Frelinghien the front of the III. Corps curved round Armentières to Radinghem, a village on the long, low ridge which divides the flat and usually waterlogged plain south of the Lys from the La Bassée-Lille Canal. On it are the villages of Radinghem, Fromelles, Aubers, Violaines, Givenchy. The ridge is south of Givenchy traversed by the La Bassée-Lille Canal at Cuinchy. It extends beyond Cuinchy to Vermelles.

Conneau's Cavalry Corps and, to its west, the II. Corps, were disposed between Radinghem and Givenchy. The II. Corps had captured Givenchy, Violaines, Aubers, and Herlies, and Major Daniell with the Royal Irish Regiment had just stormed the village of Le Pilly.

South of the La Bassée-Lille Canal the right wing of the II. Corps joined on to the left wing of General de Maud'huy's Army.

The German forces operating against this fifty or so miles long line of the Allies between the sea and La Bassée were in greatly superior numbers. The II. Corps and Conneau's Cavalry Corps had been originally opposed by a part of the 14th German Corps, four Cavalry Divisions and several battalions of Jaegers, but

from the 19th to the 31st the enemy here were reinforced by the remainder of the 14th Corps, by a Division of the 7th Corps, and by a brigade of the 3rd Corps. The British III. Corps, which was astride the Lys, holding a line from thirteen to fifteen miles long, was also outnumbered and outgunned. On the 18th Sir John French had directed its commander, General Pulteney, to drive the enemy eastward towards Lille and then to assist the Cavalry Corps to cross the Lys east of Frelinghien. Confronted by the 19th Saxon Corps, at least one Division of the 7th Corps, and three or four Divisions of Cavalry, and the German troops being constantly reinforced from Lille, the Cavalry Corps and III. Corps found themselves unable to accomplish the task set them. The road from Lille to Frelinghien remained in the German possession, as also the high road which from Lille passes Fort Carnot and crosses the Lys at Pont Rouge and by Warneton and Wervicq goes to Menin. Behind that road in

the section south of the Lys flowed the canalised river Deule to Deulemont, where it entered the Lys. Protected on his left flank by the Deule and by Forts Carnot and Englos, the Crown Prince of Bavaria could throw his troops across the Lys to attack Le Gheir, the wood of Ploegsteert, Messines, Wytschaete, St. Eloi, Hollebeke, Zandvoorde, Gheluvelt, and Zonnebeke.

The left wing of the Allies—in a straight line over 120 miles long—was now perpendicular to the centre from Compiègne to Verdun, which centre—about the same length—was nearly perpendicular to a front of similar dimensions from Verdun to Belfort. With the railroads and motor traction at their disposal the German leaders could shift their troops across the 125 miles separating Lille from Verdun more quickly than Joffre could transfer his from the neighbourhood of Lille to the great fortified camp which barred the advance of German Armies from Metz on Paris.

For the moment, then, Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig could not count on any immediate assistance from the French. Between the slag heaps near La Bassée and the seventy

feet or so wide Lys, running through a shallow depression in the plain, they could oppose to the Germans only the II. Corps, Conneau's Cavalry Corps, and a part of the III. Corps; from the Lys northwards to the Bois de Ploegsteert the remainder of the III. Corps, thence to Zandvoorde the Cavalry Corps; from Zandvoorde to Gheluvelt on the Ypres-Menin road, and from Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke, the 7th Infantry Division, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade round Zonnebeke. Between Zonnebeke and Westroosebeke and south-westward to Poelcappelle detachments of General d'Urbal's Army, which then consisted of no more than two Territorial Divisions and four Cavalry Divisions, with the British 6th Cavalry Brigade, presented a thin line to the Germans on the north and north-east of Ypres. From Poelcappelle to Bixschoote some French Cavalry and Territorials, whose left extended to the junction of the Yperlee Canal with the Yser, and, along the Yser to Dixmude, mounted African troops and part of the Fifth Belgian Division had to defend a line of fifteen miles. Round and in Dixmude, which could be attacked from three sides, were, indeed, the rest of this Division and the



THE BRITISH HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

Sir John French and his Staff passing through a French village near the Belgian frontier.



A BRITISH SCOUT.

On the look-out from the loft of a wrecked farmhouse.

6,000 Marines of Ronare'h. But only the 4th and 1st Belgian Divisions held the Yser Canal to the region of Nieupoort. The 2nd Belgian Division, assisted by a detachment of British sailors from the monitor *Severn*, under Lieut. E. S. Wise, with some machine guns, was posted in and to the east of Nieupoort. It was flanked by the British flotilla moving along the coast from Nieupoort Bains to Ostend.

With the exception of the Lahore Division, which had never before faced European troops, and the I. Corps, there were practically no reserves behind the fifty mile or so long line of battle. The Belgian troops were exhausted by over two months' fighting; they were dispirited by the loss of Liège, Brussels, Namur, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and Ostend. The handful of French Marines were mostly raw troops, and the remainder of the Allied Army was becoming stale from constant marching and entrenching and battling against larger numbers and predominating artillery.

To quote his own words, Sir John French "knew that the enemy were by this time in greatly superior strength on the Lys, and that the II., III., Cavalry, and IV. Corps were holding a much wider front than their numbers and strength warranted, and . . . it would have appeared wise to throw the I. Corps in to strengthen the line." But he had already decided to move Sir Douglas Haig's Corps to

the north of Ypres in order to relieve the German pressure on the Yser. The I. Corps was to advance through Ypres on Thourout and through Thourout on Bruges. At Thourout and Bruges it would be athwart the communications of the Duke of Wurtemberg's Army, which, if Bruges were occupied, would have to evacuate the coast line from Ostend to the Dutch frontier. Then, if it were feasible, Sir Douglas was to drive the Germans towards Ghent.

This bold and, as it turned out, unrealizable project was based primarily on the consideration that Sir Douglas, "would probably not be opposed north of Ypres by much more than the 3rd Reserve Corps," which had suffered considerably, and by "one or two Landwehr Divisions." The leading idea was to move the extreme left of the Allied Armies to the north bank of the Lys from Frelinghien to Ghent.

De Mitry's Cavalry was to operate on the left wing of the I. Corps. Byng's Cavalry was to be on Haig's right. The 7th Infantry Division would, according to circumstances, either remain on the defensive round the woods to the east of Ypres or support the advance to the north.

The Cavalry Corps from Zandvoorde to the wood of Ploegsteert, and the III. Corps from Lo Gheir across the Lys to the Radinghem-Givenchy ridge. Conneau's Cavalry Corps,



THE BRITISH TROOPS IN FARMHOUSES.

An old deserted farmhouse near the British trenches, which has been converted into billets for the troops, who are here seen entering the loft. On the right: A sergeants' mess in a ruined farmhouse. The remnants of the wall are strengthened with sandbags.

and the II. Corps (Smith-Dorrien's) were ordered to remain on the defensive.

"I fully realized," says Sir John French, "the difficult task which lay before us, and the onerous rôle which the British Army was called upon to fulfil. . . . No more arduous task has ever been assigned to British soldiers; and in all their splendid history there is no instance of their having answered so magnificently to the desperate calls which of necessity were made upon them."

Sir John French relied on the qualities of the British troops; he also reckoned that if Sir Douglas Haig wedged his Corps between

the Armies of the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Crown Prince of Bavaria, he would be rapidly reinforced by French troops. Later, it may be mentioned, Foch transported by automobile some 70,000 men to the region of Ypres.

Sir Douglas Haig was unable to carry out Sir John's instructions. The news that the British Expeditionary Force with General d'Urbal's skeleton Army was trying to wrest from him his newly acquired coast line had the same effect on the Kaiser that Sir John Moore's march on Burgos had had on Napoleon in 1808. The "little army," which he could no longer



THE BRITISH ARMY'S LIFE-LINE.

Engineers laying a cable-line.



THE GERMANS IN BELGIUM.

Repairing a fracture in a cable. On the right is seen a German soldier in his "hotel."

regard as "contemptible," might be annihilated, and, counting on the psychological disturbance in the British Isles and outside Europe which would be caused by a decisive victory over the British Army, the Kaiser and Falkenhayn unhesitatingly decided to throw north of the Lys every man and gun they could possibly spare. The result was that a British offensive on Thourout, Bruges, and Ghent became impossible.

The next day (October 20) the left wing of the I. Corps reached Elverdinghe (south of the Zuydschoote-Bixschoote bridge over the Yperlee Canal, and on the road from Ypres to Furnes); the centre traversed Ypres; and the

right wing stretched beyond Zonnebeke to the Westroosebeke-Wervicq road. From Elverdinghe troops could be rapidly transported either to the Noordschote bridge over the Yperlee Canal or to the support of the Belgians and French Marines at Dixmude.

An anonymous officer of the I. Corps in *Blackwood's Magazine* for March, 1915, has described the march of his regiment to Ypres on October 20. "At about 10.30," he says, "we crossed the Belgian frontier for the second time. . . . One could not help noticing as one went along how much more like England this part of the country was than any we had passed through as yet. Except for the large number



BRITISH HEAVY GUNS.

A 6-in. gun being got into position. These guns have done good work in Belgium.



THE FRENCH ARMY IN BELGIUM.
Senegalese troops in the streets of Furnes.

Inset : German prisoners at Furnes.

of windmills scattered all over the country on every little knoll, one might have been at home." At 12.30 the regiment to which this officer was attached reached the city, where it remained till 4.55 a.m. on the 21st. Ypres was full of French troops. A French gunner, who during dinner visited some of the officers, appeared to think that "the whole of the German Army" was in front of the Allies.

This was, of course, an exaggeration, but that the Germans were in superior numbers had been proved by the day's events. Before the I. Corps could reach the fighting line the Duke of Wurtemberg struck his hardest. Disregarding the shells of the British flotilla, on the 20th he pressed his attack along the coast. In the morning the farm of Bamberg was taken by the enemy; it was recaptured by the Belgians, but at nightfall had to be abandoned. All the villages held by the Belgians to the east of the Yser were in the hands of the Germans, who were now preparing to cross the canal. Heavy howitzers

had been brought up to shell Dixmude, and Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h's Marines and General Meyser's Belgian Brigade with difficulty resisted several desperate assaults on the town. South of Dixmude the enemy firmly established himself in the Forest of Houthulst, and was preparing to cross the Yperlee Canal.

In the triangle Bixschoote-Westroosebeke-Houthem there had been severe fighting. Byng's Cavalry Division had taken up a defensive position supporting the French between Westroosebeke and Passchendaele. Desultory firing commenced about 8 a.m. and was succeeded by an artillery duel until noon. The Germans then attacked the French and drove them south and west of the Westroosebeke-Wervicq high road. A portion fell back down the Westroosebeke-Ypres road to Poelcappelle, at which village the main road from Dixmude through the Forest of Houthulst ends. Later in the afternoon these troops, who were heavily shelled in Poelcappelle, were withdrawn still farther. Their retreat involved that of Byng's Cavalry Division, the left of which was swung back to the Langemarck-Zonnebeke road.

Thus the eastern end of the triangle Bixschoote-Westroosebeke-Houthem had been lost. On the side of the triangle Westroosebeke-Houthem the enemy, besides driving the Allies off most of the Westroosebeke-Wervicq road up to the environs of Zonnebeke, had repulsed the advance of the 21st Brigade (General

Watts) from Gheluvelt through and beyond Beelaere. At 12.30 p.m. the General, with Captain Drysdale and Mr. Underwood, proceeded through Beelaere. "As we got up to the firing line the shells started raining over the ridge where the Scots Fusiliers, the Wiltshires and the Bedfords were advancing." So hot was the fire that the machine gun section was called in and the General, who had been nearly killed by a shell, sought a less-exposed position. "As we rounded the church, shells were raining down into the village, and one carried away the arm of a Wiltshire who was standing where we had stood only two minutes before." The engagement continued till 7.30 p.m. "In the distance we could see Beelaere in flames, the church steeple standing out against the red glare."

While the 7th Infantry Division on the edge of the woods between Zonnebeke through Gheluvelt to Zandvoorde was resisting the Germans who had poured out of Courtrai, Menin and Wervicq, the Cavalry Corps down both sides of the Comines-Ypres Canal and away to the right had been making another effort to secure the line of the Lys from Wervicq to Pont Rouge, which is opposite Le Gheir. But the attempt had failed, and the 1st Cavalry Division had to retire to the line St. Yves-Messines, the 2nd Cavalry Division to that of Messines - Garde Dieu - Houthem - Kortewilde. By nightfall a body of the enemy faced the south-eastern spur of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats and other bodies were advancing up the roads from Warneton towards St. Eloi and from Comines towards Hollebeke.

We have been used as infantry [writes an officer of the 4th Dragoon Guards, present at this fighting] and armed with rifles, bayonets and spades. The spades are very necessary, as it is impossible to hold a position for any length of time without digging oneself in. On the 20th my squadron was in reserve in a big forest, and orders came about 10 a.m. to support our infantry advanced line. We left our horses and went on two miles, where I halted the squadron under cover and walked on to reconnoitre.

Captain Hornby had gone on just ahead of me with his squadron, and I found him with some of his men lying down behind a hedgerow. A company of Inniskilling Fusiliers were 100 yards on in front lying in the open and firing on the enemy about 400 yards in front and slowly crawling on. Our guns were firing hard from behind the wood, but shells started dropping short right into the Inniskillings. After sticking it for a bit they got up to come back, and the Germans opened on them with two maxims. They lost some men and came back behind our lines. By then I had some of my squadron up.

Captain Hornby was badly hit; his subaltern Sharp got four maxim bullets in the arm, and some of their men were killed and wounded. Poor Charles Hornby fell right in the open, and we had to get him back to

cover as best we could. We stuck to our hedge, and advanced again to almost where the Inniskillings had been, and as soon as it got dark we dug. We dug all night and fortified a farmhouse, and by the morning we had a jolly strong position in the middle of the infantry line. They didn't have enough men to occupy it themselves.*

Advanced posts of the 12th Brigade of the 4th Division of the III. Corps had been forced to retire between the Ploegsteert Wood and the Lys, and at dusk it was evident that the enemy were preparing to attack Le Gheir and the wood. With Le Gheir in the German possession the right of the 1st Cavalry Division at St. Yves might be turned.

South of the Lys the Germans from Lille had on the 20th been battering at the thin line of British infantry and French cavalry strung out from the west of Frelinghien to Givenchy. The aim of the Germans was to recover Armentières and the Radinghem-Givenchy ridge.

A British soldier, wounded that day in the trenches near Armentières, told a *Times*' Correspondent that, at daybreak, a deadly fire had opened upon the trench in which he lay

* This narrative was published in the *Daily Telegraph*.



THE KING OF THE BELGIANS
Chatting with one of the French General Staff at
Market Square, Furnes.



BRIG.-GEN. E. S. BULFIN, C.V.O., D.S.O.

with his company. It was an enfilading fire. The enemy had crept up very close in the darkness to the right of the line. One bullet destroyed the back sight of this soldier's rifle; another struck him in the head. The men in the trenches were helpless, and the enemy attacked them with the bayonet. They surrendered, but both friend and foe were for fourteen hours shelled by the artillery from both sides. Then the trench was retaken by the British and the Germans made prisoners.

South of Radinghem, and three-and-a-half miles east of Neuve Chapelle, the II. Corps had on the 20th suffered a reverse. The Royal Irish Regiment had lost heavily in prisoners at Le Pilly.

In view of the results of the day's fighting, of the progress made by the Germans to the east of the Yser, of their victorious advance into the triangle Bixschoote-Westroosebeke-Houthem, of their successful attacks on the Cavalry Corps and III. Corps between Houthem and the wood of Ploegsteert, and of their recapture of Le Pilly, the plan formed by Sir John French of driving a wedge between the Duke of Wurtemberg's and the Crown Prince of Bavaria's Armies was no longer feasible. Nevertheless, the I. Corps and the Lahore Division might be able to recover the ground

lost on the 20th. General Joffre had arrived in Flanders, and during the 21st Sir John French saw him. Joffre assured Sir John that he was bringing up the 9th French Army Corps to Ypres, and that more French troops would follow it. He, like Sir John, was full of confidence. He told the British Generalissimo that it was his intention on the 24th to attack the Germans and drive them eastwards.

On Wednesday the 21st the Germans once more attacked the long, thin line of the Allies.

The enemy crossed the Yser Canal and tried to take Schoorebakke, one of the vulnerable spots in the Belgian centre. They were beaten back, leaving behind them lines of dead and wounded. Dixmude was furiously bombarded by heavy howitzers, and no fewer than eight separate assaults launched by the Duke of Wurtemberg against the town so bravely defended by the French Marines and the Belgians. At nightfall the Yser, south of Dixmude, had been temporarily passed by the enemy, but they had not been able to maintain their hold on the west bank.

Farther south, and north and east of Ypres, it was the Allies who had at first attacked. With De Mitry's Cavalry and Bidon's Territorials on his left, and Byng's Cavalry on his right, Sir Douglas Haig had directed the I. Corps to retake Poelcappelle and Passchendaele, and the ground between those villages. The attack was somewhat delayed through the roads being blocked, but it progressed favourably in face of severe opposition, often necessitating the use of the bayonet. The 26th Reserve Corps round Passchendaele replied by a violent counter-attack, which was repulsed with heavy loss, and up to 2 p.m. it looked as if Sir Douglas Haig would achieve his object. The enemy from the Forest of Houthulst were, indeed, threatening his left, but it was not until De Mitry was ordered, it seems by Joffre, to withdraw his cavalry behind the Yperlee-Yser Canal that Sir Douglas was obliged to suspend his advance. This retrograde movement of De Mitry was presumably due to the impression created on the Allied Commander-in-Chief by the frantic efforts of the Germans to cross into the loop of the Yser, and pass the canal at Dixmude, and between Dixmude and Fort de Knoeke. The 42nd French Division had not yet detrained at Furnes, and the only reserves Joffre could throw into the battle of the Yser

were the 16th Chasseurs and the African Cavalry stationed near Loo.

The I. Corps, supported by General Bidon's Territorials, now halted on the line Bixschoote-Langemarck - St. Julien - Zonnebeke. On its left the Corps faced the German 23rd, in the centre the 26th Corps.

Meantime, the 27th Corps had been pushed against the 7th Infantry Division. The 22nd Infantry Brigade, commanded by General Lawford, was attacked by these newly raised troops with frenzied zeal. Its left flank, near Zonnebeke, was in great danger, and Byng sent the 7th Cavalry Brigade to its support.


Thus reinforced, Lawford managed to maintain himself round Zonnebeke. To the south, between Zonnebeke and Zandvoorde, the 21st and 20th Infantry Brigades were resisting the efforts of the Germans from the neighbourhood of Becelaere to gain the fringe of the woods to the east of Ypres. Apprised of the formidable attack on the 7th Infantry Division, Sir Douglas Haig had early ordered his reserves to be halted on the north-eastern outskirts of Ypres.

It has been seen that Byng had had to reinforce with his 7th Brigade the left of the 7th Infantry Division round Zonnebeke. At 1.30 p.m. it was reported to him that the left of General Gough's Cavalry Division (the 2nd) had been pierced south of Zandvoorde. Byng promptly dispatched his 6th Brigade to fill the gap; it rode over and occupied the crossings of the Comines-Ypres Canal, north of Hollebeke.


Later in the evening the brigade moved to its left between Zandvoorde and the canal, near the Château de Hollebeke; the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which had been relieved at Zonnebeke by battalions of the I. Corps, rode to the west of the canal, and was stationed to the west of Hollebeke at St. Eloi and Voormezele. The use made by Sir John French and his subordinates of the cavalry was on this day no less masterly than it had been during the retreat from Mons. The lessons which French had learnt at Colesberg had not been forgotten.

By sunset the 2nd Cavalry Division, which at 4 p.m. had been violently attacked, was disposed between Messines and Hollebeke. The enemy had advanced a considerable distance across the open ground which divides the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats at Messines from the rolling, wooded district east of Ypres.

The 1st Cavalry Division which was deployed between Messines and the wood of Ploegsteert had also been in peril. At 7 a.m. the Germans had taken Le Gheir and begun to file into the wood. A battalion of the 104th Regiment of the Saxon 19th Army Corps entrenched itself in the village. The importance of Le Gheir does not need to be insisted upon. Through it the Germans could enter the wood of Ploegsteert, turn the flank of the 1st Cavalry Division at St. Yves, spread out on the ridge beyond, cross the Douve and attack from the south Messines and the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats.



1. BRIG.-GEN. H. E. WATTS, C.B. (21st Infantry Brigade).
 2. BRIG.-GEN. H. J. RUGGLES-BRISE, M.V.O. (20th Infantry Brigade).
 3. BRIG.-GEN. S. T. B. LAWFORD (22nd Infantry Brigade).



THE GERMANS AT DIXMUDE.

Well-protected infantry firing from beneath a concrete roof shelter.

Happily a British soldier of daring and resource was on the spot. General Hunter-Weston, who in the South African War had passed through the Boer lines and cut the railway between Bloemfontein and Pretoria, had anticipated the German attack on Le Gheir. At 2 a.m. he had moved the East Lancashires and Somerset Light Infantry from the south to the north bank of the Lys. With Lieut.-Colonel Anley he now organized a counter-attack. Le Gheir was recaptured, and the brave Germans defending it were practically wiped out. Some 400 dead were picked up in the British lines alone, and 130 prisoners were taken. In this fighting the King's Own Lancaster Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers of the 12th Infantry Brigade were well-handled by Lieut.-Colonel Butler.

Details of the fighting are supplied by an officer of the East Lancashire Regiment in a letter published by the *Morning Post* :

At 2 a.m. on the 21st we had orders to trek on another three miles across the river. The bridge had been blown up, so we went over on a pontoon bridge, and got to the village of Ploegsteert, when we were hurriedly sent for and ordered to take the battalion out to the trenches defending the village. So away we went, and then met a stream of wounded, all declaring that the Germans were in thousands when they attacked their trenches two miles away and captured them. We were now ordered to make a counter-attack and recapture the lost trenches, so with A and D companies we plunged into a thick wood and gradually worked our way through it. The Germans were firing into it with rifle and machine-guns, so the bullets were humming through the trees. On getting through the wood and looking over the fence,

we saw we were behind the Germans, who were occupying a trench in the open. Then the fun began. We enfiladed them and knocked them over like rabbits. Lieutenant Hughes and his platoon charged them in front, and as they got near he was killed, shot through the head. His slayer was spitted on a bayonet, and even then tried to kick his man, but he was downed and spitted through and through. Afterwards we found he was the proud possessor of the Iron Cross. He died game. Two companies of the Somersets also joined in with us, and between us we got over 100 prisoners and of the dead we picked up about the same number, but many others are lying in the fields.

It was a funny sight to see our men picking up the Germans out of the trenches and making them high-step away with hands above their heads and with fixed bayonets at their backs. We came off cheap : some ten killed and fifty wounded. We put the — back in their trenches, and we were warmly thanked by their commanding officer. As soon as the German artillery realized their men were driven out they began shelling us, but with no result. At dusk we were ordered to take over the trenches.

South of the Lys there had been a succession of fierce encounters. Away on the extreme right at Violaines, a mile to the west of La Bassée, the Germans had endeavoured to break through the line of the II. Corps. They had been repulsed with considerable loss. A little to the north of Violaines, however, the British had been driven from the ridge, but had regained their trenches by a counter-attack. Between that point and Armentières the Germans had captured some trenches. The total losses of the enemy south-east of Armentières were estimated at over 6,000. A subaltern who pictures for us one of their attacks on the 21st permits us to understand how it

was that they received such heavy punishment:

A German attack is an extraordinary thing, but I must say they are very brave indeed. First you hear their trumpets blowing, also a kind of hunting horn, then the orders of the officers and the yells of the soldiers. Then follows a hail of bullets and they come on in masses, making an awful noise. We let them get about 40 yards off and then we let them have it with a vengeance. What with the shrieks, yells, horn-blowing, rifles firing, and everything on fire, it is as if hell were let loose. Well, we beat them back; that was the first day. The next two days the same thing happened, except that we dug ourselves in the first of the two nights. Then we were shelled all day long for the two days and attacked at night. At length, the third night, we were relieved after the attacks, and the men who relieved us counted 740 dead Germans in front of our trenches, at a distance of about 40 yards. As the average of killed to wounded is said to be one to three, the German casualties must have been about 3,000.

The horrible sights behind the German lines must have given the German Commanders furiously to think. They brought home to them very definitely that the destruction was not all on one side.

Though the Germans had suffered on the 21st the most appalling losses, it was now apparent to the British Generalissimo that the utmost he could do was to maintain his very extended front and to hold fast his positions until French reinforcements could arrive from the south.

Elated by their successes, if depressed by the awful slaughter incurred in gaining them, the Germans on Thursday, October 22, pressed on. They issued from the trenches near La Bassée, and captured the village of Violaines and another point on the long, low ridge. Violaines was lost to the Allies, but the Worcesters and Manchesters prevented the enemy from marching through Violaines to cut the connexion between Maud'huy's left and the II. Corps, while the French and British artillery saved a third village near Violaines from the German advance by interposing a curtain of bursting shells. At sunset Smith-Dorrien's exhausted and nerve-shattered troops still clung to the greater part of the Radinghem-Givenchy ridge, but during the night, which was very cold, Sir Horace withdrew his Corps to a position which he had previously prepared. This ran from the eastern side of Givenchy, east of Neuve Chapelle, to Fauquissart on the Armentières-Neuve Chapelle chaussée. The British abandoned most of the ridge and descended into the flat, waterlogged plain behind the stream of the Layes, which flows into the Lys at Armentières.

A few hundred yards to the south of Neuve




TO DRAW THE ENEMY'S FIRE.


The British expose a dummy from the trenches.

Chapelle the Armentières road joins the highway from La Bassée to Estaires on the Lys. Henceforth Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's aims were three. At any price he must prevent the Germans from dividing him from Maud'huy's left in front of Béthune; at Neuve Chapelle he must bar the advance of the enemy on the Lys and to the single-line railway which south of the Lys connects Armentières with Béthune; between Neuve Chapelle and Fauquissart he must defend the road which linked his Corps to Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the II. Corps. Fighting from the plain against the Germans on the ridge his tasks were, it need hardly be said, extraordinarily difficult.


From the east of Fauquissart the Allied line covering Armentières and touching the Lys west of Frelinghien was on the 22nd again subjected to heavy cannonading and—in the evening—to a number of attacks by the German infantry. Here the Germans made little headway.

North of the Lys at 4 a.m. the Germans assaulted Le Gheir for the second time, but were beaten off. All day they shelled the village, but as the British were not in it but in the surrounding trenches, they inflicted little





MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF YPRES.



BELGIAN CAVALRY AT WORK.

This unit of a patrol is the last man left to watch the movements of the approaching Germans.

loss. North of Le Gheir the Cavalry Corps defending the gap between the wood of Ploegsteert and Messines and that between Messines and Hollebeke was by Sir John French's orders reinforced by the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade less one battalion. That brigade moved to Wulverghem on the Douve, and General Allenby, who commanded the Cavalry Corps, sent one battalion of the Indians across the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats to Wyt-schaete, north of Messines, and another battalion to Voornezele, a village a little to the west of St. Eloi. These dispositions permitted Byng to move the 7th Cavalry Brigade from Voornezele and St. Eloi over the Comines-Ypres Canal to Klein Zillebeke on the Wervicq-Zandvoorde - Klein Zillebeke - Zillebeke - Ypres road. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, it will be recollected, had the day before entrenched itself between Zandvoorde and the canal. For the next few days the 6th and 7th Cavalry

Brigades alternately occupied the Zandvoorde-Château de Hollebeke trenches, being constantly shelled, sniped at, and charged by the enemy.

Seldom have cavalry rendered such services as Byng's Division and the Cavalry Corps now performed. Great, indeed, had been the progress made in the training of the British since the South African War, which had made them equally adept in fighting on horseback or on foot. As infantrymen these splendid troops rivalled the best foot-soldiers in the Army. On horseback they had more than maintained the traditions of Waterloo and Balaclava. It must have been gall and bitterness to the Kaiser that his cavalry, nursed in the memories of Ziethen, Seidlitz and Blücher, and taught to regard itself as invincible, had fled headlong before the British troopers, who now dismounted, held at bay enormous masses of the German infantry.

From Zandvoorde over the fields to Gheluveld on the Menin-Ypres road, and from Gheluveld to Zonnebeke, the German efforts against the 7th Division had not on the 22nd relaxed. At daybreak shells began to fall. About 3.30 p.m. the battle raged fiercest, and General Watts received a message from Sir John French that he must hold on at all costs, "as the I. Corps was coming up as quickly as possible to his support." The Wiltshires and Scotch Fusiliers, among other regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, suffered terribly. The Germans had brought up heavy howitzers, and many men had been buried alive in their trenches. At 5 p.m. the firing slackened and the German prisoners were brought in. They were mostly fathers of families, about the ages of 39 and 40, and had received little training; their uniforms were brand new. To render them desperate they had been told that the British took no prisoners.

Meanwhile the I. Corps, hampered by the necessity of sending support to the 7th Infantry Division, had with ever increasing difficulty held its own between Zonnebeke and Bix-schoote. During the day a series of attacks had been beaten off, but late in the evening the enemy broke through the line south-west of Langemark and north of Pilkem. The Cameronian Highlanders retired and the road to Ypres for a moment was open.

That night the German commanders must have believed that a crowning victory was within their grasp. Away on the Yser they

had crossed the loop of the canal at Tervaete; the low embankment of the railroad from Dixmude to Nieuport might at dawn be in their possession; from the embankment they could march through Pervyse and Ramsappelle either on Nieuport and Dixmude or on Furnes. From Furnes high roads led to Dunkirk and Ypres. North of Ypres the Germans, as mentioned, had penetrated the line near Pilkem, and to the east of Ypres the 7th Infantry Division seemed in its last gasp. To the south of the city only cavalry and a few Indian troops stood between them and the capital of Western Flanders, and the right wing of the Allies was withdrawing from the Givenchy-Radinghem ridge.

Early in October the Crown Prince of Bavaria had exhorted his soldiers "to make the decisive effort against the French left wing and to settle thus the fate of the great battle which had lasted for weeks." The defeat of the Allies north of the Lys and between the Lys and La Bassée would not only transfer Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne to the Germans and prepare the way for the invasion or starvation of Great Britain, but would also force Maud'huy to beat a precipitate retreat to the Somme. The morrow might see the annihilation of the British and Belgian Armies, and after such a disaster would not the French resistance everywhere collapse?

Happily on the 23rd, as on subsequent days, the hopes of the Germans were not to be realized. The 42nd French Division under General Grossetti and several howitzers of large calibre had reached Furnes. The 42nd was directed by Joffre to relieve the Belgian 2nd Division in Nieuport. Owing to the fire of the German artillery Grossetti had to pass his troops in small bodies over the Nieuport bridge, but by nightfall the Belgian troops who had lost Lombartzyde had been replaced by some of the best fighting material in the French Army, and at last big guns on the land as well as from the sea supported the defenders.* The Germans, who had swarmed into the loop of the Yser and driven back the Belgians to the railway embankment between Ramsappelle and Pervyse, could make no further progress, and the fourteen assaults on Dixmude delivered by the Duke of Wurtemberg

* The German forces on the Yser at this date appear to have consisted of the 3rd and 21st Reserve Corps, one Ersatz Division, and a brigade of Landwehr. Later a Division of Marines joined them.

during the night of the 23rd-24th ended in failure.

North of Ypres the gap in the line of the I. Corps between Bixschoote and Langemarck was closed. Major-General Bulfin, with the 2nd Infantry Brigade (less the 2nd Royal Sussex Regiment, which was left at Boesinghe to guard the Yperlee Canal), had been sent to reinforce the 1st Infantry Brigade. At 6 a.m. on the 23rd the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, the King's Royal Rifles, and the Northampton moved on the enemy, mostly consisting of troops of the recently raised XXIII. Corps. Near Bixschoote, through close and difficult country, the Lancashires, under heavy shell and rifle fire, advanced steadily, aided by the regiment's machine guns. Within a comparatively short distance of the hostile trenches they formed up, fixed bayonets, and charged. The position was taken. Hard by the King's Royal Rifles and the Northampton, at the point of the bayonet, were driving



LIFE IN THE TRENCHES.
A British soldier eating his dinner.

the Germans before them. As the foe fled the British field artillery and howitzers opened. The rain of shrapnel drove the Germans for shelter into villages and farms. Out of these they were expelled by high explosive shells. Again in the fields hundreds of the Germans fell victims to the shrapnel bullets.

The enemy, who were reluctant to forgo what the night before had appeared to be a certain victory, were five times brought back to charge Bulfin's Brigade and the 3rd Brigade. They marched in masses, singing "Die Wacht am Rhein," but lack of training and faults in leading told their tale. The British reserved their fire till a very close range, and then with their rifles and maxims mowed down the enemy. If the columns of the Old Guard at Waterloo had not been able to withstand the fire of infantry armed with the Brown Bess what chance had these masses against soldiers with repeating rifles and machine guns? As on each occasion they retired the scene which had followed their flight before the Lancashires, Northamptons, and King's Royal Rifles was re-enacted. The British field guns and howitzers gave them no rest; for that day the guns were worked with almost superhuman haste, one field battery alone expending 1,800 rounds of ammunition.

Six hundred prisoners were secured, and fifteen hundred German dead were counted in the neighbourhood of Langemarek alone. How many were wounded, how many managed to reach their own lines and there die, is not known. From correspondence found subsequently on a German officer it transpired that on the 23rd the attacking corps lost 75 per cent. of their strength.

Between Bixschoote and Langemarek the Germans had in the open met with the same fate as their comrades who were trying to storm Dixmude. "We are all in the seventh heaven," wrote on the 23rd a non-commissioned officer of the Loÿal North Lancashires. "Have given the Germans an awful slap and have them going all along the line. Their losses must be

enormous. Our fellows got among them with the bayonet, and nothing could withstand them."

From Langemarek to Zonnebeke and from Zonnebeke to Zandvoorde and the Ypres-Comines Canal, the fighting had been also of a severe character. At Zonnebeke Corporal W. J. Askew, of the 2nd Coldstream Guards (part of the 4th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division of the I. Corps) had shown conspicuous courage and great ability. He had voluntarily taken out a patrol to hold ground 300 yards in front of the trenches, and, placing his small party in pairs, 150 yards apart, he held up the enemy's attack for no less than three hours, and then succeeded in retiring under heavy fire from both flanks.

The Cavalry Corps between the Ypres-Comines Canal and the wood of Ploegsteert and the III. Corps from Le Gheir across the Lys and Conneau's Cavalry Corps were also violently but unsuccessfully attacked. On the right the enemy, having discovered that Smith-Dorrien had withdrawn the II. Corps to the line Givenchy-Neuve Chapelle-Fauquissart, confined himself to an artillery duel in which several of his batteries were silenced by the British fire.

Joffre and Foch had reinforced the Belgians on the Yser in the nick of time; they were now reinforcing the British. That evening a division of the French 9th Army Corps who had reached Ypres came up into line and took over the trenches held by the 2nd Division (I. Corps).

With the simultaneous arrival of French reinforcements on the Yser and at Ypres the first phase of the battle of Ypres may be considered to have ended. The British and the Belgians, with Ronarc'h's 6,000 Marines, Bidon's two Territorial Divisions, De Mitry's four Cavalry Divisions, and Conneau's Cavalry Corps, had from the night of October 16 to the night of October 23, attacking and counter-attacking, acted as a firm barrier in the path of the hosts of the Duke of Wurtemberg and the Crown Prince of Bavaria.



CHAPTER LXIII.

THE FRANCO-BELGIAN BATTLE OF THE YSER.

THE GERMANS ON OCTOBER 24 ACROSS THE YSER AT TERVAETE—GROSSETTI RETAKES LOMBARTZYDE AND MOVES TOWARDS OSTEND—THE GERMANS OVER THE YSER AT ST. GEORGES—BOMBARDMENT OF NIEUPOORT—FRENCH AND BELGIANS DRIVE GERMANS INTO THE YSER—BATTLE OF THE 25TH; RENEWED OFFENSIVE OF THE DUKE OF WURTEMBERG—EXHAUSTION OF ALLIES—INUNDATION OF THE YSER DISTRICT ORDERED—NATURE OF THE INUNDATION—BATTLE OF OCTOBER 26; ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE DIXMUDE; BELGIAN STAFF LEAVES FURNES BUT RETURNS; VICTORY OF THE ALLIES—BATTLE OF OCTOBER 28; H.M.S. VENERABLE RAKES THE GERMANS ADVANCING ON NIEUPOORT—EFFECTS OF THE FIRE OF THE BRITISH FLOTILLA; THE INUNDATION SPREADING TOWARDS PERVYSE—BATTLE FOR THE RAILWAY EMBANKMENT (OCTOBER 29, 30, 31); RAMSCAPPELLE LOST AND RECOVERED; VICTORY OF THE ALLIES; GERMANS DRIVEN HEADLONG INTO THE FLOODS AND OVER THE YSER.

FROM the preceding chapter and from Chapter LIV. it will be gathered that on October 24 the Germans seemed to be on the point of gaining at Ypres and on the Yser victories which, even if they were not decisive, would gravely imperil the cause of the Allies. Those two battles formed what the French call the "Battle of Flanders," which was by far the bloodiest of the battles delivered by the left wing of the Allies from the middle of September to the middle of November.

The heroic resistance of the Allies on the Yser from October 16 to October 23 has been already related. In the present chapter will be told the story of the fighting in October from the 23rd to the 31st.

By the morning of the 24th the Germans had crossed into the western side of the loop which is formed by the Yser half-way between Dixmude and Nieuport, and General Grossetti with the French 42nd Division had the day before relieved the Belgian 2nd Division round Nieuport and, protected by the fire of the Allied flotilla, had marched on Lombartzyde. His aim was to recapture that village, storm

Westende, Middelkerke and Mariakerke, and seize both the Digue, running westward along the Dunes from Ostend to the last-named seaside resort, and also the north bank of the canal which from Nieuport runs into the Ostend-Ghent Canal between Ostend and Bruges. A blow at Ostend, which could be bombarded by the British monitors and destroyers, would oblige the enemy to reduce his effectives on the Yser south of Nieuport.

During the night of the 23rd-24th there were several fierce encounters round Lombartzyde. A French company caught between two fires was severely handled. Another company which had crept forward to an advanced trench found a party of what appeared to be Belgian infantry on their right. In the morning of the 24th a heavy sea-fog spread over the coast land. Suddenly through the mist a jet of bullets swept the French trench. It came from the soldiers on the right who were Germans dressed in Belgian uniforms, and they had turned on Grossetti's men a machine gun. Despite these unfortunate in-



Exercising Artillery horses.



Belgian dogs drawing a gun across the sands.



Belgian Lancers on the way to the fighting line. Inset: Motor-cyclist scout.

idents, the French infantry pressed on, stormed Lombartzyde and attacked Westende.

At any price the Germans had to prevent Grossetti turning their right flank. To do this the obvious course was to shell Nieuport, and from Mannekensvere to cross the canal at St. Georges and to assault the eastern streets of the town. All through the morning, therefore, howitzers and field guns played on Nieuport and the bridges there which led over the Yser and its various branches. From the little watering place of Brueders-Duynen, west of Nieuport Bains, and from other points the French artillery unavailingly endeavoured to keep down the German fire. Over Nieuport hung an intensely black pall of smoke, broken every moment by the gleaming flashes of bursting projectiles. The streets had been barricaded, and motor-ambulances found difficulty in threading their way through the town in their efforts to bring back the wounded.

In the afternoon the German artillery gave Nieuport a rest and the bombardment died down. The enemy was charging the Belgians defending St. Georges, and his artillery was wanted elsewhere. "There seemed," says an observer at Nieuport, "no cessation to the continuous roar of the guns through the mist." Crowds of Belgian wounded and fugitives from the trenches along the Yser trooped into the town.

At last the resistance of the Belgians in and around St. Georges broke down. Two batteries of artillery and several machine gun sections were withdrawn, and the worn-out defenders retired. Near Nieuport they were rallied, and their faces were again turned towards the foe. At 5.30 the bombardment of Nieuport, where the inhabitants were hiding in the cellars, began afresh. The Germans had taken (at St. Georges) another crossing over the Yser; if they were not checked, they might carry Nieuport and cut off Grossetti's Division,

THE BATTLE OF THE COAST--

From Ostend to Dunkirk along the shore stretch the Dunes - great heaps of sand, some planted with trees.

or, avoiding Nieuport, they might pierce the Allied line at Ramscappelle on the railway between Nieuport and Dixmude.

Ramscappelle was also threatened from the east. Orders had been given to the Germans to break through the Allied centre at all cost. Between St. Georges and Schoorbakke (at the northern end of the Yser loop) and into the loop of the Yser from Keyein through Tervaele rushed the long lines and columns of the Kaiser's infuriated soldiery, accompanied by dozens of machine guns, while another attempt was made to carry Dixmude from the right bank of the canal. Over the heads of the struggling combatants passed the huge shells of the German and French howitzers. From the sea came the reverberations of the 6-inch guns of the British warships as they fired at the advancing infantry of the Kaiser.

On the edge of the canal, and in the network of dykes and ditches between the canal and the low railway embankment there were terrific hand-to-hand encounters. With bayonet and butt-end soldiers fought after the fashion of the middle ages. A huge Belgian who had come from British Columbia used his rifle as primitive man was accustomed to use a club. To destroy the illusion that the world had gone back many centuries, soldiers from time to time would empty their pistols or repeating rifles, and machine guns would drill long holes through advancing columns, or sweep to the ground a line of charging men.

To stem the tide of Germans flowing towards the railway embankment the Belgian 2nd Division, which had been relieved by Grossetti's had been brought up to the railway; from Lombartzyde and Nieuport, French troops were hurried back. Belgian cavalrymen dismounted and went into action as infantrymen, and French Territorials were pushed forward. Ronarc'h had already detached from Dixmude to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke Commandant Jeannot



Belgian scout.



Goumiers on the Dunes.



Belgian Artillery on the sands. Inset: A machine-gun.

—THE SAND DUNES.

Skirting the Dunes on the south side is the canal from Dunkirk through Furnes to Nieuport.



DUKE ALBRECHT OF WURTEMBERG.

with a battalion; for the Germans from Tervaele seemed about to attack Dixmude along the west bank of the canal.

Gradually step by step the Germans, who fought with even more than their accustomed recklessness, were thrust back to and then up the high bank of the canal. On the edge of the canal groups of struggling men could be seen against the sky line. At places the pontoon bridges had been destroyed by shells, and there the Germans, followed by their pursuers, were precipitated into the muddy, sluggish waters. By nightfall the attack had failed. The Germans had lost some 5,000 men; Jeannot had established himself round Oud-Stuyvekenskerke; and, though the enemy still held the crossings at Tervaele, Schoorebakke and St. Georges, the whole line of the railway embankment remained in the hands of the Allies.


Dixmude was safe from an attack delivered by the enemy down the west bank of the canal. The long continued assault on it from the east during the day had failed. It and Nieuport were in ruins; the flames of four or five villages marked the track of the Germans and the work of their artillery, but the Allied line was intact. The sensations of the average German who took part in the day's fighting

may be surmised from this note found the next day on the body of an officer killed at Oud-Stuyvekenskerke:

"Everywhere we lose men, and our losses are out of proportion to the results achieved . . . Our guns cannot silence the enemy's batteries; the attacks of our infantry lead to nothing; they end in frightful butcheries. . . Our losses must have been enormous. The Colonel, Major, and many other officers are dead or wounded."

Soldiers and officers might be disturbed by the awful slaughter, but the German higher command had no compassion for its men. On Sunday (the 25th) the battle was renewed.

While the French from Lombartzyde attacked Westende, the Germans again bombarded Nieuport. The centre of the town was an inferno. Shells were blowing up or setting fire to houses, others were falling with a hiss into the canal waters. To the south there was another advance of the enemy from Schoorbakke on Ramscappelle, and from Tervaele on Pervyse. The Belgians and the detachments of Grossetti's Division, one of which—a battalion of the 19th Chasseurs—had relieved the marines in Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, did not,



THE GERMANS IN FLANDERS.

The enemy have a quiet half-hour.
Note the food-cans on the side of the trench.

however, give way. But there is a limit to human endurance; the Belgians were tired out, and away to their right Ronarc'h and his Marines found it ever more difficult to maintain themselves in Dixmude. The town was a wreck, and the trenches on its outskirts were full of water, for there had been a heavy rain. The men in the open, often soaked to the skin, were up to their knees in mud and slush. Well may the German observers in the cradles below the two cigar-shaped captive balloons which had gone up behind the enemy's lines have imagined that in a few hours the world would be echoing with the news of a genuine victory on the Yser, a prelude to the Kaiser's triumphal entry into Calais. To counter the Allied flotilla, more and more of the guns which had destroyed the Brialmont forts at Antwerp, Liège, Namur and Maubeuge were being mounted among the Dunes, and it was becoming evident to Rear-Admiral Hood that the armament of most of his ships was too light for the task which they had undertaken. Many of the vessels had been hit and several seamen killed or wounded, chiefly by shrapnel. So seriously was the situation regarded by the Belgian staff that the doctors and nurses in the hospitals of Furnes had already received orders to be in readiness to clear out the wounded at two hours' notice.


Facts such as these were not likely to be lost on Joffre and Foch. It was now abundantly clear that the Germans were bent on delivering a decisive blow north of the Lys. Instead of having to run the risks and losses which would be entailed in an advance on Ghent, Joffre

would have only to confine himself to fighting defensive actions between the coast and La Bassée. It was round Ypres and the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats and between the Lys and La Bassée that the Germans were almost certain to make their chief effort; and yet, as has been seen, the Allies on the Yser were fast weakening. Could nothing be done which would not involve a further expenditure of French troops to strengthen the defence there?

One resource was still at Joffre's disposal. Inundations had not saved Antwerp, but they might here be effective. The celebrated Vauban had proposed to protect this very district by flooding it. In 1795, Nieupoort had been defended by an inundation. Some years before the Great War, Commandant Delarmoy, a Belgian Staff Officer, when a pupil at the *École de Guerre*, had published an essay explaining how the obstacle of the Yser might be increased by flooding the surrounding country.* The idea of an inundation between Nieupoort and Dixmude was familiar to the Belgian commanders, and had not been overlooked by an engineer officer, like Joffre, or a profound thinker on war, like Foch.


That no steps had hitherto been taken to materialize this idea is easily explainable. An inundation would protect the Belgians, but it would also have hindered Joffre in his intended offensive between Dixmude and Nieupoort, and up to the present the French generalissimo had hesitated to believe that the Kaiser would

* "Fighting with King Albert," by Capitaine Gabriel de Libert de Flemalle (Hodder & Stoughton), p. 298.



THE BRITISH IN BELGIUM.

Infantry behind a barbed-wire entanglement awaiting the enemy.



BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND BRITISH LINES.

British troops, while erecting barbed-wire entanglements, surprised by the unwelcome light of a magnesium flare from the German lines.

accumulate his reserves north of the Lys. For a German victory north of the Lys might, indeed, lead to the occupation of the Channel ports, but did not, like a victory between the Somme and the Oise or one near Verdun, promise to wound mortally the French Army.

By the 25th, however, the evidence that dynastic and political motives were disturbing the minds of the German strategists was becoming overwhelming, and the inundation was decided upon.

The meadows and fields to be flooded were on an average three mètres or so above sea level, but not at high tide, when the sea at this point rises 4.50 to 6.0 mètres. By a system of sluices at the mouth of the Yser the waters of the canal and the innumerable dykes and ditches which drain into it were ordinarily discharged into the sea. At high tide the sluices were closed and the land water held back until the sea again fell.

On the 25th M. Charles-Louis Kogge, the Sluice Master who superintended these operations at Nieuport, received directions as it were to reverse engines. From that day onwards no land water was permitted to enter the sea, while at high tide the sea was introduced into the canal to push back the land water.

The result, though slow, was certain. From the eastern side of the hill of Cassel and the northern side of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats the streams, increased by heavy rains, flowed down into a *cul-de-sac*, the bottom of which was covered by hundreds of ditches and dykes already filled almost to the brim by the recent downfalls. To spread the inundation the Belgian and French artillery during the 25th and the succeeding days fired shells into the raised bank of the canal of the Yser, thus breaking this water-channel in several places, while to prevent the floods extending west of the low railway embankment from Dixmude to Nieuport, the culverts and bridges under it were closed up. In the evening of October 25 the Belgian Staff informed Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h that they "had taken all the necessary measures to flood the left bank of the Yser between the canal and the railway from Dixmude to Nieuport."*

Napoleon, it is said, was unaware of Welling-

ton's creation of the lines of Torres Vedras until he was informed of their existence by Masséna. It seems probable that the Duke of Wurtemberg did not anticipate that a lake might be formed between the Yser and the railway. Otherwise it is to be supposed that at any cost he would have taken Nieuport between October 16 and 24, and seized the sluices. The contemporary German reports



GENERAL MEYSER,
Commander of the Belgian Naval Brigade.

which mocked at the Allied artillerymen for firing into the canal bank confirm the hypothesis that for once the elaborate spy system of the Germans had broken down, and that they had no knowledge of the possibility of flooding this area. Before the war the Germans had built in Dixmude at the unfinished flour mills platforms for the Krupp howitzers, and to the south they had in peace-time constructed a veritable fortress—the Château de Woumen—from which they could, if necessary, assault

* In November M. Kogge was created Knight of the Order of Leopold, "for his courageous and devoted co-operation" in the work of inundation. The map showing the inundations, based on reports of Belgian Engineers, will be found at p. 479.



IN THE TRENCHES.

The Belgians at Ramscappelle.

the town. But they do not seem to have apprehended an inundation of the Dixmude-Nieuport district.

From the 25th onwards the Germans, on the west side of the Yser, were in a trap. Their only chance of escaping was to carry Nieuport, and obtain control of the sluices.

To pierce the Belgian centre, unless it led to the retreat of the Allies from Nieuport, would be of small advantage to them. Joffre could have railed more troops to Furnes, and the

Germans would ultimately have been driven into the artificial lagoon forming east of the railway embankment.

Unconscious of the snare which was being laid for him, the enemy on the 26th threw three pontoon bridges across the Yser and attacked Nieuport, but the majority of the 20,000 troops who were passed over the bridges seem to have been directed on Pervyse, which was mercilessly bombarded. It was against these that General Grossetti, a man of gigantic build, sitting in an armchair opposite the ruined village church, calmly encouraged his men to press on through the flaming and shell-swept street. Many such calm leaders had the war produced in the French Army.

At noon (October 26) it looked, however, as if the enemy would reach Pervyse. "The gradual progress made by the Germans," says an observer, "could be marked by the way in which their bursting shells approached nearer and nearer to Furnes. Amidst the din could be heard the rattle of continuous rifle fire and the ceaseless pap-pap-pap of the machine guns." Large numbers of the Belgians began to file off to the rear. About 3 p.m. so critical had affairs become that the Belgian Staff left Furnes for Poperinghe. Three hundred of the worst wounded in Furnes were hastily embarked on the Red Cross train for Calais.



THE GERMANS IN FLANDERS.

Troopers outside a destroyed factory take up a position behind an overturned gun.

Most of them would probably die on the journey, but they preferred to run any risk to that of falling into the hands of the exponents of Kultur. "They knew as well as we did," observes Mr. Souttar, a surgeon who assisted at their entraining, "that they were not fighting against a civilized nation, but against a gang of organized savages."*

The hospitals in Furnes were three hours later sent off to Poperinghe. The fine avenue "running between glorious trees" from Furnes to Ypres was crowded with fugitives—boys and girls, women, old men—some pushing wheelbarrows and perambulators, others driving or sitting in carts. Every vehicle was laden with such articles as could be hastily collected from houses and cottages. To the right and left of the road were encamped African troops in their bright robes. At Oostvleteren a cross-road goes south through sleepy villages and hop-fields to Poperinghe. Here all was peace. "Little children," says Mr. Souttar, "looked up from their games in astonishment as we rolled by." Children were playing by the roadside, and cattle slowly wending their way to their stalls. In the great square of Poperinghe, along one side of which was drawn up a squadron of French cavalry in bright blue and silver uniforms, were collected ambulance wagons, guns, and ammunition trains. Between these foot-

* "A Surgeon in Belgium," by H. S. Souttar (Edward Arnold), p. 140.

soldiers passed to and fro. The men and machinery of war were awaiting orders to proceed to Armentières, Ypres, Dixmude, or Furnes.

Later in the day Mr. Souttar returned to Furnes for stores. "It was a glorious night," he writes, "and one had the advantage of a clear road. We were driving northwards, and the sky was lit up by the flashes of the guns at Nieupoort and Dixmude, whilst we could hear their dull roar in the distance. All along the road were encamped the Turcos, and their camp fires, with the dark forms huddled around them, gave a picturesque touch to the scene."

Since his journey into Poperinghe, the position had changed for the better. The French and Belgian artillery, firing at very short ranges, had deluged the advancing Germans with shrapnel and case shot.

From the villages in rear of the Allied lines reserves had been pushed forward, and had established at points a new line of trenches. The Germans had in the end sullenly retired; many had surrendered and the remainder had taken refuge in their trenches in front or behind the Yser.

The Belgian Staff on the 26th slept not in Poperinghe but in Furnes.

Meantime a strange and alarming event had happened at Dixmude. The information which Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h received from the Belgian Staff on the evening of the 25th that the inundation was about to commence had



FRENCH SUCCESS IN BELGIUM.
Guns and a Taube captured from the Germans.

come at an opportune moment. That night the weakness of his position had been brought home to the Admiral by an occurrence which showed that his system of defence by trenches and barbed wire was defective or that his Marines were becoming exhausted.

At 7 p.m. on the 25th, one of his companies marching to the trenches south of the town had run into a body of Germans who had apparently slipped through the lines. The Marines after a short hand-to-hand fight put the Germans to flight, and up to 2 a.m. there was no further disturbance. No sounds were to be heard but those of the falling rain and the occasional

German bombardment. In spite of orders, the firing however continued, and the Admiral sent an officer to reconnoitre. The officer proceeded to the bank of the canal, but met no signs of the enemy. The fusillade behind him ceased but, on returning, he ran into a French ambulance. It was in the hands of Germans who were promptly secured.

When day broke on the 26th the mystery of the firing was cleared up. A German detach-



INUNDATIONS ON THE YSER.

A scene near Ramscapeelle.

Top picture: Belgian outpost sentry guarding a dyke bank near Nieuport.

Bottom picture: On the Yser.

movements of sentinels and patrols. Suddenly there was an alarm. Firing was heard from the direction of the railway station of Caeskerke, the Admiral's headquarters. It was followed by the half muffled sounds of a hand-to-hand struggle. Then there burst out suddenly the shrill tones of trumpets sounding the assembly and cries of "To Arms!" Perceiving that the shots came from the interior and not from the exterior of the lines, the officers at Caeskerke shouted to their men to cease fire. Doubtless a false alarm had been given by some excited sentinel. Some man's nerves had broken under the strain of the recent

ment had apparently glided along the railway line. Doctor Duguet and the Abbé Le Helloco, who at the noise of the firing had risen from their straw couches and rushed into the street, were wounded. Before Doctor Duguet died the Abbé had given him absolution. The band of Germans passed on and reached an ambulance, whose attendants they seized and dragged along with them. Commandant Jeannot, who had displayed such courage at the assault of Beerst on the 19th, dashed out of his house to ascertain what was happening. In his excitement he had forgotten to pick up his pistol. Supposing that there was a panic and mistaking the Ger-

mans for some of his own men he had run towards the enemy, who made him prisoner and with shouts of "Hoch, Hoch!" continued to advance on the bridge over the Yser. Some of the Germans (with the prisoners) had already crossed when the officer commanding the guard at the Grand-Pont turned on them first a searchlight and then his mitrailleuses. The bridge was covered with dead and wounded, and those of the enemy who were on the point of crossing it scattered and hid in the ruins of the town. As for the head of the column, it sought to escape across the fields to the German trenches. Jeanniot and the other prisoners were an encumbrance and might prove a danger. They were, of course, massacred. "Prisoners may be put to death," says the German General



THE FLOODED COUNTRY.

The inundations that stretch for miles in Flanders. Top picture: On guard. Bottom picture: British troops wading along a road with forage for the horses.

Staff, "in case of overwhelming necessity, when other means of precaution do not exist and the existence of the prisoners becomes a danger to one's own existence."* Shortly after committing this crime the assassins surrendered but were not killed, which was in flagrant contradiction to the doctrine laid down by their own War Book, but more in consonance with the customs of civilized beings. Prisoners, the Germans held, may be "executed in case

* "The German War Book," translated by Professor J. H. Morgan, M.A. (John Murray), pp. 73-4.

of overwhelming necessity, as reprisals, either against similar measures or against other irregularities on the part of the management of the enemy's Army." *

An episode of this kind which might have led to the capture of Dixmude had naturally disturbed Ronarc'h, and he asked for reinforcements. Two battalions of Senegalese were sent from Loo to his support. During the day of the 26th Dixmude was again bombarded, but the French howitzers, west of it, kept off the German infantry from attacking the trenches till nightfall, when another charge on them was made. The mitrailleuses



IN A GERMAN TRENCH BEHIND THE YSER.

Germans cleaning up their kits.

stuek, but headed by Lieutenant Martin de Pallières, the Marines with their bayonets flung off their assailants, many of whom were schoolboys worn out by long vigils in the trenches, by the inclement weather and by insufficient nourishment.

The next day (October 27) the first effects of the efforts of M. Kogge and his assistants at Nieuport to flood the district between the Yser and the railway embankment became apparent to the Belgians. That their trenches were an inch or so deeper in water does not seem to have disturbed the Germans. The rain and the

damp nature of the soil would account for that phenomenon, and the soldiers were so tired out by the fighting of Monday and the previous days that it may have escaped their notice. At any rate, though every minute they delayed in their attack on Nieuport was of vital importance to them, they showed no unusual activity on the 27th. The defenders of Dixmude, indeed, spent almost a peaceful day. Between the railway and the canal there were some insignificant engagements, and two British cruisers and a torpedo boat, directed from a captive naval balloon, bombarded the German lines south of Nieuport.

The 27th, the twelfth day of the long-drawn struggle, was virtually a contest between the guns of the two armies, but how differently would the Duke of Wurtemberg have behaved had he known that the inundation had begun; how feverish would have been the activity of his troops, if they could have heard what a French officer who had motored from Versailles told a *Times* correspondent in Furnes at 5.30 a.m. that morning! He had passed, said the officer, a continuous stream of motor transport stretching out along the road for a hundred kilometres (sixty miles). With the Germans caught in the trap, Joffre and Foch were hurrying northward in auto-omnibuses, taxicabs, motor lorries, some of those reserves of men and munitions which they had been so carefully and cautiously husbanding.

Perhaps informed of this movement which threatened to snatch the coveted Calais from his grasp, and certainly now aware of the inundation, the Duke of Wurtemberg on Wednesday, the 28th, again attacked all along the line; he hoped to win Nieuport, the railway from Nieuport to Dixmude, and Dixmude before the floods retarded his further progress. Under the fire of the 12-inch guns of H.M.S. Venerable and other cruisers, and of the sloops and gunboats which Rear-Admiral Hood had summoned from the English ports, the Germans advanced down the coast on Nieuport. "From the muzzles of the 12-inch guns," an eye-witness tells us, "came a thin puff of smoke, enveloping a great ball of fire, which seemed to rush from the muzzle a yard or two and then move back towards it a little before vanishing. The huge shells could be seen smashing in the German lines, the fall of each marked by a pall of green-black smoke." Nevertheless Lombartzyde was evacuated by the Allies.

* "The German War Book," translated by Professor J. H. Morgan, M.A. (John Murray), p. 73.



**BRITISH MONITORS IN
ACTION OFF THE BELGIAN
COAST.**

The monitors, being of light draught, approached close to the shore of the Belgian coast. So close to land did they come, that the crews even fired with rifles at the enemy. The portrait at top is of Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. Hood, the Commander. Bottom left: Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Wilson (Monitor Mersey), and on right, Commander A. L. Snagge (Monitor Humber.)



THE MAIN STREET, RAMSCAPPELLE.

Most of the towns and villages in Belgium present the same appearance—wrecked beyond recognition.

The effect of the fire from the British ships may be gathered from the account furnished that day by a German soldier to a Dutch journalist.

“The bayonet attacks were fearful. Some of the combatants were pierced from breast to back. It was hell. There we stood in trenches, sometimes breast-high in water—and that awful sea firing! We could see the ships lying there. We got the attack from the side. Bodies lay in heaps. Many were killed too in the region of Middelkerke and the canal. It was indeed sometimes red with blood. (My informant meant the canal from Ostend to Nieuport, which also played a part in this battle.) Yes, it was hell, and if you’ve a wife and children—” (the man burst into tears).

“All soldiers are not warriors,” I ventured to say.

“No,” he replied; “many are longing earnestly for the end—for home, wife, and children. The stream of volunteers was very great but, alas! when they are actually in the fight for a moment some of them in anguish call upon fathers and mothers, and one could do nothing with them. There was enough to eat; but weariness, shock, the fear of death, all this broke the soldiers.”

South of the canal, which from Nieuport joins the Canal de Ghent, the Germans across the Yser at St. Georges also assaulted the town, behind which lay the machinery causing the inundation. Nearer Dixmude, they endeavoured from the loop of the Yser to get astride of the railway at Ramscappelle and Pervyse, and to penetrate between those villages to Boitshoucke and thence to Furnes where five shells from their 28 cm. howitzers dropped that day just short of the railway station.

Impressed by the fact that reinforcements were arriving the Allies stuck to their trenches. The Belgians scarcely needed to be reminded by their King in the following proclamation of the issues at stake.


Soldiers, our towns are burnt, our homes annihilated, there is mourning upon our beloved Fatherland. But

still crueller things will befall our compatriots if you do not deliver them from the invader. It is an imperative duty for you. You can deliver our Fatherland with the help of our brave Allies.

The shout of “Louvain! Termonde!” which rose from the Belgian Army on the Yser was the reply to the words of the King. And once more the wearied soldiers attacked the enemy with the bayonet.

The Germans also fought energetically. Ditches and dykes were overflowing, and water pouring down the high bank of the Yser Canal into the fields. Every private perceived the snare laid for the Duke of Wurtemberg, but with task-masters who flogged them forward and even turned machine guns on to them, retreat seemed the more dangerous alternative. By sunset they were still in swarms round Ramscappelle and Pervyse. Ronarc’h and his heroic band, shelled most of the day by heavy and light artillery—to which the French howitzers had made some reply—in the evening had had to beat off another violent assault on the south of Dixmude.

The battle was resumed on Thursday, the 29th. Dixmude was merely bombarded, while the Duke of Wurtemberg aimed blow after blow at the Allied centre from Pervyse to Ramscappelle. He did not yet regard himself as beaten and still might lay his hands on the Nieuport sluices. With their numerous “table-tops” (light, roughly-constructed but strong portable platforms on legs which could be thrown across rivulets as bridges) his infantry might manage to make their way across the artificial lake which, except at the points where there were ditches and dykes, could be forded by cavalry and even by infantry. His advanced



MAP SHOWING THE INUNDATED AREA ON THE YSER. THE INUNDATION IS SHOWN DOTTED.

guard was on part of the rim of the inundated district. If he could take Ramscappelle and cross the Furnes-Nieuport Canal, he might isolate Nieuport or seize Furnes, which could be attacked from Ramscappelle, Boitcheucke, or Pervyse. The tremendous effort being made on his left to crumple up the Allied Army round Ypres was calculated to prevent Joffre and Foch largely reinforcing Grossetti and the Belgians. So long as it was humanly possible to continue the attack, it was the Duke's duty to do so in order to influence the centre and right of the Allied Army engaged in this gigantic battle. To keep the French reserves in the plain north of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats was well worth sacrificing his "cannon fodder."

During the afternoon the offensive was, therefore, resumed, and that night in a violent storm of wind and rain Ramscappelle was at last captured, and so dangerous for the Allies was the situation at Pervyse, that Ronarc'h depleted his scanty garrison round Dixmude and sent to the latter village two companies of Marines.

The morning of Friday, the 30th, dawned. Five French torpedo-boat destroyers had been added to Rear-Admiral Hood's flotilla. He hoisted his flag on the *Intrepide* and led the French ships into action off Lombartzyde. The French and British destroyers guarded the larger vessels from submarines, whose presence was betrayed by periscopes, and from their torpedoes. From the Dunes the German howitzers hurled their huge shells. The *Amazon* had been badly holed; Lieutenant Wauton commanding the *Falcon* and eight seamen on it had been killed, eighteen disabled. The monitor, *Mersey*, during the operations had had its 6-in. gun turret disabled and received several shots on the water-line.

The Germans were in front of Nieuport; they were barricaded in Ramscappelle and along the railway to the north and south of it; but between the railway and the canal the inundation was slowly and steadily advancing towards Pervyse. All day the battle raged for the possession of Ramscappelle, the railway embankment and Pervyse. The former village was taken and retaken by the French and

Belgians. Pervyse remained in the hands of the Allies.

At daybreak on the 31st Ramscappelle was bombarded. The Germans finding the village untenable advanced westward from it. The moment for which the Allies had been waiting in the small hours had come. The bugles sounded the charge, and the French and Belgian infantry, under a hail of shot and shrapnel and in face of batteries of machine-guns pouring lead as a hose pours water, rushed forward with a courageous and irresistible impetus. The distance between the two lines rapidly diminished. The assailants were soon 300 yards, 200 yards, and then but 50 yards from the foe; which side would give way?

For a second the issue was in the balance. Then, with a mighty shout, the Allied troops hurled themselves on the Germans, and drove them headlong backwards to Ramscappelle and the railway. Seven mitrailleuses were captured and 300 prisoners taken. The ground was littered with the dead and dying.

In Ramscappelle the Germans rallied, and there was a terrible struggle at hand-strokes. But the Allies would not be denied, and still pressed onward driving their foes before them. In vain did the German officers with threats, curses, blows, and even shots from their pistols try to keep their soldiers from throwing down their weapons and evacuating the village. Fear had overtaken this once brave host, and by 9 a.m. Ramscappelle was lost to them. An hour later the Allies were over the railway embankment. Then the "seventy-fives" were brought up at a gallop and poured a hail of shell on the demoralized German infantry wading frantically through the water towards the canal. Rifles and machine guns joined in the work of destruction, and the placid lake between the railway and the canal was soon dotted with drowning Germans fallen from the demoralized crowds struggling to reach a haven of safety over the bridges at St. Georges, Schoorbakke, and Tervaele.

The crisis of the Battle of the Yser was over; the Germans had made their great effort and had failed.



CHAPTER LXIV.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REBELLION.

ORIGINS OF THE REBELLION—A POLITICAL MOVEMENT—THE SOUTH AFRICAN DUTCH AND THEIR LEADERS—THE BOTHA-HERTZOG QUARREL—RIVAL IDEALS—HERTZOG'S FALL—HIS RESPONSIBILITY—REBEL LEADERS—MARITZ'S INTRIGUES—THE PROPHET VAN RENSBERG—DEATH OF DE LA REY—MARITZ REBELS—OUTBREAK IN TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE—NEGOTIATIONS WITH REBELS—DEFEAT OF BEYERS AND DE WET—DE WET SURRENDERS—DEATH OF BEYERS—END OF THE REBELLION.

IT would be easy to say that the rebellion which broke out in South Africa soon after war was declared in Europe was the result of German intrigue—easy, but superficial. German intrigue had no doubt a good deal to do with the rebellion. The rebel leaders had long looked forward to the day when a conflict with Germany should give them the opportunity of making with some hope of success an attempt to restore republican rule in South Africa. What is known already about the efforts of Germany before the war to prepare the way by organizing such elements of discontent wherever they seemed to exist in the British Empire makes it quite certain that the obvious opportunities of South Africa did not escape the vigilance and industry of the German Secret Service. We know, too, what hopes were built in Germany itself upon the possibilities of revolt in South Africa. We have the word of the South African Government for the existence on a large scale of a system of German propaganda in many districts in South Africa. And, lastly, the speeches and manifestoes of the rebel leaders show that they had great expectations of

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German aid in men, and, more important than men, in supplies of heavy guns, ammunition, and equipment. The evidence of the extent to which all this had gone is still in the hands of the South African Government. It will be revealed when the proper time comes. Meanwhile, it is as well not to assign too great an importance to these machinations of the enemy. There were elements in South Africa which had made for rebellion long before August 1914. Whether they would actually have brought rebellion about if there had been no war is uncertain. But it is certain that rebellion was their natural consequence, and that German intrigue was the breeze that fanned the smouldering fires of revolt into a flame, much more than the match which first set it burning.

The South African rebellion was a political movement carried to its logical extreme. Its military significance was slight, though it might have been far more serious. Not as a campaign can it have any great interest for the student of the war; but as a revelation of the problems that had to be solved by Great Britain in South Africa, as a test of the efficacy



THE PREMIER OF SOUTH AFRICA AND HIS FAMILY AT GROOTE SCHUUR.

Mrs. Botha, Miss Frances Botha, General Louis Botha, Captain Louis Botha, Headquarter Staff ;
Mr. John Botha, Cape Town Highlanders ; and Mr. Philip Botha.

of the solution that had been attempted long before the war came, as a criterion of the ultimate efficacy of that solution. It cannot, in fact, be regarded as an isolated and inexplicable outbreak, hopeless from the first, speedily suppressed. It was much more than that, and to make clear its objects and its chances of success its relation to the history of South Africa since the end of the Boer War must be investigated and explained.

The history of the Dutch-speaking race in South Africa is largely the product of the personality of its leaders. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. They lived, most of them, isolated lives. They were a farming people, and in South Africa the farms were large. The defects of their racial character were mostly due to this fact. They were not

a highly educated people. Their beliefs, their habits, their methods of agriculture were all primitive. The organization of their social system was still patriarchal. The family, with its flocks and herds, was the unit. Upon it was grafted three characteristics, each of which had a strong influence on their development. They were a land-owning people, and, as the family grew, a progressive sub-division—in legal right though not in practice—of the land belonging to the family went with it. They lived in a land where native labour was at hand to do all the manual work and so became inevitably more the masters of labour than labourers on the land themselves. Their religious belief was a fervent, if narrow, Calvinism. Among a people with whom reading was in little favour this intensity of

religious belief gave the minister of religion—the Predikant—an immense influence. It followed from these three conditions of their life that they grew to believe in themselves as a kind of chosen race, specially favoured by Providence, given South Africa as a dwelling-place and expressly appointed to rule over the native population for its good. With these strong traditions they combined an individualism created by the hard struggle that they had with Nature in that land of sparse rainfall, of thronging plagues and blights on beast and crop, of immense distances. Add as a culminating element in the formation of Dutch racial character two facts: first, that the tradition of ordered government and of respect for constituted authority was strong in them. Second, that combination was constantly imposed upon them as the one condition of success in early wars against the natives, and that where they were so few and the natives so many, success could only be won by matching the cunning of their enemies by a superior craft and the overwhelming native superiority in numbers by better weapons and a more resolute courage. Throughout the early history of the South African Dutch a leader of exceptional ability was always a

necessity for survival and was always found. When the small Transvaal Republic found itself threatened by the stream of British pioneers that poured north to exploit the riches of the goldfields, President Kruger was surely established as the leader of his people in the north. In the Cape, after peace with the natives had made possible responsible government under the British Crown, the Dutch found it necessary to organize politically if their traditional claims were not to be abandoned. Here, too, there was need for a leader. He appeared in the person of Jan Hofmeyr, whose word was law to the Dutch of the Cape through many years of political conflict. When the Transvaal took up arms against Great Britain and Paul Kruger was too old to lead her troops in the field, natural leaders



MEN WHO CRUSHED THE REBELS.

General Smuts delivering his famous speech at Johannesburg. Inset: General Smuts.



SPECIAL CONSTABLES ON A ROUTE MARCH.

Town Police section of Pretoria who volunteered to do night duty in order to release the South African Police for active service.

of men appeared from the ranks of the commandoes and were followed because they proved their capacity. They were Louis Botha, de la Rey, Smuts, and Beyers in the Transvaal; in the Orange Free State President Steyn and Christian de Wet.

The Boer War ended on May 31, 1902. Twelve years and a few months later the Boer leaders who had won eminence during the war were ranged against each other in the field. Botha and Smuts were Ministers of the Crown, the Jourdan and the Carnot of the King's forces in South Africa. De la Rey was dead, shot by accident upon the threshold of rebellion, whether he knew that he stood there or not. Beyers and de Wet were rebel leaders in the field. And every Dutchman in the country looked anxiously towards Onze Rust—the farm near Bloemfontein where ex-President Steyn nursed the shattered remnant of health that the war had left him—looked, and wondered whether he would speak the word that would leave Beyers and de Wet with only the desperate remnant of a following. The history of these men during those twelve years is very largely the history of South Africa. The loyalty to them of the Dutch-speaking people was constant and unshaken. When they split into two sections and went their different ways, the Dutch split also and followed—most Botha and Smuts; the rest ex-President Steyn, Beyers, de Wet, and Steyn's lieutenant and mouth-piece in politics, Hertzog.

In this breach between the Dutch leaders

Botha was the protagonist on the one side, Hertzog on the other. But Hertzog spoke and acted in all essentials as the representative of ex-President Steyn, though with a personal violence and a passion of individual conviction that constantly exaggerated his own importance and obscured the hand of ex-President Steyn which guided him. The breach had thus two sides. It was a personal quarrel, and a very violent personal quarrel, between Botha and Hertzog. But it was also much more than that. It was a definite and irreparable rupture between two ideals. When Botha won and Hertzog was beaten there remained only two courses for him and those who held the same ideals as he did. They could submit, or they could prepare for rebellion and await a favorable moment for taking the field in arms against Botha and Great Britain. This statement needs some superficial qualification. Hertzog did not rebel. Both he and ex-President Steyn claimed when all was over that they had done everything possible to prevent armed rebellion. But the rebel commanders fought for their ideals, inscribed Hertzog's name on their banners, constantly assured their followers that Hertzog was on the same side as they were and approved everything that they did. Essentially, the verdict that the South African rebellion was the natural development of the breach between Botha and Hertzog at the end of 1912 is beyond question.

A brief retrospect of the events that led up to the quarrel will show this. South African

history, between the Peace of Vereeniging, which ended the Boer War in May 1902, and the rebellion at the end of August 1914, divides itself naturally into three periods. In the first period the conquered Republics—the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—were governed as Crown Colonies. In the second they received responsible government, elected their own representatives in Parliament, and were ruled by a Ministry of their own choosing. In the third they united with the other two South African Colonies, Cape Colony and Natal, to form the Union of South Africa. The first period need not keep us long. It was a time of reconstruction during which the Transvaal and the Free State* were re-settled after the war, their farmhouses rebuilt, their lands restocked and cultivated again, the whole fabric of their normal life restored. During this period the Dutch leaders in both Colonies took practically no part in the work of government. They stood on one side and allowed the British authorities to do all they could to restore the destruction that war had brought. In the second period the men who had become leaders of the Dutch during the war became in both Colonies Ministers of the Crown and rulers of the State. This period also, but for one thing,—the outbreak in the Free State of open hostility by the Dutch towards the British—need not detain us long. Elsewhere the two races lived side by side in a peace that was surprising,

* The Orange Free State was called the Orange River Colony from the Peace of Vereeniging till the beginning of Union. It then became a Province of the Union, and was again called the Orange Free State.

seeing how recently they had been at war. It was, as everyone felt, a period of transition. The four Colonies of South Africa were not strong enough to stand alone. They had no natural boundaries; their railways were a single system; their peoples, Dutch or British born, were of the same two races and lived side by side in each of the four Colonies. Their interests were unquestionably identical and Union meant no great sacrifice on the part of either of the two white races that inhabited them. If Natal had a great preponderance of British population, the Orange River Colony had an equally marked preponderance of Dutch. In the Cape and in the Transvaal the numbers of the two white races were more equally balanced, though in both the Dutch had a sufficient political majority to keep their representatives in power. Union of the four States was thus in the air all through this second period. It overshadowed all other considerations. Obviously it could be established only on a basis of peace between the two white races. This was the reason why, though the Dutch were in political power in three of the four Colonies so soon after the war, there was so little open racial dissension.

There was one exception. In the Orange River Colony the period of responsible government saw the sudden rise to power and influence of "General" Hertzog and gave a foretaste of the policy which he was afterwards to develop and elaborate as a member of the first South African Ministry under Union. This is no place for recalling in any detail the educational policy of Hertzog in the Orange River



LOYALIST TROOPS IN BOOYSON'S CAMP, JOHANNESBURG.

Colony. It caused acute dissension between the two white races. It set even the Dutch of the Orange River Colony by the ears, since it forbade the teaching of English as a language in the State schools to any but the elder children, and many of the Dutch fully realized how advantageous it was for their children to learn English while they were young. But, most of all, it revealed the personal character of General Hertzog and so justifies more notice than could otherwise be given to it in an estimate of the origins and causes of the South African rebellion.

Mr. Hertzog was commonly given the title of "General" by friends and opponents alike in South Africa. It did not mark any distinguished service in the field, as in the case of Generals Botha, Smuts, Beyers, and de Wet. Yet as soon as the Free State Parliament met he emerged as the strong man of the Ministry. The Prime Minister, Mr. Abraham Fischer, was a barrister of considerable age and no great strength of character. The other members of his Cabinet were undistinguished, except de Wet, and he never pretended to be a politician. In such company Hertzog had full play for his peculiar gifts and every opportunity to give effect to the views which he held with the passionate strength of a narrow and fanatical



GENERAL C. F. BEYERS,

One of the Rebel leaders. Before the Rebellion he was Commandant-General of the Citizen Forces.



GENERAL MARITZ,

Who was, in August 1914, appointed to command the Border, German South-West Africa. One of the principal leaders of the rebels.

character. Even so, without the strong backing that he received from Mr. Steyn, who had been President of the Orange Free State Republic before the war, Hertzog would scarcely have won to the position which he soon occupied in the estimation of a section of Dutch South Africans. He had certain very obvious qualities. In private life he was kindly and disinterested. He had courage and determination. He held, with an almost religious fervour—though himself not a religious man in the conventional sense—the full creed of Dutch South African nationality. He believed in the prescriptive right of the Dutch to the soil of South Africa. He resented the presence of the British and looked on them as interlopers. He would have had South Africa remain a community of pastoralists, entirely cut off from intercourse with European countries and blissfully remote from the problems that are created by the growth of great industries and the population that they attract. Appointed a Minister of the Crown, he acknowledged the duty of loyalty to the Sovereign of Great Britain, but found it not inconsistent with that duty to enunciate the doctrine that in all matters the claims of South Africa must be paramount. "South Africa first": this was his motto, the text of many of his public utterances, the test that he would apply to any matter which concerned the Empire of which the Orange River Colony had become a part. The test was to be thoroughly applied. No sacrifice of the immediate claims of the part to the welfare of the whole could be tolerated for a moment. To contemplate such



GENERAL HERTZOG,

Whose policy led to rebellion in South Africa.

a sacrifice was to be guilty of treachery to South Africa, to be branded as a "foreign adventurer," to be excluded once and for all from the company of good patriots. His was the whole gospel of Krugerism, modified only in appearance so as to conform with the changed conditions of a country in which Krugerism had been encountered and defeated by Great Britain. Its logical outcome was rebellion as soon as the moment came when a decision would have to be made between the momentary interests of South Africa and the welfare and safety of the Empire.

But that was not yet. The seed of this doctrine, however, fell in the Free State upon ground only too well prepared for its reception. The war was still a thing of the recent past. Its memories rankled. The Dutch were in a large majority over the British-born people of the Colony. When they were granted responsible government it was inevitable that some at least of them should set themselves to win again what they had lost through the war. And the British-born people, whose country had been victorious in arms, found themselves as soon as Parliament met at the mercy of any man who should care to be vindictive. Hertzog was that man. He had two great grievances, and of both he was determined to make the most. Crown Colony government had done much for the Free State. It had built railways, resettled the country, established schools on a scale unknown before. Under a wise policy of State research and encouragement farming had flourished. If they had been let alone, Boer and Briton might have settled down to a future of

mutual prosperity. But Hertzog had his grievances. He believed that the Crown Colony government had attempted to crush out the Dutch language, and he was convinced that the Dutch had not been given their fair share of administrative posts. He set himself to vindicate the claims of the Dutch to speak their language, to penalize English, and to take a part in the administration of the country proportionate to their preponderance in population over the British. There is no need to go in detail into the steps which he took to these ends. Their results show their nature. Separate schools for English-speaking children were established in many of the Free State towns, and numbers of English-speaking Civil Servants were driven out of Government posts.

Then came the Union movement. It was clear that the Free State could not stand out. Hertzog went as one of the delegates to the National Convention which had been summoned to draw up a constitution for United South Africa. There he met the representatives of the other colonies: Generals Botha and Smuts, leaders of the Dutch in the Transvaal; Mr. Merriman, Mr. Sauer and Sir Henry de Villiers,



GENERAL CHRISTIAN DE WET,

Who led the rebels against the Union forces.



READY TO PURSUE THE REBELS.

Commandant Collins and his troops, after attending service at the Dutch Reform Church, leaving Pretoria.

all closely identified with the Dutch in Cape Colony; Dr. Jameson, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, Sir George Farrar, and the leading men of Natal, all representative of the British population in South Africa. Ex-President Steyn and Mr. Jan Hofmeyr were not members of the National Convention. The former was too ill to attend; Mr. Hofmeyr had long ceased to take a public part in the political life of Cape Colony, though he had still great influence as a power behind the throne. Union meant compromise between the claims of the Dutch on one side and the British on the other. From the first meeting of the National Convention the representatives of the British showed that they were prepared for compromise. And at once there also appeared a distinct cleavage between the moderate Dutch, whose opinions were voiced by General Botha, Sir Henry de Villiers, and Mr. Merriman, and the extreme section of Dutch nationalists, championed by Mr. Hertzog. The moderates prevailed. Hertzog, seeing that he could not carry his proposals, gave way. Union was formed, and General Botha became the first Prime Minister of South Africa. His Cabinet included Hertzog and Fischer and was formed on party lines, being composed of chosen men from the Ministries in power in the Cape, the Transvaal, and the Free State. All were the representatives of parties supported by the Dutch-speaking section of the South African people.

From the first it was an ill-assorted and uneasy combination. The cleavage between the moderate Dutch and the reactionists continually asserted itself. Contradictions between the speeches of Botha and Hertzog became more and more frequent and glaring. It was impossible to reconcile them. General Botha took office on May 31, 1910. The first elections for the South African Parliament were held in September of that year. The Unionists, under the leadership of Sir Starr Jameson,* fought the elections on a platform which pledged them to support Botha in every measure that was consistent with the compromise between the claims of British and Dutch which was the basis of Union. They openly proclaimed their dislike of Hertzog and his views, and their leader in his election speeches foretold the necessity of supporting Botha against the reactionary section of his party led by Hertzog. The events of the next eighteen months showed the justice of this prediction. As the inconsistencies between the convictions of Botha and of Hertzog on race questions became more and more plain the protests of the Unionists increased in frequency and in effect. In December, 1912, the end came. Botha at last made up his mind that the speeches of Hertzog could not be tolerated any longer. He asked Hertzog to resign from the Cabinet. Hertzog refused. Thereupon Botha resigned and, on the request

* He received a baronetcy on Union Day.

of the Governor-General, formed a new Cabinet. Hertzog was not a member of it. From that moment the breach between the two sections of the Dutch was complete and irreparable. Desperate efforts were made to heal it. It defied them all and grew wider and wider. Personal dislikes between the rival leaders helped to broaden it. At last Hertzog was defeated on a formal vote at a conference of supporters of the Botha Ministry. He left the conference chamber with his following. A few months later he formed a new party to oppose Botha.

It is important to understand the exact nature of this breach between Botha and Hertzog. The views to which Hertzog gave expression while he was a member of the Botha Ministry were the same views as Beyers, Maritz, and de Wet proclaimed when they went into armed rebellion nearly two years later. They amounted to a complaint that the Dutch were not being fairly treated under Union; that the Dutch language was not in practice being given absolute equality with English, as the Act of Union had declared that it should

be given; that those who spoke Dutch only were at a disadvantage as compared with those who spoke only English, especially as to their chances of promotion in the Civil Service; and, generally, that the interests of South Africa were being sacrificed to those of the British Empire. On these points Botha broke with Hertzog. He took this drastic step because he believed that perpetual bickering about them would be fatal to peace between English and Dutch in South Africa, and peace between the two white races were essential to the prosperity of the country. He was right. The Hertzog policy led at last to rebellion in South Africa, though Hertzog himself flinched from the extreme and refused to take up the arms of the rebel.

An extract from a speech made by General Hertzog while he was a member of the Botha Ministry, and from the proclamation issued by Maritz after he had gone into rebellion, will show that on the most important of these issues the rebels merely carried the Hertzog doctrine to its logical conclusion:



WITH THE UNION FORCES.
Wireless Outfit and the Operators.

General Hertzog at De Wildt in the Transvaal. December 7, 1912.

Imperialism is important to me only when it is useful to South Africa, to its land, and to its people. When it is not serviceable, I have respect for it from a distance, but as a South African I have little to do with it, and when it is contrary to the interests of South Africa and the interests of the people of the country, then I am a distinct enemy of Imperialism. I am prepared to let my future as a politician depend on that. That is my feeling and by that I stand. Imperialism is important to me when it is in the interests of South Africa, and when any question of that kind is to be dealt with, then it will always be my duty to ask myself, is the solution of this question in the interests of South Africa, and if it is to the detriment of the country then it is my duty to have nothing to do with it.

Maritz. Extract from Proclamation issued on December 16 1914, explaining his reasons for going into armed rebellion.

Because both the English Government and the jingo section in England have continually brought pressure to bear on the Union (South African) Government, contrary to promises made, to extinguish and suppress the national aspirations of our people and to place the interests of the Empire above those of South Africa.

It is worth noting that the words quoted above from Hertzog's speech at De Wildt in December, 1912, finally convinced Botha that it was impossible to allow Hertzog to remain a member of his Ministry. Two months later Botha issued a public statement in which he explained his reasons for expelling Hertzog from the Ministry. In this statement he showed how mischievous the condemnation in Imperialism in Hertzog's De Wildt speech might be :

A public man must not only be held responsible for what he himself intends to convey, but especially for the impression which his words have left reasonably in the public mind ; and it was, above all, General Hertzog's duty, in the high official position which he occupied, to consider and weigh his words most carefully when discussing our relations towards the British Empire. Instead of doing that, he spoke frivolously, and in a manner which induced many of the Dutch as well as the English-speaking public to imagine that it was a matter of circumstances whether South Africa would remain part of the Empire or not.



MOTOR-CYCLIST SCOUT.

Botha reinforced this condemnation of Hertzog's policy by a reference to a passage in another speech made by Hertzog, in which he declared that, "as a Minister, I am a Minister of South Africa and not of the Empire." Botha pointed out that in making such a statement Hertzog seemed to have "forgotten the oath of allegiance to the King which every Minister, when accepting office, must take." Events were to show how just was Botha's estimate of the effect that such words were likely to have on some of the Dutch-speaking people of South Africa.

It is thus hardly too much to say that from the moment when Hertzog ceased to be a member of the first South African Ministry some at least of his following believed that in the end rebellion would be the only means of making the doctrines that he had preached prevail. Hertzog himself may not have thought so, probably did not think so. His gospel was the old gospel of Kruger. He may well have clung to the belief that it would prove irresistibly attractive to the mass of the South African Dutch, and that when the next General Election came—it had to come not later than September, 1915—he would return to Parliament as leader of a party strong enough to force Botha to submit to his dictation. His formation of a new party, his intrigues with the Labour party, seem to show that this was his idea. Let him have such credit for it as may be his due. But he never realized—or if he realized was reckless of the consequences—that he had to deal with the most ignorant and prejudiced section of the South African Dutch. They still looked back with regret to the days of their independence. They resented the influence of the British in South Africa. A people born to arms and tried in war, they were impatient of constitutional methods. In their eyes Hertzog—driven from the Botha Ministry—became a martyr to the cause of their race, sacrificed by Botha to placate the British. Hertzog might have known that this would be the way they would look upon his fall from power. It is almost incredible that he should not have known. Yet, even knowing this, he may have flattered himself that they would wait for the fruition of his political organization and intrigues. He trusted, perhaps, in their loyalty to himself, and to ex-President Steyn, whose mouthpiece he was. If so, he reckoned upon a characteristic of the South African Dutch to which we have already assigned its

due importance. But all such calculations broke down when other leaders—men like de Wet, and Beyers, and Kemp—abandoned constitutional methods and set themselves to organize armed rebellion. Hertzog should have known this. But the truth is that he was a man who had no real gift for leadership. He fumbled with the ambitions of passionate men as though they were books in a library. He was blinded by his own self-importance. His slow, yet passionate, mind saw only the path that he had marked out for himself, and followed it with an intense preoccupation. This is the most charitable assumption about Hertzog's part in the plot that led up to the rebellion. It is quite possible that he knew nothing of what was going on. If so, the less credit to his intelligence. Nor does such blindness—if blindness there were—lessen his responsibility for the tinsel tragedy that was being prepared. Men who aspire to lead their fellows shoulder a responsibility far too heavy to be weighed by the literal meanings of spoken words. And Hertzog might have known, should have known. De Wet, for instance, warned him in a speech made at Pretoria within a month of the definite breach between him and Hertzog. De Wet chose on this occasion to select a dung-heap as his platform. The whole substance of his speech was a vindication of the rights of Dutch South Africans and an attempt to prove that they were trodden under foot when Botha broke with Hertzog. Hertzog was held up to admiration as the only man who fully represented the South African people. And de Wet dramatically declared that he would rather be on a dung-heap among his people than on the most brilliant platform among foreigners. The "foreigners" were clearly the British people of South Africa, and Botha was represented as having surrendered to them. Language of that kind could only mean one thing. It meant war in South Africa against the "foreigners" and their dupes, whenever the "patriots" should think that their time had come.

Such were the political antecedents of the rebellion. Knowing them, we should expect to find that the rebel leaders, when their moment had come, would select some occasion which would give them the opportunity of proclaiming that the interests of South Africa were being sacrificed for those of the British Empire, that the Dutch were being down-trodden and oppressed, that the Botha Ministry



GROUP OF LOYAL SOUTH AFRICANS.

were the tools of "foreigners," and that a recourse to arms was the only way of ending these evils. This was exactly what happened. The Blue Book issued by the South African Government shows how the chief conspirators went about their work.*

They were four—Beyers, de Wet, Maritz, Kemp. Besides these there were a number of minor leaders—four members of the South African Parliament, several ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, and more than one member of the Free State Provincial Council. Of these minor leaders none were men of first-rate importance. The type to which they belonged was illustrated, though with many of its characteristics exaggerated, in the personality of Hendrik Serfontein, who was elected to represent the Free State constituency of Kroonstad at a by-election. Tall and stooping; with the immense shoulders, long arms and enormous hands of an almost primitive son of the soil; his face rugged, narrow, bearded and frowned upon by great overhanging eye-rows; violent in speech, yet often almost inarticulate for lack of education to provide him with the words in which to express himself, Hendrik Serfontein amazed his colleagues in the South African Parliament by occasional exhibitions of the narrowness and concentrated bitterness of his mind, no less than by the almost grotesque uncouthness of his personal habit. With such leaders as this, it was no wonder that many of

* This Blue-Book was issued on February 26, 1915. The Preface states that "a mass of material in the hands of the Government could not be used, as it forms important evidence in the cases of individuals on trial or awaiting trial. In the case of certain German agents, investigations are still being pursued, and it would be premature to disclose the information so far collected. On certain points, again, the available evidence had not yet been properly sifted at the time of writing."



CAPE PENINSULAR RIFLES ON THE MARCH.

A morning bath after a heavy night march.

Inset: Ready to advance.

the Boers of the Free State were led blindfold into rebellion by appeals to race hatred and prejudice. The Transvaal rebel-member of the South African Parliament, Piet Grobler, was quite a different type. Young, a nephew of Paul Kruger, a lawyer not a fighting man, pleasant and mild-mannered, he seemed the last man to plunge into rebellion. The news that he had joined in the conspiracy and was in arms must have seemed to those who knew him as strange as the news that Hendrik Serfontein was a rebel leader was natural and ex-

pected. But these minor leaders need no very detailed mention or description, though doubtless their influence in their own districts was considerable. It is quite otherwise with two at least of the four chief leaders—Beyers and de Wet. Taking into consideration the character of the baek-veld Dutch, it is quite certain that without two such leaders of national reputation the rebellion would have been a far less serious affair than it was. It is more than doubtful, indeed, whether there would have been any rebellion at all if they had not sanctioned and fomented it.

Yet the contrast between the characters of Beyers and de Wet was very great, so great that even if things had gone well with them, success in the field would almost certainly have revealed fatal differences between them. Both were fighting generals who had won enduring reputations during the Boer War. The name of de Wet was, of course, far better known outside South Africa,



THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN SOUTH AFRICA.
General Botha leaving his special "saloon" on his way to the front.




THE TROOP TRAIN.

Officers of the Union Forces travelling in shallow open trucks on their way to the Front.

but in their own country and among their own people the military capacity of Beyers was rated as high as, if not higher than, that of his more famous colleague. Beyers was young, brave beyond the ordinary bravery of the Boer, endowed with the stark courage that burns like a flame among the more clouded spirits of normal men. During the last desperate days of the Boer resistance to the armies of Great Britain he had done great deeds in the Eastern Transvaal. He and Louis Botha, alone among the Boer leaders, had shown some grasp of the deep principles of strategy and had proved their ability to direct with success a composite force in the field. Beyers's handling of his guns through a long and arduous campaign had given him, indeed, some title to be regarded as the most able military leader that the younger Boers had produced during the Anglo-Boer War. He had, too, the reputation of a chivalrous and merciful foe. In person he was tall, straight, black-bearded, with a keen eye and all the bearing of the born soldier. His religion was a deep and ardent passion—narrow as such fervent convictions are apt to be, yet commanding respect and admiration by its very sincerity of conviction. Endowed with all these

qualities, Beyers stood out among the Boers of South Africa, till the day of trial came and found him wanting, as a singular, romantic and almost heroic figure. As Speaker of the Transvaal Parliament during the days of responsible government he had shown a sense of justice and fair-play towards political opponents which had raised him high in their estimation. When the South African Parliament met the Transvaal Unionists joined with Botha in urging Beyers's claims to the Speakership. But Mr. Merriman, who had been Prime Minister of the Cape till the day of Union, but had been passed over by the Governor-General in favour of Botha when the time came to call on someone to form the first South African Ministry, had also a candidate for the Speakership. The Cape was the Mother Colony of South Africa. Its representatives in the South African Parliament were inclined to think that one of its men should have been the first Prime Minister of the Union. They backed Mr. Merriman in his demand that his nominee should be made Speaker. Botha gave way and Beyers lost the post. There is some reason to think that he never forgave Botha and Smuts for this defection. They tried to soothe his



THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND HIS WIFE.

General and Mrs. Botha at a Railway station in German South-West Africa.

feelings by making him Commandant-General of the Active Citizen Force when they passed the Defence Act in the session of 1912. But those who had known Beyers from boyhood had always declared that vanity was his weakness, and the vain man does not easily forgive a wound to his self-esteem, nor can subsequent favours quite eradicate its smart. So, probably, it was with Beyers. If Botha had had his way and Beyers had been made the first Speaker of the South African Parliament, there might have been no rebellion, at least in the Transvaal, where Beyers was the outstanding leader.

The ease of de Wet was very different. He had none of the superficial attractions of Beyers. Rugged, uncultivated, almost totally unlettered, he owed his reputation to a natural gift of handling men by the most forceful methods of the guerilla leader. Several times during the Boer War the savage that lurked under his homely exterior of a Dutch farmer revealed itself. He treated prisoners with brutal ferocity, ill-used and bullied his own men, showed no mercy when mercy could not have injured his cause and would have done honour to himself. Like Beyers in the Transvaal, de Wet in

the Free State came with credit through the days of responsible government. As Minister of Agriculture he presided over a department whose energy and efficiency was an example to the rest of South Africa. It employed experts who knew the country and its needs. Their methods were backed by de Wet with all the force of a character as strong as it was simple, and with a loyalty that never wavered. When Union came, he retired to his farm and took no more part in public life, refusing the preferment from the State that must have been his if he had cared for it. There was little more heard of him till the day when he burst out of his retirement, just after Hertzog's expulsion from the Botha Ministry, to make the violent speech at Pretoria which has already been mentioned.

The other two chief leaders, Kemp and Maritz, had no position in South Africa like that of Beyers and de Wet. Kemp was known as an efficient soldier. He had been de la Rey's chief lieutenant during the Boer War throughout the operations in the Western Transvaal, but he was overshadowed by the merited distinction of his leader. Since the war, he had done nothing to single himself out, though when the Defence Force was organized in the

Transvaal he was appointed a Major. He appears to have been in command of a training camp at Potchefstroom in the Western Transvaal just before the rebellion began. Maritz had had a variegated career. He had given some proofs of a natural aptitude for leadership during the Boer War. When peace was made, he tried his fortune first in Madagascar and afterwards in German South-West Africa, where he made himself useful to the Germans in the Herrero campaign. He then returned to the Orange Free State, entered the Union Police, and when the Defence Force was formed was given a commission in it, going through a course of training at the Military College at Bloemfontein in 1912. Early in 1913 he was appointed to command Military District No. 12, which included the north-western districts of the Cape Province. At the beginning of August, 1914, he became Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the South African border between the Union and German South-West Africa, with headquarters at the little town of Upington. Promotion was rapid in South Africa in those days. The Defence Force was being organized, and old soldiers who had shown capacity during the Boer War were naturally given preference when selections for the higher posts were made. But the rise of Maritz was meteoric even for South Africa. His appointment to the command of the frontier districts marching with German territory was due to the "repeated and urgent demands" of Beyers, who was Commandant-General of the Citizen Forces.


Beyers's anxiety to have Maritz as Commander of the Border must have warned General Smuts, who was Minister of Defence, that something sinister was in the wind. Maritz was known to have friends in German South-West Africa. No doubt his experience in that country was the ostensible reason for Beyers's demand. Smuts, we may be sure, had his doubts, but it was obviously difficult for him to reject the nominee of the Commandant-General on such a point. The post to which Maritz was thus appointed was very important. War had just broken out in Europe and the South African Government had at once offered to release the garrison of Imperial troops in the Dominion for service elsewhere. On August 7 the Imperial Government telegraphed to the South African Government that if they desired and felt themselves able "to seize such parts of German South-West Africa as would give

them the command of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior, we should feel that this was a great and urgent Imperial service." On August 9 the Imperial Government sent another telegram to the South African Government saying that they regarded the capture of the wireless stations at Swakopmund and Luderitzbucht as necessary and urgent; that this could "only be effected in reasonable time by a joint naval and military expedition up the coast"; and that the capture of the German long-distance wireless station at Windhuk, which was "of great importance," might follow another expedition against the coast stations, or might be carried out independently from the interior. On August 10 General Botha replied by telegram that he and his colleagues had given careful consideration to these proposals and that they cordially agreed "to cooperate with the Imperial Government and to assist in sending an expedition for the purpose indicated, the naval part to be undertaken by the Imperial authorities and the military operations to be undertaken by the Union (South African) Government." *

It was not till September 9 that General Botha announced the intention of the South African Government to undertake this expedition. It had then to be submitted to a special session of the South African Parliament, where it was bitterly denounced by the Hertzog party, but approved by a large majority. But General Beyers must have been consulted by the Government as soon as the telegram of August 7 from the Imperial Government was received. He was Commandant-General and the natural adviser of the Cabinet on a military question of this importance. Maritz was appointed to command the Border "early in August." It would be interesting to know whether Beyers, when he insisted on the appointment, knew of his Government's intention to invade German South-West Africa.

Whether he did or not, the evidence that Beyers and Maritz were in collusion with the Germans and seized on the outbreak of war as the long-looked-for opportunity of making a bid for independence, of breaking the power of Botha, and of installing themselves as the rulers of a South African Republic, is very strong.

* These telegrams were published in an Imperial White Paper [Cd. 7873] giving a Return of Correspondence laid upon the Table of the South African House of Assembly on March 11, 1915.



MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Against Maritz it is quite conclusive. Against Beyers it is not, and in his case there is just a possibility that it was really his objection to the German South-West expedition that drove him into rebellion. Dead, he may be given the benefit of the doubt, but the doubt is very slender. However that may be, nothing can excuse or palliate the way in which he went about his preparations. As Commandant-General he must have been in the most intimate confidence of the Government. He had been for years a close political associate, a near personal friend, of Botha and Smuts. Conspirators are doomed to have dirty hands. If they succeed there are always plenty of sycophants ready to lick them till they look clean. But the treachery of Beyers was peculiarly black. He held to his confidential and important post till the last moment. Then, when everything seemed ready for the rising, at the very last moment as he thought, he launched his resignation at the head of his old colleagues in the form of a political manifesto published broadcast in the Press.

The first step, then, towards the rising was the appointment of Maritz, at the instance of Beyers, to the command of the German border very soon after war had broken out in Europe. It would naturally be his first task to prepare

the invasion of German territory from the south-east. Beyers had different plans for him. The evidence all goes to show that the rising had been concerted before war broke out. On August 11 Maritz was in Pretoria, where he saw Beyers. It should be remembered that before he was appointed to the general command of the border, Maritz had been since the beginning of 1913 in command of Military District No. 12, comprising the magisterial districts of the Cape which adjoin German territory. Probably he had been in treasonable communication with the Germans, and came to Pretoria on August 11, just after his appointment to the general command, with offers of German aid to show to Beyers and the other conspirators. At the moment when he was on his way to Pretoria one Joubert—his intimate personal friend—who had been in German South-West Africa during July, had just returned to South African territory. At the earliest possible moment Maritz, hurrying back from Pretoria to the German border, sent several telegrams to Joubert, evidently desperately anxious to get into touch with him. They met immediately and Joubert was appointed Staff-Captain by Maritz. Joubert was soon afterwards sent to Pretoria, where he reported to Botha and Smuts, and also saw Beyers. Maritz himself, hearing that there had been a collision between the Germans and some Dutch South-African farmers at Schuit Drift on the Orange River, the southern boundary of German South-West Africa, hastened there, first sending a telegram to Beyers, on August 21, informing him that he



BREAK-UP OF THE REVOLT.

South African Mounted Rifles behind barricades. Inset: A rest in the open.




CHASING DE WET.

The Motor-car Contingent passing through Vryburg.

was leaving by motor to prevent difficulties. Reaching Schuit Drift, one of the few practicable fords over the Orange River, Maritz crossed into German territory and talked on the telephone to the Officer Commanding the German forces at Warmbad. On his return he spoke publicly with great indignation about the conduct of the Dutch farmers who had fired on the Germans, and declared that they ought to be shot. Within a few days German patrols had crossed the river at Schuit Drift and were searching for these farmers on South African territory. Meanwhile the Germans had also set foot on South African soil at Nakab, a police post on the South African frontier about eighteen miles north of the point on the Orange River where the boundary between German and South African territory strikes the river from the north. This was on or about August 19.

Within a week of the beginning of war with Germany in Europe, therefore, the position in South Africa was exceedingly grave. The Commander of the Union Forces on the border was in league with the Germans. The Commandant-General, or Commander-in-Chief, of the South African Army was disaffected, if not altogether, at least as far as the question of active hostilities against the neighbouring German Colony went. And the South African Government had already committed itself to such hostilities. But this was not all. In

various parts of the Union there were mutterings of discontent and disaffection. In the Western Transvaal particularly the look of things was serious. Here there was a "seer," or prophet, named Van Rensburg, who had attained a position of considerable influence. The tale of his visions and prophecies throws an extraordinary light on the character of the Dutch people of those parts. His reputation rested on a vision correctly foretelling events that preceded the Peace of Vereeniging which ended the Boer War. Another vision had shown him the number 15 on a dark cloud with blood issuing from it and General de la Rey returning home without his hat, followed by a carriage covered with flowers. This vision was widely known in the Western Transvaal, where de la Rey was the hero of the people. He was called, in fact, the "uncrowned King" of the Western Transvaal. When war broke out, it was recalled and discussed. The plotters against the Government determined to make use of it. A great meeting of burghers was summoned, to take place at Treurfontein on August 15, the day of the first month of war that bore the number seen by Van Rensburg in his vision. Information came to the Government from many quarters that this meeting was designed to begin a rising. It was to be addressed by de la Rey. On August 15 the meeting was held. About 800 burghers rode in to attend it. De la Rey spoke to them, but



SLEIGHING OVER THE SAND.—A Transport of the Rand Rifles.

he had had an interview with Botha some days before. He exhorted them to remain cool and calm, and to await events. "A strange and unusual silence" fell on the burghers as he finished. They passed without dissentient voice a resolution expressing complete confidence in the Government. Then they dispersed to their farms. The voice of their leader had spoken. They obeyed.

The first concerted plan of rebellion thus came to nothing. Beyers remained in chief command of the South African forces. Maritz was busy on the German border intriguing with the enemy. Meanwhile, in Europe, all went in favour of the Germans, whose armies were pouring in an unending stream, with an unexampled efficiency of equipment and transport, to the overthrow of Belgium and the advance on Paris. Visions still played before the eyes of Van Rensburg. He saw the English leaving the Transvaal and moving down towards Natal. "When they had gone far away, a vulture flew away from among them and returned to the Boers and settled down to remain with them. That was Botha. As for Smuts, he would flee to England. There was no hope that he would see South Africa again."* The value set by the conspirators upon these hallucinations of a disordered and fanatic brain is shown by their devotion to the number 15. August 15 had proved useless for their ends. They determined to make their next attempt on September 15. The date was favourable for them. The Citizen Forces in the Western Transvaal would be gathered for training at Potchefstroom under the command of Kemp. They might be induced to rebel, would undoubtedly rebel, if de la Rey could be persuaded to lead them. And Botha and Smuts would be in Cape Town at the special session of Parliament which was to discuss the expedition against German South-West Africa.

Again their plans failed. This time there intervened a tragedy so fortuitous that they might well have seen in it the hand of Providence raised against them. As the appointed day drew near, the camp at Potchefstroom seethed with rumours. Kemp, in command; Kock, the Lieutenant-Colonel of "A" Squadron, had prepared everything for the rising. Kock actually addressed his men and told them that he would not obey Government orders to march

* South African Blue Book (U. 9, Nos. 10-15) p. 16.

against German South-West Africa. Kemp and Beyers both prepared their resignations. Everything depended on de la Rey. As a Senator of the South African Parliament he had gone to Cape Town to attend the special session. He was to start from Cape Town on his way back to the Transvaal on September 14. There are two alternative routes. That through Kimberley would have brought him to Potchefstroom on the 15th. He was expected to take it. He took, however, the other route through the Free State and reached Johannesburg on the 15th. That evening Kemp at Potchefstroom was noticed to be in a fever of anxiety. Beyers at Pretoria must have been no less anxious. On the morning of the 15th Joubert arrived at Pretoria from Upington, where Maritz awaited the signal to join hands with the Germans. He brought a message which told Beyers that "all arrangements had been made and all was ready." Beyers sent him to Johannesburg in a motor-car to fetch de la Rey. There was still time to reach Potchefstroom that night. Kemp's resignation had been received at the Headquarters' Office. As soon as Joubert had gone Beyers summoned his Staff, and announced his resignation. He had already handed to the Press the manifesto in which he made it public. The motor-car returned from Johannesburg with de la Rey, who was evidently then persuaded to go to Potchefstroom that evening with Beyers. Their way lay through Johannesburg. The roads leading into the town were guarded by armed police on the look-out for a motor-car in which a gang of criminals had escaped. Beyers's car was summoned to stop. The chauffeur took no notice and drove on. The patrol fired on the car. De la Rey, shot in the back, died instantaneously. At Potchefstroom that night the officer who shared Koek's tent woke to see Kemp leaning over Koek's bed and whispering something in his ear. "Koek, in a profoundly startled voice, exclaimed, 'Oh, God!' Kemp left immediately, and Koek then whispered to his friend, 'General de la Rey is dood geskiet' ('General de la Rey has been shot dead.')" * September 15, like August 15, had failed the conspirators. But the vision in which the prophet Van Rensburg had seen de la Rey returning home without his hat—a carriage covered with flowers following him, and overhead the

number 15 stamped upon a cloud that dripped blood—had come tragically true.

With de la Rey dead, the plot drifted into a disorganization that made failure almost certain. Beyers and Kemp had burned their boats by resigning from their posts in the Defence Force. Kemp hurried to Pretoria to try to withdraw his resignation, and failed. Beyers had other things to think about. There is no doubt that when his car was summoned to stop outside Johannesburg he thought that he was trapped. When he found the whole affair an accident, he still had to explain a good many awkward circumstances. The extremity reduced him to a very abject figure. At de la Rey's funeral, with a Bible in his hand, he passionately declared that rebellion was far from his thoughts, and called the spirit of de la Rey to witness to the truth of this pitiful lie. That was on September 20. The next day a meeting of about 800 burghers was held at Lichtenburg. Kemp presided, and Beyers and de Wet were both present. The flag of the Orange Free State Republic was unfurled by one of the audience, but Beyers told him that "we don't want any of this nonsense here." De Wet also declared that they wanted to act constitutionally. The truth was that de la Rey's death had deprived them of the one man who could have raised the whole of the Western Transvaal against Botha, and that, with Beyers no longer at the Defence Headquarters in Pretoria, they had no means of co-ordinating their plans in different parts of the country. So long as Beyers was Commandant-General the telegraph could be used at the expense of the Government; no one could question the meaning of messages that came to or went from him: and he could keep his finger on the pulse of the whole movement. Now all that was done with. The mere distances between Beyers in Pretoria, Kemp in the Western Transvaal, de Wet in the Free State, and Maritz on the German frontier, made real combination impossible. And no doubt by this time the telegraph was closely watched.

Beyers's resignation manifesto left, indeed, little doubt of what his intention had been when he sent it broadcast. It affirmed that "by far the great majority of the Dutch-speaking people of the Union" disapproved of the expedition against German South-West Africa. It raked up bitter memories of the Boer War. It insinuated that the Botha Ministry had been bought by the Imperial Government at the

* South African Blue Book, p. 18.



COMMANDO OF LOYAL BURGHERS.
Returning to Pretoria after rounding up the rebels.

price of a loan of £7,000,000. It cited the authority of Maritz for the statement that the Germans had not invaded South African territory. And almost its last words were the question, "Who can foretell where the fire the Government has decided to light shall end?" If Beyers had not intended to rebel the same night as his manifesto was published he would hardly have asked that question. The reply of General Smuts is well known. Its tone was one of supreme contempt for a man who could have descended to such ignoble depths of treachery as Beyers had reached. It reminded Beyers that only the freedom granted by Great Britain to South Africa enabled him "to write with impunity a letter for which you would, without doubt, be liable in the German Empire to the extreme penalty." To Beyers's phrases about duty and honour it supplied the crushing retort that "the people of South Africa will . . . have a clearer conception of duty and honour than is to be deduced from your letter and action. For the Dutch-speaking people in particular I cannot conceive anything more fatal and humiliating than a policy of lip loyalty in fair weather and a policy of neutrality and pro-German sentiment in days of storm and stress."

Meanwhile, on the German frontier, events were hurrying Maritz into open rebellion. Within a few days of Beyers's resignation a

telegram was sent from Headquarters, where Smuts had now taken the reins, to Maritz at Upington, asking him to send a small force to Schuit Drift, and himself to move towards the German border in cooperation with Colonel Lakin, who, in command of a column, had orders to invade German territory, and to try to capture Warmbad. Maritz's reply showed how little he could be trusted. He advised the Government to abandon the expedition, declared that his force was quite unfit to take the offensive against the Germans, and expressed his willingness to "do my best to support you *on this side of the frontier*." Maritz ended his telegram, sent on September 25, by saying that "if there are further plans to attack German South-West Africa under these conditions, I shall be glad if my resignation is accepted." An emissary from Smuts went on the instant to Upington. He reached it on September 27, and found a most serious state of affairs. Maritz was in constant communication with the Germans. The force under his command, about 1,600 men, had been corrupted and was not to be trusted. Smuts hastily moved all the troops he could lay his hands on towards Upington, and, as soon as they were gathered, placed them under the command of Colonel Brits, who was instructed to move on Upington, and if possible, to arrest Maritz. In the meantime Maritz had twice been in-

structed by telegram to report himself at Pretoria, and had twice refused.

Brits arrived at Upington on October 7. He did not find Maritz there. On October 2 Maritz had moved towards the German border, concentrating all the forces under his command at Van Rooisvlei, about 25 miles west of Upington. On October 6, taking Joubert with him, he crossed the border and had a consultation with the Germans. On October 9 he assembled and made a speech to his command. Sixty loyal officers and men were taken prisoners and handed over to the Germans. The rest agreed to rebel, and elected him as their leader. Major Bouver, sent by Colonel Brits to summon Maritz to surrender his command, was put under arrest. He was released, however, and sent back to Colonel Brits with an ultimatum in which Maritz declared that unless he was allowed to meet Hertzog, Beyers, and de Wet, and was otherwise advised by them, he was determined to fight to the bitter end. In this ultimatum Maritz also boasted that he would overrun the whole of South Africa, and that the Germans had supplied him with 100 guns and unlimited quantities of small arms, ammunition, and money. Major Bouver, when he reached Colonel Brits, reported that he had found the Dutch republican flag flying over Maritz's camp, and that Maritz had shown him numbers of telegrams and heliograph messages from the Germans which showed that Maritz had been in frequent communication with them at least since September 10. These facts were communicated to the public of South Africa in a statement issued by the Government on October 12. On the same day martial law was proclaimed throughout the Union.

The measures taken by the Government to deal with this outbreak were both prompt and effective. The situation was difficult. Maritz's force had been intended to cooperate with other South African columns in the invasion of German territory from the south-east. Its defection disorganized the whole plan of campaign. More, unless the counter-stroke was rapid and effective, it left the north-western districts of the Cape Province open to invasion by a combined force of rebels and Germans. The test brought out the great ability of Smuts as an organizer of victory in the field. The force rapidly concentrated and placed under the command of Colonel Brits attacked

Maritz within ten days of his open rebellion. As early as October 15 Colonel Brits was able to report that he had engaged Maritz's commando at Rattedraai, ten miles south of Upington on the road to Kenhardt. After a brief fight the rebels were driven off, leaving 70 prisoners in the hands of the Loyalist forces. This first success was followed up with great energy. Within a few days Maritz found that when he relied on German help he leant on a reed that broke and pierced his hand. On October 26 Colonel Brits met him at Kakamas, which had been evacuated by its small garrison as Maritz approached. There the decisive engagement took place. Maritz was completely defeated; his force broken into fugitive bands that scattered in all directions through the barren and waterless veld; himself wounded and forced to take flight over the German border. Three days later Colonel Brits could report that he had defeated a remnant of the rebels at Schuit Drift, and that the rebellion in the north-west of the Cape Province was completely broken, so much so that he handed over the command of the Loyalist troops in that region to Colonel Royston, and returned to the Transvaal, where more important work in the field awaited him.

For in the 20 days that it had taken the Government to smash Maritz, a far more serious outbreak had taken place at the very heart of the Union. General Botha's reply to the resignation of Beyers was to announce that he himself would take command of the South African forces, and would personally direct operations in the field against the neighbouring German colony. This bold and decisive step, characteristic of the man who took it, must be ranked in its effects among the most important events in the history of South Africa after the Peace of Vereeniging. Botha, when he decided to lead the King's forces in the field, must have foreseen, if he did not know for certain, that the first enemy whom he would have to meet would be, not the Germans, but Beyers and de Wet and Kemp—men who had been his fellow-generals in arms against Great Britain only 12 years before. With what anxiety, with what heart-searchings, must he have weighed and balanced a crisis that demanded of him so supreme a personal sacrifice. From the standpoint of his own advantage it must have seemed to him that he had everything to

lose—nothing to gain. His reputation as a military commander of far more than local distinction had been won for all time in the Boer War. It was secure so long as he did not put it to the test again. And Beyers, de Wet, and Kemp were the three men yet living who, after himself, had proved themselves in the Boer War the best leaders of fighting men among his people. He might well have shrunk from such a test. The years that had passed over his head since peace had been made at Vereeniging in May, 1902, had been exacting years. They had notoriously taken a heavy toll of his strength and health. The work of Prime Minister of South Africa, head of a Dutch Government under the British Crown at a moment when many of the Dutch throughout South Africa were on the brink of rebellion, was heavy enough for any ordinary man. No one could have thought of blaming him if he had been content with that burden. He was not content. It took him exactly seven days to make up his mind. Beyers had resigned on September 15. On September 22 it was announced that General Botha would take personal command of the South African forces. It will never be easy for the people of Great Britain to recognize the full extent of the obligation laid upon the Empire by General

Botha when he made that decision. Such an obligation can never be discharged. But it is the welcome task of the historian to set it at its true value.

Coming two days after the funeral of de la Rey, this announcement of General Botha's determination to take the field must have made the rebel leaders in the Transvaal and the Free State realize that their task would be formidable. The prestige of Botha rallied many waverers among the Dutch and brought the whole British population of the Union to a fervour of enthusiastic support of the Government. The rebel leaders redoubled their intrigues. They shamelessly spread a rumour that de la Rey had been shot, not accidentally from behind, but in front—the victim of deliberate assassination committed on Government orders. Still proclaiming their loyalty, they busily organized in the Transvaal and the Free State meetings of protest against the German expedition. Botha, well aware of their real designs, replied by a speech to a great meeting at Bank, in the Transvaal, on September 29, when he emphasized the fact that only volunteer troops would be used in the expedition, and that no one would be forced to go. Nevertheless, the campaign of slander and thinly-veiled sedition grew throughout the Free



INSPECTION OF TROOPS AT THE CAPE.



GENERAL DE WET'S BROTHER GIVES INFORMATION TO COLONEL COEN BRITS.

General de Wet's brother, Piet, seen on the right, is a Loyalist. The white armband distinguishing a Loyalist soldier may be seen on the Colonel.

State and the Western Transvaal. The news of the rebellion of Maritz on October 9 reached Kemp and Beyers on October 12. Already it was freely rumoured in many districts that rebellion would break out immediately. The leaders hardly held their followers in. A meeting of the chief conspirators took place at Kopjes, in the Free State, on October 13. It was adjourned. The next day Beyers and de Wet met in Pretoria and concerted their final plans. When the news of Maritz's rising reached the Government, all the District Commandants were ordered to collect their men for the defence of the Union. The district of Lichtenburg was responsible for 300 men. It

had throughout been a centre of sedition. Here de la Rey had been buried, and here the Republican flag had been displayed at the meeting that was held the day after the funeral. Of these 300 men, 150 suddenly refused to obey orders on October 19. They rode off, taking with them the horses and rifles and other Government property with which they had been equipped. On the same day Beyers left Pretoria and disappeared. He had made no reply to urgent requests from the Government that he should go to Maritz and persuade him to surrender without more bloodshed. Three days later the Government knew that Beyers was at Damhock in the Transvaal, with a



WHERE DE WET'S FORCES WERE SCATTERED.

General Botha (on left) and staff at Mushroom Valley, where the rebel forces were completely defeated and routed.

rebel commando. From there he sent a message to the other leaders, who met again at Kopjes on October 22. "Here," he told them "everything is ready, and the burghers practically under arms." The meeting resolved that:

Whereas the Dutch South African people in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal are oppressed, the meeting resolves to confide all further measures to General Beyers in the Transvaal and to General de Wet in the Orange Free State.

Kemp was at that meeting, and de Wet and other subordinate leaders from both the Transvaal and the Free State. The next day the rebellion broke out in the Free State; the day after in the Transvaal. On the evening of October 23 a rebel force occupied Heilbron, in the Free State. On October 24 Reitz was threatened, and a train stopped which contained volunteer recruits for the South African forces. They were deprived of their rifles and ammunition. That same day other trains were stopped at Treurfontein, in the Transvaal, and men and war material were commandeered "by order of Commandant-General C. Beyers."

The energies of the Government were now directed towards two ends. They had first to ensure sufficient forces to dispose of Beyers and de Wet in the field. But they had also to use every endeavour to avoid bloodshed if that was possible. They were not lacking to either need. General Botha had already appealed to ex-President Steyn and to Hertzog to make public declarations condemning the rebellion

of Maritz. From Hertzog this had met with no response. Nor had Steyn thought fit to declare himself publicly. When Botha heard of Maritz's treason on October 11 he at once sent a telegram to Steyn informing him of the facts, telling him that the Government intended to proclaim martial law, and concluding, "You, of course, know the seriousness of the affair. A word from you will go far." Steyn replied by letter (October 12), saying that his health was bad, his position difficult, his personal disapproval of the expedition against German South-West Africa strong. In these circumstances he found himself unable to make any public pronouncement without including in it a statement as to his disagreement with the Government on the question of the expedition. He also used a phrase implying that the rebellion of Maritz was caused by the policy of the Government in undertaking the expedition. Botha's reply (October 13) disposed effectively of this implication. "There is no connexion," he wrote, "between the decision of Parliament (approving of the expedition) and this act of treason. I possess the proofs that long before the resolve of the Government became known, in fact long before that resolve was come to, a plot was already on foot, a plot with which Maritz and others with him were closely associated. . . . The cause of this treason is nothing but the outbreak of the war with Germany and the deplorable and fatal idea of the present traitors that now that the British Empire finds itself in difficulties the time has

come to recover our freedom by making common cause with the Germans across our border. It is an abominable thing that Maritz has done."

Botha made in the same letter, in words full of deep feeling, another appeal to Steyn to say the word that might save numbers of the Dutch from being led away into rebellion:

The misery and the sorrow that may come upon our people in consequence of this action are so awful that in my opinion it is the sacred duty of every man of influence in our country to do everything in his power to keep those consequences within as narrow limits as possible. There is no one, President, who could speak a word with greater effect than you. . . . I would address an earnest appeal to you who stand above political parties and interests—speak a word to warn our people against treason, against the everlasting stain that anything of the kind would be upon our national honour, and against the incalculably fatal consequences.

Steyn made no response, and the word for which Botha asked remained unspoken. But on October 22 Botha wrote again, telling Steyn that the Government had unquestionable information that de Wet, Beyers, and Kemp were on the brink of rebellion:

I consider it imperative that you should without delay, through your son Colin and other reliable men, dispatch a letter to de Wet, Beyers, and Kemp, and either summon them to meet you or in some other way turn them from the path of destruction where they now stand. If they come to you the Government will take no steps to arrest them, and will provide every facility for your messengers.

Do your best, President, to save our people from this reproach, this indelible dishonour. The position is more serious than words can describe.

What you do must be done at once: an outbreak may now be expected any day.


Then, at last, Steyn was moved to action, though his reply to Botha still kept the ungracious tone of a sick man disturbed in his brooding over bodily ailments. It questioned, also, the accuracy of the Government's information about de Wet's treasonable intentions. But it announced Steyn's intention to summon Beyers, Kemp, and de Wet to come to Onze Rust (Steyn's farm near Bloemfontein).

Colin Steyn was accordingly dispatched with the letter. He went on October 24 to Damhoek, where Beyers lay at the head of a rebel commando. He returned to Pretoria that night, and reported that Beyers would not go to see Steyn until he knew that de Wet was going too. A telegram had been sent during the day to de Wet, telling him that Colin Steyn had a letter for him from Steyn, and asking him to leave word with a mutual acquaintance at Vrede where he could be found. No reply had come from de Wet. Colin Steyn waited in Pretoria till October 26, and then went back to Bloemfontein to consult with his father. On October 28 he went with Hertzog to Heilbron, hoping to meet de Wet, but did not find him there. During the next



SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY.

General Botha and his staff.



AFTER THE CAPTURE OF DE WET.
The General knocks the ashes from his pipe as he leaves Vryburg. De Wet and the remnant of his following were afterwards conveyed to Johannesburg, where they were lodged in a fort.

three days Hertzog succeeded in meeting de Wet twice, on the second occasion in company with Colin Steyn, but failed to persuade him to go to Steyn. He reported, however, that the position was hopeful, and the commanders of the Government forces were ordered to take no hostile steps against de Wet, while a safe conduct was sent him to enable him to go to Steyn at Onze Rust. This was on the last day of October.

In the meantime there had been a collision between the Government forces under Botha and Beyers's Commando in the Transvaal, at a place called Commissie Drift, near Rustenburg. There is ample evidence to show that the Government had done its utmost to avoid active hostilities. On October 23 the Commissioner of Police was informed that General Smuts, the Minister of Defence, was most anxious to avoid bloodshed. On October 26 a public statement was issued that burghers, who had refused to obey the Government's summons to active service, need not fear any action against them so long as they remained quietly at home and abstained from acts of violence or hostility against the authority of the Government. Throughout the rebellion, indeed, the Government went to the furthest limits of moderation and self-restraint. The troops were ordered, for instance, not to fire upon rebel commandoes unless they fired first, an order which led directly to some loss of life among the Government men, and caused a good deal of murmuring by the loyalist population. Thus Colonel Alberts, a Dutch member of the South African Parliament, who had taken command of one of the columns which were being concentrated against the rebels, reported from Treurfontein on October 31 that there was a very strong feeling among the officers under his command against the policy of allowing rebels who were openly organizing to return freely to their homes on simply surrendering their arms and ammunition. General Smuts replied (October 31):

It is in the interests of the Government to put an end to the rising in the Western Transvaal as speedily as possible. Therefore we promise pardon to those who surrender immediately. If not, they will be punished as rebels.

These steps were taken after the collision at Commissie Drift. The earlier efforts made by the Government to end the rebellion without bloodshed evidently encouraged the rebel leaders in the Transvaal to believe that the Government would do nothing decisive by way

of armed force. Beyers and his colleagues were commandeering men on the pretended authority of the Government, were spreading reports that Botha and Smuts were really on their side, and would give way as soon as force was used, and were looting stores and breaking up railway and telegraph lines. So it became necessary to show that the Government was in earnest. On October 27, three days only after Beyers's men had committed the first hostile acts in the Transvaal, General Botha took the field against him, fell on his commando at Commissie Drift, and scattered it to the winds. Beyers himself escaped. For some days no one knew where he had gone.

In the Free State, while Steyn's emissaries were doing their best to induce de Wet to go to Onze Rust, and there listen to Steyn's advice, de Wet himself was giving full rein to his passionate resentment against the Government. On October 29 he came with a band of about 120 armed men to Vrede, a town of the Free State. There, while his men looted and pillaged, he delivered a violent speech in which he denounced "the miserable, pestilential English," the "ungodly policy of General Botha," and the German South-West Expedition—"a dastardly act of robbery." This was also the speech in which de Wet complained that he had been fined 5s. by a magistrate for flogging a native, and gave Smuts the opportunity of a biting retort on the subject of "the 5s. rebellion." The tenour of the whole utterance was a complaint that the Dutch were being oppressed by the English, that their language was boycotted, that their customs were trampled under foot, and that they did not receive their fair share of Government posts. Many have wondered that de Wet could make such a speech as a justification for his rebellion. They need not have been surprised. He spoke the ordinary jargon of Hertzogism, though with more violence and less subtlety than its exponents ordinarily affected. But then de Wet was no politician, and troubled himself little about those mental reservations and verbal quibbles which enabled Hertzog and his followers to take their seats, quite unabashed, in the South African Parliament after the rebellion was over, and to lay their hands upon their hearts and protest that rebellion had always been far from their thoughts.

To such heights of sophistry de Wet never aspired. He was one of the dupes, and when



MEN OF DE WET'S COMMANDO ON THEIR WAY TO PRISON.
The Commando, guarded by Mounted Infantry, marching through Vryburg.

the time came to put the doctrines of Hertzog to the practical test, he flung himself into rebellion with rugged enthusiasm. But he had, nevertheless, a kind of cunning of his own, and as the Government still held its hand, and the attempts of Steyn to get him to go to Onze Rust continued, with the countenance of Smuts and Botha, he made the best use of them to gain time. More than once he assured Colin Steyn that he would go to see ex-President Steyn. His officers all urged him to do so. But all the time, as his captured letter-books show, he was sending orders to the commandants of his detached columns directing the attacks on towns, telegraphs, and railways which they were making. Thus on November 4 the rebels blew up a railway bridge south of Kroonstad; on November 5 they blew up the Kroonstad-Natal line in two places; and on the same day a commando, under Conroy, blew up the railway bridge at Virginia. On November 6 a loyalist patrol was attacked by rebels south of Kroonstad. And on November 8 a sharp engagement took place between some of de Wet's men and a small commando under Commandant Cronje. In this action the loyalists suffered a reverse, which cost them several men. It convinced the Government at last that de Wet would have to be dealt with by means of armed force, and closed the last avenue to a bloodless settlement through the mediation of Steyn.

In the Transvaal the rebellion had already been brought to the issue of arms. After his reverse at Commissie Drift on October 27, Beyers was believed by Smuts to have retired to the fastnesses of the hill country north of Rustenburg. It was the only case during all these days of doubt and haste in which the intuition of Smuts proved to be at fault. Beyers's next appearance was at Kathosfontein, north-west of Wolmaranstad. There he had again collected a commando, and there a long interview took place between him and a Mr. Cecil Meintjes, who acted on behalf of the Government, on November 4. From this interview Mr. Meintjes returned charged by Beyers with a message defining the terms on which the rebels would lay down their arms. In this document Beyers offered to disband his force if the Government would use only volunteers against German South-West Africa, and would guarantee rebel officers and leaders against prosecution. Smuts's reply gave this guarantee and pointed out that the Government had



CAUGHT AT LAST.

General Christian de Wet (in centre) directly after his capture. He surrendered on December 1, 1914, at Waterburg, 110 miles west of Mafeking.

repeatedly pledged itself not to press men for service against German South-West Africa. But Beyers's request for terms was not sincere. By noon on November 5, before he could possibly have had any reply from the Government, he had marched 25 miles south, and was close to the railway line at Kingswood. Here the railway was guarded by Government troops. Beyers attacked them and broke through. His object was evidently to cross the Vaal into the Free State, and there join de Wet. But the Government troops were rapidly closing round him. On November 7 they attacked his camp, took it, and captured 350 of his men, more than a third of his whole force. Smuts, meanwhile, on November 6, had sent Beyers a safe conduct to go to Steyn. Defeated and in flight, Beyers determined to use it. He reached Bloemfontein in a motor-car with three companions. There he was arrested by a single armed scout riding a motor-bicycle. The Government might have repudiated the safe conduct, which Beyers had not attempted to use till he was a beaten and broken man. They recognised it, and allowed Beyers to go to Steyn.

He reached Onze Rust on November 10. Steyn immediately telegraphed to Smuts asking him to give Beyers a safe-conduct to go to de Wet. But the affair between de Wet's men and Cronje's commando had taken place meanwhile. On November 9 de Wet himself had entered Winburg, one of the largest towns in the Free State, and had behaved with brutal ferocity to the Mayor and other leading inhabitants. De Wet had had ample time to go to Onze Rust if he had desired peace. The patience of the Government was exhausted. Smuts refused to give Beyers another safe-conduct.

Botha now took the field against de Wet. On November 12 he met his main force at Mushroom Valley. The result of the engagement was the complete defeat and rout of the rebel forces. The Mayor of Winburg and a Senator of the South African Parliament, who had both been taken prisoners by de Wet, were rescued. De Wet himself escaped, but his power was broken. Thereupon he, like Beyers, suddenly became anxious to secure the mediation of Steyn. Again Smuts refused, pointing out to Steyn

that this might be merely another attempt to gain time, and that great dissatisfaction existed among the loyal burghers at the leniency of the Government, and telling him that "unconditional surrender on the basis of the Prime Minister's conditions is necessary, on the understanding that there is at present no intention to apply capital punishment in the case of the leaders." Meanwhile, de Wet was a fugitive before the Government forces. After Mushroom Valley he fled south, turned east, and then doubled due west; till on the night of Sunday, November 15, he reached the railway at Virginia. The next day, after a sharp action, he managed to break through the Government forces guarding the railway, and fled westwards, closely pursued by Government mounted troops, aided by a fleet of motor-cars. On November 22 he was cut off, and again turned back east. With only 25 men he attempted to cross the Vaal River into the Transvaal, but was driven back from the river. A second attempt was more successful. But realising at last that all was lost, he then turned straight west, evidently hoping to be able to make the German border. It was no use. The motor-cars that were in pursuit were too swift for his tired horses. On December 1, at Waterburg, 110 miles due west of Mafeking, his pursuers, having surrounded him while he slept, compelled him to surrender, with the small remnant of men that still clung to him. The officer to whom he gave himself up was Colonel Brits, who had dealt so successfully with Maritz six weeks before.

Beyers, since he had left Steyn's farm, had been vainly trying to join hands with de Wet. It says much for the fairness of the Government that, after he was refused a second safe-conduct by Smuts on November 10, he was allowed to make good his escape. Botha and Smuts might have drawn a cordon round Onze Rust, through which Beyers could never have broken. But they had recognised his safe-conduct, out-of-date though it was, and the

spirit of that recognition required that he should be unmolested if he chose to leave the shelter of Steyn's roof. So much law, in fact, was given him that he got clear away, and was not heard of for some days. Then he reappeared with a handful of men in the Free State. Reports about his being at various places kept coming in. On December 7 he was engaged, and again defeated, about 15 miles south of Bothaville. The pursuit pressed him on to the Vaal River—then running high and swollen with flood waters from the mountains. Beyers tried to swim his horse across, while the bullets swept the water all round him. No bullet touched him, but the stream was too swift for him. Hampered by a heavy coat, he was carried away and drowned. Two days later his body was recovered from the river.

The capture of de Wet and the death of Beyers really ended the rebellion, though scattered parties in the Free State held out for some time, and were only gradually brought to surrender. Kemp, who operated throughout on the extreme western border of the Transvaal, penetrated some way into the north-western districts of the Cape. On November 7 he attacked Kuruman, but was beaten off. The Government forces in pursuit brought him to action on November 16 at Klein Witzand, about 80 miles from Kuruman, but Kemp had occupied a strong position and compelled them to retire. Closely pursued by Government troops, he, nevertheless, managed to elude them, and finally disappeared westwards into the Kalahari Desert on November 25. About two months later, in company with Maritz, he reappeared, and invaded the north-western districts of the Cape. They attacked Upington on January 24, 1915, but were repulsed with heavy loss. After desultory fighting during the next few days, Kemp suddenly appeared at Kakamas with 43 officers and 486 men. All surrendered, voluntarily and without conditions, to the Government. The South African rebellion was at an end.

END OF VOLUME THREE.

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